Research Monograph

Urban Governance and Services in Ghana

Institutional, financial and functional constraints to effective service delivery

Cities Alliance
Cities Without Slums
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Introduction

This monograph follows on from the State of Art Paper, submitted to Cities Alliance in March 2016, which provided an overview of the main issues and debates related to the respective dimensions of urban governance and services with a focus on Sub Saharan Africa analysed in this monograph.

The monograph examines the empirical evidence related to the various dimensions of urban governance and services in Ghana and locates the evidence within a proposed theory of change that provides a potential pathway to more inclusive and resilient urban growth. In so doing, the monograph provides an insight into the causes and consequences of incomplete and unbalanced provisioning for basic services in Ghanaian cities, in particular, and Sub-Saharan Africa, more generally.

While the monograph highlights a number of promising practices in Ghana, it identifies many institutional, financial, technical and managerial constraints that limit the capacity of cities to deliver basic services and bring about more inclusive and resilient urban growth. These capacity constraints include incomplete policy implementation; weak political and administrative decentralization structures and systems; complex and centralized fiscal transfer frameworks; poor revenue mobilization; inadequate infrastructure financing mechanisms; structural and technical problems in planning and land-use management; weak operations and maintenance systems; poor contract management and regulation; and high degrees of political interference. These challenges, coupled with the pressures of urbanization in Ghana represent a threat to achieving more inclusive urban economic growth development.

Ghanaian society has undergone a tremendous change in the past two and a half decades since the advent of the Fourth Republic in 1992. The country’s estimated population of 26.4 million (2014) has experienced both rapid urbanization and a significant increase in GDP over this period. More significantly for our purposes, Ghanaian city populations are growing at a rate of 3.72 per cent a year. The country’s urban population is expected to increase in the future from about 52 per cent (2010) to 65 per cent by 2030 and by more than 70 per cent by 2040. Since 2010, Ghana has grown more quickly than the average among lower-middle-income countries. The macro-economic outlook for Ghana’s economy is brighter than in many other parts of Africa as the country continues to grow and attract investment, especially from China, but fiscal deficit continues to be unmanaged. Equally important is the forecast made through socio-economic indicators highlighting Ghana’s status as a low-income and food-deficient country.

These facts highlight increasing pressure on available resources and a call to examine the adequacy of prevalent infrastructure, services and policies to create inclusive growth and equitable service delivery. Regrettably, however, there is limited analysis and general understanding of the limitations of urban planning and governance in the face of rapid urbanization in Ghana, although understanding of these issues is central to managing urbanization sustainably and providing an urban management pathway that guarantees the realization of the benefits associated with urbanization (that is, modernization, industrialization and improved standard of living).
The pace of urbanization in Ghana, however, is neither uniform nor consistent across the country. A large share of the urban population is concentrated in big urban agglomerations like Accra and Kumasi. An overwhelming number of towns are concentrated in the administrative regions in Southern Ghana, whereas the Northern and Upper Regions of the country continue to be dominated by rural habitation. Similarly, there is a sharp contrast in urbanization patterns between the Greater Accra and Ashanti Regions and other regions of the country. This differential in urbanization has had implications for the quality, quantum and variety of services delivered.

Ghana’s urbanization, however, has been neither spectacular nor unique when compared to trends in developing countries. Ghana has progressed more slowly at all levels of urbanization than the global average. Similarly, whilst overall poverty has declined in the country, poverty rates have increased in the past eight years in urban areas and in coastal and forest regions, and its major cities are experiencing diminished access to basic services. Ghana recently fell two ranks in the World Bank’s assessment of ease of doing business, indicating pervasive barriers to local economic development stifling inclusive growth. More significantly, despite being one of the top gold exporters in the world, it retains only a fragment of the sector’s revenues, indicating huge tax rebates to mining corporations. Despite its rich mineral base, its human development rank is fairly low at 140 out of 188 countries assessed under the latest Human Development Report. Outside of the coastal regions, where urbanization is bringing economic benefits in terms of poverty reduction to both urban and rural areas, urbanization is characterized by “growing pains” and greater stress on the limited resources of the cities. Most new urban residents in Ghana can be found in slums or informal settlements characterized by insecure land tenure and poor-quality marginal land, with 56 per cent of inhabitants still without access to improved sanitation. Most of them work in the informal service sector, and nearly all are excluded from formal wage labour and housing. Work, when it can be secured, is generally in low-productivity but highly competitive personal services. Few services can be found in Ghana’s towns and cities that complement and support an expanding manufacturing sector.

Within this scenario, there is further evidence of the feminization of poverty. The Human Development Index rated Ghana as 127 out of 155 countries surveyed on its Gender Inequality Index (GII) in 2015. At the level of politics, there has been little done institutionally to make governance systems more representative. In Ghana, women hold only 10.9 per cent of parliamentary seats, less than half of the SSA average (22.5 per cent). At the district level, only 7 per cent of the elected members are women. In economic terms, female participation in the labour market is 67.3 per cent compared to 71.4 per cent for men, a slightly better ratio of women in employment than the SSA average (65.4 per cent to 76 per cent). However, women’s labour opportunities are limited, and they end up working in the informal sector. Women dominate in informal micro, small, and medium-scale agriculture, manufacturing and services sectors of the economy, yet in general women are generally poorer than men. And although women in Ghana are more likely than men to own business assets, the mean value of men’s business assets is much higher. Furthermore, women’s access to land and credit on average in the country is less than half of men’s. However, their chances to own or rent a house are equal or, in some towns and regions, even higher than that of men, especially in the urban areas.

Unless managed properly, urban growth can reduce the economic benefits of urban concentrations and increase costs and inequalities. The various dimensions of the country’s
institutional and policy frameworks on urban governance are having a marked impact on service delivery. Ghana’s decentralization policy framework and institutional structures operate through its 216 Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies (MMDAs). As chapters in this monograph will show, this local government system has emerged as a fused or mixed system combining elements of prefectoral-style rule of traditional district administration, responsible to central government, with elements of democratic authority over local service provision and taxation of devolved local government. A number of national policies have also been formulated in recent years that are anchored on the decentralization policy framework, such as the National Urban Policy Framework and Action Plan (2012). However, the lackadaisical implementation of decentralization reforms has undermined the ability of central and local governments to leverage these policies fully. In the absence of adequate civic infrastructure and reliable service delivery, evident in the urban squalor in many Ghanaian towns, citizen dissatisfaction continues to mount. This has implications for both business and growth. This delivery gap is often filled by private operators, resulting in an increase in cost of services to households. More important, where MMAs have been unable to provide direct basic services to their citizens, they have been less likely to perform any better with the responsibilities of regulating the provision and management of these services by other non-state actors such as the private sector.

Similarly, land delivery systems based on legal concepts and administrative systems have proved unable to cope with the demands of rapid urban growth in Ghana. This has impacted negatively on urban spatial morphology and has reduced the liveability and functionality of cities. Across rural Ghana, and to a surprisingly large degree across its urban areas, it remains a challenge to implement land legislation, and most resource users gain access to land based on local land tenure systems. Land tenure in Ghana differs from that of most other countries (including African countries) because of the constitutional endorsement of the control of land by customary authorities: Customary (private) and state/public land are thus the two basic legal categories of land ownership in Ghana. Private lands in most parts of the country are in communal ownership, in principle held in trust for the community or group by a stool or skin as a symbol of traditional authority, or by a family.

Urbanization is contributing to erosion of customary land, as land is being alienated for development and transferred to outsiders, although many land transactions still follow customary practices, and the receiver of land is expected to offer a token payment to the original owner. With growing land pressures in urban and peri-urban areas, token payments have increased in value, such that now they are nearly equal to the market rates. And, with land, housing and agriculture markets expanding, the trend is toward individualization of land rights. However, it is emerging that land administration by the state is no fairer than the activities of the chiefs, who often seize land without compensation. Efforts at land registration have proven too slow or too expensive for poor people to access. On the expanding urban periphery, there is little or no coordination among the different arms of government that are responsible for land registration and management of land titles and land-use planning, despite their close relationship or legislation to provide for this. To avoid poor and slow service, those seeking to register and title their land often must pay bribes.

Thus, despite steadily maintaining a democratic government for two decades after its foray into dictatorship, Ghana has yet to build strong, accountable and transparent institutions for these transactions. The issue of land management is closely linked to a weak history of empowered and
mature institutions for governance in the country. Fiscal and administrative decentralization in the country has been marred by a political tug-of-war between its two major parties, the National Democratic Congress (NDC) and the New Patriotic Party (NPP).

Urban service delivery to a growing populace has also suffered at the hands of poor financial devolution that has incapacitated governance. Local governments lack adequate funds to undertake priority capital investments for addressing infrastructure gaps in cities. This is true despite the presence of a number of important legislative acts and regulations (including Local Government Act [Act 462], District Assemblies Common Fund Act [Act 455], as well as the National Decentralization Policy and Action Plan) to strengthen fiscal decentralization in Ghana. Legislations and policies, such as on public financial management guidance, have been drafted from a very centralized perspective and do not address specific PFM issues at the local assembly level.

Local governments continue to be financially anaemic and functionally subdued as political determination of fund flows, delays in disbursement, lack of predictability of intergovernmental transfers, and poor internal revenues preclude the creation of a system that rewards improved performance. Specifically, the quantum of funds received by local governments under the DACF as an unconditional block grant allocation, as well as through performance-based grant funds (DDF and UDG), is grossly insufficient to meet the recurrent funding needs for effective O&M and the capital funding required to address a long-pending urban infrastructure gap. Whilst the total quantum of funds has increased over the years, the allocation principle and political imperative of creating ever-more MMDAs means that the resources are spread thinly across a larger number of MMDAs, which have multiplied from 170 to 216 in just 8 years.

In Ghana, performance-based grant funds are predominantly funded by international development partners with abysmally low contributions from the national government. This further dilutes local ownership and raises issues of sustainability of works in the overall context of decentralization. However, this infrastructure funding gap created by a shortage of funds from the centre has been filled by external financial assistance, especially through Chinese aid.

Unlike in other African countries, Chinese aid in Ghana has been targeted at transportation. Even here, it is major national transport infrastructure such as the railway network, port development and national highway links that has been targeted, with the only local roads to benefit being those in oil production areas. Road infrastructure investment tends to be skewed toward the main arteries – dualization and widening measures, including the construction of urban expressways, whilst failing to address the requirements of local access. In most big cities in Ghana, the transport environment is characterized by heavy congestion, weak traffic management, inadequate facilities for pedestrians and bicyclists, and poor road safety arrangements, leading to high accident rates. Being aware of these problems, and the inability of private players to address them, since early 2000s the government has tried to end the monopoly of private transporters through the establishment of Metro Mass Transit Limited (a PPP in 2003), and the Ghana Urban Transport Project (GUTP) in 2007 to reform public transport in big cities.

In response to the problems of urbanization, LED strategies are currently high on the agenda of the government. A determining and important cause of the current plight of many urban areas in Ghana is the lack of structural transformation characterizing the urban economies of the country, the
vast majority of which remain as “consumption cities.” Few services can be found in Ghana’s towns and cities that complement and support an expanding manufacturing sector. The response in Ghana to the lack of economic development in urban areas has been the adoption of an entrepreneurial approach in which the state (national and urban local governments) seeks to facilitate the growth of the private sector, especially domestic formal sector activities and foreign inward investment.

At the micro level, the transformative impact of small business on local development has remained largely untapped in Ghana in the absence of any institutionalized policy for their involvement, administrative reluctance for sharing development responsibilities (and consequently power), and resource constraints. Moreover, LED measures taken by individual local governments remain discrete and sporadic. For instance, the districts of Awutu-Efutu-Senya and Ajumako Enyan-Essiam created formal public-private forums to discuss strategies for benefiting the informal economy and reducing poverty with the help of the International Labour Organisation. These forums were considered unique in the LED practice in Ghana because they had some formal standing.

There are, however, few structured spaces for public-private dialogue within the framework of local governance in Ghana. Where they exist, they are often notional, with local governments preferring to continue working alone. This is one of the reasons why the LED plans of many district assemblies remain unimplemented. A lack of direction and ambition on part of the assemblies has ensured that, where international agencies are not involved, districts continue LED activities in the traditional vein of prioritizing downtown development, hard infrastructure, revenue for the district, and jobs. At a more granular level, evidence indicates that the way in which district assemblies are staffed and operated can impede the preparation and implementation of LED strategies. District officials are seconded; they are local civil servants “run” by the Ministry of Local Government with no clarity on the length of their tenure. This uncertainty and potential lack of identification with the city or town in which they are working underpins and promotes a rigidly bureaucratic way in which many approach their job.

Service delivery in Ghana faces a number of critical governance issues that resonate through SSA. Various institutions provide the services, with weak coordination among them, and along with the respective MMDAs have governed provision of utilities and services. In many instances, there are overlaps of institutional mandates, and the lack of capacity of the MMDAs has constrained their coordinating role. Political factors such as politically determined tariffs, political appointments in utility companies, corruption and informal practices have continued to affect the performance of service providers much to the detriment of consumers. A case in point is the water reform through privatization in Ghana. The Ghana Water Company Limited (GWCL), a government-owned water utility, has been responsible for the production, transmission and distribution of water in all urban areas since 2011. While GWCL has many highly qualified and competent professionals and well-established operations maintenance and management systems for water production, distribution, billing and revenue collection, most of the business processes are still manual, and staff motivation levels are low. At the same time, GWCL operations are based on inadequate and aging infrastructure, inadequate capital investment and a weak financial base. All this has meant that, despite the company reducing non-revenue water to 45 per cent (by 2014), there have been no obvious signs of improvement in operations to most customers, with water shortages continuing to be a common occurrence and a 10-
fold rise in the consumption of pre-packaged water. Similarly, waste management is a critical problem for cities throughout the country, exacerbated by the rapid increase in urban population and concomitant increases in the volume of waste generated, as well as changing consumption patterns that affect the composition of waste. Waste disposal is a major problem, with only three-four government engineering landfills, and the smaller districts having to take recourse to private landfills upon payment of fees. Processes for procurement are opaque, and districts operate with asymmetric information over their capital invested. Further, the absence of an integrated waste chain operator means that it is difficult for any stakeholder to realize sufficient economies of scale and to maintain sufficient control of the chain to maximize the potential from waste processing and recycling.

The monograph shows that the type of growth that continues to characterize urban areas in Ghana, and the attendant delivery of services, is not translating into structural change in the economy and inclusive development. For cities and towns in Ghana to become engines of growth, and the locus of inclusion and equality, they must be the sites of transformational change. The chapters will show how Ghana has settled into a pernicious equilibrium; commercial, political and social elites control a form of value extraction from the economy that both requires and then reinforces the non-inclusiveness of the economy, the uneven distribution of the fruits of the economy, and the relative powerlessness of many state institutions, and quasi-private entities, including district assemblies, to change society or the economy. This has been explained by the nature of the political settlement in Ghana, since the return to multiparty democracy in 1992, characterized by “competitive clientelism.” This has meant that ruling elite coalitions are not entrenched, but instead compete for electoral power against similar coalitions of clientelist networks organized as factional alliances. Therefore, each ruling coalition in Ghana is characterized by a high degree of vulnerability in power, leading to the politicization of public institutions and the allocation of public goods according to an electoral logic. The two dominant parties see the control of the state as the most lucrative avenue for group and individual wealth and influence facilitated in part by the excessive concentration of political power in the office of the President by the constitution. The economic impact of this practice of competitive clientelism in Ghana has been far-reaching. It has engendered institutions and practices that undermine meritocracy and administrative decentralization.
1. Analytical approach and method

This monograph sets out to explore the structure, form and capability of the various dimensions of urban governance in Ghana to identify the main drivers of change and transformation towards more inclusive and resilient growth. The analysis aims to identify the potential for change in the capability and quality of urban governance that will contribute to bringing about improvements in service delivery and lead to more inclusive and resilient growth. Urban governance is defined as a broader notion than urban government and concerns both the institution of government as well as the process through which decisions are made and implemented that affect city services and outcomes (see UN-HABITAT 2002). Hence our analysis examines the institutional and fiscal dimensions of urban governance as well as the functions of urban planning, land, transport, environmental services and local economic development.

The analysis of the urban governance structure, system and functions in contemporary Ghana is intended to shed light on the key issues and failings in urban governance and services and to understand the underlying causes of failure and the manner in which these influence and shape the system of urban governance. In so doing, the analysis draws on the emerging literature on transforming state capability to identify key urban governance problems around which a constituency for change may emerge as well as political settlement theory to understand the causes of failure, the nature of incentives and the possible scope for reform.

1.1. Isomorphic mimicry and organizational stress

Our analysis of urban governance is rooted in an emerging theory of change and transformation (see Pritchett et al., 2010) that challenges the notion that effective and sustainable reforms are the product of implanted best practices models and neoliberal modernizing theory. Pritchett et al. (2010) propose an alternative paradigm arising from their analysis of implementation capability in weak states. This paradigm is based on a critique of modernizing development discourse that propounds a common historical path culminating in convergent institutional forms. Instead, they demonstrate how actors and organizations in low-capability environments will tend to engage in the practice of isomorphic mimicry in an attempt to assume the appearance of adopting more sophisticated organizational forms that mask the reality of continued organizational dysfunction while outwardly appearing to engage in a reform process.

Pritchett et al. (2010) go on to demonstrate that the ensuing mismatch between the implementation requirements associated with an imposed organizational model and the actual implementation capacity of the prevailing administrative system leads to “premature load bearing” as organizations are asked to perform tasks that are too complex and burdensome too soon. This, in turn, leads to implementation failure and organizational stress reflecting a high level of divergence between the private interests of the agents within and around the organization and the public interest of the organization itself. More complex organizational forms simply exacerbate this stress, as operational complexity requires the application of greater levels of discretion that provide further opportunities for the pursuit of private rather than public interest. Different governance tasks create different organizational stresses that provide inducements to deviate from the organizational goal, depending on
the complexity of tasks and the gap between the agent’s private interests and the organization’s public interest.

Conventional responses to addressing the problem of low capability and organizational failure tend to focus on the design of new policies intended to address system-wide failure; programmes for capacity building to enhance skills and the expertise to address failure; creation of special-purpose structures and systems to implement policies insulated from the inefficiencies and influences of the wider organization; and increased financial and human resources to alleviate the inadequacy of finance and staffing. Such responses, either individually or in combination, often constitute the standard elements of a reform project or programme and, typically, represent the basis of new business cases made by donor agencies in seeking approval for new project interventions. The justification for addressing failure through enhanced new policies, coupled with capacity building and finance appears to be a logical set of prescriptions that underpin many donor and government reform interventions.

1.2. Problem-driven iterative adaptation

Such a formula is often presented as a system-wide reform rooted in an attractive modernizing agenda with wide developmental appeal. The limitations of this supposed panacea, however, are well articulated by Pritchett et al. (2010), who argue that imposed modernizing models and blueprints simply encourage the practice of isomorphic mimicry, which not only undermines the interventions but can also exacerbate existing failure as organizations assume greater load-bearing stress. Instead, Pritchett et al. (2010) point out that a better approach to addressing low levels of institutional or organizational capability would be to help create the conditions in which innovation can emerge and be replicated across different parts of the organization without imposing standard models and solutions Andrews (2013) further develops and refines this theory of change as problem-driven iterative adaptation, where successful reform is most often brought about in response to encountering a problem rather than a desire to impose a predefined solution. Problem-driven iterative adaptation encourages multiple actors to work together to address a problem based on a mix of internal ideas, external practices and influences. He goes on to argue that such an approach is more likely to succeed as it embodies awareness of the issue and a willingness and interest to overcome the problem in a context-specific manner.

Here, our analysis of the various dimensions of urban governance in Ghana is based on a systematic review of institutional, fiscal and functional policies, structures, systems and processes that characterize the operation of metropolitan and municipal governance. This review is intended to examine the current levels of institutional and organizational capability across the select dimensions of urban governance to highlight the main capability traps and problems. It draws from the wider literature and debates on the respective dimensions of urban governance to do the following:

- Locate the prevailing structures, systems and processes
- Evaluate their application and implementation
- Highlight key governance, operations and management capability issues
- Assess the main problems that appear to contribute to systemic failure
- Identify the potential entry points for change and policy implications.
1.3. Urban governance and service diagnostic

Our analysis also draws from another useful framework for the analysis of urban governance and services as presented by Boex et al. (2013) based on three main types of semi-structured review combining technical and financial analysis, policy and legal analysis and political economy to provide a synthesized tool for the diagnosis of urban governance and services.

1. **Technical and Financial Analysis (TFA):** This refers to an analysis of the technical package of solutions that seek to strengthen the human resource and financial capacities of local governments and service delivery agencies. This can be conducted at the level of organizations.

2. **Policy and Legal Analysis (PLA):** This captures the policy visions, strategies, legislations and regulations affecting the urban space. (Boex & Edwards 2014)

3. **Political Economy Analysis (PEA):** This is the component the literature has engaged more recently, emphasizing the political incentives and institutional structures. This can be applied to individual staffing the organizations as well as influential elites and groups. PEA involves the systematic identification of the interests, incentives and ideas that shape the behaviour of individuals and organizations. PEA is about understanding the dynamics that drive collective action and conflict.

1.4. Political economy and political settlements

Our review also draws from political economy analysis, which assumes political economy factors are just as important for urban service delivery as funding and technical capacity (Boex et al. 2013; Jones et al. 2014; Fritz et al. 2014) and where the politics of service delivery affects performance (Jones et al. 2014). Political economy analysis is designed to counter the core focus of much development writing on technical and managerial explanations for institutional and organizational failure. More recent emphasis on institutional analysis marks a recognition that institutions underpin markets and provide the framework within which the bureaucracy acts and political contestation plays out. However, it has become evident that adopting reforms based on technically sound institutional models and legal and regulatory frameworks is not sufficient to ensure effective institutions. Behind institutions lies politics; effective institutional (and policy) reform requires understanding political underpinnings and drivers that shape and influence how institutions develop and function and how decisions are made (Fritz et al. 2009).

Similarly, political settlement theory has become an important lens for analysing the politics of development in recent scholarship. A political settlement may be seen as an elite pact wherein the elites of a country negotiate the distribution of power and resources. Societies cannot develop amid conflict and unrest; however, the way each society resolves these conflicts creates powerful path dependencies for the way they subsequently develop. Political settlement theory is about understanding “the formal and informal processes, agreements, and practices that help consolidate politics, rather than violence, as a means for dealing with disagreements about interests, ideas and the distribution and use of power” (Laws & Leftwich 2014: 1).
In contrast to the good governance approaches that emphasize adoption of “best-type” institutions, political settlement theory pushes development thinking beyond an institutionalist approach by focusing on the underlying power arrangements that underpin the emergence, stability and performance of institutions. The political settlements framework explains the prevalence of clientelism in developing countries as a structural problem, underpinned mainly by the limited availability of fiscal resources. In all countries, ruling elites face pressures to redistribute resources to accommodate both their supporters and groups in society that can threaten political stability. Khan (2010) argues that the inherited distributional power by ruling political coalitions in developing countries cannot be supported by the income created by formal institutions alone primarily because of the limited size of the formal productive economy. These issues are explored in depth in the chapter on political economy.

Our analysis, therefore, draws from political settlement theory to characterize the nature of the contemporary political settlement in Ghana and to see how this has and continues to influence the structure, system and process of urban governance in a wide array of areas, including urban policy, political and administrative decentralization, fiscal governance, planning and land management and the operation of transport, local economic and environment services.

1.5. Methodology

Aim of the study

The methodology assesses the various dimensions of urban governance in relation to both the Ghana-specific and wider Sub-Saharan (SSA) context. The chapters draw on secondary desk research and review of the literature and other secondary source materials as well as primary research in-country based on fieldwork and structured interactions with governance and sector practitioners, administrators, local political representatives, other experts and academics.

The study has followed a hybrid Systematic/ Semi Systematic Review, as summarized by DFID’s guidance note on Assessing the Strength of Evidence.1 The study examines existing structures, systems and processes of governance to identify key issues and problems as potential entry points for change. The avenues identified for transformation will be further examined as part of the future research agenda.

The study operates as both a secondary review exploring primary research studies and secondary materials, summarising and interrogating their data and findings, as well as a conceptual study by collating the findings of secondary and primary sources and placing them within a larger conceptual hypothesis around capability traps and political settlements as discussed above.

Data collection and analysis

This monograph uses both quantitative and qualitative data collection tools, but is rooted largely in a qualitative epistemological position that recognizes the importance of locating the research within a particular social, cultural and historical context. A qualitative evaluation framework was used for this

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research project, leveraging subjective methods such as interviews and observations to collect substantive and relevant data.

An extensive literature review was conducted to identify core issues and debates in urban service delivery in Africa, and more specifically in Ghana, as well as sources for primary data. Robustness of data was ensured by relying most heavily on peer-reviewed studies and data from government sources. An effort was made to triangulate and substantiate analysis from multiple references. Each chapter opens with a high-quality body of evidence that is both contemporary and contextually relevant.

Secondary research draws on both desk reviews of a wide range of official (governmental, international), scientific and academic sources. It employs a systematic review design approach that involves a comprehensive assessment of the literature and constitutional and other legal documents on urban local government as a basis of the findings and conclusions. The secondary review interrogates existing research studies and findings as well as constitutional and legislative instruments on the various dimensions of urban governance and services both in Ghana and elsewhere in developing countries. Specific documents reviewed are reflected in the bibliography and list of primary materials consulted. Primary data consulted during fieldwork included constitutional, policy, legal and regulatory documents, strategies and plans, survey data, budgets, accounts, staffing lists and schedules.

Data and information collection consisted of surveys, focus group discussions and interviews with officials in five reference metropolitan and municipal assemblies as well as central ministries, line departments, agencies such as the Local Government Service Secretariat, trade associations, experts, and academics from the University of Ghana (see Annex IV and V for a list of interviewees and primary documents referred). Semi-structured interview questionnaires were administered to these officials to understand issues and attitudes toward governance and service delivery in Ghana. Information was also triangulated with 40 participants from cities, central agencies and civil society in a series of focus group discussions hosted at the Institute of Local Government Studies (ILGS) on April 13th.

Sampling was undertaken based on snowball and convenient methods. Working with qualitative data and non-probability-based sampling methods, careful consideration was given to the quality of evidence with a focus on:

- Verifying material such as information and data extracted from budgets and plan documents from multiple sources
- Triangulation of information from semi-structured interviews with stakeholders in intensive full-day visits
- Controlled focus group – representing 41 stakeholders from municipal assemblies, ministries and agencies and civil society – where our preliminary findings were tested and verified and explored more deeply in breakout groups.
- Evidence was collected from two large and three medium-size assemblies to understand a cross-section of views and problems on operations and service delivery and ensure that they are more or less representative of the systemic problems ailing local governments.
Research questions

The research questions were developed to provide a comprehensive exploration of the urban service delivery landscape of Ghana, with a view to derive lessons for other developing countries as well.

1. What is the current status of urban development and services in the country?
2. Who manages infrastructure and services, and how efficiently?
3. What factors constrain service delivery?
4. How does politics influence these factors?
5. What are the implications for policy?
6. What are the entry points for change?

These questions were then applied to expose debates in urban development, land, planning, decentralization, fiscal governance and basic services in Ghana. These sectors were seen as holding the key to unlocking the hitherto untapped urban transformation potential of the country. An analysis of their status, existing roadblocks and future possibilities was deemed necessary to capture the extent of Ghana’s capability traps. The analysis has focused on what policies, systems and processes have worked in practice and what conditions have determined this.
2. Institutional dimensions of urban governance and services

2.1. Issues in urban governance

While there are a number of definitions of urban governance, Obeng-Odoom (2013: 10) points out that clarifying the concept is “is important because it enhances understanding, influences practices, improves the quality of evaluation, and makes clear what direction policy and future research should take.” Nevertheless, Nuissl & Heinrichs (2011) and (Obeng-Odoom 2013) advocate not to conceptualize this in narrow terms that would restrict our understanding and limit the complexities, peculiarities and dynamics of the concept in different regions and countries at different levels of socio-economic development.

In broad terms, urban governance can be defined as the process of decision making and implementation by government and other stakeholders in a city context with the goal of enhancing urban development. This definition goes beyond urban government to include other stakeholders such as community actors and leaders, the private sector and civil society organizations (CSOs), in partnership with civic authorities. Here, the notion of partnership should not be misconstrued as an equal relationship but rather a relationship among multiple actors with unequal powers, engaged in a progressive and inclusive process of urban management (Obeng-Odoom 2013). This concept raises several critical issues regarding the nature of policy and regulatory frameworks; institutional capacity and the organization of service delivery; political and decision-making structures for engaging with citizenry and other stakeholders; policy synchronization at the national and sub-national levels to achieve effective urban governance. This means that the policy and practice of urban governance needs to be all-encompassing if it is to achieve the goal of urban development. Here, urban good governance will thus embody three key interrelated attributes: decentralization that promotes progressive and inclusive decision making and service delivery; entrepreneurialism that encourages the efficient use of resources and supports the livelihoods of the urban population, especially the poor; and democratization that leads to transparent and accountable government. More important, this definition of urban governance helps to reposition the concept within a political-economy context that can examine its effects and outcomes and interrogate its reactions on urban citizens.

This chapter examines the institutional dimension of urban governance and its possible effects on service delivery in Ghana. We examine this through the lens of Ghana’s decentralization policy and institutional framework and incentives and rules for the efficient and effective delivery of urban services. The chapter is divided into five sections covering Ghana’s policy and legal framework for urban governance: political decentralization; administrative decentralization; key urban governance issues for service delivery; summary and policy implications for Ghana and SSA in general; and future research agenda on the institutional dimensions of urban governance and service delivery in Ghana and Africa in general.

It needs to be stressed that, although the paper sets out to discuss the key dimensions of the institutional and policy frameworks of urban governance in Ghana and their impact on services delivery, the discussions no doubt have relevance for other SSA countries and other countries in the developing world. As a recent state-of-the-art report on urban governance and service delivery in Ghana by ICF International notes, an analysis of urban governance and services in Ghana could
provide an opportunity for identifying the main drivers for structural transformation in African cities geared toward inclusive and resilient growth. The report further argues that an assessment of the urban governance scenario is an exercise that requires analysis of both state and non-state actors (whose decisions and actions influence the city) as well as the informal and the de facto situation on the ground alongside the formal structures, regulations and processes. Clearly, in many SSA countries it is these informal and formal actors and, structures, regulations and processes that influence and shape the delivery of services, a fact too often missed by policymakers and city authorities.

2.2. Policy frameworks for urban governance

Ghana’s decentralization policy framework and institutional structures date back to 1988, with legal backing from the promulgation of the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) Law 207. This resulted in the establishment of 110 MMDAs, which replaced the previous 65 administratively run District Councils that had been in existence since the mid-1970s. PNDC law 207, promulgated under a military regime with socialist and communist orientations, was subsequently superseded by Chapter 20 of the 1992 national Constitution and later replaced by the Local Government Act, 1993 (Act 462) after the return to democratic constitutional rule in 1992 (Ayee 1996, 1997; Owusu 2005). These constitutional and legal changes have maintained the overall policy focus and structures of the decentralization initiative of the former military regime. Consequently, Ghana’s local government system has emerged as a fused or mixed system combining elements of prefectoral-style rule of traditional district administration, responsible to central government, with elements of democratic authority over local service provision and taxation of devolved local government (Naustdalslid 1992; Eriksen et al. 1999; Crook & Manor 1998). Under the existing legal regime, MMDAs have overall responsibility for the development of the areas under their jurisdiction. They have executive, legislative and deliberative powers, as well as administrative and technical support, to articulate the views and aspirations of citizens and implement local services.

There have been several attempts to reform the institutional framework of the current decentralization policy over the years to enhance its efficiency and effectiveness in service delivery. Under the 1992 national Constitution, decentralization is a key mechanism for the implementation of the directive principles of state policy. Indeed, two entrenched provisions are made in the 1992 Constitution: establishment and objectives of the decentralization and local government framework (Article 240) and establishment of the District Assembly Common Fund (Article 252) as an inter-governmental transfer mechanism for sharing revenue between central and local government. Moreover, to achieve the state’s policy aim of promoting democracy, social integration and development, Article 35(6) of the Constitution proposes to:

“make democracy a reality by decentralising the administrative and financial machinery of government to all regions and districts and by affording all possible opportunities to the people to participate in decision-making at every level in national life and in government.”


Further to the above, Chapter 20 of the Constitution is devoted exclusively to decentralization and local government. The chapter spells out the purposes and functions of MMDAs and their composition. It also spells out the appointment and functions of key officers, namely, the Metropolitan
(Municipal) Chief Executive (MCE), as the head of the Assembly; the Presiding Member (PM), who presides over all meetings of the Assembly; and the mode for conducting elections. It also addresses the issues of central government transfers to MMDAs, audit of MMDAs’ accounts and the composition of the Regional Coordinating Councils (RCCs) as regional coordinating bodies of MMDAs within each administrative region of Ghana.

It is instructive to note that Article 240(1) under Chapter 20 of the Constitution states that “Ghana shall have a system of local government and administration which shall, as far as practicable, be decentralised”. Clauses 2a and 2b of Article 240 add that:

Parliament shall enact appropriate laws to ensure that functions, powers, responsibilities and resources are at all times transferred from the central government to local government units in a coordinated manner; Parliament shall by law provide for the taking of such measures as are necessary to enhance the capacity of local government authorities to plan, initiate, co-ordinate, manage and execute policies in respect of all matters affecting the people within their areas, with a view to ultimately achieving localisation of those activities. (Republic of Ghana 1992: 150)

It is within this context that in 1993 Parliament enacted the Local Government Act, 1993 (Act 462) to give further meaning to the provisions of decentralization and local government as provided in the Constitution. Despite the implementation of decentralization over three decades and the gradual evolution of subsequent policies on decentralization, there have been major constraints in implementing effective local governance and service delivery (Thomi et al. 2000; GoG/NDPC 2006). Meanwhile, various studies have suggested that most households are dissatisfied with the performance of MMDAs. A survey by the National Development Planning Commission (NDPC), as the apex state planning agency, for example, revealed that over 69 per cent of households were dissatisfied with the performance of MMDAs (GoG/NDPC 2006; Owusu 2008). According to (Owusu 2008), analysis of the survey results indicates that over 50 per cent of suggestions from households were centred on the need to improve service delivery.

Following the criticisms and shortcomings of the decentralization policy, there has been a series of policy measures to strengthen functional and fiscal decentralization in recent years. This includes the Local Government Service Act, 2003, which separated the central civil service and its agencies’ personnel from staff of the Local Government Service of the MMDAs. A Decentralization Policy Framework and Action Plan were adopted in 2010, following a series of regional and national consultations, written position papers and expert review (GoG/MLGRD 2012a). The new policy framework and action plan seek to address the following fundamental issues faced over the preceding decades of implementation in an accelerated manner, including:

- incoherence or contradiction in sectoral approaches to decentralization; the need to clarify the role of the region in the national governance architecture; persisting slowness in integrating decentralized departments into the assembly administration and in

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2The NDPC was established by Articles 86 and 86 of the 1992 Constitution and further given legal backing by the National Development Planning (System) Act, 1994 (Act 479 and Act 480). Acts 479 and 480 establish the NDPC as the apex organization in the decentralized development planning framework of Ghana, and define the relationship between the NDPC and other planning bodies such as government ministries and agencies (NDPC 1996).
implementing fiscal decentralization; the ineffectiveness of local government sub-structures; low capacities and motivation of assembly members; the need to stimulate popular participation in local governance; and streamlining relationships with traditional authorities (GoG/MLGRD 2010: 2).

As one of the key pillars of the new policy framework and action plan, a new Legislative Instrument (LI 1961) was passed in 2010 to strengthen administrative decentralization by allocating functions and human resources from central government agencies to MMDAs. This is a critical initiative, as municipal service delivery requires adequately trained and skilled human resources.

In the context of cities and urban governance, a number of national policies also formulated in recent years are anchored in the decentralization policy framework. These include the National Urban Policy Framework and Action Plan (2012), National Housing Policy and Action Plan (2014), the Land Use and Spatial Planning Bill (2016), National Spatial Development Framework and the national medium-term policy framework (Ghana Shared Growth Development Agenda II, GSGDA II, 2013-2017). All these policies have a direct bearing on cities and require an effective functional and fiscal decentralization process as the basis for their implementation, while acknowledging the critical challenges of urban governance. In particular, the National Urban Policy Framework notes that:

At the core of urban governance challenges are: (i) weak governance structures; (ii) lack of capacity in MMDAs to undertake decentralised functions as outlined in the provisions of the Local Government Act, 1993 (Act 462) and the National Development Planning (System) Act, 1994 (Act 480); (iii) failure of MDAs [ministries, departments and agencies] to transfer functions, personnel and resources to the MMDAs as required under the decentralisation policy; (iv) failure of MMDAs and RCC to establish institutional coordination as required under Act 462 (v) parallel statutory provisions and; (vi) external donor programmes and projects whose implementation arrangements tend to undermine decentralisation policy. The prevailing institutional situation weakens urban governance, and consequently urban development (GoG/MLGRD 2012: 17).

Although the quote above highlights the main challenges of urban governance in Ghana, the half-hearted approach to decentralization by the state over the last three decades has undermined the ability of central and local governments to address such challenges and raises some scepticism about the likely impact of recent interventions. Furthermore, these challenges and their negative impact on service delivery tend to have gendered dimensions through the under-representation of women in local decisions (Addoquaye-Tagoe 2015) and the costs in terms of time and financial means required, which tend to fall disproportionately on women as the guardians of homes and households. Women, because of their low participation in decision making, hardly ever take decisions on services delivery; at the same time, limited access to these services, especially in poor urban communities (where in-house facilities are generally lacking), require that women deploy more time and resources in order for their households to have these services.

2.3. Political decentralization
Ghana’s political system is characterized by a vibrant and active multi-party democracy at the national level. The President and Members of Parliament (MPs) are elected based on universal adult suffrage. However, partisan politics is forbidden at the district level, and the Constitution stipulates that persons seeking election to MMDAs and their sub-structures need to present themselves as individuals and not use any symbols associated with any political party. Political parties are also forbidden to endorse, sponsor or offer any support to any person seeking election to an assembly or its sub-district structures.

As already noted, decentralization was introduced in 1988 by the then ruling military junta, the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC). However, the introduction of constitutional rule in 1992 has resulted in a situation where a partisan central government system has been superimposed on a non-partisan local government system. This has generated intense debate at both the local and national levels. Some have called for the introduction of partisan politics at the local level to set in motion debates on local issues, a process that is likely to lead to transparency and accountability at the local level (CRC 2011; Awal & Paller 2016). They add that the present system serves only the interest of the ruling party (central government), without allowing for the formal participation of other parties in local-level politics. This situation has allowed the ruling party to entrench itself at the local level through its influence on all local-level decentralized structures.

However, arguments for the introduction of partisan politics at the local government level have been countered on the grounds that partisan politics will lead to divisiveness and will weaken any collective mobilization of local people for development. It is also argued that the “non-partisan nature of local level elections has enabled local governments to build effective partnerships with civil society organizations (CSOs) to deepen democracy and accelerate district level development. This is because CSOs are also expected to operate in a non-partisan manner.” (CRC 2011: 470). It is, however, significant to note that the call for the introduction of partisan politics at the local level is gaining momentum, with politicians and CSOs increasingly calling for a restructuring of the present system (CRC 2011).

At the same time, the lack of formal political competition at local government level is accompanied by partial political decentralization, in a context where one-third of local representatives (referred to as assembly members) of the MMDAs are appointed by central government in consultation with traditional authorities and other interest groups in the local government area. The remaining two-thirds of the assembly members are elected through the ballot box in a non-partisan electioneering process. Similarly, the Metropolitan/Municipal Chief Executive (MCE), the head of the Assembly, is also an official appointed by the President with loyalties to the centre and ruling party rather than specific local constituents. The MCE or the mayor is influential and although his/her appointment requires a two-thirds majority backing of assembly members to ratify the President’s decision, most MCEs and the ruling party headed by the President are expert in managing and manipulating assembly members to obtain support for executive decisions.

The composition of the membership of the Assembly is further complicated by the undefined relationship between the Member of Parliament (MP) as a non-voting member of the Assembly and the MCE as a voting member. The MP is elected by universal adult suffrage and represents the district/constituency at the national legislative assembly (Parliament), whereas the President appoints the DCE. More important are the numerous reported open confrontations between MPs and MCEs.
According to Ahwoi (2010), at the heart of the conflict and rivalry between MPs and MCEs is the MPs’ membership of the MMDAs as well as the two-term limit on the tenure of the MCEs. These conditions tend to create a situation whereby the MCE or the MP wants to assert his political authority as the “head” of the local government area or the MCE contesting for the seat of the MP, which has no tenure term limit (Ahwoi 2010).

One area that has attracted a lot of attention and debate with respect to decentralization in Ghana is the question of whether to elect MCEs and to introduce partisan politics or to maintain the status quo. Almost three decades since the coming into force of Ghana’s current Constitution, a Constitutional Review Committee (CRC) was established in 2010 to conduct a public consultative process throughout the country to gather recommendations for a review of the Constitution. The CRC completed its work and submitted a report in late 2011. In summary, the CRC recommended the election of Mayors and the introduction of partisan politics in local government in the long-term after some constitutional amendments by Parliament. However, a government White Paper issued afterwards watered down many of the recommendations of the CRC and completely rejected the proposal to introduce partisan politics at the local government level (GoG 2012). Indeed, the White Paper highlights sharp differences between the government’s position and the view of the public on several items on decentralization and local governance as presented by the CRC.

Interestingly, the government’s White Paper also rejected recommendations to carve out a specific role for traditional authorities in the appointment of officers to local government. This includes a recommendation from CRC that “the traditional authorities develop detailed criteria for the selection of the thirty per cent appointees for appointment by the President.” Indeed, “the lack of institutionalized platform for CSOs …. and participation of traditional leaders in the governance process at the local level has also been highlighted as hampering the involvement of citizens in the process” (IDEG 2010, p. 1). Notwithstanding the government’s position on the election of MCEs and introduction of partisan politics at the local government, the CRC report and many other studies have noted that there is massive evidence of political partisanship in the appointment of mayors and other appointees as well as the conduct of local government elections. Indeed, the CRC Report (2011: 471) notes that:

“The restriction [on partisan politics] stems from the fact that the current system of decentralisation was introduced at a time that political parties had been banned in Ghana [by the ruling military regime which introduced the current decentralisation policy]. That system was then replicated in the Constitution without much debate. … In practice, political parties clandestinely sponsored candidates for district level elections despite the constitutional ban. It is time to allow the law to conform to the practice.”

The extensive central government control of local government and its unwillingness to change the status quo brings into question the commitment to local accountability and its consequent impact on service delivery. As IDEG (2010: 1) notes “[a]s appointees of the Executive President [and ruling government], MMDCEs [and other appointees] have tended to conduct themselves in a manner that makes them more accountable to the President and the central government than to the elected representatives of the communities in the Assemblies.”
2.4. Administrative decentralization

Despite shortcomings in political decentralization, Ghana is often credited as having gone far with administrative decentralization (Ayee 1996, 1997; Crook and Manor 1998; Owusu and Asante 2014). In other words, since implementation of the decentralization programme a number of functions and roles hitherto performed by central government and its ministries, agencies and departments (MDAs) have been transferred to MMDAs but often without the corresponding resources, particularly financial resources.

The existing legal regime provides structures for Metropolitan and Municipal Assemblies (MMAs). An MMA is made up of the MCE as the head of the Assembly, assembly members representing communities within the municipality/metropolitan area, and a team of civil servants (mainly administrators, engineers and planning officers). Almost a decade and half ago, the Local Government Service Act, 2003 (Act 656), was promulgated, leading to the establishment of the Local Government Service (LGS) with the view among others of bringing civil service staff of MDAs at the municipal level under the direct regulation and control of the MMAs. To actualize this vision, the Local Government (Departments of District Assemblies) Instrument, 2009 (LI 1961), was promulgated in 2010 to operationalize the decentralized departments at the MMAs as the Departments of the Assemblies.

Acts 462 and 656 as well as LI 1961 call for an integrated structure of line departments at the MMA level. However, the provisions contained in the legal instruments are yet to be truly implemented. This is interesting, given that the memorandum of LI 1961 notes that with the establishment of the Local Government Service under Act 656, the staff of the assemblies automatically became members of the Service once LI 1961 came into force and that no other action is required. The memorandum adds that LI 1961 achieves the following four objectives: commencement of the functioning of the decentralized departments at the municipal level as Departments of the MMAs; transfer of the functions to the relevant Departments of the MMAs; establishment of a composite budget system at the municipal level by integrating the budgets of the Departments of the MMAs into the budgets of the assemblies; and transfer of the staff of the Departments of the Assemblies from the Civil Service [central government] to the Local Government Service (Republic of Ghana 2010: iii).

In the absence of an integrated structure, line departments perform functions of the assemblies without the active involvement of the assemblies. The integration process must involve the transfer of implementation responsibilities and activities together with appropriate financial resources, staff and authority. According to Zanu (1996), such staff transferred should belong to and be paid directly by the local-level institutions to eliminate dual allegiance and give meaning to decentralization. At present, most heads of decentralized agencies are more responsive to directives from their regional and national supervisors than they are to the assemblies. However, as (Mawuena-Dotse, 1990: 61-62) has argued “it would be unrealistic to request the staff of these agencies to cut off the link with their present organisations when issues relating to their career progression, salary scales and other forms of remuneration, training and development are yet to be concisely determined.”
Below the MMAs are the sub-district structures (see Table 1). These structures have been established to facilitate the mobilization of local communities and neighbourhoods in decision making, pooling of resources, and the formulation and implementation of policies at the local level. According to Naustdalslid (1992), the sub-structures are local organs of the MMAs with no independent powers but consultative bodies (partially nominated) with no budgets of their own; they carry out functions as delegated by the Assembly or by legal instruments setting up the assemblies. Because the sub-structures are closer to local people, their basic role of educating, organizing and mobilizing citizens can be very important. They also form the basis for problem identification and for the initiation and implementation of self-help projects at the local level (Laryea-Adjei 1998).

Table 2.1: Sub-structures of MMDAs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies</th>
<th>Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies</th>
<th>Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4-Tier Metropolitan Assembly</td>
<td>3-Tier Municipal Assembly</td>
<td>3-Tier District Assembly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Cities/large towns with population of over 250,000)</td>
<td>(Towns with population over 95,000)</td>
<td>(Population over 75,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Metropolitan Assemblies</td>
<td>1. Municipal Assemblies</td>
<td>1. District Assemblies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Sub-Metropolitan District Councils</td>
<td>2. Zonal Councils</td>
<td>2. Urban/Town/Area Councils</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Town/Area Councils</td>
<td>3. Unit Committees*</td>
<td>3. Unit Committees*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Unit Committees*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Unit committees are formed for populations of 500-1,000 and 1,500 in rural and urban areas, respectively. Urban, Area, and Zonal councils are formed for settlements with populations above 15,000, 5,000-15,000 and 3,000, respectively.

However, in many MMAs, these lower structures of the assemblies are non-functional (CRC 2011). A study by the Centre for Democratic Development, Ghana, cited in Obeng-Odoom (2013: 197) indicated that 51 per cent of the Unit Committees are not functional. The non-functioning of the sub-structures is largely blamed on their haphazard creation and unclearly defined functions (CRC 2011); limited budgets to support their operations; and their continuous existence premised on voluntarism of elected and appointed members. According to Owusu (2005), the non-functioning of the sub-structures of the assemblies raises questions about the impact of Ghana’s decentralization programme as it hinders the core aim of the programme of promoting grassroots decision making and accountability.

**Key governance issues**

Currently, devolved services under the LI 1961 consist of 16 Departments and the closure of 16 Departments (see Table 2). The LI 1961 also spelt out in detail the functions of each of the devolved departments. As many as 50 functions have been assigned by the central government to the Department of Education, Youth and Sports. At the same time the department is tasked with harmonizing the activities and functions of four agencies operating at the district level: Ghana Education Service; Youth Council; Sports Council and the Library Board.

Table 2.2: MMAs’ departments prescribed under LI 1961
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Departments established</th>
<th>Departments ceasing to exist</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central Administration Department</td>
<td>Department of Social Welfare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Finance</td>
<td>Department of Community Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education, Youth &amp; Sport Department</td>
<td>Department of Cooperatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Works Department</td>
<td>Controller &amp; Accountant General’s Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical Planning Department</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Health</td>
<td>Ghana Library Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Trade and Industry</td>
<td>National Youth Organizing Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Agriculture</td>
<td>Registry of Births &amp; Deaths</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural Resources Conservation Dept. &amp; Game and Wildlife Division</td>
<td>Office of the District Sport Organiser</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disaster Management &amp; Prevention Department</td>
<td>Public Work Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Social Welfare &amp; Community Development</td>
<td>Department of Feeder Roads</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal Department</td>
<td>Town &amp; Country Planning Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waste Management Department</td>
<td>Department of Rural Housing &amp; Cottage Industries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban Roads Department</td>
<td>Department of Animal Health &amp; Production</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budgeting and Rating Department</td>
<td>Agriculture Extension Services Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport Department</td>
<td>Crops Services Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Department of Agriculture Engineering</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The immediate question raised by the introduction of LI 1961 is the extent to which the functions that have been decentralized are commensurate with the finances devolved. The transfer of such a large number of functions and tasks without accompanying resources would mean nothing in terms of deepening decentralization and urban governance. Without such a shift, the infrastructure development and service delivery needs of the rapidly growing urban centres will remain unmet regardless of the intent of LI 1961.

The mismatch between devolved functions and commensurate resources, especially finance, is often described as “vertical imbalances” (Ayee 1996). According to (Owusu & Asante 2014), in the absence of adequate finances for assemblies to meet their delegated functions, the tendency is for MMAs to seek central government financial assistance, which in turn further erodes the existing autonomy of local governments and instead reinforces a process of “centralisation through decentralisation.” What is unclear is whether this situation is a temporary or permanent feature of Ghana’s decentralization programme.
The National Urban Policy and its Action Plan, and other recent formulated national policies, call for creativity and innovation on the part of mayors and other city authorities in partnering with communities, businesses and Civil Society Organisations to address the challenges confronting Ghanaian cities, especially in the areas of infrastructure and service delivery. A key question here is what this means in practice in the context of appointed authorities, who are obliged to be responsive and accountable to the centre/ruling government/President rather than local citizens. In particular, the functions of the appointed MCEs as enshrined in the Constitution make this a key position in terms of local development, building partnerships and generating new and innovative ideas to address the myriad challenges facing cities. Indeed, putting in place creative and innovative ideas requires mayors who “have the confidence and security of tenure necessary to insist on long-term local development whilst this is sought to be sacrificed by the centre for short-term and parochial interests” (CRC 2011: 481). In other words, the generation and implementation of innovative ways of generating new sources of funding and managing cities in general are unlikely to occur in a situation where mayors and other appointees are constantly conducting themselves in ways that make them more accountable to the President and the central government rather than to local communities. It is an undeniable fact that the lack of creativity and innovation accounts in part for the poor performance of MMAs in service delivery. While the challenges continue to mount up, city authorities have largely adopted the same attitude and approach to dealing with such challenges without adequately tailoring approaches to the local context.

Another issue requiring attention is the continuous fragmentation and proliferation of MMDAs and their impact on service delivery. The last decade has witnessed a steady increase in the number of MMDAs. There has been a doubling in the number of MMDAs from 110 in 1988 to 138 in 2004, then 170 in 2007 and 216 in 2012 (see Table 3). This increase of MMDAs has been justified partly as a response to a doubling of the population since 1984 (when it was 12.3 million) and partly in response to arguments in favour of small jurisdictions, which are compatible with concepts of grassroots democracy because they are better able to represent the preferences of local residents with lower costs of participation and more localized scales of service provision. Also, political demands for fragmented jurisdictions tend to revolve around the assumption that the establishment of a legally constituted assembly will automatically provide a fast route to accessing public funds for local development.

Table 2.3: Proliferation of local governments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of Local Governments</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Increase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Metropolitan</td>
<td>Municipal</td>
<td>District</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>161</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Act 462 provides three criteria for the creation of local government areas in Ghana: minimum population threshold (Metropolitan Assembly – over 250,000; Municipality – over 95,000; and District
According to Owusu (2015), many of the recently created local government areas hardly meet these criteria, suggesting political considerations in their creation. The political consideration argument becomes more plausible when viewed against the fact that more MMDAs have been created in the regional strongholds of Ghana’s two dominant political parties, National Democratic Congress (NDC) and New Patriotic Party (NPP), that is, the Volta Region and Ashanti Region, respectively, than any other region (Owusu 2015).

Using the Greater Accra Metropolitan Area (GAMA) as a case study, Owusu demonstrated how this most densely populated metropolitan region was fragmented from just three MMAs in 2003 to as many as 12 by 2012. The fragmentation of MMAs into smaller spatial units makes it difficult to realize economies of scale and the efficient use of physical, financial and human resources and common infrastructure (for example, transport and logistics depots/hubs and landfill sites) across a wider contiguous area. It also makes it difficult for local governments to be self-sufficient in the provision of professional skills required for municipal administration. Furthermore, fragmentation makes it relatively easier for political elites to hijack smaller local assemblies in a context where small communities have a tradition of being intolerant towards challenges to the status quo (Ahwoi 2010).

The result of the overstretching of decentralization and the proliferation of Assemblies is that many local governments have now become less viable or inviable in terms of revenue potential and have thus become wholly dependent on the centre for all capital and recurrent funding. This undermines the very concept of local self-government while reducing the total quantum of funds accessible by any one local government, as funds are now spread more thinly across a larger number of political and administrative units (Owusu 2015). In short, there is an organizational and financial burden associated with the proliferation and potential duplication of MMDA administration as well as the opportunity cost of failing to optimize resources across a wider strategic area to achieve minimum economies of scale in the delivery of infrastructure and operation of services that are amenable to common action. In the view of Owusu (2015), these challenges resulting from fragmentation of local government areas, especially metropolitan regions, are compounded by weak regional planning and non-cooperation of adjoining MMAs.

The Urban Development Unit (UDU) of the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development is aware of issues concerned with the continuous division of MMDAs into smaller physical units. Supported by the World Bank, the UDU is working on a study of the jurisdictional issues for better metropolitan management in GAMA, Sekondi-Takoradi and Tamale. The interim findings make a case for single-purpose districts and metropolitan assemblies to provide the strategic overview and planning required for the city-region as a whole vis-à-vis large infrastructure and services that require minimum economies of scale and inter-agency coordination. However, it is yet to be seen if central government would accept and implement such recommendations, because continuous creation of MMDAs has served as a means of achieve the centre’s parochial political agenda of rewarding loyal party members through appointments as MCEs and enhancing electoral fortunes through gerrymandering.
Key Staffing Issues

IMF (1998) data show that, contrary to popular misconception, the African civil service is not only poorly paid compared to that of its international counterparts, but also remains undersized compared to that in other regions of the world when measured in terms of civil servants as a proportion of the country’s population. This capacity constraint was a function of many civil service reforms, often funded by international aid agencies that advocated downsizing to improve service efficiency. These reforms, critical for state performance, economic, and governance improvement in the continent, ended up aggravating the decay of the institution. This shortage was particularly dire for the increasingly expanding urban local context.

Recently, a number of countries in Africa have established a local government service commission or secretariat as the main agency responsible for local government staffing to parry these shortages. At a more granular level, this has been done to address two significant problems endemic to the issue of human resource management: connecting pay to performance and ensuring equitable adequacy of competent human resources across the country. To this end, Ghana’s Local Government Service Secretariat (LGSS) ensures the recruitment and posting of staff to all local authorities countrywide. Ghana is also one of the few African countries to have evolved elaborate local government staffing norms that prescribe in meticulous detail the type and number of positions for professional, and sub-professional categories that local governments must have. In Ghana, however, local government personnel are paid on a central civil service spine to ensure equivalence between the central and local public services.

These steps have gone a long way in helping maintain staffing levels in local governments by ensuring improved pay and working conditions despite variations in local opportunities and resources. This has had a stabilizing effect on local government staffing although the steady fragmentation of local government units in Ghana has reduced continuity in posts as staff are frequently moved around to fill vacancies in newly created local authorities.

2.5. Conclusion and policy implications

It is well noted that the practice of decentralization in Ghana for almost three decades and in many African countries since the 1990s has not met the expectations of citizens, who continue to deal with the daily challenges of the lack of civic infrastructure and poor service delivery (Dickovick & Riedl 2010). Across all cities and towns in Ghana and elsewhere in SSA, urbanization and growth have outpaced metropolitan and municipal authorities’ capacity to provide basic services (waste and sanitation, education, health, water). As many analysts have observed, poor urban governance (reflected in weak local government structures and the lack of transparency and accountability in city management and decision making) can be the cause and consequences of poor urban services delivery and weak urban development in general (Chaplin 1999; Hardoy et al. 2005; Obeng-Odoom 2013).

Projections of Ghana’s urban growth and the level of urbanization indicate that the shift of the population from rural to urban areas is not likely to slow down until after 2030 (Owusu & Oteng-Ababio 2015; World Bank 2015b). Consequently, the challenges of urban infrastructure and service
delivery are likely to intensify and worsen if interventions are not put in place to meet the needs of the growing urban population and ever-expanding cities and towns in Ghana (GoG/MLGRD 2012).

As a result of the poor performance of city governments within the decentralized policy framework, the provisioning of urban services is increasingly being delivered through privatization initiatives, with attendant increases in costs of services to households. However, delivering services through the private sector, most often through public-private partnership (PPP) agreements, has the tendency of distancing urban citizens from decentralized city governments and institutions (Crook & Ayee 2006; Owusu & Afutu-Kotey 2010). Furthermore, Owusu and Afutu-Kotey (2010) have argued that MMAs that are unable to provide direct basic services to their citizens are unlikely to perform any better with the responsibilities of regulating the provision and management of these services by other non-state actors such as the private sector. This is evident in the subsequent chapter on services, which highlights the problems associated with the weak governance and management of private contracting in water and solid waste. The “franchising of waste collection and sanitation [and other basic services] has enhanced the city government’s political patronage and contracts have become a means of rewarding political loyalists. This has further weakened the Metropolitan Assemblies’ capacity to regulate private operators and ensure improved service delivery” (Owusu & Afutu-Kotey 2010: 11).

Further compounding the lack of visibility of MMAs among citizens as privatization takes a firm hold on services delivery are the weak and non-functional sub-structures of the assemblies as earlier noted. Functional sub-structures could have served as the basis for monitoring the conformity or otherwise of private operators with respect to regulations and could have served as liaison structures among communities and city authorities and the state. This situation accounts in part for the weak capacity of MMAs to regulate private operators and ensure improved service delivery.

An emerging urban governance issue related to privatization and community-based participation in urban services delivery is the growing incidence of self-provision of services by the middle and upper classes. The emerging trend of self-provision of services by the wealthy is particularly prominent in the supply of water, security, education and sanitation. Consequently, many private businesses have been established to provide services mainly to households with the means to pay for them. However, the increasing trend of self-provision by the wealthy raises concerns about galvanizing support for city-wide responses to service delivery. According to Chaplin (1999), the urban development experience of 19th-century Britain and Europe is similar to that of many developing countries, but it was the critical role played by the middle and upper classes that led to progressive and incremental response to poor services delivery in these developed countries. However, Chaplin (1999) notes that the conditions that facilitated the development of city laws and regulations, governance structures and infrastructure in Great Britain and elsewhere in the developed world seem to be absent in the developing world. She attributed the situation partly to little middle-class pressure for genuine reform and the nature of the state in the developing world, which allowed the middle class to monopolize the limited urban services provided by the state, as well as to the flight of this class to new suburbs that often have self-contained apartments and self-provision of services. In short, self-provisioning of basic services by the middle and upper classes in urban Ghana, as well as the capture
of the limited services provided by the state by the elites, is unlikely to provide incentives for city-wide calls for improved services provision for all (including the poor).

Administrative and political decentralization are not going to be meaningful unless they go together with fiscal decentralization. Indeed (Aasen et al. 1997), analysing the performance of decentralization in five SSA countries (Ghana, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Cote d’Ivoire) and three South Asian countries (India, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh) conclude that without proper systems of fiscal decentralization it is impossible to develop sustainable local government systems that support the majority of the population. Consequently, the subject of financing urban services needs to be given serious attention, as in the absence of funding, devolved services become almost meaningless to local governments and citizens. Indeed, studies in Ghana have indicated that inadequate and poor funding of city governments resulting from limited fiscal decentralization by the state has had an impact on the effectiveness and responsiveness of MMAs, and accounts in part for the citizens’ relatively low rate of participation in local government elections (Addoquaye-Tagoe 2015). However, the reality is that, as Ghana continues to consolidate its economic status as a low- to middle-income country over time, grants and concessionary loans will decline, and therefore market-based financing options need to be explored. This new demand for funding to support services delivery would require higher standards of transparency and accountability in revenue generation and expenditure management by city governments, a situation that is rarely the case currently. This issue is examined in detail in the subsequent chapter on fiscal governance.

The arguments for and against the election of all assembly members and MCEs are silent on the extent of women representation in decision making. According to Addoquaye-Tagoe (2015), the introduction of competitive partisan politics at the national level as well as appointments at the municipal level have not enhanced the representation of women. Indeed, women continue to be under-represented despite campaigns by NGOs and other civil society groups. In the view of Addoquaye-Tagoe (2015), this is interesting especially because the decentralization process is expected to afford women in particular the opportunity to get involved in decision making at the grassroots level. This situation is largely blamed on factors such as society’s lack of recognition of women’s capabilities; women’s multiple roles and responsibilities (reproductive and productive activities); and lack of self-confidence. It remains unclear the extent to which the status quo or an elected regime could enhance women’s representation in urban political governance.

In policy terms, urban governance needs to take note of the reality of climate change/variability as both an inducer of urbanization (uprooting rural population because of stress on rain-fed agriculture and triggering movement to cities) and possible negative impact on services such as water and its effect on health and other water-stressed-related diseases. It has been predicted by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) that Ghana and West Africa in general will experience rainfall variability patterns that will affect negatively agriculture, with serious implications for food availability, access and utilization (IPCC 2001; Codjoe & Owusu 2011). According to Owusu and Oteng-Ababio (2015), the prediction is that climate change/variability is likely to trigger climate-induced migration flows from rural areas as many leave the land in search of better livelihoods in cities.
An issue related to climate change is possible rise in sea level, with possible inundation of coastal cities and towns. Indeed, many of Ghana’s important cities and towns, notably Accra (national capital), Tema (major port and industrial centre) and Sekondi-Takoradi (hub of the country’s oil and gas industry) and other national assets and infrastructure are all located on the seaboard. Also, recent annual floods with associated deaths and loss of properties in major Ghana cities, particularly Accra, have been partly blamed on climate change/variability within the context of weak urban infrastructure and mitigating measures. As Jacobsen et al. (2013) note, the floods in Accra in recent years are a grim example of the serious impact of natural disasters on African cities – a phenomenon predicted to increase as climate change intensifies.

If we accept the definition of urban governance as a form of governance that promotes inclusive decision making and implementation; efficient use of resources (including supporting the livelihoods of the urban poor); and transparent and accountable political authority, then a lot needs to be done using decentralization in Ghana as the vehicle in this direction. Implementation of decentralization so far in Ghana suggests that the policy may be popular and a conceptually viable development strategy, but it is unlikely to lead to positive outcomes, particularly in the area of service provision that benefits most the urban population, without serious efforts to strengthen and broaden accountability mechanisms at both national and local levels (Crook 2003). Consequently, Crook (2003) and Thomi et al. (2000) have argued that the general regime and relations between local and central government are key factors in determining whether decentralization facilitates and promotes inclusive and sustainable development. However, as Owusu (2005: 44) argues:

“…it is important to note that in many developing countries (including Ghana), the relationships between local and central government are largely shaped and dictated by the central government due to the large power imbalance between the two systems of government. In short, poverty reduction and local development are mostly likely to succeed where there is a strong commitment by central governments eager to pursue and support such policies. In other words, the extent to which decentralisation results in improvements in human development outputs is largely a function of the resources and systems for allocating funding, primarily by central governments” (Crook 2003: 83).

The policy implications drawn here have relevance for many African countries. This is because the trend of urbanization is occurring across many countries on the continent, while at the same time the vast majority of these countries have embraced decentralization and local government reforms (Crook & Manor 1998; Dickovick & Riedl 2010). A report published by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) indicates that many African countries have initiated or deepened processes of decentralization and local government since the 1990s (Dickovick & Riedl 2010). The report, however, adds that achievements have been modest and marginal because of sub-national autonomy that has been restricted because of controls exercised by several top-down forces, especially controls by central government and dominant political parties, suggesting continuation of centralized patterns of governance in many cases. This ultimately affects accountability, with local governments continually looking up to the centre rather than addressing the needs of their citizens in terms of service delivery. African countries stand to benefit from the benefits of urbanization but this will occur
only in the context good urban governance, which needs to be conceived as inclusive decision making, efficient use of resources and transparent and accountable government.

Key Issues

Achievements in service delivery have been modest and marginal because of sub-national autonomy that has been restricted because of controls exercised by several top-down forces, especially controls by central government and dominant political parties, suggesting continuation of centralized patterns of governance. District officials are appointed by the central government and not locally. Poor salaries often mean that if opportunities for rent-seeking behaviour arise they are often explored. This means that there is limited innovative risk-taking and professional managerial behaviour in ULGs. Furthermore, effective institutional platforms for change, bringing together all relevant but often competing interests and stakeholders, are only infrequently created, as they impinge on protected institutional and individual turfs and take time, commitment, compromise and enthusiasm to establish and maintain.

Constrained decentralization has reduced local ownership of the development agenda. Inadequate and poor funding of city governments because of limited fiscal decentralization by the state has had an impact on the effectiveness and responsiveness of all assemblies, and accounts partly for the citizens’ relatively low rate of participation in local government elections in Ghana.
3. Fiscal decentralization and local government finances

3.1. Issues in fiscal decentralization

This chapter focuses on identifying and analysing the key issues relating to fiscal governance, decentralization and municipal finance aspects of urban governance and service delivery. The chapter aims to cover aspects relating to (a) fiscal decentralization in relation to functional, expenditure and revenue assignments, and inter-governmental fiscal framework and systems; (b) financial resources focusing on the inter-governmental transfer receipts, own-source revenue generation, market borrowing and sub-national financing, including private sector investments and asset monetization, as well as external aid support from multilateral development banks; (c) public financial management and governance systems, including financial planning, budgeting, accounting and reporting frameworks and practices, as well as the institutional systems and capacities to manage the functional, expenditure and revenue assignments under the fiscal decentralization framework; and (d) financial sustainability and creditworthiness of local governments as service providers and market borrowers for sub-national infrastructure financing. The chapter also highlights the influences of urban politics on local government fiscal systems in contemporary Ghana. The chapter is structured in six main sections: (i) brief review of the literature; (ii) review of fiscal governance practices; (iii) key fiscal governance issues; (iv) influence of politics on fiscal governance; (v) policy implications; and (vi) conclusion.

A review of the literature on fiscal governance highlights the fundamental importance of a robust and enabling legal framework with strong supporting structures to meet the requirements of decentralized service delivery. Although many aspects of the framework are fiscal in nature, others relate to the larger institutional and political context in which urban local governments operate.

A sound local government fiscal system typically requires the delineation of: clear functional, expenditure; adequate and autonomous revenue assignments with service-specific cost-revenue linkages; clear and robust inter-governmental fiscal framework with consistent, predictable and timely fund transfers and objective revenue-sharing mechanisms; and access to sub-national sources of funds for financing capital investment requirements within an overarching fiscal safeguards framework at the national level for macroeconomic stability (GOLD II).

Globally, the share of public expenditure managed by local government remains low. The implementation of decentralization policies has been poor and half-hearted in many cases, with some countries regressing into fiscal centralism. In Mali and Burkina Faso, for example, the principle of the simultaneous transfer of functions and finances was recently questioned. In Uganda, the management of local personnel has been recentralized, and the status of the capital city has been modified to create a metropolitan authority whose governing body is appointed by the central government. In Malawi and Togo, local elections have been suspended for long periods and centrally appointed officials brought in to manage local governments. Meanwhile in a number of countries, the share of the revenues of local government coming from national resources has decreased in recent years (Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, Uganda, Senegal, Tanzania and Togo) (United Cities and Local Governments 2010).
Overall, local authorities in Africa have limited spending autonomy. The division of responsibilities and expenditure between local authorities and central governments is often unclear. The responsibilities of local authorities are written into the constitution or the laws of most countries in Africa, with the exception for Tunisia and Niger, for example, but there is a huge divergence between de jure and de facto practice. This is the case, for example, in Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt, Ethiopia, Rwanda and Algeria. The responsibilities granted to local government are often shared among several local levels and the state (ibid).

A critical component of the fiscal decentralization process is the design of the inter-governmental fiscal transfer system and revenue-sharing mechanisms between national and sub-national governments. While in an ideal decentralized context, local governments would be financially self-sufficient in own-source revenue terms, in practice almost all local governments depend significantly on inter-government transfers and shared/assigned revenues from the national governments. Here, inter-governmental fiscal transfers (IGTs) are an essential building block for sub-national financing because they provide the bulk of revenue in almost all decentralization contexts and thus undermine the real autonomy of local government.

This is true not only for many developing countries where IGTs constitute the largest single source of revenue at around 66 per cent in Uganda, for example, but is equally the case for some OECD countries such as the UK. Being a prerogative of national government, transfers can be variable and unpredictable, depending on the macroeconomic conditions, the evolving national development agenda and other political factors (Bahl & Linn 1992). The design of inter-governmental transfers is particularly important in the context of local governments, because central government usually retains a strong interest in at least some of the outcomes of the services being delivered by local governments. In such cases, central government will typically devise conditional transfers linked to performance measures (Bird 1999).

Own-source revenue (OSR) mobilization and effective financial management are also key determinants for successful sub-national financing of infrastructure. While IGTs provide the bulk of revenue, there remains a substantial financing gap when it comes to local infrastructure requirements. OSR is thus a key source for meeting some of this gap. It can also be used for leveraging investment through borrowing. Urban local authorities can increase OSR by expanding the local tax or charge base, increasing rates and enhancing collections. This will also enable them to engage in borrowing, should regulations permit, to fund capital and certain operational requirements. Increasing OSR improves overall cost recovery and provides guaranteed revenue streams against which borrowing becomes possible. However, debt financing requires local governments to be more transparent in terms of finances and to demonstrate fiscal stability. Improved creditworthiness and higher ratings are critical factors in enhancing fiscal transparency.

The main source of local authority revenue in developed countries is from property tax, but its potential in the developing world has yet be maximized (Bahl & Linn 1992). Taxation based on the value of land is often considered to be the best approach. If rates are kept low and values assessed at or near market rates, considerable inflation-proof revenues can accrue (Brockman 2011). This works best in a context where there is an efficient and transparent land and property market such as is found in all developed countries. In much of Asia where transactions are mediated through individual brokers this
can become an issue. In SSA this is further complicated by market rates that generally differ from official rates.

Given the almost universal context in which sub-national governments across the world face funding constraints, there is increasing interest in exploring new ways of raising funds for infrastructure and services. Urban infrastructure financing mechanisms are generally driven by the potential of OSR generation; robust, objective and reliable inter-governmental fiscal transfer framework as part of effective fiscal decentralization; and the financial autonomy and the creditworthiness of the local governments to access market sources for raising funds for urban infrastructure investment requirements.

A number of local authorities in India, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Indonesia and South Africa have begun to explore sub-national borrowing within legally permissible limits (Peterson & Annez 2007). Most sub-national borrowing is for short- and medium-term loans and, most often but not exclusively, for projects of a commercial orientation and most often restricted to public sector banks. There are few instances of long-term loans of more than 10-15 years being raised from domestic credit or capital markets. The most common form of sub-national borrowing in this context has been from state-owned local/municipal development funds, which are typically supported by multilateral and bilateral development agencies. The mandate of these funds may vary from direct project financing to credit enhancement as well as technical support for project development, with varying geographical and administrative coverage. This ranges from countrywide, such as in the case of the Local Loans and Development Fund in Sri Lanka and the Municipal Development Fund in Bangladesh, to province- or region-wide such as the Tamil Nadu Urban Development Fund in India.

Budget approval is often dependent on legal compliance with mandates on revenues, expenditures and budget balance. Local governments in countries such as Ghana, Gabon, Egypt, Tunisia, Rwanda and Zambia are strictly controlled by higher levels, with reviews of the budget structure as well as component budget lines. For countries like Kenya, Uganda and Burkina Faso, the reviews concern only the budget structure. In Malawi, South Africa, Tanzania and Algeria, they focus principally on budget lines. In Morocco, the recent organizational reforms of local finance (2009) and local accounting (2010) have reduced veto powers. In Senegal, the individual decisions taken by local governments are not submitted for prior approval to a higher authority. Also, the timeframes for budget approvals can be long in many countries. In francophone West Africa, for example, Mali and Niger, legal approval timeframes are generally exceeded, because it takes so long for the oversight authority to provide comments (United Cities and Local Governments 2010).

The substantial body of literature on municipal finance and fiscal decentralization suggests that efficiency and consistency of transparent financial management systems, which include adoption of standard and uniform accounting and budgeting and auditing procedures, are heavily dependent on the overarching fiscal decentralization and inter-governmental transfer system. Unless the fiscal decentralization framework assures objective and reliable inter-governmental fiscal transfers, it is difficult to improve financial management protocols in local governments.
3.2. Fiscal devolution

This section reviews key elements of fiscal governance in the municipal sector in Ghana, including fiscal decentralization, focusing on expenditure assignments and revenue authorities that determine the form and depth of devolution; the design of the inter-governmental fiscal architecture; and internally generated revenues by MMDAs. The section also reviews sub-national financing for urban infrastructure, including market borrowing, private sector investments and land/capital asset monetization. Finally, the section examines municipal financial management and governance, including accounting, budgeting, auditing and financial reporting as well as capital investment planning and expenditure management systems.

The efficiency and performance of a decentralized local government system are quite significantly determined by the coherence and financial strengthen of the fiscal framework. Fiscal decentralization in Ghana is based on a number of important legislative acts and regulations, including Local Government Act (Act 462), District Assemblies Common Fund Act (Act 455) and the National Decentralization Policy and Action Plan prepared in 2010 and currently revised for the period 2015-20. As widely acknowledged in the international literature, the first pre-requisite for effective fiscal decentralization is a set of clear functional and fiscal assignments in line with responsibilities and services. In Ghana, functional assignments are driven by a shift of authority from the centre to MMDAs through vertical deconcentration from central ministerial departments at the local level and horizontally at the MMDA level, from central ministries to assemblies.

The Legislative Instrument 1961, 2009, indicates around 11 functions that should be assigned to Districts, 13 functions to municipalities and 16 to metropolitan assemblies under Schedule One and Two of LI 1961. Schedule 2 functions are those that require legal review before transfer. Although the legal framework is in place, there have been challenges in implementing the assignments owing to a combination of factors that include unwillingness of politicians to facilitate transfers on the stated reason of lack of capacity, resources and skills at the assembly level. Incomplete functional assignments despite an enabling regulatory framework raise important issues relating to the political commitment to decentralization.

The National Decentralisation Policy (2010) commits to the principle of fiscal decentralization where “finances follow functions” and thus seeks an equilibrium between the functions that are transferred to MMDAs and accompanying fiscal resources through the totality of resources available under the District Assemblies Common Fund (DACF), District Development Facility (DDF), budgetary allocations (budgets of decentralized departments plus transfers for payment of MMDA staff) and internally generated funds (IGF) plus other miscellaneous transfers.

In 2011, the Fiscal Decentralisation Unit (FDU) updated a draft Inter Governmental Fiscal Framework and action plan to facilitate fiscal decentralization reforms and set out a policy and vision. The key components including requirements for expenditure and revenue assignment, intergovernmental fiscal transfers, borrowing, budgeting and financial management articulate Ghana’s fiscal decentralization policies and vision.

From a fiscal governance perspective, the challenge, however, is that most of the laws that provide public financial management guidance have been drafted from a very centralized perspective
and do not address specific PFM issues at the local assembly level. Unfortunately, the Financial Memorandum (FM), which guides sub-national public financial management, is simply a set of administrative instructions and not an Act of Parliament and thus does not provide the requisite legal backing for fiscal decentralization. There is an important need to review the FAA and FAR and prepare a comprehensive Public Financial Management law with substantial local consultation to regulate the PFM processes at MMDA level in line decentralization policy.

**Inter-governmental fiscal transfer (IGFT) framework**

The IGFT framework for urban local authorities has the appearance of a relatively sound structure for fiscal devolution based on three core elements of: (a) discretionary formula based block grant allocation comprising 7 per cent of total national government revenue routed through a District Assembly Common Fund (DACF) intended to provide certain, predictable and equitable revenue to local authorities; (b) performance-based grants funded by donors under the DDF and UDG with a minimum conditional prerequisite; and (c) internally generated funds as OSR from business licenses, rates, fees, permits and fines based on the legal revenue assignments and authority under the decentralization framework.

While the IGFT combines all the elements of devolved financing as a package of funding for local authorities, the main issues are with regard to the various elements of this package, the main issue here being that the quantum of funds received by local government under the DACF as an unconditional block grant allocation, as well as through performance-based grant funds (DDF and UDG) is grossly insufficient to meet the recurrent funding needs for effective O&M and the capital funding required to address a long pending urban infrastructure gap. While the total quantum of funds has increased over the years, the allocation principle and political imperative of creating ever-more MMDAs means that the resources are spread thinly across a larger number of MMDAs, which have multiplied from 170 to 216 in just 8 years. At the same time the application of the formula is not that clear to many assemblies given many unilateral deductions, although they are broadly aware of the criteria.

**District Assembly Common Fund**

The DACF is an unconditional block grant transferred to local authorities based on a formula approved by Parliament and administered by the DACF independent administrator who reports to the President. MMDAs have no direct input into the formula, which is based on indicators that are maintained and updated by MoLGRD. In 2014, the DACF allocation formula was based on an equality factor, which had a weightage of 45 per cent, a service delivery need factor with a weightage of 45 per cent, service pressure factor (to account for rural-urban transformation) with a weightage of 4 per cent and last a responsiveness factor (to measure DACF’s initiatives for enhancing locally generated financial resources) with a weightage of 6 per cent. The factors identified for block grant allocation cover the key elements of urban services; however, a 45 per cent weightage-to-equality factor, coupled with the fact that the number of MMDAs has risen sharply over the last few years, skews the allocation against the large and medium-size cities that have a relatively higher service delivery and infrastructure investment requirement. This skewed allocation formula distorts the capital supply to urban local
authorities under DACF and severely restricts their ability to invest in capital projects for long-term service delivery.

Before disbursal, the DACF provides each MMDA with an estimate of its likely receipts for that year, and from that the MMDA is requested to provide an estimate for the supplementary budget. Each MMDA must submit a budget and work plan against which its allocation will subsequently be monitored quarterly at the MMDA level. Once MoF has concluded all its fiscal mobilization efforts for the year, the DACF funds are disbursed based on the formula above. Although the budget is constructed based on the trend of allocation, the final allocations can be higher or lower than the estimate. However, in reality, fund disbursements are invariably significantly less than the estimated allocation (in the range of 30-40 per cent of total allocation) because of unilateral deductions at source by central government (MoLGRD). Deductions at source comprise a variety of statutory deductions for capacity development and contingencies as well as other unilateral deductions for centralized bulk procurement of equipment and/or services to be supplied to assemblies in areas such as sanitation, waste, public health, roads and drains, etc. While the main rationale here being that that centralized procurement will provide greater leverage to negotiate price reductions on account of bulk purchases, the process severely undermines MMDA autonomy in planning and decision making and reduces the transparency of such procurement, given that MMDAs are not party to all financial data. This provides scope for additional charges and fees to be hidden within a larger contract, with MMDAs having to bear the full cost of such additions. MMDAs rarely gain access to all the procurement information and have little knowledge of the full contract details and costs, which makes it difficult for them to answer any third-party questions. This also makes it difficult for service planning, as there is limited control over all inputs and costs.

Table 3.1: Total DACF allocations and disbursements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Projected Tax Revenue (5-7.5 per cent) (A)</th>
<th>Actual Disbursements (B)</th>
<th>Difference (B-A)</th>
<th>Percentage of Releases (B/A)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>122,002,500</td>
<td>149,287,390</td>
<td>27,284,890</td>
<td>122.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>236,197,500</td>
<td>217,008,095</td>
<td>(19,189,405)</td>
<td>91.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>345,687,483</td>
<td>188,565,425</td>
<td>(157,122,058)</td>
<td>54.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>434,484,802</td>
<td>340,402,619</td>
<td>(94,082,183)</td>
<td>78.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>530,738,000</td>
<td>487,895,081</td>
<td>(42,842,919)</td>
<td>91.93</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
An illustration of the deductions in DACF is presented below based on the details shared by the Kumasi Metropolitan Assembly.

**Table 3.2 DACF for the Kumasi Metropolitan Assembly**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(In Cedis)</th>
<th>Projected</th>
<th>Q1</th>
<th>Q2</th>
<th>Q3</th>
<th>Q4</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Allocation</td>
<td>2,258,618</td>
<td>468,181</td>
<td>395,529</td>
<td>513,628</td>
<td>482,476</td>
<td>1,859,816</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Deductions</td>
<td></td>
<td>264,100</td>
<td>262,885</td>
<td>313,142</td>
<td>235,266</td>
<td>1,075,395</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total net transfer</td>
<td></td>
<td>204,080</td>
<td>132,644</td>
<td>200,486</td>
<td>247,209</td>
<td>784,421</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per cent Deductions</td>
<td></td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actual disbursement as per cent of total allocation</td>
<td></td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Performance-based grant funds: DDF and UDG**

Performance-based grants have been supported under the bilaterally funded District Development Facility (DANIDA, KfW and CIDA) and the multilaterally funded (World Bank) UDG, which provides funds for metropolitan and municipal assemblies provided they meet the DDF performance criteria. These funds are intended to help strengthen fiscal devolution through the provision of a discretionary grant to MMDAs routed through GoG. The District Development Facility provides a total of US$80m alongside a GoG contribution. Under this facility, MMDAs can access DDF block grants assuming they demonstrate compliance with a set of minimum conditions and a number of performance criteria in urban governance and accountability, planning, procurement, finance (budgeting, reporting, auditing) revenue, assets, etc. Some MMDAs have adopted the practice of hiring consultants to prepare their FOAT reports so as to help present progress in a manner that will help to obtain a higher score. A recent audit report of the DDF by PriceWaterhouse Coopers highlights the prevalence of this practice across many MMDAs.

While the concept of a performance-based grant allocation system is widely appreciated as a useful mechanism to strengthen fiscal decentralization in Africa and Asia, it is extremely important to ensure a robust measurement system is in place if it is to incentivize improved performance in a genuine manner. Furthermore, it also critical to supplement performance-based grant allocations with a comprehensive and integrated capacity development intervention. In the absence of this, MMDAs may adopt the malpractices of fudging performance reporting.

In the Ghanaian context, both the performance-based grant funds (DDF and UDG) are predominantly funded by international development partners, with abysmally low contributions from the national government, which raises some important questions about the importance, ownership and sustainability of such mechanisms in the overall decentralization context. Second, the total quantum of funds routed through such grants is cumulatively less than the DACF “unconditional” grants and are insufficient for MMDAs to plan and implement long-term capital or operational expenditures (see Table 3.3). Last, it is important to note that even the performance-based grants suffer from delays in...
disbursement and predictability issues similar to those of DACF, which is a major deterrent in mainstreaming such a system to reward improved performance. Looking at the overall framework for DDF and UDG, one obvious question is why two parallel mechanisms exist and why they can’t be integrated to establish one unified performance grant system.

**Table 3.3 DACF and DDF per region**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>DACF</th>
<th>DDF</th>
<th>DDF as percentage of DACF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Greater Accra</td>
<td>3,54,48,715</td>
<td>99,10,127</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brong Ahafo</td>
<td>6,73,65,059</td>
<td>1,82,76,441</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Region</td>
<td>3,59,89,810</td>
<td>82,59,309</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Region</td>
<td>3,67,91,988</td>
<td>86,52,277</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Region</td>
<td>4,44,43,116</td>
<td>1,16,84,183</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ashanti Region</td>
<td>7,65,36,653</td>
<td>1,72,00,779</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern</td>
<td>4,15,52,107</td>
<td>1,78,79,907</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volta Region</td>
<td>3,78,70,067</td>
<td>87,05,459</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U/E Region</td>
<td>1,69,71,469</td>
<td>67,66,805</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U/W Region</td>
<td>1,58,80,776</td>
<td>1,04,60,114</td>
<td>66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>40,88,49,760</td>
<td>11,77,95,401</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Other transfers**

Other transfers comprise stool land revenue, which consists of rents, dues, royalties, revenue and other payments, whether in the nature of income or capital from stool land; direct releases from ministries, departments and agencies to finance deconcentrated, delegated and devolved functions as per LI 1961 (Schedule 1), such as Agriculture, Community Development and Feeder and Urban Roads, among others; and other development expenditures from vertical statutory funds, such as the Road Fund, the Ghana Education Trust Fund, the Ghana Health Service and the National Health Insurance Fund, which fund services at the local level. Last, there is a separate GoG establishment grant routed through the Local Government Service Secretariat (LGSS), which covers the establishment expenditure for all LGS staff working in MMDAs other than the lowest grades, with pay scales equivalent to the central civil service. This transfer is a simple credit-debit to the MMDA account and the MMDA has no role in varying the rates.

**Fiscal governance issues: IGTF**

The current inter-governmental transfer (IGFT) system has evolved incrementally into a vertically and horizontally fragmented system of grant channels, some of which are earmarked and/or deducted at source. This largely emanates from the lack of clarity governing functional devolution and
accompanying fiscal devolution and is further complicated by the underlying political economy of
decentralization in contemporary Ghana. Currently, multiple fiscal instruments transfer funds to
MMDAs for both capital and recurrent expenditures. The volume of funds available for MMDAs has
been gradually increasing, in particular because of the increase in the DACF. However, the funds
available for MMDA investments fall significantly short of financing large-scale urban infrastructure.

The inter-governmental fiscal transfer system in Ghana, while sophisticated in terms of the types
of transfer, is limited because: the volume of funding is highly unpredictable; the timeliness of
transfers is not adhered to as per the existing regulations, leading to substantial delays; and the
formulas and principles for allocation and disbursement of individual grants are not fully consistent,
transparent and predictable.

Because it is dependent on CG resources for capital expenditures, MMDA PFM is affected by
volatilities in the overall intergovernmental system, unreliable intergovernmental transfer ceilings
coupled with unpredictable budget flows, all of which contribute to serious failures observed in
procurement at the MMDA level, including the accrual of high levels of expenditure arrears; the
development of informal credit arrangements with suppliers, which facilitates abuse, undermines
competition and can distort the implementation of planned expenditures; and the practice of
procurement slicing (breaking bulk procurement). Service delivery is negatively affected by the
approval of the budget after the beginning of the fiscal year. This is compounded by unpredictability in
the amounts and timing of CG transfers to MMDAs; delays in these transfers undermine planning and
the efficient implementation of local development projects within the budget year, particularly in terms
of procurement for supplies and building works.

The DACF is the most significant and hence the most critical mechanism of the IGFT in Ghana,
as it provides discretionary funds to MMDAs for capital investments and recurring operational
expenditures. Over time, the total quantum of the devolutions under DACF has gradually increased in
line with the economic growth; in real terms, however, the DACF multiplied by only a factor of three
because of inflation. In 2005, the DACF level was 1,048 billion Old Cedis (US$116.5 million)
(Farvacque-Vitkovic et al. 2008). With the adjustment of the overall allocation in 2009 from 5 per cent
to 7.5 per cent of total revenues, the total envelope of DACF increased drastically, from 114 million
cedi in 2006 to 812 million cedi (US$406 million) by 2012, to 1.4b cedi (US $710 million) by 2013.
However, the DACF management framework is characterized by three important features that affect
financing of MMA activities. First is the allocation formula applied to the DACF, which is skewed
towards rural districts compared to urban in terms of transfer per capita by the weightages assigned to
various factors, specifically the equality factors. Second is the actual disbursements to MMDAs, which
are significantly lower vis-à-vis the overall allocation because of unilateral deductions at source by the
central government, for reasons mentioned above and where the DACF has been applied to provide
financing to institutional beneficiaries, MP funds for priority programs in MMDAs, national
government priority programs and finance-specific interventions in local governments through
earmarks and deductions; this results in a reduction in the overall amount available as discretionary
grant for MMDAs. Hence, there has been an increased level of deduction and earmarking of the DACF
over the years and a declining trend in the overall envelope of DACF funds transferred directly to
MMDAs. Third, the unpredictability and delayed disbursements of actual allocation and disbursements
have severely affected the local authorities’ annual budgeting, planning and implementation cycle and
their fund utilization capability. Together, these three glitches in the DACF mechanism have been a major challenge in strengthening the overall fiscal decentralization framework and in particular have limited the strengthening of financial and institutional capacities of MMDAs to address the priority investment requirements at the local level.

Most of the other miscellaneous transfers are tied in nature and are related either to deconcentrated services or delegated services, and eventually MMDAs do not have much of a role to play apart from being an efficient implementing agency. However, in a local service delivery perspective, this is an important element that needs to be mainstreamed as a robust tied grant funding mechanism.

In this context, while IGFTs are and will continue to be an important source of revenue for the MMDAs, one of the major objectives of the fiscal decentralization framework in Ghana must be to build up a sub-national financing framework and enhance the borrowing capacities of the MMDAs to reduce their dependence on budgetary support.

3.3. Municipal financial management

Internally generated revenue

Internally generated revenue (IGR) mobilization and effective revenue management are key elements of effective fiscal decentralization and play a critical role for successful sub-national infrastructure financing. While in a developing country context such as Ghana, the IGFT provide the bulk of revenues, there remains a substantial financing gap when it comes to local infrastructure and service delivery. The importance of IGR is particularly pronounced in the Ghanaian context where the IGFT is not completely robust, reliable and efficient in terms of providing adequate, timely and reliable funds to MMDAs, and there is a long pending and huge backlog of infrastructure and service delivery investments in the urban sector. IGRs are thus a key source for closing some of this gap.

Parts VII and VIII of the Local Government Act, 1993 (Act 462), allow Assemblies to mobilize revenue in the form of fees, fines, rates, rents, trading services and licensing and all those revenues specified in the sixth schedule of the Act. The main sources of IGF are fees and fines, basic property rates, tolls and licenses. Fees are a major source of IGF, comprising revenues collected from building permits, market trading, lorry parks (dedicated parks with fees at different rates for lorries, taxis, buses, marriage registration, use of toilets publicly or privately operated). Property rates must be understood in the context of Africa, where property taxation is constrained by underlying issues associated with the fact that significant amounts of land remain vested in traditional forms of ownership. These are not well defined into formal units of property with corresponding title and rates. There is also a general reluctance to value land for rating purposes partly because of lack of cadastres and information about property values or rental value and the lack of transparent land market (see chapter on Planning and Land). MMDAs are the rating authorities, and chiefs and traditional authorities are barred from making or levying rates. Rates may be general over the entire district or assembly area or a special rate may be levied over a specified area for the purposes of a project approved by the assembly. A general rate may be a property rate on landed premises payable by the owner; a rate on possession tends to be restricted to vehicles and cattle. A special rate may be a basic rate payable by all persons between the ages of 18 and 70 who reside in the area in return for provision of basic amenities. Rates on landed premises are
insignificant in many rural areas but important in the urban context. Exempted properties include educational and charitable premises, hospitals and clinics, churches and cemeteries and foreign missions. Central government may make payments based on contributions as agreed with the MMDA. Public boards and statutory corporations are obliged to pay rates on premises. Each MMDA is required to appoint a five-person rate assessment committee to which petitions against property valuation are directed. An appeal can be made from a decision of the Committee to the High Court.

The Land Valuation Division of the Land Commission is the authority responsible for setting and revising the rateable value, which should be undertaken every five years as stipulated in the Local Government Act. MMDAs may engage consultants to undertake the valuation, but this must be approved by the Land Valuation Division, which will fix and assign the value. This is then submitted to the MMDA rate assessment committee followed by a reasonable level of public consultation before the rate is finalized. There is a general tendency in the process to maintain lower rates across the board on the pretext of affordability. The valuation method is a land-used-based system that depends on type and location of land, access to facilities and amenities and land-use type, building footprint and type of materials. It does not factor in the actual value of land or the prevailing rents and the gap between the rents. The gap in actual market or rental value between properties in under-serviced areas and those in high-end areas is generally very high, as in all developing countries, but if this is not reflected in the valuation affordability means there is a bias in favour of higher-income citizens. Thus it is clear that, although the MMDAs have a significant role in determining property rates, they are constrained by the prevailing method of valuation as well as by local political and social imperatives.

Fees, Charges and Licenses

The 6th schedule of the Local Government Act lists some of the areas for fees and charges, including slaughterhouses, market dues and stalls, trading kiosks and cattle pounds. Licenses are issued for many items such as hawkers, hotels, entertainment, bars, petrol stations, lorry parks and self-employed artisans. MMDAs may also undertake trading activities for which revenue is charged. Another related source of IGR is rents for serviced market facilities and other municipal spaces.

MMDAs in principle have full legal authority over all such revenue sources, and the assembly holds an annual fee-fixing consultation that brings together stakeholders from various associations to discuss rates in addition to holding several town hall meetings with communities at the zonal level (electoral areas). MMDAs also broadcast the rates to the public for wider feedback and discussion.

The level of internally generated revenues is low for most MMDAs; either the rates are set altogether too low (often because valuation of land and properties or setting of fees has not been updated for decades) or tax collections are inefficient. However, for some of the larger cities, OSR is increasingly important; thus, between 2009 and 2012, the total OSR for the six metropolitan areas grew from 22 million to 44 million cedis, and the level of OSR as a share of total budget increased from 32 per cent to 44 per cent, although there are marked differences between cities. Some of the MMDAs have adopted different approaches to implement revenue augmentation reforms focused primarily on property tax, including street naming and property tax rating. The two successfully implemented models are described below.
In the first model, GiZ has been building the internal capacity of MMDA staff to implement property tax improvements through a programme of street naming and GIS. In this model 46 MMDAs are supported by GiZ to implement street-naming and property tax rating reforms as a key initiative to enhance OSR of MMDAs. This has entailed providing finance and training to the pilot MMDAs to enable them to develop a robust and accurate property tax database. Bilateral funding has been used to enable MMDAs to acquire satellite images or aerial photographs and train MMDA staff to digitize and geo-reference the images to demarcate streets and properties and to survey properties to collect details on building type and characteristics to compile a property cadaster and prepare an update property tax register. This initiative has enabled MMDAs to acquire skills and expertise to undertake property tax surveys and mapping and enhance revenues by as much 300 per cent in property tax in one or two cases. Overall, the initiative has led to discernible increases in property tax revenues in more than 20 MMDAs, with marginal gains in others, although the costs of technical expertise has been disproportionately higher than the increases in tax. The initiative is now planned to expand to cover 56 MMDAs.

In the second model, some MMDAs have outsourced all aspects of property tax survey, mapping, billing and collection to a private contractor. Tema Metropolitan Assembly, for example, has contracted GEOSYS to undertake all property tax management in return for a 30 per cent share of total tax proceeds collected. Here, the private contractor has prepared detailed property map layers showing streets and properties from high-resolution aerial photographs. This has enabled the contractor to develop a sufficiently robust property tax database showing all the key features of tax objects without having had to undertake lengthy and cumbersome surveys, which can be the subject of significant dispute between property tax owner and assembly. This has also eliminated the role of traditional municipal tax inspectors, many of whom had a vested interest in manipulating tax data and blocking reforms.

Both models have been successfully implemented to date in terms of addressing the institutional-level capacity issues either through internally focused capacity-building initiatives or by engaging with the private sector and have a potential to be replicated elsewhere. Most of the MMDAs in real terms (absolute Revenue increases) have recorded increments in the internally generated revenues over the last 5 years. Major metropolitan assemblies such as Accra, Tema and Kumasi have recorded progressive and stable increases in IGR. Accra Metropolitan Assembly recorded a 24.5 per cent increase in IGF to total revenue over the previous year (2009); with a further 37 per cent and 12 per cent, respectively, for 2012 and 2013. There is evidence that revenues have increased as a share of MMDA budgets across all cities compared with earlier studies (such as, Farvacque 2008, reviewing MMDA performance in FY2004). However, both Cape Coast and Tamale have seen a reduction in IGF as share of total budget.
Table 3.4 MMDA revenues

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MMDA Revenues</th>
<th>Share (percentage)</th>
<th>Million Cedis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DACF Direct Transfers</td>
<td>29.7</td>
<td>409</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDF</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other GOG transfers (compensation)</td>
<td>31.2</td>
<td>430</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DP funding</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGF</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1378</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Based on Budget for 170 MMDAs - 2012)

**Fiscal governance issues: IGR**

Despite the progress observed, there are still clear indications that OSR collection for municipal and district assemblies remains very unstable and susceptible to change. The main challenges identified include poor target setting; inability to institute the right strategies to raise revenue; inadequate institutional mechanism (technical staff and logistics) to exploit new revenue potential; inefficient distribution and collection of bills; and suppression of bills by revenue collectors. For specific revenue types, recent data indicate that both property rates and land revenues are deteriorating in terms of collection efficiency.

**Legal and administrative issues for IGR augmentation**

A slew of issues must be addressed for optimal IGF performance relating to legal, administrative and institutional aspects, which are mentioned in a detailed manner in the annex.
Capacity Requirements
The main capacity constraints facing MMDAs include the following:

- Lack of expertise in spatial planning, geographic information system (GIS), valuation and revenue forecasting
- Infrastructural and technological inadequacies, which include the non-existence of robust database on rate payers, as well as appropriate software to facilitate effective revenue management
- Absence of a billing and collection software to provide a regular basis of tracking collections
- Low capacity of revenue collectors; most of the Assembly’s own collectors are old, less educated and sometimes cannot read and write
- Inadequate logistics, which makes revenue mobilization and collection difficult. Methods of revenue collection and accounting are also rudimentary and unreliable
- Leadership commitment and political interference that hinder IGF mobilization and collection
- Leadership commitment that determines the extent to which resources and personnel are committed to IGF mobilization; political interference from higher authorities frustrates revenue collectors and the assembly leadership in enforcing penalties
- Poor adherence to financial management regulations, which is of great concern and needs to be streamlined.

Expenditure Management
Expenditure management, one of the key aspects of local government finances, involves both capital expenditures as well as recurrent operational expenditures. The trends of municipal expenditures vary from country to country depending on the overall service delivery status as well as the resources available with the local governments. Municipal capital expenditures in Ghana are relatively high as compared to other countries in the region, mainly because the entire establishment cost is the responsibility of the central government (LGSS) and is not paid out of the main MMDA transfer and development grants. Although the overall budget envelope available relative to needs is small, capital expenditures typically amount to between 60 per cent and 90 per cent of MMDA total expenditures, while 80 to 95 per cent of the capital budget is financed by grants and external funds, especially in the case of district assemblies (PPF Study 2011). The capital expenditure amounts to an average of 12 Ghana cedis (around US$6) per capita per year, with large differences among MMDAs. This is still far short of the estimated infrastructure needs, estimated at around US$80 per capita per annum (Farvacque 2008). The high level of grants for capital expenditures skews local finances. The low weight assigned to current expenses must be interpreted correctly; central ministries often support some recurrent expenses, whereas the delivery of services is often financed by the private sector. In the case of Ghana, 90 per cent of the DACF is dedicated to capital expenditures, emphasizing the dependence of MMDAs on central grants for development. As a result, MMDAs tend to allocate almost all IGF on recurrent expenditures: Kumasi, Tamale, Sekondi Takoradi and Ho spend on average 88 per cent of their IGF on recurrent expenditures.

Analysis of expenditure data indicates that most MMDA investment projects are relatively small and fragmented and focused on education and health sectors with a minor share invested in trunk
infrastructure such as roads and sanitation. Data also indicates that projects tend to be relatively small between US$20,000 to US$60,000 per sub-project (refer to DDF reports, UDG reports), far below what is required for transformative infrastructure investments.

The fragmentation of capital expenditures relates to the points made above on the lack of coordination of investments and expenditures and lack of economies of scale of investments. The combination of many stakeholders, parallel and unpredictable funding flows, and different uncoordinated planning and implementation at the national and local levels, increases the risk of inefficiency in investments resulting from coordination failures.

Table 3.5 Fragmentation of capital expenditures budgets

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Items</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Ghana Cedis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central Administration</td>
<td>47.20%</td>
<td>65,00,41,453</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance</td>
<td>0.20%</td>
<td>33,29,811</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education Youth and Sports</td>
<td>13.60%</td>
<td>18,79,34,539</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>5.50%</td>
<td>7,58,65,669</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waste Management</td>
<td>4.50%</td>
<td>6,23,87,255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>6.80%</td>
<td>9,35,27,679</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical Planning</td>
<td>1.00%</td>
<td>1,38,17,730</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Welfare, Community Development</td>
<td>0.80%</td>
<td>1,06,51,639</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural Resource</td>
<td>0.10%</td>
<td>9,61,786</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Works</td>
<td>16.00%</td>
<td>22,08,52,753</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade and Industry</td>
<td>0.40%</td>
<td>49,54,541</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budget and Rating</td>
<td>0.20%</td>
<td>27,55,630</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>5,33,190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>0.30%</td>
<td>44,91,010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disaster Prevention</td>
<td>0.60%</td>
<td>87,53,290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban Roads</td>
<td>2.70%</td>
<td>3,69,52,099</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Birth and Death</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>3,90,861</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>1,37,82,00,935</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3.4. Financial reforms

Sub-national infrastructure financing (SNIF)

Based on ACT 462, 1992, MMDAs are permitted to borrow only GHC 2000 (US$50) and this has not been revised to date. For any borrowing beyond this amount, the MMDAs need the permission of central government, which has deterred them from borrowing to date. While MMDAs don’t borrow for the long term, some take quasi-credit from the bank as overdraft facility, and some even construct PPPs to leverage loans. In 2008, a draft bill was prepared to review the borrowing threshold and presented to Parliament on two occasions but could not be passed into law. From the responses obtained from the two ministries MLGRD and MOF, it was observed that the two attempts to review the limit failed because of the limited participation of MOF.

The central government is currently working on a Local Government (Borrowing) Bill, 2016, with the main objective of allowing the MMDAs to borrow from the market for infrastructure development and to establish a Local Government Lending Agency. The memorandum of the bill mentions that the earlier two attempts failed because they had tried to bring together four different aspects of local government finances relating to revenue mobilization, local government borrowing, local government administration and management as well as PPPs, which made it over-complicated and difficult to be taken up by the Parliament. However, in 2015, the incumbent national government reinstated the focus of this bill to be reformulated and presented in the Parliament as an enabling framework for municipal borrowing for infrastructure financing. The newly proposed bill, while allowing the MMDAs to borrow for short-term, medium-term and long-term investment needs, also introduced adequate checks and safeguards to ensure that the MMDAs do not borrow beyond their debt-servicing capacity and that municipal borrowings do not add up to the financial burden of the central government. The bill also clearly established the institutional and financial framework for setting up a corporate local government lending agency. On the other hand, it faces the danger of not being passed by the end of this year, which would imply its curtailment because of parliamentary rules requiring the completion of the cycle before the end of a legislative life (of 4 years ending December 2016).

Fiscal governance issues: SNIF

While the newly proposed local government borrowing bill addresses the key elements at the policy level that are essential pre-requisites to establish an enabling framework for municipal borrowing, it is important that this bill have the required political and administrative backing at the national level. It is also critical to provide relevant capacity-building support, because commercial borrowing will require that MMDAs be able to demonstrate high levels of creditworthiness in terms of adequate, reliable and secured internally generated revenue sources that can be securitized and leveraged for market borrowing; adoption of commercial borrowing practices, including financial reporting, accounting, budgeting and planning; transparency and accountability in the overall financial management systems, including expenditure management internal and external audits; and improved institutional governance, including local service delivery units with sound financial health, fiscal prudence and governance. In addition, the central government will also have to establish procedures and instruments for providing credit enhancement support to the MMDAs through budgetary support for debt servicing.
or through sovereign guarantees. In this context, while enacting the local government borrowing bill is a major stride, it is only the first step, and it needs to be taken forward in a focused and persistent manner to ensure development of a sustainable municipal borrowing framework for MMDAs to address their priority investment requirements in the long run.

**Municipal financial management**

The key elements of the municipal financial management that define fiscal governance in any country include budgeting, accounting, auditing and financial reporting practices. Together, these determine the strength of the financial architecture of local governments and hence levels of financial governance – transparency and accountability (Venkateswaran 2015). The robustness of these systems affects the creditworthiness of local governments, as measured by municipal credit ratings required for market borrowing, which are now mandatory in countries such as India and optional in others such as Mexico (Slater & Goyal 2015).

In Ghana, MMDAs have adopted the Ghana integrated financial management information system, which is based on double-entry modified cash-based accounting with budget and accounting heads as defined in the National Accounting Manual 2003. The system records transactions when cash is spent, and the system is modified as it discloses the extent of liabilities. There is a requirement to convert to accrual accounting and valuation of assets (which will then be depreciated over time) but MMDAs at present have no clarity on how to value various types of assets such as municipal roads. Hence there is a need for the government to provide clear definitions and formulae for asset valuation. For auditing, the MMDAs have an internal auditor as well as an external auditor, Ghana Audit Service.

**Fiscal governance issues: municipal financial management**

The central government adopted composite budgeting for all MMDAs from 2015 onwards. The Composite Budget for 2015-17 was to be prepared based on all funding sources. Budget ceilings disaggregated by MMDAs by sources of revenues include estimated DACF. MMDAs are required to review their current data on revenue collection and the fee-fixing resolutions of the current year. To improve on the IGF mobilization, MMDAs are also required to review IGF collection strategies and produce a report on the revised strategies as a part of budgeting. However, once the MMDAs submit the budgets to the Ministry of Finance, the budgets are normally pruned down on account of fiscal prudence and lack of availability of resources at the national level. An example of how this works in practice is from Tema Metropolitan Assembly, which initially budgeted in 2014-15 for GHC 54 million; this was later revised down to GHC 46 million in the absence of an anticipated sanitation project grant, but finally Tema received just GHC 34 million, a GHC 12 million shortfall.

From an urban governance and service delivery perspective, robust financial management is critical to local government functioning and in turn depends on the consistent, timely and reliable transfer of devolutionary funds as per the budgetary allocations as pointed out above. The systemic weaknesses prevailing currently in the financial management systems at the national and sub-national levels are severely influencing the whole cycle of planning, budgeting and implementing projects and services within MMDAs.
3.5. Politics and fiscal governance

The MMDAs are perceived to be over-politicized and under the control of the two dominant political parties. The actions of the opposition party at any point when progressive reforms are being tabled by an incumbent government have tended to undermine the reform process required for effective determination of functional and fiscal assignments, owing to political vested interests, and such cases are not specific to fiscal management but are part of the wider canvas of development. For example, frequent changes in the National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) and School Feeding Programme management are clear cases in point. The two functions have been decentralized and recentralized. For example, while NPP decentralized these functions to the MMDAs, NDC upon assumption of power recentralized the management of these functions.

Bird & Vaillancourt (2008) have argued that national government tends to perceive MMDAs as unreliable in implementing priority projects that are of interest to the central government. In Ghana, this situation has led to the recentralization of some basic functions such as provision of classroom blocks and aspects of public sanitation that are clearly local government functions. Such situations arose because of the perception by central government that the MMDAs have neglected their functions as provided in the Local Government Act, 1993 (Act 462).

Furthermore, political clientelism complicates the IGFTs in a major way. During election campaigning, the two main political parties (NDC and NPP) compete forcefully for votes through promises to the electorates to provide the quality services the MMDAs is perceived to have neglected. These are then termed as government priority projects. After winning votes and realizing that the available funds cannot meet the needs of mandated functions of the MMDAs, funds are earmarked from the DACF to undertake these projects or carry out manifesto promises on behalf of the MMDAs, which undermines the very spirit of decentralization, as these functions are a core responsibility of the MMDAs. This whole system of earmarking and deducting funds severely impacts the efficiency and robustness of the IGFT framework in an already challenging environment where the national government is facing financial stress that limits the resources available with the MMDAs to address priority investment needs. In addition, there is a constant political struggle between MPs and the ambitious MMDCEs, who are politically driven. Here, MMDCEs are perceived to have advantage over the MPs in managing the provision of key basic services for vote (capture) from the DACF. The MPs, in an attempt to leverage their disadvantage, have also succeeded in allocating a percentage from the DACF annually to the MPs constituency fund, in order to be able to implement their projects and programmes in exchange for votes. The implication here is that the very functions transferred by the Act 462 and LI 1961 to the MMDAs are being gradually recentralized in the name of government priority projects and MPs constituency projects from the DACF to the detriment of direct transfers to the MMDAs. In 2012 and 2013, this practice led to a reduction of the direct transfer to MMDAs to 25 per cent and 33 per cent, respectively. Thus, in these years, 75 per cent and 65 per cent, respectively were retained by central government and MPs’ priority projects.

DACF is a major source of revenue to the MMDAs. Over the years, the DACF has suffered various deductions, defeating the purpose for which the fund was set up, i.e., to be shared with MMDAs for development in the assemblies. Out of the total allocation of 7.5 per cent to DACF by the national government, for the period 2012, 2013, and 2014, the total deductions were 66.79 per cent,
71.3 per cent, and 70.2 per cent, respectively. The discretionary direct transfer to the MMDAs was 33.27 per cent, 28.97 per cent, and 29.2 per cent for 2012, 2013 and 2014, respectively. The implication is that MMDAs are not able to implement their MTDPs. In addition, all over the world, sanitation is a key function of local governments; however, in Ghana sanitation is one of the major functions that central government deducts from DACF to implement. This again reflects the lack of clarity over the assignment of functions and finances between the central government and the MMDAs.

The evidence above clearly demonstrates a continuing conflict between the vested interests of the national government and the sub-national governments, coupled with institutional and governance issues that together have a debilitating effect on fiscal governance and financial management of MMDAs in the core area of service delivery.

### 3.6. Conclusion and policy implications

Inter-governmental fiscal transfers remain an essential building block for sub-national financing because they provide the bulk of revenue in almost all decentralization contexts. This is particularly true for developing countries where IGTs constitute the largest single source of local government revenue. In Ghana, MMDAs substantially depend on the IGTs, and this has constrained overall fiscal devolution on account of the shortage of funds and the unpredictability of fund flows and delayed disbursements as seen above. The IGT framework in Ghana has emerged over a long period of time and is fragmented, with institutional weaknesses that need to be researched further and addressed in a comprehensive manner. In a number of countries in Africa, the share of local government revenue derived from national resources has decreased in recent years (Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, Uganda, Senegal, Tanzania, and Togo) (United Cities and Local Governments 2010).

The division of responsibilities and expenditure between local authorities and central governments is often unclear. The responsibilities of local authorities are written into the Constitution or the laws of most countries in Africa, except for Tunisia and Niger, for example, but there is a major divergence between de jure and de facto practice. This is the case, for example, in Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt, Ethiopia, Rwanda and Algeria. The responsibilities granted to local government are often shared among several local levels and the state (ibid).

In the case of Ghana, as seen above, performance-based grant systems such as DDF and UDG, as well as the main IGFT mechanism through DACF, allow adequate discretionary powers to the local governments to plan and utilize the allocated financial resources. However, the constraints are more on the quality and the quantity of the funds being made available to the local governments, which severely impact the expenditure management systems and eventually urban service delivery.

In the wider African context, there has been less decentralization of revenues than expenditures. United Cities and Local Governments (2010) highlight the local share of total government revenues for 24 countries. In 17 of these countries, local government revenues represent less than 10 per cent of public revenue and, in 13 countries, represent less than 5 per cent. Only Tanzania and Rwanda exceeds 20 per cent, followed by Ethiopia, South Africa and Nigeria (15-19 per cent). In some cases, inter-governmental transfers provide the vast bulk of revenue, which can be as high as 85 per cent-90 per
cent of local revenues, such as in the case of Tanzania and Uganda. In Egypt, local governments fully depend on shared taxes and transfers. In contrast, in Niger, Senegal and Togo, local taxes, fees and charges dominate local budgets. There, own revenues provide approximately two-thirds of local revenue. South Africa falls in this range, if shared taxes are included. However, in Niger and Togo, for example, the predominance of own revenue is not necessarily a sign of autonomy. Morocco and Kenya fall slightly below a 50/50 split in their balance between own revenue and transfers, and below this are Mauritania, Tunisia, Mozambique and Malawi. Own-source income for most local governments comes from a limited number of taxes, charges and duties. Many countries generate incomes from local services, but these are often insufficient to cover costs (United Cities and Local Governments 2010). The case of Ghana reinforces this trend, as internally generated revenue does not contribute significantly to local government total revenue (not more than 20 per cent-30 per cent at an aggregated level), although the situation within the country varies significantly between the large and the small MMDAs. There is an urgent need to focus on supporting the MMDAs at the policy as well as the implementation level to help them enhance the internally generated revenues and improve the local government’s financially autonomy and sustainability.

In the context of the research findings detailed above, the policy implications for both the Government of Ghana and MMDAs focus primarily on strengthening local government finances and ensuring effective fiscal decentralization. The government needs to focus on developing a robust policy and regulatory framework supplemented by a strong institutional framework for an objective and sound IGT framework commensurate with the contextual differences among the MMDAs, which will include improving the timeliness and predictability of funds flow and making the complete transfer mechanism more transparent, accountable and responsive to local demand.

There is also an urgent need for the policymakers in the Ministry of Finance and MoLGRD to review the current practices of DACF allocation, administration and disbursements to strengthen decentralized planning, budgeting and implementation for improved urban governance and service delivery. Furthermore, national government must focus on strengthening the performance-based grant allocation fund mechanisms already established through DDF and UDG. International experience has demonstrated that performance-based grants, if designed robustly and backed by sufficient incentives, can really drive the local governments to improve local governance and service delivery performance. The Government of Ghana must focus on policy-level initiatives to leverage on their existing systems by improving the institutional architecture and ensuring convergence horizontally and vertically.

The next most important policy focus needs to be on creating an enabling policy and regulatory framework for tapping the potential of internally generated revenues at the local level to enhance the financial sustainability and autonomy of the MMDAs. Here, policies and implementation guidelines need to be put in place for clear functional assignments coupled with clear legally defined revenue authorities corresponding directly to the services to be delivered by the MMDAs, followed by developing handholding and support mechanisms to help the MMDAs strengthen their local institutional systems and capacities to enhance the coverage and billing efficiencies. The policies need to support a two-pronged strategy to enhance MMDA’s internally generated revenues: augmentation of the already defined local revenues sources and expansion by identifying new revenue sources.
One of the major constraints in improving urban service delivery is the inadequacy of funds at the local level to undertake priority capital investments for addressing the long-pending infrastructure gaps in the cities. As highlighted in the analysis above, the quantum of discretionary funds under IGFTs through DACF, DDF and UDG available with the MMDAs for capital investments is significantly short of the requirements, while IGRs are more focused on meeting the recurrent operational expenditures. Hence, the government needs to focus on developing sub-national infrastructure financing mechanisms to enable MMDAs to access non-budgetary sources of funds for capital investments in the long run. The central government must take forward the enactment of the local government borrowing bill 2016, which also includes establishment of a local government lending agency.

Key Issues
High dependence on central and external assistance and a poor own-source revenue base have meant little stability in planning, and reduced scope for market-based borrowing. The IGFT framework is fragmented, with division of responsibilities and expenditure between local authorities and central governments unclear. Performance-based grant systems, as well as the main IGFT mechanism, allow adequate discretionary powers to local governments to plan and utilize financial resources; however, constraints remain on the quality and the quantity of funds being made available to local governments. This has negatively affected the expenditure management systems and eventually urban service delivery. In Ghana, as in the rest of Africa, internally generated revenue does not contribute significantly to local government total revenue (not more than 20 per cent-30 per cent at an aggregated level), although the situation within the country varies significantly between the large and the small MMDAs.
4. Urban planning and governance

4.1. Issues in planning

In the wider SSA context, this chapter considers the effectiveness of planning policy, legislation and the management of the planning functions at the local level in Ghana, focusing on its relationship to urban governance in the Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies (MMDAs). The chapter draws on the extensive knowledge of local researchers in urban planning issues in Ghana, on interviews and workshop activities carried out by the research team in April 2016, and on local urban planning and governance-related reports and published works.

Ineffective urban planning is a major factor contributing to the failure of urban governance to deliver urban services and infrastructure on a scale sufficient to address the great challenges posed by rapid urbanization in Ghana, as across most of SSA. Urbanization is occurring in a largely unguided way. The consequences include the exploding low-density, mainly informal and unserviced urban sprawl eating up farmland on the periphery of the major cities, dense inner-city slums that in most cases are lacking basic services, inadequate waste management and growing traffic congestion and pollution.

There is a longstanding and evolving literature on the role of urban planning in developing countries that analyses its critical role in addressing economic and social development priorities (Devas & Rakodi 1993; Hamdi & Goethert 1997; Taylor & Williams 1982; UN-Habitat 2009; Watson 2009; Zetter & White 2002).

UN-Habitat (2014) point out the “ubiquitous weakness of urban institutional and infrastructural capacities” limits the ability of Africa’s cities to cope with rapid urban growth affecting in particular medium-size and smaller cities, which carried three-quarters of urban growth between 2005 and 2010, and the expectation is that this trend will continue into the next decade (Ibid). Kessides (2005) emphasises that widespread urban poverty is not a “sign of failure of the urban economies in Africa,” rather it relates to “institutional failures that perpetuate social exclusion and inequalities between the urban poor and the urban non-poor.” The failure of the urban/land-use planning system is one of the major factors contributing to creating cities characterized by social exclusion, inequalities, informal settlements, pollution and traffic congestion (Harrison 2006; Njoh 1999).

Floater et al. (2014) emphasize the importance of poorly managed urban growth, which can reduce the economic benefits of urban concentrations and increase costs. Poorly managed growth is defined here as urban development that results in economic, social and environmental costs. Typically, unplanned subdivision of land and selling of plots of land for housing are resulting in scattered, unserviced low-density urban sprawl on the edge of cities. Retrofitting basic urban services to such areas is far costlier than if they were properly planned and serviced at the outset, so these rapidly become slums and add to the legacy of existing slums in more central areas. The costs and challenges of upgrading are therefore spiralling upwards.

In Ghana, planning in general – both socio-economic planning, which has assumed a leading role since colonial times, and physical/land-use planning – is recognized as a critical tool to guide development decisions and manage land, in the context of the rapid urbanization that the country has
experienced over the past half a century. However, there is little evidence that it has achieved any degree of success. The introduction of the urban planning concept in Ghana’s development trajectory by the colonial authorities was intended to formalize the informal approach to urban development. However, the ongoing strength of traditional forms of land tenure and governance, increasing competition for land, land tenure challenges, a weak and misused regulatory framework, and growing urban poverty and inequality have led to a haphazard pattern of physical development.

The chapter considers the effectiveness or otherwise of urban planning practices and legislation in Ghana within the broader context of its historical institutional development and decentralization policies. It notes, in particular, the pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial influences on Ghana’s institutional approach to urban and development planning and land governance and summarizes the current status quo at the national institutional and local levels of planning practice. Some recent efforts towards improving urban planning in Ghana are analysed. The subsequent sections of the chapter cover the critical areas of urban land markets and land governance, noting the continuing central role of the traditional authorities and recent efforts towards reforming and improving land administration. The final sections summarize the political economy influences on urban land planning and management and set out some preliminary policy recommendations.

4.2. Modernist planning approaches

Urban planning and land policy and legislation in Ghana in precolonial and colonial times

Historically, human settlements in Ghana and other African countries were developed as traditional settlements shaped by indigenous land tenure systems, land-use arrangements, and kinship and religious ordering of communities (Okpala 2009). Large pre-colonial cities in Africa such as Kano or Ibadan in Nigeria, Sekondi-Takoradi in Ghana and other trading cities such as Mombasa in Kenya were all successfully governed based on traditionally meaningful planning practice that ensured that physical structures conformed to traditionally established arrangements and cultures.

Formal urban planning was introduced to Ghana through the creation of town councils in 1877 by British colonialists as a strategy to manage poor sanitation and hygiene conditions by decongesting overcrowded neighbourhoods and removing unsafe and insanitary structures as well as improving transport and communications (Quarcoopome 1993).

The British Colonial Governor, Gordon Guggisberg, in a first attempt to promote nationwide urban and development planning, introduced a 10-year Development Plan for the country between 1920 and 1930. This plan included institutional development and strengthening, with a goal of filling half of the colony’s technical positions with Africans as soon as they could be trained. The focus was on improving infrastructure development across the country, prioritizing transportation, water supply, drainage, hydroelectric projects, public buildings, town improvements, schools, hospitals, prisons, communication lines and other services. The plan led to the development of an artificial harbour at Takoradi, Ghana's first port, and Achimota College, which developed into one of the nation’s best secondary schools (McLaughlin & Owusu-Ansah 1994). The Guggisberg plan led to the provision of important basic infrastructure that remains central to Ghana’s economy today.

This plan was regarded in general as successful and one of the first of its kind in the world to integrate institutional strengthening with economic and physical development, although Guggisberg
did not see it through to its full implementation as he was replaced in 1927 (Adarkwa 2013). Fuseini and Kemp (2015) explain that, although no reason for Guggisberg’s replacement was provided, it was generally believed amongst sections of Ghanaian society that his efforts were empowering local residents to become politically conscious, and that could have threatened colonial rule.

It is often argued that the replacement of Governor Guggisberg created a vacuum in land-use/physical planning efforts in Ghana as the 10-year Development Plan suffered implementation challenges following his departure. Another reason for the planning hiatus during the period was the inception of World War II, to which Britain diverted human, logistical and financial resources, including those of its colonies.

The introduction of the Town and Country Planning Ordinance (Cap 84) in 1945 provided a comprehensive land-use planning framework for ordering human activities, but suffered initial implementation challenges. The Cap 84 emerged out of, and was based on, the post-war restructuring of planning initiatives in metropolitan Britain, extended to the colonies to provide accommodation for war veterans and local educated workforce and to plan for increased urban growth. The Cap 84 built on and retained key elements of the Guggisberg plan.

The Cap 84 established the Town and Country Planning Department (TCPD) to plan and manage the growth and development of human settlements in Ghana, with the objective of promoting efficiency, orderliness, safety and health (Cobbinah & Amoako 2012). The Town and Country Planning Board of TCPD was mandated to formulate and implement planning schemes.

Although the Cap 84 was passed to guide planning across the country, Fuseini and Kemp (2015) note the limited geographical scope of colonial planning efforts, which focused on areas with exploitable resources. They note that the top-down and European-centric nature of planning and the strict implementation and enforcement guidelines were subsequent constraints to implementation.

Nevertheless, because of its strictness and enforcement system and the low levels of urbanization at the time, urban planning was mostly perceived as successful, leading to good landscaping scheme, particularly along roads, and with few apparent cases of poor environmental sanitation. Given this, and subject to various subsequent amendments, the post-colonial planning, and contemporary land-use planning and physical development in Ghana is still founded on the ideals of the Cap 84 Ordinance.

4.3. Post-independence urban planning (1957-1990)

Urban planning, particularly land-use planning, remained spatially skewed when Ghana gained independence in 1957, favouring the resource-rich southern sector that had enjoyed most colonial investment. President Kwame Nkrumah aimed to bridge this development gap through a nationwide industrialization programme. A 7-year Development Plan (1964-1970) was introduced, underpinned by a socialist philosophy, to accelerate rapid transformation of Ghana’s economy, from a predominantly rural and agrarian to modern and industrialized one. The emphasis was on import substitution and on self-management by Ghanaians to meet their own aspirations. This plan also placed greater emphasis on infrastructure development and was driven by a national development agenda, aimed at establishing industries across the country, including agro-processing, meat and shoe factories.
Before the launch and implementation of this plan, sections of the Cap 84 were amended in 1958 (Act 30 of 1958) and 1960 (Act 33 of 1960), making it more responsive to the development needs and aspirations of the Ghanaian citizens. One result was the transfer of land-use/physical planning functions from the Town and Country Planning Board to a minister responsible for Town and Country Planning, although the basic guiding principles of the Cap 84 remained (Fuseini & Kemp 2015).

Institutional capacity to implement the plan was strengthened through the establishment of planning departments across Ghana. By declaring other cities, particularly Tamale, as planning areas in 1959 and through the first city planning schemes in 1964, the plan made the first attempt to roll out planning efforts beyond the colonial planning areas of Accra, Kumasi and the Sekondi-Takoradi. The policy innovations led to the planning and construction of 52 new urban settlements, including Tema Township. Others (Inkoom 2009) suggest that Nkrumah’s plan paved way for the promotion of planning education in Ghana through the establishment of the Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology (KNUST) in 1963.

Other planning efforts were accelerated during the decade, including an order from the Director of Town and Country Planning in 1969 directing all regional and district planning departments to prepare a 15-year long-term physical/land-use plans for their respective areas. A National Physical Development Plan (1963-1970) was initiated to guide land-use/physical development of economic and social infrastructure to ensure spatial equity in development and correct the bias in development investments that dominated the colonial urban planning. However, the coup that toppled Nkrumah’s regime in 1966 brought the National Physical Development Plan initiative to a halt.

More generally, planning for industrialization in the “new nation” had implications for urban planners. Even where support from planning professionals was forthcoming, urban planners were overwhelmed by the scale of growth in urban population and its associated increased demand for housing, basic services and infrastructure that occurred following the end of World War II.

For example, Accra’s population increased over 200 per cent between 1950 and 1960 (Wood 1970), with net migration contributing about 97.8 per cent and 66.1 per cent, respectively, to the city’s population between 1948 and 1960 and 1960 and 1970 (Songsore 2009). This pattern of urban growth – both population and land-use/physical development – spilled over the official administrative boundaries of major Ghanaian cities such as Accra, Kumasi and Takoradi into neighbouring settlements during this period, as reflected in the 1984 census (Songsore 2009).

Despite Nkrumah’s efforts to ensure balanced socio-economic and physical development across the country, investment remained skewed towards the better-served urban centres of the south, with cities including Accra, Kumasi and Sekondi-Takoradi attracting many industrial establishments and serving as attraction points for job seekers and migrants (Fuseini & Kemp 2015). These three cities combined had about 80 per cent of all industrial establishments in Ghana during the time (Songsore 2009). According to Fuseini and Kemp (2015), the challenge of regional spatial development inequity that characterized colonial urban planning persisted and has never been resolved.
4.4. Contemporary urban planning (1991-2016)

The urban challenges of today are seen to be rooted within the poor performance of post-colonial planning efforts. Earlier commentators observed that the inability of urban planning to regulate rapid urban growth, dating from soon after World War II, was a consequence of lack of foresight by urban planners and lack of urban planning capacity (Wood 1970). To Obeng-Odoom (2010), urban planning in Ghana has continued to operate on a piecemeal basis, emphasizing reactivity rather than a proactive approach.

These views need to be considered in the light of the impacts of the liberalization of Ghana’s economy that has considerably influenced urban development from the 1980s onwards. In parallel to the boost that deregulation has given to all forms of informal development, both physical and economic, the policy approach of neo-liberalism downplayed the role of urban planning in general and the master plan-led approach in particular, in favour of an “urban management” concept. This became important in the early 1990s as a response to the issues emanating from the ongoing rapid urban growth.

By the mid-1980s, Ghana’s research and policy concerns responded to the adoption of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) to restore the country’s deteriorating economy. The neo-liberalism agenda, which included the introduction of the decentralization policy in 1988, yielded some positive outcomes on urban growth through increased investment, despite the negative effects of the programmes on formal sector employment (resulting in an initial slowdown in urbanization in some areas). These included an improved transport sector and system, increased participation of the private sector and individuals in housing provision, and provision of basic infrastructure, particularly roads and electricity (for example, the northern part of Ghana was, for the first time in history, connected to the national grid in 1991, despite the production of power in the country since the 1960s).

In the 1980s and 1990s, there was an increasing focus on the Metropolitan, Municipal and District capitals. This orientation was capital city infrastructure-focused, at least in the sense of seeking to prepare and assist these district capitals to perform their administrative and development functions adequately in the more decentralized governance system. The liberalized economy was an avenue for stimulating and encouraging private retail businesses. This was adopted by large numbers of Ghanaians, including retrenched formal sector employees, resulting in considerable growth in the informal sector that has persisted and grown more significant, complicating the urbanization dynamics of Ghana.

In Obeng-Odoom’s (2013) view, the critical issue was how to correct the skewed urban development in favour of southern Ghana, and increased investment in the district capitals was regarded as one approach. Adarkwa (2013), Fuseini and Kemp (2015) and Obeng-Odoom (2013) wrote at length on the diverse functions and outcomes of these economic programmes and the decentralization policy in mediating the adjustment of spatial equity in terms of urban settlements distribution, and decongesting existing cities.

Ghanaian cities continued to grow rapidly under the neo-liberal and globalization-led policies, with Accra’s population having grown by over 300 per cent over the past 20 years. Even cities that
benefited far less from globalization, such as Tamale in northern Ghana, witnessed considerable growth in both population (116 per cent) and spatial expansion (137 per cent) between 1984 and 2000, with accompanying private investment in housing and growth in informal sector. However, as noted in the introduction to the monograph, regional disparities have persisted and become entrenched with much higher levels of poverty including increasing urban poverty, which remains apparent in the northern and even central regions of Ghana.

A new model of land-use planning was introduced to address issues resulting from liberalization and decentralization processes. The 1992 Republican Constitution of Ghana strengthened and cemented this new planning model through key legislation such as the Local Government Act (Act 462 of 1993), the National Development Planning Commission (NDPC) Act (Act 479 of 1994), the National Development Planning System (NDPS) Act (Act 480 of 1994), and Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Act (Act 490 of 1994).

These earlier phases of planning legislation were aimed at setting out a framework within which planning practice would operate in decentralized and cooperative manner with other institutions such as the EPA. These initially were based on empowerment of the local government sector (MMDAs), which had the responsibility and mandate for planning all human settlements, and further strengthening of the NDPC to exercise a supervisory role over all the planning functions at the MMDAs to ensure consistency between local and national development goals (Owusu 2004). These functions were supported by the Local Government Act (Act 462 of 1993), section 10, sub-section 3, which states that the MMDA (Republic of Ghana 1993):

- is responsible for the overall development of the district and shall ensure the preparation and submission, through the regional coordinating council, of development plans of the district to the National Development Planning Commission for approval
- shall formulate and execute plans, programmes and strategies for the effective mobilization of the resources necessary for the overall development of the district
- shall promote and support productive activity and social development in the district and remove any obstacles to initiative and development
- shall initiate programmes for the development of basic infrastructure and provide municipal works and services in the district
- is responsible for the development, improvement and management of human settlements and the environment in the district.

Other sections of the Local Government Act (Act 462 of 1993) (for example, Section 12, sub-section 1) state that the MMDAs are mandated to perform any other planning functions that may be assigned by legislation. Planning in the decentralized regime was intended as a viable strategy of promoting local-level participation. There was recognition of the role of cooperation between local communities and their elected MMDAs representatives in identifying, pursuing and championing matters of local importance into national development planning through the District Planning Coordinating Unit (DPCU) established by the Act 462 at the MMDA level for onward approval by the NDPC.

The Act 462 devolved overall land-use planning functions at the national level to a Statutory Planning Committee (SPC), with membership spanning several land-related agencies including EPA,
DPCU, Lands Commission, Survey Department, Customary Land Secretariat (representing traditional governance system), Department of Urban Roads, Ghana Water Company Limited, and Electricity Company of Ghana, with the TCPD as the secretariat. The SPC is charged with ensuring sustainable and efficient physical development across all human settlements in Ghana, through needs assessment, design of planning schemes and approval and implementation of plans. The SPC is expected to review every planning application, but this function will be performed by the District Spatial Planning Committee in addition to others, according to Section 35 of the Land Use and Spatial Planning Bill, 2016.

Current statutory planning practice in Ghana

From the discussion above, it might be assumed that Ghana has an effective urban planning structure, policy and institutions, basically amenable to the philosophy of sustainable development – that is, ensuring balance between socio-economic development and environmental conservation. In reality, however, the practice of urban planning in Ghana over the past two decades has failed to prevent a state of growing blight, informality and haphazardness. Despite the advent of the decentralized planning system and the optimism for improved urban management, urban planning has deteriorated in practice (Adarkwa 2013; Amoateng et al. 2013; Cobbina & Amoako 2012). This has resulted from a series of inadequacies, distortions, contradictions and conflicting factors that include:

- Socio-cultural elements (for example, land tenure systems, poor service delivery, livelihood stress)
- Political factors (for example, activities of traditional leaders, poor enforcement of planning legislation)
- Economic issues (for example, growing informal activities, urban poverty)
- Institutional factors such as under-resourced urban planning agencies, lack of co-ordination as well as limited public knowledge on urban planning matters (Boamah et al. 2012; Cobbina & Amoako 2012; Kasanga & Kotey 2001).

Evidence of poor institutional collaboration has been widespread, particularly among planning agencies (the TCPD, the Survey Department and the Lands Commission). Although the issue of poor coordination was recognized and addressed through the passage of the Lands Commission Act (Act 767 of 2008) to bring these institutions together to facilitate effective collaboration, there is evidence of mistrust and a sense of self-importance among the agencies, with a big divide along professional lines.

Fuseini and Kemp (2015) found that economic and social planners are separated from physical/land-use/spatial planners, with the first consistently preferred by the MMDAs in resource allocation. Effective, successful and integrated planning that considers both socio-economic issues and land development is limited, leading to poor urban planning outcomes.

Concerns have also been expressed about the different institutional affiliations of the major urban planning institution, the Town and Country Planning Department. The TCPD is the sixth land agency operating in Ghana under the control of the Ministry of Environment, Science and Technology. Its functions are decentralized to the MMDAs, being to conduct land-use planning, prepare planning schemes and issue building permits. While at the national level the TCPD is aligned and draws its
authority from the Ministry of Environment, Science and Technology, the department operates under the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development at the MMDA level. Although in many jurisdictions this might not be a problem, this divided affiliation does not support the operations of the TCPD, particularly in resource allocation.

According to WaterAid (2009), the department is constrained by the incoherence of various planning laws and regulation, insufficient skilled manpower and inadequate equipment and logistics. Only 80 out of 170 MMDAs have a Town and Country Planning office (Ibid). In institutional constraints, Fuseini and Kemp (2015) observe that a whole northern region, the largest region in Ghana in land size, is served by only nine qualified physical planners across the 26 MMDAs. With a ratio of about 1:3 coupled with limited logistical support, many MMDAs are rendered ineffective in carrying out their planning functions.

The situation in the south and central parts of the country is better, but town planning capabilities are limited in every location. In the assemblies that the research team visited in GAMA, Ashaiman Municipal (population 190,972 in the 2010 census) and Ledzokuku Krowor Municipal (population 227,932), the only planners represented at face-to-face meetings were the senior (economic) development planners, although there were very small town and country planning units producing maps and layouts and/or processing development permits. The situation was similar in Kumasi despite a 2010 population of 2,035,064 to cater for. There was no evidence of urban planners working on policy, and any policy documents were largely economic policy reports framed according to the stated national development policy priorities.

According to an Africa Planning Association (APA) and UN-Habitat’s “The State of Planning in Africa” joint report (2014), Ghana had only 150 accredited planners in 2011-12 relative to a population of nearly 27 million, whereas the UK had 150 times as many registered planners for a population less than three times as great. Similar huge disparities in the professions exist between other rich world countries such as the United States and Australia.

A small ad hoc survey of small and larger local planning authorities in the UK suggests an average of about one planner for every 15,000 of the population in the local authority area, more for smaller authorities and relatively fewer for the largest authority (40 planners, not all qualified, for a city of 800,000). This is close to the U.S. average of planners working in the public sector of 1:12,000. The UK examples are in urban areas where the pace of development is almost certainly considerably slower than in SSA.

However, taking these as an initial indication of the kind of benchmark Ghana would be looking at to manage all ongoing development effectively, a city the size of Kumasi would need at least 10 times the number of planners it has the moment, with a third of these being policy or development planners and an equal size of support staff required to help process planning permissions. Ghana is not the worst-off SSA country by any means; Burkina Faso had only 14 registered planners for a population of nearly 17 million in this survey. Some countries have a smaller capacity, though others such as Nigeria and South Africa are doing rather better but still a fraction of the richer countries.

Ghana is relatively fortunate in having had planning established as an academic discipline at KNUST during the Nkrumah period. This is the main planning school with two undergraduate
programmes – development planning and settlement (spatial) planning. In 2008, there were 600 students across 4 years of the programmes, in the proportion 3:1 development planning: spatial planning (Inkoom, 2009). However, to meet the demands of development control, much larger numbers of spatial planners need to be trained.

As with most SSA countries, planning and building permits are dealt with in one development permission process. An outline planning permission is required, and a Town and Country Planning Application is submitted as part of the building permit application. In Ghana, there is a widely-held perception that having obtained a building permit, applicants can put up whatever property they want on their land (Mate-Kole & Kow Essuman 2015). However, the Towns Act of 1892 that still applies in Accra and some other towns, and the Local Government Act of 1993 (Act 462), which applies elsewhere, have a rigorous set of requirements, including building inspections at various stages after construction has started before a final certificate of completion for habitation can be issued. Inspection of ongoing construction is carried out by building inspectors attached to the public works and architecture departments of the MMDAs, but as with trained planners and other built environment professionals, there is a lack of professionally trained building inspectors (Town and Country Planning Department 2010).

Even if and after a certificate of completion for habitation is issued, the Authority has powers to inspect to ensure that the building is safe for habitation (although this seldom happens). Where a building falls within the definition of an unauthorized building (either has no permit or is being built outside the scope of the permit), fines can be levied and the District Planning Authority has the power to remove, alter or pull down the building (Mate-Kole & Kow Essuman 2015). In reality, these things seldom happen and only when buildings collapse and a tragedy occurs do the authorities respond to the issues. As Mate-Kole and Essuman (2015) remark, “the general public should be educated on what steps they ought to take in putting up buildings in accordance with the law.”

Several key constraints on the issue of development permits emerged in discussions with senior local government officials. First, an application requires a registered title deed. As noted below, it is commonplace for those wanting to build a dwelling to obtain through informal land markets and not bother with registering title with the Lands Commission. Second, in urban areas, costly professional expertise is required as architects’ building plans are required and engineers’ reports may be needed. Third, the building permit itself is expensive.

Given that the requirements for getting permission to erect a building in Ghana are hardly less onerous or relatively expensive in terms of professional support than they would be in a richer country, and that Ghana has a per capita income 1/20 that of a country like the United Kingdom, it is not surprising that most building developers find ways around the legal process.

It was noted in discussions with officials that building permits represented potentially a major source of revenue, with charges far higher than other types of fees levied by the local authority. In the case of one assembly, it was noted that inspectors can be bought-off relatively easily at a lower cost, informally, and even attempts to incentivize them by offering 10 per cent of the full permit fee collected were insufficient to overcome the problem.
Ongoing initiatives in urban and spatial planning policy development

There are two major recent planning policies initiatives – the Ghana National Urban Policy Framework (NUPF), which came into effect in 2012, and the Land Use and Spatial Planning Bill (LUSPB) pending before Ghana’s Parliament since 2011.

The National Urban Policy Framework was in response to issues including the uncontrolled and haphazard urban development, worsening environmental quality, weak urban economic performance, limited infrastructure and services, and increasing vulnerabilities and exposure of urban residents to disasters such as flooding, urban poverty and slum proliferation, as well as weak urban governance and institutional coordination (Ministry of Local Government 2012). The goal of the NUPF is to “promote a sustainable, spatially integrated and orderly development of urban settlements with adequate housing, infrastructure and services, efficient institutions, and a sound living and working environment for all people to support the rapid socioeconomic development of Ghana” (p. 21).

While the key policy prescriptions and initiatives of the NUPF (Table 2) are considered plausible by Fuseini and Kemp (2015), there are reservations. For example, there is no evidence to support the claim that creating new growth centres and promoting the growth of small and medium-size towns would ensure fairness in the redistribution in urban population and address many of the urban development challenges – for example, poor sanitation, poor urban planning and poor infrastructure services. Obeng-Odoom (2013) has already pointed out that there could be concurrent growth at both the new and established growth centres.

Table 4.1 Some policy objectives and initiatives of the Ghana National Urban Policy Framework (NUPF)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy objective</th>
<th>Initiative for implementation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>i. To facilitate balanced redistribution of urban population</td>
<td>• Create new growth points as counter-magnets to fast-growing cities such as Accra and Kumasi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Promote accelerated growth of small and medium-size towns, including district and regional capitals</td>
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<tr>
<td>ii. To promote a spatially integrated hierarchy of urban centres</td>
<td>• Spatially integrate regional and district capitals by transportation and communications facilities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Establish rural service centres and strengthen rural–urban linkages to promote agriculture and development of agro-based industries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iii. To promote urban economic development</td>
<td>• Target infrastructural investments in growth centres as the choice destination for investments and other economic activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Enhance the competitiveness of Ghanaian cities in regional and international context</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Ensure that urban planning provides for the activities of the informal economy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
iv. To ensure effective planning and management of urban growth and sprawl, especially of the primary cities and other large urban centres

- Ensure that investments and development will consistently and increasingly be directed towards targeted counter-magnet growth areas
- Ensure adoption of spatial planning framework
- Strengthen the use of remote sensing and Geographic Information Systems (GIS)

v. To ensure efficient urban infrastructure and service delivery

- Assess infrastructure needs of urban areas and mobilize resources to support infrastructural development
- Improve delivery and management of urban services and infrastructure
- Provide adequate technical capacity, equipment and operational funds to support waste management activities

vi. Strengthen urban governance

- Review, strengthen and resource the decentralized structures and substructures to make them effective in local governance
- Institute practical measures to continually enrich the capacities and outlook of key actors in urban development and management
- Probe and strengthen the institutional framework at the local level for effective coordination of urban development
- Establish special courts to handle issues pertaining to urban development

Source: Based on the NUPF (2012).

Not unexpectedly, issues of investment, capacity building and resourcing to support the policy initiatives have been raised. There are no specific indications of how the financial and human resources would be mobilized to implement these initiatives. This notwithstanding, there are prescriptions within the NUPF that, if given the needed attention, could lead to improved urban governance and planning.

For example, the Spatial Development Framework (SDF), a flagship policy in the Land Use and Spatial Planning Bill (LUSPB), is a strategic framework for implementing many of the NUPF objectives at the national, regional and district levels. The bill includes a joint-regional spatial development framework for multiple regions, where appropriate for two or more districts, district structure plans and local plans. However, the bill has been pending in Ghana’s Parliament since 2011, hindering implementation of the NUPF. The LUSPB seeks to restructure and reorient land-use planning to a more integrated system based upon the principles of sustainable development.

The LUSPB proposes a Land Use and Spatial Planning Authority (LUSPA) to implement its provisions, but with all the members of the board of the Authority to be appointed by the President in line with past practice. The bill further recommends that the Cap 84 be repealed in its entirety, with sections of Act 462 dealing with planning functions of the MMDAs to be amended to give more planning powers to the LUSPA, which some might conclude indicate a retrograde reinforcement of the central authority at the expense of the local. Although the bill has yet to receive parliamentary
approval at the time of writing, it is expected to pass before the current Parliament goes for recess. With the repeal of the Cap 84 and sections of several other laws such as the LI 1630, 1996 and Act 462, 1993, according to the draft bill (clause 201), the Town and Country Planning Department will cease to exist after a 60-day transition period and be replaced by the Land Use and Spatial Planning Authority (Ministry of Environment, Science, Technology and Innovation 2016).

The draft bill makes no mention of the fate of the Statutory Planning Committee, so it might be assumed either that it continues in existence or is replaced by the proposed Regional Spatial Planning Committees according to clause 29, that these “shall act in accordance with the directives of the Regional Planning Coordinating Unit and take into consideration the Regional Development Plan prepared by the Regional Planning Coordinating Unit.” (Ibid.) The Regional Spatial Planning Committees will be the Technical Committee of the Regional Planning Coordinating Units (See Section 25 Subsection 2 of the draft bill).

Amendments to Acts 479 and 480 of the NDPC are proposed to include spatial planning within the scope of development planning (Fuseini & Kemp, 2015). The bill requires the “establishment of an inter-sectoral approach to decision making in spatial planning in accordance with the development objective of government to attain a coordinated approach to development” (Ministry of Environment, Science, Technology and Innovation 2016).

The bill states that “The Authority may recommend the making of further regulations regarding the spatial planning matters to be taken into account in the creation of districts.” The bill proposes zoning plans. When referring to existing uses that do not match, the current ones takes two approaches. If the previous use was in accordance with the Town and Country Planning Ordinance, 1945 (Cap 84), and any related law then in force, it is valid under this Act. If not, compensation will not be paid and demolition is possible (see section 109).

Criteria on blighted areas: A District Assembly may require acquiring an area for redevelopment; or ask the owner to redevelop the land to bring it to a required standard. The criteria for determining that an area requires redevelopment include the following:

1. Irregularity of plots or parcels;
2. Inadequacy of streets in the vicinity;
3. Lack of access to plots or habitable dwelling within the area;
4. Diversity of existing use which makes development control difficult or impossible;
5. Incompatibility with
   5.1. The existing or proposed use;
   5.2. The spatial development framework; and
   5.3. The structure or local plan;
6. Adverse impact on the environment;
7. Overcrowding leading to unhealthy population density;
8. Lack of sanitation, drainage or appropriate service;

9. High incidence of crime which has been confirmed to be attributable to the type of development; and

10. Safety or restriction to other authorised users.

It is notable that these characteristics, among others, essentially describe slum conditions. However, informality is not explicitly mentioned in the bill, except for section 180, which refers to “relocation of informal street activities and operations at alternative sites with extensive support services” (Ministry of Environment, Science, Technology and Innovation 2016).

4.5. Politics and planning

The 1992 Republican Constitution of Ghana places strong emphasis on devolving power away from central government and into the hands of local authorities. According to the Constitution, each district in Ghana has a district assembly, in fulfilment of a constitutional requirement of “ensuring accountability of local government, and empowering local people to be afforded the opportunity to participate effectively in their governance.”

Most members of a district assembly are elected by local people to assure they are directly accountable to the local electorate. However, the chief executives heading the districts are appointees of the President, while a proportion of assembly members are also directly appointed. The district chief executive is thus overseeing the implementation of government policy at the local level. The balance between top-down central power and bottom-up responsibility to the local community is thus tipped strongly in favour of central government. It should be noted that the distinction between the legal commitment to political decentralization and democratically local accountability and the reality of politically very weak and poorly resourced local authorities is certainly not unique to Ghana but is repeated across most SSA countries. Additionally, there is an issue of political representation in local democracy. At the district level, the situation is that only 7 per cent of elected members are women (CEDAW 2013). This compares to the national Parliament, where 10.9 per cent of seats are held by women, compared to the SSA average of 22.5 per cent.

Through the legislative reforms of the post-colonial era, Ghana has thus undergone a partial and incomplete process of decentralization of what remains a substantially centralized state. In principle, to support socio-economic and physical development at the grassroots level, Ghana is divided into 10 administrative regions replacing the pre-colonial traditional ethnic states. The decentralization policy introduced in 1988 further divided the regions into districts, which as noted above are intended to have an intermediary role in the devolution of planning responsibilities and which established the MMDAs as agents of development at the local level to facilitate effective local administration.

The MMDAs have their foundation in the decentralization policy introduced in 1988 and the Local Government Act of 1993. A district must have a minimum population threshold of 75,000 people (for example, Shama District), and a municipality consists of a single compact settlement with a minimum population threshold of 95,000 people and with a geographical contiguity and economic viability, as it provides basic infrastructural and other developmental needs from the monetary and other resources generated in the area (for example, Adenta Municipality). A metropolis, on the other
hand, has a minimum population threshold of 170,000 people and is usually a large urban centre with huge and vibrant economic and infrastructural services (for example Accra Metropolis).

The decentralization policy allows for the establishment of agencies of the formal governance system at the district level, to ensure (in theory) that development decision making and interventions originate from the local to the national level (bottom-up). However, officials of the assemblies remain employees of the central government, which reduces their autonomy and complicates their relationship to local political actors, who may or may not, in turn, reflect governing party interests.

Planning officers anywhere in the world may be subject to self-interested pressures from local politicians. However, while planning officers in the MMDAs are required to report to relevant committees that consider their recommendations regarding development proposals, as central government appointees they live under the threat of reallocation should they step out of line, and with a level of uncertainty that can undermine their commitment to the local polity.

Politically, the statutory planning efforts in Ghana have been hampered by the mainstream multi-party system to which the country has subscribed since 1992. According to Yeboah and Obeng-Odoom (2010), multi-party democracy has created cracks in urban planning efforts as it continues to breed political patronage which influences works to create negligence, impunity and counterproductive acts. Complicating matters further are the issues of red tape and high cost of compliance with planning and development requirements. This situation has arisen because politicians are driven by the desire to win or retain power, to the detriment of a well-planned or well-developed neighbourhood or community.

The President through an executive instrument may declare and name any area in Ghana as a district. To satisfy local political and tribal interests and curry favour with voters, large numbers of new districts have been carved out of the existing ones over the years. This has resulted in increasing fragmentation of local government administration and the creation of smaller and less viable local government units.

On the one hand, this undermines the continuity of information and practice within local planning authorities and adds to the insecurities of tenure of local planning officials. On the other hand, it constrains the remit of urban planners as far as the strategic planning of the emerging larger metropolitan areas around Accra and Kumasi in particular.

In the Greater Accra Region, for example, the original Accra and Tema metropolitan districts and two non-metropolitan districts before 1988, now consist of 15 separate districts. It was noted in discussions with officials that Ashaiman Municipal Assembly, formerly part of the Tema Metropolitan District, now subdivided into four separate assemblies, was established in response to local political pressures, but that there was a residual institutional overlap. According to Owusu “The practice of constantly creating new local government areas of jurisdiction has resulted in a fragmentation of large metropolitan areas. More importantly, while the existing Local Government Act calls for adjoining local government areas to work together, there is no enabling legislation to foster such cooperation among municipal and metropolitan authorities” (George Owusu 2015).

The post-colonial administrations were driven by nationalistic aims in the name of “modernization” but, largely in relation to land and planning, were continuous with and built on the colonial institutional framework, which in turn had accommodated itself to the realities of traditional
forms of authority, at each stage in line with the interests of ruling elites (Acemoglu & Robinson 2010). Thus, whether through an unwitting established “path dependence” (Acheampong and Ibrahim 2015; Cypher 2014; Mahoney 2001) or political expediency, urban policies and planning and land management practices transferred from the European context and frequently ill-fitted to post-colonial Africa have remained in place. Moreover, the land administration systems that “were established to implement them proved quite unable to cope with the rapid urban growth that occurred after independence” (Rakodi & Leduka 2004).

The fundamental constraints on the influence and practical exercise of urban planning in Ghana cannot be fully comprehended without a fuller examination of issues of land governance, the workings of land markets, and the political economy of land that forms the following chapter of the monograph.

4.6. Conclusion and policy implications

Despite the multiplicity of legislative instruments, plans and agencies, there has been little to show for it over the past decades. The challenges facing the implementation of urban planning policies and schemes coupled with lack of enforcement of planning requirements has generated deficiencies, distortions and conflicts in the ongoing development of urban Ghana, with resulting regional disparities, slum development, growing informal activities, haphazard development and urban sprawl, congestion and deterioration in transport system and services. While the metropolitan centres of Accra, Kumasi, Tema and Sekondi-Takoradi have clearly benefited from major investment in infrastructure and building development to some degree, large areas even of these cities, but certainly of the vast majority of urban development in the rest of Ghana, is sub-standard.

Introduction of the LUSPB gives a basis for some optimism in the attempt to rationalize and coordinate the past efforts of government that have resulted in such a profusion of legislative and administrative arrangements. The NUPF and Ghana Spatial Development Framework offer the opportunity for a coherent approach to spatial planning in the future and a basis to begin to address the regional imbalances in economic development that have persisted to this day. With ongoing urbanization, Ghana’s cities will undoubtedly be the drivers of future economic development across the country; hence, the importance of improving the national and inter-city infrastructure that connects them within a wider urban economic system.

Past metropolitan planning efforts, for example in GAMA, have failed to gain purchase in the face of the political fragmentation and the growing numbers of district assemblies. New metropolitan plans are being produced for the larger Accra and Kumasi metropolitan regions, while the new spatial planning legislation encourages and provides for greater regional coordination, including a joint regional spatial development framework for multiple regions and districts.

The huge challenges of implementation remain, however, and unless the capacity constraints begin to be seriously addressed, there is no reason to believe that new laws and organizational arrangement will fare better than those in the past. Moreover, the ongoing bias towards centralization and reluctance to implement a more fundamental process of political decentralization, with greater resources and autonomy at the local government level, will inevitably constrain the remit of urban planning.
Key Issues

The ongoing bias towards centralization and reluctance to implement a more fundamental process of political decentralization, with greater resources and autonomy at the local government level, has constrained the remit of urban planning. The challenges facing implementation of urban planning policies and schemes, coupled with lack of enforcement of planning requirements, have generated deficiencies, distortions and conflicts in the ongoing development of urban Ghana, with resulting regional disparities, slum development, growing informal activities, haphazard development and urban sprawl, congestion and deterioration in transport system and services. While the metropolitan centres of Accra, Kumasi, Tema and Sekondi-Takoradi have clearly benefited from major investment in infrastructure and building development to some degree, large areas even of these cities, but certainly of the vast majority of urban development in the rest of Ghana, is sub-standard. Past metropolitan planning efforts have failed to gain purchase in the face of the political fragmentation and the growing numbers of district assemblies.

The policy implications and recommendations are for the most part not new, but those that are not need to be constantly reasserted. These include the following and will be further elaborated in the policy paper:

1. A further freeing up of local planning authorities from the centrally driven policy agendas and greater responsiveness to the local, democratically elected bodies, local communities and civil society consultative bodies
2. Widening the participation of women in such bodies
3. Development planning and town and country (spatial) planning to be integrated under a single spatial and socio-economic planning organizational framework (see Acheampong and Ibrahim 2015)
4. Economies of scale and better use of existing planning and building control resources through shared provision across MMDAs and associated rural districts – building on the city regions and urban networks identified in the Ghana National Spatial Development Framework; consideration given to the creation of larger metropolitan planning authorities for the Accra and Kumasi city regions
5. Considerable strengthening of the local planning capacity and capabilities, with greater emphasis on providing the necessary local policy, development plans and spatial development frameworks and the professional capacity to produce, manage and implement these.
6. Training programmes to greatly increase the numbers of professionally trained planners, building inspectors and other built environment professionals, aiming at more equal gender representation
7. Investment in training and academic programmes in support of the professional training requirements
8. Simplified and less costly procedures for securing building permits in low-income areas. A community-based approach to urban upgrading and community involvement in the planning and development of urban expansion areas
9. An increased role for private consultancies in support of local planning authorities. Support for professional associations in developing quality assurance mechanisms, appropriate professional codes of conduct and framework agreements with local planning authorities

10. Encouraging the creation of local developers’ associations to work responsibility with the planning authorities

11. Focusing limited planning and development control resources on supporting strategic planning objectives – for example, protecting rights of way for future road alignments and other crucial infrastructure from encroachment by unauthorized development

12. The production of inclusive and participatory local urban and spatial development policies and strategies – not only zoning plans but full “master plans” that include written policies and guidance that addresses the range of local development concerns – economic, social, environmental and cultural

13. Phased and costed urban plans based on current economic realities, subject to frequent review and open to adaptation to uncertain future circumstances

14. The use of scenario planning to explore forward-planning strategies and options, especially for longer-term natural resource and environmental management in the face of climate change and urbanization pressures; building local resilience and sustainable development
5. Urban land markets, land governance and housing

It is not possible to understand the process of the ongoing physical development of urban settlements in SSA, or the evident failures of urban planning to contribute effectively to their management without considering the current status of urban land markets and land administration systems. Institutional issues and a lack of planning capacity are clearly critical. However, problems are deeply rooted in the historical structure and development of land tenure and land governance across the subcontinent, the constraints on the creation of functioning and transparent land markets and issues of political economy that arise from this (Durand-Lasserve & Royston 2002; Durand-Lasserve & Selod 2007; Payne 2004, Payne 2014).

In the traditional societies of pre-colonial Africa, land was regarded as an “unbounded resource to be used; not as a commodity to be measured, plotted, sub-divided, leased, pawned or sold” (Pottier 2005). During the pre-colonial period, “Land was vested within traditional leaders, families and communities, and controlled and managed through customary practices. Access to land was linked to usage and centred on agrarian practices, tribal villages and expansive settlements” (APA & UN-Habitat 2014). Without the concept of individual ownership of land, there was little regard for strict boundaries or conventional tenure arrangements as understood in the Global North.

The control of land by the colonial governments through a variety of laws and management systems adapted from the European context that focused on government control and notions of private property to protect economic interests of settlers was superimposed on varying indigenous land-use practices, invariably leading to dualistic land tenure and land administration regimes (AUC et al. 2009; Udoekanem et al. 2014). The reforms introduced by the colonial authorities aimed to commodify land and endow the administration with as much land as possible with little regard to traditional values or systems (Njoh 2003).

Across rural Africa, and to a surprisingly large degree across its urban areas, it remains a challenge to implement land legislation, and most resource users gain access to land based on local land tenure systems. Efforts at land registration have proved too slow and expensive for poor people to access. Even where implemented, they have proved a challenge to keep up-to-date. Generally, less than 10 per cent of rural land across the continent has been registered and remains largely subject only to customary land governance (Cotula et al. 2007; Deininger 2003). Within the boundaries of most cities, informal development predominates to a large extent over formally titled properties that are primarily the preserve of the middle class and elite who can afford to pay for titled land. In Accra, for example, according to a USAID report (2013), 65 per cent of its population cannot afford to purchase urban land.

On the expanding urban periphery, land in customary tenure is being sold and turned into “informal” layouts without the official recognition of or approval by government. These are technically illegal until they are registered with and approved by the government. In practice, however, because the formal process of obtaining land title is usually cumbersome and expensive, most informal house builders don’t bother with it, deferring only to local traditional authorities.

Land delivery systems based on legal concepts and administrative systems have proved unable to cope with the demands of rapid urban growth across SSA. There is little or no coordination between
the different arms of government that are responsible for land registration and management of land titles and land-use planning despite their close relationships or legislation to provide for this.

5.1. Land and urban governance issues

Historical land governance in Ghana pre-dating colonialism was grounded in traditional chieftaincies. The chieftaincy structure as a symbol of authority has lower-level portfolios such as elders, clan heads and traditional landowners, which facilitated governance of the wider communities. According to Ray (2003), quoted in Ubink (2008, p172), the stools, skins and other symbols of office also have a spiritual significance – “the chief deriving his power from the ancestors and mediating between the people and the ancestors.” During this period, governance and leadership were organized locally around ethnic and tribal groupings. Major ethnic groups such as the Asantes, Ewes and Dagombas were governed by different chieftaincy structures.

These traditional institutions served as custodians of indigenous traditions, customs and society (see CIKOD, 2010; Dokurugu, 2011 for detail analysis). The chieftaincy institutions exercised authority over stool and skin lands and other natural resources, settling disputes among factions of the society using customary laws and rules. Chieftaincy institutions used occasions such as festivals to embark on development projects, and were considered effective administrative structures with a well-ordered chain of command and hierarchy of authority.

From the mid-19th century, the natural resource-rich “Gold Coast” area came increasingly under British colonial administration with the emergence and growth of the early Europeanized settlements of Accra, Gold Coast and Sekondi. The British executive and legislative councils that advised the governor were gradually enlarged to include chiefs and other African representatives, initially from the coastal area, and much later from Asante and the Northern Territories (McLaughlin & Owusu-Ansah 1994). Following Lord Lugard’s principle of indirect rule, widely applied in British colonies in West Africa (Lugard 1965), traditional chiefs featured prominently in the formal system of governance and were made responsible to the colonial administrators. However, empowerment of the chiefs, which was useful to administer the territory, often came at the expense of wider local participation in governance of the area, its land and resources and, as argued by Amanor and Ubink (2008), a severance of the spiritual sources of the traditional authority of the chieftaincy.

The main challenge for the colonialists was to develop a governance framework that would allow for dilution of the established traditional governance system, in order for it to be integrated into the new colonial administrative system as a means of facilitating control and achieving cost-efficiency in governance, to ease the exploitation and extraction of indigenous natural resources. Thus, the land tenure system, which traditionally empowered chieftaincy institutions to control all lands, was modified through legislative and judicial processes based on English laws, with retention of some pre-colonial lands. This led to land commodification and a greater emphasis on the state role in land administration. This undermined the traditional system, as many chiefs became colonial agents and begun to lose their long-held community reverence as social discontentment among local people increased and formal/modern governance system emerged.

Following Ghana’s independence in 1957, the formal governance system was maintained and institutionalized. The relationship between the formal and traditional governance systems remained
ambiguous because of the colonial dilution of the traditional governance system. Regardless of differing political views, land administration rights were re-granted to the chieftaincy institutions in 1979 to operate alongside the formal governance system. The formal governance system was strengthened in the 1990s following the institutionalization of the democratic process and adoption of the 1992 Republican Constitution, which nevertheless recognizes both formal and traditional governance systems, upholds the authority of the latter, and divides land management into customary (traditional governance system) and statutory (formal governance system) tenures.

5.2. Land tenure and administration

Customary (private) and state/public land are thus the two basic legal categories of land ownership in Ghana. According to USAID (2013) and the World Bank (2013), 20 per cent of land in Ghana is legally owned by the state, with about 80 per cent of land being held by the customary owners (Djakoto & Opoku 2010). The same tenure distribution applies in both urban and rural areas, even in Accra (Ibid.) Public lands are defined as lands “compulsorily acquired by the government through the invocation of the appropriate legislation (State Lands Act, 1962, (Act 125)) or through any other statutes in the public interest, vested in the President, on behalf of, and in trust for the people of Ghana.” The statutory lands are managed by established formal institutions, notably the Lands Commission.

Land tenure in Ghana differs from that of most other countries (including African countries) because of the constitutional endorsement of the control of land by customary authorities (World Bank, 2013). Elsewhere in West Africa, in Northern Nigeria for example, the colonial authorities brought ownership of all land under the Crown, with the governor issuing statutory rights to occupy land for a given period. The right to use land was in line with traditional land tenure, which did not recognize individual ownership and was thus a method of formalizing customary practice, which was largely left untouched (Max Lock and Partners 1967; Max Lock Consultancy Nigeria et al. 2008). In Ghana, however, the British Government bowed to local pressures from traditional rulers and educated elites to back down on the proposed Crown Lands Bill (1894) and Lands Bill (1897) and retain traditional land practices in the legislation (Lumumba-Kasongo 2015).

Private lands in most parts of the country are in communal ownership, in principle held in trust for the community or group by a stool or skin as symbol of traditional authority, or by a family. National Land Policy (1999) defines customary land tenure as “The right to use or dispose of use-rights over land which rests neither on the exercise of brute force, nor on the evidence of rights guaranteed by government statute, but on the fact that they are recognized as legitimate by the community, the rules governing the acquisition and transmission of these rights being usually explicit and generally known, though not recorded in writing” (Ministry of Land and Forestry 1999).

According to WaterAid (2009) “customary lands support the livelihoods of the majority of the population in the country and therefore sustainable management of such lands is critical to the overall socio-economic development of the country.” While private land ownership applies in both urban and rural settings, its form varies across the country. In large parts of southern Ghana, customary land is vested in the stool, in the north customary land is defined as skin lands, and in other areas such as the Volta Region and in some traditional areas in the Central, Eastern, Greater Accra, Northern, Upper
East and Upper West Regions of the country, land ownership is vested in the family, individual or clan (Ministry of Lands and Forestry, 1999).

The customary land tenure framework includes several categories into which interest on land can be expressed under the Land Title Registration Law, 1986, PNDC Law 152. USAID (2013) identifies them as follows:

- **Alloidal title** is the highest form of customary tenure in Ghana. The stools, skins, clans or families are not subject to restrictions beyond that which is imposed by the laws of Ghana (Majeed 2010).
- **Freehold title** is derived from a freehold grant (by gift or sale) by an allodial rights holder. This type of title mostly exists in Greater Accra and Kumasi, and in pockets where chiefs gifted or sold stool land to private beneficiaries prior to the 1992 Constitution.
- **Customary freehold title** refers to the rights held by individuals or groups on behalf of the “owner” community, the title is conditionally perpetual, and holders may sell, lease or mortgage their rights.
- **Leasehold**: Alloidal title and freehold titleholders can grant leasehold to individuals.
- **Sharecropping** (abunu or abunya arrangements). Under an abunu arrangement, the sharecropper provides one-half of the harvest to the landlord; under abunya, one-third (Sarpong 2006; Ubink & Quan 2008; USAID 2013).

The National Land Policy (Ministry of Lands and Forestry, 1999) recognizes a further category, vested lands, where the owner retains the customary land ownership but the land is managed by the state.

USAID (2013) notes that with land, housing and agriculture markets expanding, the trend is towards individualization of land rights. Customary land tenure is being eroded in the south, notably in urbanizing areas, less so in the north. Urbanization in contributing to customary land is being alienated for development and transferred to outsiders, although many land transactions still follow customary practices, and the receiver of land is expected to offer a token payment to the original owner. With growing land pressures in urban and peri-urban areas, token payments have increased in value, such that now they are nearly equal to the market rates.

While formalization of land ownership is becoming more common in urban areas, rates of land registration remain very low throughout the country. According to USAID (2013), in peri-urban Accra, approximately 80 per cent of land transactions take place informally. The same source notes that 70 per cent of Ghana’s urban population lives in informal settlements, with a population growing at a rate of 2 per cent per year. According to UN-Habitat (2009), informal settlements in Ghana are characterized by insecure land tenure and poor-quality marginal land, with 56 per cent of inhabitants still without access to improved sanitation.

5.3. **Land registration process, legislative and institutional framework**

WaterAid (2009) notes the piecemeal and ad hoc manner in which the legal framework for land administration has developed from colonial times, “in response to specific issues or political dictates.”
There are now at least 86 land-related legal instruments often overlapping and conflicting and operating alongside the customary laws (Ministry of Lands and Forestry 2003).

Some of these laws still date from colonial times, for example, Town and Country Planning Ordinance of 1945 (CAP 84), the Deeds Registration Ordinance of 1883 and the Towns Act of 1892. Most of the acts that address the issues of land and planning reform have been promulgated in Ghana since independence:

- 1960, the Land Development Act (Protection of Purchasers)
- 1962, Land Registry Act (Act 122)
- 1962, State Lands Act (Act 123)
- 1962, State Lands Regulations (L.I. 230)
- 1962, Administration of Lands Act (Act 123)
- 1986, Land Title Registration Law (PNDC Law 152)
- 1999, National Land Policy

Despite the extensive legislation, land registration and titling procedures in Ghana have historically been cumbersome and expensive, and only a small minority of the population registered their land. Long and expensive procedures have discouraged most from going through the formal tenure and land administration systems, with impacts particularly on the urban periphery where uncontrolled development results in low-density urban sprawl with no basic service provision. It is these factors as much as any others that are holding back urban planning from addressing the pressing problems of rapid urbanization and regularized housing provision.

From the 1980s, the country began the process of reforming its institutional framework for land governance. In 1986, the Land Title Registration Act was enacted, introducing title registration as the official system to promote tenure security by registering the title rather than just the transaction. According to the World Bank (2013), only 30,000 out of 6 million land parcels are registered. Hacibeyoglu (2008) argues that the registration process was previously very slow and expensive, with an average turnaround time of 5 years to secure title to a private land transaction (Hacibeyoglu 2008).

In 2003, supported by international donors, the Land Administration Project was established “to stimulate economic development, reduce poverty and promote social stability by improving security of land tenure, simplifying the process for accessing land and making it fair, transparent and efficient, developing the land market and fostering prudent land management” (World Bank 2016b). In 2008, under the project, a new Lands Commission Act was established.
The Lands Commission Act merged four major land sector agencies, the Survey Department, Land Title Registry, Land Valuation Board and Lands Commission Secretariat, under the National Lands Commission. Up to this point, barriers to effective working in the sector included poor coordination among the existing land agencies, a lack of both human resource and systems capacity and a weak land registration system (USAID 2013). The four divisions of the new Lands Commission are:

- Public and Vested Lands Management Division, the main function of which is to acquire and manage government land
- Survey and Mapping Division regulates the survey, mapping and demarcation of land
- Land Valuation Division assesses land values to determine property taxes and compensation for land that is compulsorily acquired by the government
- Title Registration Division registers and records all land deeds and titles (World Bank 2013).

Land matters at the local level require engagement with these divisions. Of particular importance is the Title Registration Division, where title deeds must be secured to apply for building permits. The Land Valuation Division carries out the periodic valuation of properties on which property taxes can be levied on a very generalized basis of access to basic services. However, the visiting research team was advised by MMDA officials that, as it is only the middle-class registered properties that pay this tax and it is set at a low rate, the revenues accrued thereby are small. Clearly, when only a minority of the urban population is being charge the tax, there are strong political pressures to set it at a low rate.

All four land agencies report to the Ministry of Lands and Natural Resources, as does the Office of the Administrator of Stool Lands (OASL). The OASL is a decentralized office with 30 district-level offices throughout the nation (USAID, 2013) established to collect and disbursement of all stool land revenues, defined to include all rents, dues, royalties, revenues or other payments, whether in the nature of income or capital from stool lands (WaterAid 2009).

With the creation of the OASL, all land management functions are transferred to the to the Administrator of Stool Lands. This contradicts the 1992 Constitution, which states that “all stool lands shall vest in the appropriate stool on behalf of and in trust for the subjects of the stool in accordance with customary law and usage” (WaterAid 2009). All revenue accrued from customary lands is shared between the state and the customary landlord, although the latter only receives 25 per cent (out of 90 per cent of the price money) of the revenue. However, the World Bank (2013) notes that the major share of the rent accruing to chiefs comes from the informal “drink money” obtained from allocating land. The fraction received from the tax paid to the OASL is minimal in comparison. Thus, “as land values have risen the drink money has ceased to be a token amount, and the distinction between lease and sale has blurred.”

The performance assessment report of the LAP produced by the World Bank in 2013 states that the merger of the four land agencies was not well managed, with no significant improvement in the quality of service. Ehwi and Asante (2016) argue that although a clear hierarchy and work itinerary among the four land agencies has been established, “traces of unhealthy competition for funding, separate accounting systems, corruption, and low public awareness are easily noticeable among the divisions.” Additionally, little progress has been achieved in the complete digitization of the title registration process and follow-up procedures. However, on the positive side, there has been a
reduction to the registration process from more than 36 months to about 3 months, as well as increased public awareness about the process of registration of land titles (ibid).

A World Bank Doing Business report (2015) relating to registering property in the country, assuming a case of an entrepreneur who wants to buy land that is already registered and free of title dispute, notes this takes 46 days in Ghana. This compares well with the average time needed in SSA (57 days), while the cost of registering a property in Ghana is almost one-eighth of the regional average (World Bank 2015a). Getting a building permit to build a warehouse, however, involves 15 different steps and can take 216 days, well above the average for SSA (162 days).

**Gender aspects of access to land**

In Ghana, although women’s access to land has been enhanced by the Land Administration Programme, access to and control of assets and productive inputs remain major challenges for women in Ghana. Most land is governed under the customary law, which has both matrilineal and patrilineal systems of land rights. Women enjoy slightly higher levels of land-use rights under the matrilineal system, although access is declining as a result of increased cultivation of cash crops, which seems to have shifted inheritance and usufruct rights to favour men (Manuh, 1989; cited in Amuzu et al., 2010) “Strong regional disparities are apparent regarding access to land: the percentage of female landholders ranges from 2 per cent in the north to 50 per cent in the Ashanti region, where property is distributed according to a matrilineal system.” (SIGI 2016) Research on the impact of urbanization is lacking but, regardless of the system of land rights, women are disadvantaged, constrained by limited access to and ownership of land and credit or inputs, as well as time constraints from additional household care burdens. (Amuzu et al., 2010; Rünger, 2006; cited in Amuzu et al., 2010)

**5.4. Politics and land management**

Complex traditional rural land tenure systems, overlain with emerging urban and peri-urban land markets accompanying rapid urbanization, have undermined all efforts at administering land, planning for land use and managing development for in Ghana’s urban areas. As noted, about 80 per cent of land in Ghana is customarily owned, largely by traditional chieftaincy institutions, in principle and in law, in trust for the people, but studies suggest that the traditional institutions do not often participate responsibly in planning and land administration. Fuseini and Kemp (2015) argue that traditional institutions frequently bend planning regulations to gain more from land allocation and sales. This changing perspective of traditional institutions on issues of planning has its roots in the general commodification of land that has characterized the liberalized Ghanaian economy (Yaro 2010).

The practice of the traditional institutions engaging the services of “moonlighting” surveyors to plan areas under their jurisdiction rather than collaborating with legally mandated planning institutions has become widespread across Ghana. The research team was advised by planners in the Ashaiman Municipality that they were virtually powerless to stop the large-scale subdivision that was going on in the municipality, and there were no zoning instruments in place to constrain or channel the land developers’ efforts. This situation is also becoming of concern in northern Ghana, where the restitution of land to the local people following the adoption of the 1992 Republican Constitution led to individualization and disposal of skin land, contradicting the customary land tenure system (Fuseini & Kemp 2015; Yaro, 2010).
Given the important role of the traditional governance system given in the Constitution, the Ministry of Chieftaincy and Culture and the National and Regional Houses of Chiefs were established as the official institutions charged with the responsibility of assimilating traditional knowledge into national policy. Other roles, such as appointment of representations to various government statutory bodies, including the Council of State, Prisons Council, National and Regional Lands Commissions and Regional Co-ordinating Councils, are performed by chieftaincy institutions.

With the recognition and the willingness of the traditional and the formal governance systems to work together, it is reasonable to assume that there can be effective, efficient, equity, participation and accountability in urban governance in Ghana. However, there is growing evidence of mistrust and fear of conflicting power relations between traditional and formal governance systems (see CIKOD, 2010).

A World Bank report (2013) argues that the customary system is not transparent, “favouring the powerful over the less powerful, offering fewer rights to women than to men and discriminating against outsiders” (Ubink 2009; Ubink & Quan 2008; Whitehead & Tsikata 2003). USAID (2013) notes that women have legal rights to own and inherit property; this is not the case under customary law, where use-rights are obtained through husbands or fathers. With growing urban populations, land values have soared, “creating new opportunities for the chiefs to enrich themselves at the expense of their subjects, and of society at large” (World Bank, 2013).

Amanor (2008) notes that, while strengthening of chieftaincy can form part of strengthening localized administration, it also promotes unequal development:

Although chiefs claim to be the customary custodians of land and of communities, in reality, many chiefs form part of the modern elite. Many of them are businessmen in their own right. Modern and customary elites straddle each other. They intermarry; and they are members of the same political parties, religious associations and other elite associations. Businessmen use their wealth to gain chiefly titles and wealthy sections of chiefly families are able to wrest succession from poorer lines of the chiefly families. (Arhin 2001)

However, the World Bank (2013) argues that land administration by the state is no fairer than the activities of the chiefs. To avoid poor and slow service, bribes often must be paid by those seeking to register and title their land (Bugri 2012). Land has been seized by the state, often without compensation being paid, while later on, “the divestiture of those same lands has, in many cases, not been handled transparently (Ubink and Quan 2008).”

5.5. Conclusion and policy implications

Policy with regard to urban land in SSA has largely been driven for three decades, as in rural areas, with efforts to register land as a way of promoting market development. USAID, the World Bank, international donors and national governments have promoted land-titling programmes as a means of increasing tenure security, improving access to formal credit and reducing poverty, and creating transparent land markets. Policy options that relied on market forces were seen as more feasible politically than administratively determined land redistribution (Durand-Lasserve et al. 2009).

However, many barriers to progressing registration at the necessary pace and scale have been apparent and the continued focus on titling and registration has not gone uncontested (Ubink &
The focus on extending titling was challenged by World Bank-sponsored research published in 1994 (Migot-Adholla & Bruce 1994) that “argued that there was no direct correlation between titles to land and long-term investment in land, since investment was conditional upon the existence of another set of infrastructures, such as functioning land markets – on which the development of collateral and ability of banks to foreclose on mortgages was dependent – as well as credit and insurance markets” (Ubink & Amanor 2008). Similar arguments continue to be made in the urban context.

The research in the 1990s gave support to an alternative community-based land-titling approach, and current policy has begun to combine the two approaches (Ubink & Amanor 2008). This is regarded as leading to a framework “supporting the recognition of customary tenures within the evolutionary theory of property rights,” with customary systems developing towards individual property rights systems with economic change (Deininger 2003). In line with this, there is donor support in Nigeria for a community-based, Systematic Land Titling and Registration (SLTR) programme (GEMS 2016). This is capable of realizing 50,000 land titles per year in each location and is currently being piloted in Kano, Kaduna, Calabar and other cities in Nigeria.

However, it is clear in the Ghanaian context, as is commonplace elsewhere in SSA, that most urban settlers who have built their properties without full title have little motivation to change their status. According to the comprehensive review of land titling carried out by Durand-Lasserve et al. (2007), the propensity to register title depends on the circumstances. It is higher where residents feel vulnerable to eviction, or where it is perceived that titling gives significant advantages to living under other tenure regimes. Where residents feel relatively secure under the prevailing tenure, the focus is on directly obtaining services and community facilities. The same source notes that stimulating investment in property improvement can be realized by less formal, intermediary improvements in tenure status that are cheaper and easier to implement given limited institutional and human resources. There is also a question about “gentrification” and whether improvements that follow on land titling can be attributed to the original occupiers, or whether the land has been sold to better-off newcomers (ibid).

From the point of view of locally generated revenue, the relative paucity of title registration, building permits and property tax payments is clearly a problem, and this can be a strong point in favour of systematic land titling, even if the advantages are not immediately so obvious to the urban poor. However, if something is received in return in the form of greatly improved public infrastructure and services, there is evidence to support the view that people will be prepared to pay something in return. Investment in commercial property development is growing, especially in the capital. With the wider loss of urban land price uplifts lost to private gain on the urban periphery, mechanisms for capturing resulting increases in land value for public benefit, including the provision of associated public infrastructure and services should figure highly on the policy agenda.

Because of its entrenched system of land governance, Ghana presents particular challenges to effective land administration that can bring public benefit. These problems are not insurmountable, and there is an opportunity to research and apply the many lessons to be learned from elsewhere in the world. Of necessity, this very frequently involves a community-based approach that involves partnership and commitment within a given approach or framework, rather than the simple application
of laws, rules and procedures. The SLTR is one example, but others focus on intermediate forms of land title that are easier and cheaper to achieve, whether or not as a step towards full title. Cities Alliance is promoting the Social Tenure Domain Model (Cities Alliance 2016) and a range of slum-upgrading projects drawing on different approaches successfully piloted in different locations.

In Ghana, there are already several programmes in place, including the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development’s Land Services and Citizenship for the Urban Poor (LSC) Programme. A presentation to a workshop attended by the visiting research team by the NGO, the People’s Dialogue on Human Settlements, as another example, demonstrated a pilot project of commercial development cross-subsidizing housing in a low-income area of Ashaiman municipality.

The challenge of scaling up these range of initiatives and programmes in the face of ongoing rapid urbanization and peri-urban development in creating the “slums of the future” remains, but it is unlikely there is one “silver bullet” solution. A combination of different approaches adapted to the local circumstances is likely to be the way forward, and this will be subject to further review in the policy paper to follow. As Geoffrey Payne (2016) notes:

“It is not for lack of practical policies that we remain in crisis…. numerous examples of socially acceptable and administratively practical examples of good land and housing market management (exist). Examples include land value capture (or sharing), land pooling/readjustment, transfer development rights (TDR), Requests for Proposals (RFPs), various public-private partnerships, land sharing, in-situ settlement upgrading, participatory budgeting, etc., etc. Similarly, there are many alternatives to property ownership, including cooperatives, joint ownership, equity sharing, and innovative ‘intermediate’ forms of tenure such as Brazil’s zones of social interest and Trinidad and Tobago’s ‘Certificate of Comfort’. Given the rich menu of options, the inevitable question arises of why they have not been widely adopted and applied.” (Payne 2016)

Payne concludes that: “if the political, administrative and commercial elite in a country are benefiting sufficiently from the status quo, why should they change?” The last point is key and the real issue is one of political economy, that personal gain from the status quo undermines the potential for a managed urban land development process that could bring wider, long-term benefits to the whole community, including basic urban infrastructure and services and the necessary protection of the natural environment and resources. The challenge, therefore, is to find a way of convincing existing decision makers (with “political sensitivity as to the types of evidence and arguments that will carry weight”) that they will not be adversely affected and may even benefit by the policy recommendations that emerge from the analysis given here (Ibid).

**Implications for housing policy**

Formal housing provision in Ghana sector actors provides some few thousand dwellings to cater for the small but growing middle classes. About 90 per cent of housing for all income groups is provided informally, with individuals obtaining their land from traditional community leaders and building their own houses in collaboration with small-scale, local contractors (UN-Habitat 2011).
While most of the new development is occurring on the urban fringe, there is also active construction in the central areas, adding new rooms to existing houses, with resulting overcrowding and creation of slum conditions. “Almost 60 per cent of households in urban Ghana occupy single rooms. Only one in four households own, the remainder are either renters or live rent-free in a family house” (Ibid.) Modern, formal housing is simply unaffordable to the vast majority, who in any case have no access to mortgages. According to the government, 85 per cent of all households can afford less than GHS72,000 (US$18,380)\(^3\) for a dwelling, or its rental equivalent.

There are several conclusions that can be drawn. First, land governance issues must be addressed in a practical manner, usually working closely with communities and particular disadvantaged groups such as women, and making use, where appropriate, of a menu of possible measures and intermediary tenure solutions. If not, then informal land markets will retain their place in facilitating shelter provision through “incremental” self-developed housing for most urban residents, to the detriment of basic services and efficient land-use planning and adding to the numbers living in slum or semi-slum conditions. Providing purpose-built low-income housing or even fully serviced plots has yet to produce results that are affordable to the majority, but given adequate financial support, these solutions alongside the necessary post hoc slum-upgrading measures can take their place among others in a stepped progression towards improved and affordable housing conditions for all.

### Key Issues

Land management is caught up in a complex web of formal and informal institutions, often operating on contrarian views that prevent land optimization for inclusive urban development. Indigenous land management institutions have become less and less accountable to their communities, and in many places management has ceased to be for the benefit or in the interest of communities. Land, the most useful asset at government disposal, cannot be leveraged fully because of powerful actors with vested interests. The majority of urban settlers have built their properties without full title and have little motivation to change their status, thus affecting government revenue from title registration, building permits and property tax payments.

On the other hand, investment in commercial property development is growing. With the wider loss of urban land price uplifts to private gain on the urban periphery, mechanisms for capturing are resulting in increases in land value for public benefit, including the provision of associated public infrastructure and services.

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\(^3\) 1 Ghanaian cedi equals 0.26 U.S. Dollar (06.06.2016).

http://www.xe.com/currencyconverter/convert/?From=GHS&To=USD

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6. Urban transportation

As African cities grow in size and complexity, their transportation systems are one of the key challenges for urban planning and service delivery but with scant leverage to local governments to address it. Growing traffic congestion and accident rates, worsening mobility and accessibility and poor transport infrastructure and services present major hurdles to urban economic development and better living conditions. In African countries, transport often represents the biggest element of small but rapidly growing carbon emissions, while local air pollution from frequently old and poorly maintained motor vehicles is an ever-growing problem. A report by the Global Commission on Climate and Economy suggests that major investment now in public transport, as part of long-term strategic city planning and management, will have the biggest immediate impact in improving people’s lives and fighting climate change (Goldenberg 2015).

Traffic management measures and efforts to improve the environmental substantiality of transportation systems certainly need to be addressed urgently, as vehicle ownership grows in scale. Conversely, the transport sector is drawing growing attention as an essential agent of growth, poverty reduction and sustainable human development (Transafrica 2008). An efficient transportation system promotes access to amenities and services that are central to the lives of all individuals – employment, education, health services and leisure (Okoye et al. 2010).

Urban transportation in SSA faces significant governance challenges, as well as basic issues of transport management and planning and, above all, of securing finance. The financial challenges are complex. Urban infrastructure is one part of a larger infrastructure demand faced by SSA countries that is being only fractionally met by national governments. Infrastructure investment is still dependent on external financial support from official bilateral and multilateral development financing (ODF), private participation in infrastructure (PPI), and official Chinese financing, with direct access to such external sources by local or sub-national government is either non-existent or highly constrained (Gutman et al. 2015).

In general, urban infrastructure is not given much priority in addressing the national infrastructure deficits. Thus, deficiencies in investment in urban road and public transport infrastructure are an aspect of a wider neglect of investment in urban infrastructure in SSA, and something of a “Cinderella” sector within a larger regional infrastructure deficit. One estimate puts urban infrastructure needs at 34 per cent of the target of $93 billion per year to meet the infrastructure needs of SSA established by the World Bank’s comprehensive analysis in 2009.

Private sector participation in funding infrastructure development in SSA has grown considerably since 2000, but energy and telecommunications rather than transportation have been the prime beneficiaries (Gutman et al. 2015). While it is recognized that it is mainly the private sector that is responsible for delivering public transport services, the domestic public transport industry in most countries is poorly developed, and experienced overseas companies have thus far had little financial incentive to invest.

An assumption that such services can be delivered with minimal public sector support has become the norm since the introduction of structural adjustment programmes across SSA in the 1980s. However, delivering the potential social and environmental benefits and global benefits to the urban
economy of an effective urban mass transit system with affordable fares and without public subsidy is
difficult to achieve, as developed world cities have discovered. As examples from Ghana and Nigeria
(Lloyd-Jones & Mutter 2016) illustrate, it has frequently been the case that, in the absence of
subsidies, the political pressure to impose over-restrictive fare regimes on regulated public transport
operators has undermined their commercial viability.

According to Basso and Silva (2014), apart from helping to counter the negative externalities
(congestion, pollution and noise) of increasing private car use (or shared taxi use in developing
countries), and improving accessibility for the urban poor, transit subsidies can have a positive
“network effect” the so-called “Mohring” effect (Mohring 1972), with increasing ridership through
subsidized fares leading to higher service frequencies, diminishing waiting times of all users and
increasing attractiveness of the public transport system as a whole, a lesson that urban transport
planners in African cities have been slow to learn.

Ghana has been a particular beneficiary of external financial assistance to manage its
infrastructure needs, primarily because of the infrastructural focus of Chinese aid. According to
Gutman et al. (2015), between 2009 and 2012, Ghana was the top destination for Chinese
infrastructure assistance (actual and commitments) in SSA, ahead of Ethiopia, Cameroon, Zambia and
Nigeria. This contributed to Ghana being third overall in terms of overall external infrastructure
investment across SSA as a whole (10 per cent of the total, compared to 17 per cent for South Africa
and 11 per cent for Nigeria).

In 2011, the World Bank stated that Ghana would need to spend US$400 million annually to fill
its infrastructure funding gap (McTernan & Van Valen 2014). However, in August 2013, the
government raised that estimate to US$1.2 billion per year over at least the next 10 years to close the
infrastructure deficit (Ibid). As it is, according to the same authors, “While Chinese companies are
building the Bui Dam and the Sunon Asogli power plant to meet rising demand for electricity, major
road, railroad and other infrastructure projects sit on the drawing board as the government negotiates
the terms of deals first signed in 2010 with the China Development Bank and the Export-Import Bank
of China (China Exim Bank).”

The higher proportion of Chinese support in Ghana’s sources of external finance has meant the
transportation, as a proportion of the total, is greater than in other African countries, such as South
Africa, Nigeria and Kenya, where telecoms and energy sectors have benefited most (even allowing for
Chinese support to the development of fibreoptic cable links to Ghana’s cities). However, it is major
national transport infrastructure such as the railway network, port development and national highway
links that have been targeted with the only local roads to benefit being those in oil production areas.

6.1. Issues in urban transportation

Lack of a strategic approach to the provision of urban infrastructure

As noted by Gutman et al. (2015) “national data estimates capture energy and water investment needs
of urban populations to an extent, but do not do so for urban transport needs.” And while this is not to
say that no investments are being made in cities in SSA, “they are not planned within a forward-
looking strategic framework,” with “the lack of a strategic approach that takes into account the
interaction of land use and infrastructure can have irreversible deleterious effects in terms of economic growth, social progress, and environmental preparedness” (Gutman et al. 2015).

Road infrastructure investment tends to be skewed towards the main arteries – dualization and widening measures, including the construction of urban expressways, while failing to address the requirements of local access. Intersections that are poorly designed and managed remain major bottlenecks. Scant attention is given to the needs and behavioural patterns of pedestrians and cyclists, with often devastating effects on accident casualty rates. Overall urban road maintenance is poor, with investment in secondary roads lagging and local access roads remaining for the most part unpaved. The Government of Ghana is promising a major increase in investment in roads as part of the Ghana National Urban Policy Action Plan. However, in early 2013, the Association of Road Contractors reported that the government still owed its members GHS400m (US$184 million) (McTernan & Van Valen 2014).

Rather than learning from the mistakes in cities in the rich world, and moving directly to “smart” measures to improve the overall street network connectivity, with better junction designs and use of phased and computerized traffic signalling, governments in African cities have been increasingly resorting to heavy and expensive engineering solutions such as flyovers to address the congestion problem. Over the past couple of years in Nigeria, for example, Kano has constructed three major flyovers in the CBD, following the example of Greater Accra. In the long term, however, only a well-developed urban mass transit system is likely to provide solution to keeping cities moving (Lloyd-Jones & Mutter 2016).

The challenges of road freight movement

Across most of SSA, the national economies are heavily dependent on road freight movement. As the main and secondary cities are invariably important trading and regional distribution centres, serving large metropolitan and/or rural populations, such freight movements are essential to the lifeblood of their economies. At the same time, however, heavy-goods vehicles that are most frequently poorly maintained and highly polluting imported second-hand vehicles add to the growing congestion on urban roads. One answer is better off-road, out-of-town freight and logistics facilities that could also serve as break-bulk locations and relieve some of the city centre pressures from warehousing activities and the freight terminals associated with central markets.

Another answer is bypass roads. These are essential in diverting heavy-goods vehicles away from congested city centres, and many have been successfully constructed around African cities over the past decades. However, they quickly attract roadside development unless this is controlled, and the economic activities in these settlements, often related to servicing freight vehicles, quickly affects the

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4 For example, the six-lane George Walker Bush Highway, a 14.1-km stretch of road, was built in Accra with funding by the United States and opened in February 2012. By July 2013, 52 people had been killed on the highway and a further 248 people sustained injuries, with media dubbing the road a “death trap highway.” http://speakjhr.com/2013/07/accras-death-trap-highway/ Accra’s “Death Trap” Highway

5 In March 2014, the department of urban roads commenced the US$135 million Accra Intelligent Traffic Management System to coordinate 182 new intelligent traffic lights in the city. The funds were due to come from the government’s US$3 billion China Development Bank loan, but a source at the department said they are still waiting for the Ministry of Finance to finalize the loan so work can begin.
free flow of traffic. Additionally, they place heavy demands on the limited public resources available for investment to respond to the growing urban infrastructure demands and can often take inordinately long periods to complete, as governments struggle to find the funds to pay for them. Toll roads can help, but purely private sector-led solutions depend on levels of traffic being sufficient and levels of charges that do not place too high a penalty on commercial freight transportation.

Ideally, heavy freight should be moved off road onto rail. However, although this can pay for itself in the long term, it requires a major upfront commitment by national governments in rail infrastructure and services (currently for the most part dependent on Chinese government loans in many African countries). And all too often, despite the promise of Chinese finance, railway improvement projects have been slow to get off the ground, as is still the case with the Ghana Railway Development Authority’s rehabilitation of the western, eastern and central rail lines.

**Public transport provision in urban areas**

In many, probably most, African cities, the informal transport sector represents the main mobility option available to the great majority of residents (Wilkinson 2008). In some cities such as Kampala, Kigali, Dar es Salaam and Dakar, the market share of the informal sector in urban transport is over 95 per cent (Bruun & Behrens 2014). Although they play an essential role in their cities, the “service they offer is often compromised by poorly maintained and frequently unroadworthy vehicles, inappropriate and unsafe driver behaviour, and fierce, often violent, competition between rival operators both for specific routes and for passengers on those routes” (Wilkinson 2008).

Formal public transport provision varies across SSA, but it is generally poorly organized and attempts to introduce bus-based municipal mass transit systems frequently fail for several reasons, for example failure to maintain vehicles that are dependent on expensive imported spare parts, or competition with cheaper, unregulated paratransit (Transafrica 2008).

The provision of public transport and the regulation of the informal transport sector have raised questions around employment destruction, displacement of current paratransit operators, compensation, and the affordability of the new service, as Rizzo (2015) argues for Dar es Salaam. In Kampala, attempts to introduce high-occupancy public transport systems have faced many challenges, as central and local government authorities have been accused of dragging their feet either for lack of a vision for the city or for selfish interests. Uganda Taxi Operators and Drivers Association (UTODA), the former taxi drivers’ association in Uganda, also allegedly worked against their introduction, concerned that high-occupancy vehicles would push them out of business and create unemployment among hundreds of drivers and conductors, many of whom are youth. The same has been observed in Ghana (see Clayborne, 2012; Pirie, 2014).

Cities across SSA are littered with past attempts to get mass transit services off the ground in the misplaced belief that all that is needed are a number of full-size buses and some willing operators (Lloyd-Jones & Mutter 2016). Without an effective institutional and regulatory framework in place to secure the necessary preconditions, however, failure is almost always guaranteed. Invariably, there are insufficient buses to maintain an attractive service with scheduled services undercut by unregulated, informal operators, disrupted by poorly managed traffic or run down because of inadequate maintenance or management capabilities or too restrictive fare regimes.
For such reasons, Bus Rapid Transit (BRT), using dedicated traffic-free segregated bus lanes excluding unregulated competitors, is increasingly seen by policymakers and development finance bodies as a “quick fix” way of addressing some of these problems. However, though providing high-capacity, high-level service, and considerably cheaper than light rail mass transit alternatives, BRT is relatively costly in terms of infrastructure and space requirements and is difficult to implement in more densely developed urban locations (Lloyd-Jones & Mutter 2016).

The Dar-es-Salaam’s BRT project implemented between 2002 and 2014 highlights many of the challenges such systems in complex urban areas face. Rizzo (2015) argues that there was a lack of commitment to the project by the Tanzanian government reflecting the “government's attempt to respond to the priorities of the World Bank without alienating local actors, some of whom wield considerable electoral power” (Rizzo 2015).

Effective mass transit requires integrated, multi-modal networks of public transport routes that provide good access right across large urban areas and not just in the main transport corridors favourable for BRT operations. Jakarta, the capital of Indonesia, with a population of 10 million in its immediate administrative area, has a long-established and successful BRT system that is the most extensive in the world. Nevertheless, it is reported that the system accommodates just 10 per cent of the city’s public transport demand (Australian Aid 2014).

Therefore, BRT should be seen as part of a larger public transport strategy involving wider Bus Mass Transit (BMT) and other modes of urban mass transit. In many instances, for example, it is possible to redeploy irregular minibus services, which are a major source of livelihood in developing cities, as regulated and scheduled feeder routes to trunk BMT or BRT services.

**National transportation infrastructure and institutions**

The transport sector plays a strategic role in the economy of Ghana. It accounts for 8.8 per cent of GDP (Trading Economics 2016) and generates a significant share of the total government budgetary revenues (World Bank 2006). By SSA standards, the country has a well-developed transport infrastructure system consisting of two large deep-water ports, a 944-km railway system concentrated in the south to serve both ports; a 40,000-km road network system, one international airport and eight regional airports and airstrips throughout the country (Ibid). Ghana’s railway network is well above average SSA standards (SSA had an average of 0.002 km of railroad track per 1,000 sq. km in 2005, while Ghana had 4.2 km per 1,000 sq. km); nevertheless, only one of the three rail lines serving the country was operational in 2014, and that one, only partly. And outside of the southern regions of Ghana, much of the country's road network system is underdeveloped. For example, from Accra to Wa, 710 km away in the Upper West Region, can take 12 hours (McTernan & Van Valen 2014).

“In 1997, the government of Ghana reformed its own role and function in the sector, by merging its involvement in all transport modes into one Ministry, the Ministry of Roads and Transport. At this time Government also adopted the principle that Government's role should be that of regulating, managing and monitoring, not of executing, agent. …In 2001, the Government again split roads and transport into two Ministries, the Ministry of Roads and Highways (MRH) and Ministry of Transport and Communications (MTC), but the envisaged role of Government remains the same” (World Bank 2006). The MTC was responsible for transport service provision and regulation, while the MRH
oversaw the development of transport infrastructure. Currently, the two ministries are Roads and Highways and Ministry of Transport.

6.2. Transportation services

“The problems of Ghanaian public transportation are identical to those observed in developing countries experiencing demographic and economic growth, since the improvement of the standard of living is linked to improved mobility of people” (Transafri 2008).

Generally, public transport in Ghana is planned and managed by a number of national government institutions comprising Ministry of Transport (for policy and coordination of various actors), Ministry of Roads and Highways (Department of Urban Roads for Road infrastructure development and maintenance), Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development (for policy on decentralization and urban development as well as coordination of MMDAs towards urban transportation), the Motor Traffic and Transport Department of the Ghana Police (for traffic control and management), the Driver and Vehicle Licensing Authority (for driver and vehicle licensing as well as introduction of standards and enforcement of such) and the National Road Safety Commission (for road safety advocacy, education and sensitization of the transport sector in particular and the nation on the whole).

Urban public transport in Ghana has undergone cycles of structured and disorganized development since the British colonial era. During the colonial period and until the early 1970s, public transport was part of the local government function. In the late 1960s, urban public transport in Ghanaian cities was consolidated in the Omnibus Services Authority (OSA Ltd), a publicly owned company that provided large and medium-size bus services in the main cities such as Accra, Kumasi and Tamale, but also operated services in smaller cities as well as inter-city bus operations. According to the World Bank (2006) OSA “services operated under an over-zealous fare regulation. The impact of fare controls was to limit revenue of the public operator to an extent that it was not able to maintain vehicles on road” (World Bank 2006).

By the mid-1970s, OSA had entered a period of financial difficulty, loss of business and collapse of both capacity and market, ceasing operations by 2000 (Finn 2008). Addo (2002, cited in Agyemang, 2015) notes that, until the late 1980s, OSA and City Express Service (CES)6 (both publicly owned companies) “provided frequent, safe, and comfortable intra-urban services in GAMA.” Because of declining services and a growing population, the Government of Ghana “partly deregulated the sector in the early 1990s, encouraging the private sector to participate in the provision of bus services” (World Bank, 2006).

The deficit in public transport service was filled by minibuses (known as “tro-tro,” they are typically a 14- to18-seater bus) and shared taxis, which became firmly established throughout the country (Finn 2008). “The tro-tro is readily available, accessible, convenient, and above all affordable.” (Agyemang, 2015) It serves fixed routes between terminals, and buses depart only when

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6 CES was created in 1981, operating as a special department within the then Ministry of Transport and Communications providing rural/urban service (Yobo 2013).
they are full, which leads lead to very long waiting times in the off-peak times and it is very difficult to board a bus for the first 2-3 km along the route (Finn, 2008).

Over time, the tro-tro operators have unionized, with the Ghana Private Road Transport Union (GPRTU) as the dominant entity that organizes more than 80 per cent of the tro-tro sector (Finn 2008; Agyemang 2015). According to Finn (2008), “the political alignment of GPRTU with the prevailing political faction in the 1980s, allowed the union to organise terminals and services” (Finn, 2008). The GPRTU operates at three levels: national, local and branch, with many branches in Accra and Kumasi. It organizes operations, departures from terminals, internal discipline, levying of fees, etc. (Finn 2008). Finn argues that fares are, in practice, negotiated between the government and the operators represented by GPRTU and the GRTCC (Ghana Road Transport Coordinating Council). By default, it appears that this union has become the de facto principal regulating body for informal public transport provision.

Starting in the late-1970s, the regulatory and enforcement capacity of the local authorities dissipated, while the private transport operators had enjoyed decades of a virtual monopoly (Agyemang 2015). In 2003, Metro Mass Transit Limited was created as a private-public initiative, with the Government of Ghana having 45 per cent, the remaining 55 per cent being held by private investors (Metro Mass Transit Ltd 2016), although some authors argue whether MMT is a private or public enterprise, as the “private” shareholders are in the main government-linked institutions (IBIS, 2005; Finn, 2008; Yobo, 2013). MMT was established to provide intra-city services throughout the country, but later started running inter-city routes and other services to supplement the intra-city operations (Yobo 2013). In 2013, MMT had a fleet of 1,631 buses operating in all regions of Ghana on 423 routes, with urban services as the core of the business.

A Ghana Urban Transport Project (GUTP) was launched in 2007 to reform public transport in large cities and towns in Ghana, in particular to bring BRT systems to Greater Accra and Kumasi. The ongoing implementation of the BRT forms part of the Ghana National Urban Policy Action Plan, which seeks to addresses the need for improvement of the urban transport system in the country’s major cities. The government has said it will spend an estimated US$1 billion annually for the next five years on road construction as part an urban transport upgrade for Ghana’s cities (Davis 2015).

The government is working across departments to do this and has also collaborated with development and donor agencies on the GUTP. Funding was accessed from the World Bank, Agence Fracaissance de Developpement and the Global Environmental Facility, with Government of Ghana providing matching funds. Initially it was a 5-year initiative (2008-2013) to improve transport infrastructure throughout Ghana’s urban areas.

The project was initially targeted at six Local Governments (Accra Metropolitan Assembly, Tema Metropolitan Assembly, Ga East and Ga West Municipal Assemblies in the Greater Accra Region and Kumasi Metropolitan and Ejisu-Juaben District in the Ashanti Region). However, by the close of 2008, the number of Metropolitan and Municipal Assemblies had increased to 11 and subsequently to 16 MMDAs, including the aforementioned, plus the Municipal Assemblies of Ledzorkuku Krowor, Ashaiman, Adenta, La Dade Kotopon, Ga Central, Ga South, Kpone Katamanso and Awutu Senya in the Greater Accra Metropolitan Area.
Transport services in Accra

In Accra, the transport environment is characterized by heavy congestion, weak traffic management, inadequate facilities for pedestrians and bicyclists and poor road safety arrangements leading to high accident rates (World Bank 2006). The public transport system operates under financial and management constraints, suppressing the economic and social advantages for which the city developed in the first place (ibid).

Most residents in Accra rely on a variety of transportation to get to work and to go shopping, although the informal sector accounts for almost 80 per cent of the market (World Bank 2010). The main mode of transportation is the tro-tro, accounting for 70 per cent of commuters. Taxis are used by 8 per cent of residents, while a similar percentage rely on their own car (10 per cent). Only a small number of commuters use the Metro Mass Transit large buses (0.3 per cent), and 11 per cent usually walk to work and shop (World Bank 2010). A 2006 World Bank report indicates that the tro-tro used less than 25 per cent of the road space while carrying 70 per cent of the persons, in contrast with the cars and taxis that carried less than 30 per cent of the passenger in 2006 but used 70 per cent of the road network.

Greater Accra Metropolitan Area (GAMA), which covers 1,494 sq. km and has a population of more than 4.3 million, half of which commute, has a total vehicle population of 890,511 and a total road length of 7,592 km according to the Korean International Cooperation Agency (KOICA 2015), which is preparing the GAMA Transport Master Plan. There are 315 tro-tro routes in GAMA covered by 11,195 vehicles.

The Government of Ghana and the GAMA with support from its partners has been implementing the Urban Transport Project (UTP) since 2007. The Urban Transport Project introduced interventions that combine traffic engineering and management measures, regulation of the public transport industry and the implementation of a BRT system. The UTP also has the objective of promoting a shift to more environmentally sustainable transport modes and lower transport related greenhouse gas emissions along the pilot BRT corridor to be introduced in Accra. Investments are therefore needed to aid the City Authority in attaining this objective.

The pilot BRT network in Accra is designed as follows:

- A main trunk corridor, of which the pilot BRT infrastructure design includes a segregated line along only a portion of the trunk corridor
- Several tributary routes will be designed and integrated in the network, to address travel demands originating outside this corridor.
- Several feeder routes will provide transit access from more local areas within the city. Two distribution routes at the city’s CBD will provide service within this area (Ibid).

The Greater Accra Transport Executive will be responsible for the management of the bus operations. With growing problems of poor mobility, unregulated and unplanned services, inadequate public transport infrastructure, as well as the self-regulated sector, full implementation of the public transport reforms in Accra would ensure a major improvement.

However, the project originally scheduled for 5 years (from 2008-2013) has yet to deliver the promised BRT and has now been restructured to deliver some improved services on three selected
corridors, Achimota-Accra, Amasaman-Accra and Ofankor-Accra. Recent reports suggested the Accra BRT would be off the ground by the end of 2015 (Appiah 2015; Lumumba 2015), but no services were yet evident at the time of the visit of the international research team in April 2016.

**Transport services in Kumasi**

Kumasi has undergone rapid population growth and physical expansion over recent decades as surrounding towns and villages have been absorbed within its expanding urban area (Adarkwa & Poku-Boansi 2011). Given its radial road and largely monocentric urban structure, this is creating considerable traffic stress in its central business district (CBD) and lengthening of average commuter travel. Along with the CBD, other, mixed-use industrial, high-density residential and shopping areas generate 90 per cent of the commuter traffic in the city, with urban sprawl occurring along all the main arterial roads out of the city (Ibid.)

Of Kumasi’s nearly 2,000 km of roads in 2008, only just over 8 per cent, or 159 km, were asphalt-surfed, largely confined to the major arterials. Local roads made up 82 per cent of the total. Between 2004 and 2010, the cumulative total of registered vehicles in the city increased from just under 8,000 in 2004 to more than 75,000 in 2010, with saloons and private vehicles making up one third of the total. Most are operated as taxis (Adarkwa & Poku-Boansi 2011). According to a traffic survey carried out in 2011, nearly all major and minor arterial roads in the city, with a handful of exceptions, have very low average vehicle speeds, with all the major arterials and 75 per cent of minor arterials suffering from extreme congestion (less than 20 km/hr. average vehicle speed, falling to less than 5 km/hr. in several cases (Ibid.)

According to Poku-Boansi (2008), Kumasi follows the same pattern as other Ghanaian cities with shared taxis as the dominant mode of transport carrying about 44 per cent of commuter traffic. He suggests that the proportion of trips undertaken by high-occupancy buses has increased in recent times with the introduction of the Metro Mass Transit services by the Government of Ghana carrying about 14 per cent of passengers.

**6.3. Institutional arrangement for urban public transport**

In Ghana, individual Metropolitan and Municipal Assemblies can come together for Joint Jurisdictional Development purposes as per Local Government Law (Act 462), 1993, LI 2232 (Joint Development Planning Board), and LI 1961 (Decentralised Departments of the Local Government system, among a few). These provisions, in principle, allow the Metropolitan and Municipal Assemblies to plan, regulate and manage public transport. Institutionally, they have been mandated to establish Departments of Transport with the requisite staffing and rules, regulations and by-laws.

However, implementing these provisions has proved difficult because of capacity challenges and other factors, and Kumasi is the only Metropolitan Assembly in Ghana that has a Transport Department that issues licenses, and a Transport Sub Committee of the Assembly. Its membership includes some Assembly members and representatives from the Transport Department, Urban Roads, Metro Engineers and Metro Security. The objective is to ensure that levies and fees are adequately discussed and agreements reached and to guarantee an effective public transport service. The Transport Department, however, has a staff strength of only eight, comprising a Head of Department, a Transport
Planner, Transport Operations Engineer, Data Analysts and supporting staff. It works closely with the Metro Roads Department. The Transport Department is a devolved office of the Department of Urban Roads under the Ministry of Roads and Highways. It provides technical support to, and collaborates with, the Assembly but it receives funding and directives from the Head Office in Accra.

The Transport Department is responsible for the Metropolitan Assembly strategic policy on public transport and for guidelines to achieve efficient movement within the city. The Department operates within the following legislative framework:

- Act 462 (Local Government Law) 1993
- LI 1961
- KMA UPTS byelaws 2008,
- KMA Coaches and taxis byelaws 1995
- KMA Vehicle parking places byelaws, 1995

Although a full department within the local government structure, the department is not represented at the Assembly committee and core management meetings, which limits its influence on Assembly decision making and on other departments. Interference from other departments and other entities in transport-related issues is seen to be a major hindrance on work progress. It suffers from inadequate enforcement capacity and a lack of incentives to carry out the enforcement activities affecting the issue of licenses.

Although it has a computerized transport database, the department is at risk from poor IT maintenance. The obsolete and archaic nature of some provisions of the various existing by-laws has made it difficult to attain the objectives of the transport reforms. The absence of other policies such as terminal operational standards to complement existing ones also compounds these issues. All these constraints are compounded by the transport infrastructural deficits.

6.4. Institutional arrangements for urban private transport

Kumasi has 348 intra- and inter-city bus routes originating from the metropolis. Both commercial and private transport services are regulated by a number of institutions and agencies. The private sector involved in the provision of public transport services in Kumasi is largely unionized, with associations largely controlling routes allocations. The dominant bodies are the Ghana Private Road Transport Union of the Trades Union Congress (GPRTU), Private Road Transport Owners Association (PROTOA), Cooperative Transport and other associations.

The GPRTU, together with other bodies, controls about 70 per cent of the transport service provision. It was noted in the visiting research teams’ discussions with assembly officials that the unions ensure the registration of the members who effectively run all the designated tro-tro routes that operate on a “fill and go” origin-destination basis. Around 30 per cent of passengers, however, are carried by non-registered and non-unionized “floaters” who operate intermediate services along the tro-tro routes in the locations that are poorly served by the registered tro-tro operators.

Urban Transport Strategic Plan (integrated into the JICA Greater Kumasi Plan)
The Transport Department has collected adequate data on various elements of urban transportation in Kumasi. They have designed a number of interventions to assuage congestions in the city centre (although that is very impossible to achieve for now). The absence of organized public transportation systems such as the BRT and other high-occupancy vehicular transportation is a clear demonstration that much would have to be done.

To this end, the Transport Department has to prepare a Transportation Strategic Plan for the Kumasi Metropolitan Assembly.

6.5. Conclusion and policy implications

Cities in Ghana, as across SSA, are facing crucial urban transportation challenges. This includes a substantial deficit of investment in their road and street networks, and a capacity and capability deficit in terms of institutions, systems and technologies for better-designed and “smarter” management of their growing traffic congestion problems. With increasing urban populations and growing vehicle ownership, however, these measures can only go so far.

The current informal public transport systems have thus far delivered a flexible response to the growing demands of urban mobility. However, the service performance and the level of accessibility they provide are well below the standards required to service a growing urban economy and the needs of growing urban populations. Moreover, the multiplicity of usually poorly serviced, second-hand vehicles on city streets combined with poorly managed stopping places and street repairs and parking are major factors contributing to current traffic congestion and high levels of local pollution, as well as the larger carbon emissions.

The practice in many cities of banning the use of motorcycle taxis, while freeing the streets of the associated accident risk and reducing the overall numbers of vehicles contributing to traffic congestion and pollution, has reduced the overall flexibility of the informal public transport provision. However, demand is transferred to other types of vehicles – in some cities three-wheelers – elsewhere mainly sedan taxis and minibuses, all requiring relatively more road space. The situation, which is already limiting the mobility and accessibility of the population to centres of employment and services and therefore the potential of urban economic development, can only get worse as the number of private vehicles grows.

Improved mass transit provision is therefore a crucial part of the required policy mix. In most instances, this is about getting conventional regular high-capacity, bus mass transit services in place, with the potential for implementing BRT systems. These have a longer design and lead-in time and much greater demands for investment in associated infrastructure and traffic management measures. They are, therefore, only relevant in large cities, as an alternative or transition to more expensive rail-based mass transit systems.

Because formal mass transit systems can only work if informal public transport operations are curtailed on the main routes and potentially translated into “feeder” route services elsewhere, this can be a threat to the current livelihoods of the many informal service owners, drivers and fair collectors. This is obviously a highly sensitive political concern. Therefore, considerable efforts need to go into managing negotiations with the transport unions, for getting buy-in, and for redeployment of those currently involved into new business and employment opportunities.
Implementing any formal mass transit system involves getting the institutional and regulatory framework in place to secure the essential preconditions. Such a process requires a sustained effort by governments over a period of many months and involves a number of critical steps (Lloyd-Jones & Mutter 2016):

1. Formulation of appropriate transport policy and follow-up legislation by the relevant government body. Policy recommendations include necessary regulatory and institutional reforms
2. In the case of large cities, the establishment of a metropolitan transport authority answerable directly to the elected authority is recommended as a coordinated, integrated approach to planning and managing public and private transport vehicular and non-motorised modes of transportation and related infrastructure investment is necessary. In many African cities, these functions are spread over various governmental department and agencies (in Ghana both central and local government are involved) with little coordination and an ad hoc approach to dealing with traffic management issues
3. Identification of investment in human and other resources that are essential for the effective management of the proposed public transport system as it develops and implementation of institutional reform and capacity building;
4. Initial feasibility work exploring current road infrastructure configuration and conditions, travel demand, accessibility and cost- and fare-related issues in relation to public transport provision
5. Identifying sources of sufficient funding for road network improvements, public transport infrastructure and vehicles; providing preliminary technical specifications for bus support infrastructure, depots and vehicles; service and operations plans; maintenance; ticketing and fare collection; route network development and integration
6. Supporting the implementation of pilot route schemes
7. Supporting integrated land and transport planning and urban design, with “transit-oriented development” to help fund investment in essential public transport infrastructure through associated “value capture.

In parallel to efforts to improve urban transportation systems and services in the cities of SSA, the continuing efforts to improve the national transport infrastructure are obviously critical to their future economic development. This is particularly the case with those that are in more remote regions, but also to realize the synergies that can result from closely located towns and cities in larger city regions and emerging urban corridors. It is important that national transport infrastructure improvements be planned, considering the needs of the cities that they connect, and be coordinated with and integrated into local transport management and city master planning efforts. Local governments can have a role in managing freight movement better by providing locations for off-road services. In the longer term, however, getting long-distance freight movements off the overstretched roads, both within and between cities, and onto to railways should be the priority.
7. Local economic development

Urban local governments (ULGs) have an important role to play in promoting LED. In developed countries LED strategies became commonplace in the early 1980s, and today are often a core local governance mandate (Schmidt & Radaelli 2004; Geddes 2004). Increasingly, developing countries are adopting a similar approach. Key initiatives of this approach include those designed to create a favourable business environment to encourage investment and entrepreneurial behaviour. This commonly involves the provision of infrastructure and services as required by businesses, and ensuring that the rules and regulations governing business, over which a ULG has jurisdiction, are not onerous and do not constrain or adversely affect commercial operations.

Many ULGs, in both developed and developing countries, engage with representatives of their local community and private sector to design and implement a favourable and enabling business environment; indeed, ULGs often can provide a structured space for dialogue on local economic issues (Helmsing 2003). Some common LED strategies deployed by local governments are listed in Box 1. Through the LED function or service, cities and towns can develop new sources of efficiency related to the provision of infrastructure and services, support productivity improvements in businesses and more effectively confront the challenges posed by rapid urbanization (World Bank 2015b). In other words, LED can be an important determinant of city economic and social resilience.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Box 7.1: Strategies for LED</th>
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<tr>
<td>• Ensuring that the local investment climate is functional for local businesses</td>
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<td>• Supporting small and medium-size enterprises</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Encouraging the formation of new enterprises;</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Attracting external investment (nationally and internationally)</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Investing in physical (hard) infrastructure</td>
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<td>• Investing in soft infrastructure (educational and workforce development, institutional support systems and regulatory issues)</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Supporting the growth of particular clusters of businesses</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Targeting particular parts of the city for regeneration or growth (area-based initiatives)</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Supporting informal and newly emerging businesses</td>
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<td>• Targeting certain disadvantaged groups</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Marketing the municipality, its infrastructure and people to local and international businesses</td>
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The first wave of LED strategies in developed countries, introduced in during the late 1970s and early 1980s, often focused on infrastructure projects and the creation of “rejuvenated” city spaces. Virtually all of these strategies, however, paid no or little regard to structural deficiencies in the economic and social fabric of the city (Cunningham & Meyer-Stamer 2006). A contentious debate soon arose around local economic development becoming synonymous with real estate development. Economic disparities often increased between city cores and their suburbs. These led to the birth of “redistributive development” policies that addressed concerns of racial, cultural and economic inequities in local development through strategies that included linking downtown development to neighbourhood development managed by community development corporations, and balancing development across economic sectors (Krumholz 1999).
Many developing countries in Africa have travelled along a similar learning curve. At first, the impact of LED in Africa was modest. This was due to an over-focus on pro-poor economic development combined with an inadequate understanding of pro-market interventions (Nel & Rogerson 2016). As occurred within many developed countries, little or no attention was paid to structural deficiencies in the economic and social fabric of the city. Countries in Africa often approached LED strategies as a mechanism to improve social welfare rather than a way to promote and secure systemic productivity improvements and economic competitiveness. Thus, for several years, governments in Africa gave preference to a “pro-poor” approach to LED supporting an array of LED projects largely focused on urban poverty alleviation (Harrison et al. 2008). However, as the value and importance of pro-market interventions were not fully comprehended by those responsible for these LED projects, many LED initiatives were not as successful as had been expected.

During the first wave of LED strategies, and sometimes far beyond, governments avoided undertaking a fundamental reform of the regulatory, planning and fiscal environments that affected local businesses, and frequently were ineffective or inattentive in pursuing initiatives to improve access to business credit and encourage structural change through, for example, value addition, product differentiation and up-skilling in the business sector. Instead, many ULGs focused on infrastructure projects (for example, the creation of marketplaces and the provision or expansion of transport hubs, such as bus stations) that delivered relatively quick and tangible results and that were often aligned to the interests of local elites (Ofori-Oduro 2011).

International development agencies supported the introduction of LED strategies through technical and financial assistance, often related to urban infrastructure and service provision (Rogerson & Rogerson 2010). An example of this approach is South Africa’s Municipal Services Project (Municipal Services Project 2001). This assistance tended to buttress the prevailing infrastructure and service focus of many LED strategies. Furthermore, in Africa, cities and towns seeking to introduce LED strategies during the 1980s and 1990s faced a range of additional challenges, including central government’s inability to manage a debt crisis, imposed structural adjustment programmes, major currency devaluations and a variety of natural and political shocks (Rodríguez-Pose & Tijmstra 2005).

However, associated with the more recent move to devolve powers and responsibilities, many ULGs in developing countries, including those in Africa, are increasingly empowered to (and eager to) stimulate economic growth and development in their city or town. Many African countries are creating comprehensive frameworks for local governments to support LED such as Kenya’s Growth and Transformation Plan and the Regional Development Framework (Mensah, Domfeh, et al. 2013), and Ghana’s Shared Growth and Development Agenda II (Ghana 2014) and Vision 2020 of the National Development Planning Council.

Currently, LED strategies in Africa often go beyond the provision of infrastructure and services, seeking to promote the structural transformation of their local economies through private sector support programmes (for example, the promotion of value addition) and pro-poor market reforms (for example, the integration of informal sector businesses in value chains leading to domestic and exports sales). Further, LED initiatives have become increasingly important for many ULGs. This is most recently manifest in the smart cities drive in India as well as initiatives in Africa such as Kumasi being declared a Millennium City in 2007 and Accra in 2010 (Obeng-Odoom 2013). Nevertheless, although
the nature of LED initiatives in Africa has significantly changed over the last 30-40 years, many LED initiatives continue to be only partly successful. The cumulative experience of the last several decades indicates that the following issues remain to be addressed:

1. how to secure the lasting beneficial impact of the regulatory environment on business growth and local economic development
2. how to clearly identify the pathways whereby core urban services, such as transport, water supply and waste management, can enable local economic development
3. what are the most effective mechanism(s) for promoting systemic structural change in the economy of a city or town in a manner that leads to inclusive and resilient development.

7.1. Issues and constraints

LED strategies are currently high on the agenda of the Government of Ghana. This is, perhaps, no surprise. In common with many countries in Africa, Ghana has recently experienced rapid urbanization (World Bank, 2015b). Cities and towns, however, are in danger of being overwhelmed by serious urban infrastructure and service deficits, growing public health hazards, expanding slums and informal settlements, and increasing unemployment and inequalities (ibid). Ghana, like much of Africa, faces a time-bound window of opportunity to design, plan and manage urban areas in a manner that directly addresses these challenges and leads to more productive, prosperous and inclusive urban societies. In so doing cities can fulfil their promise as engines of national economic development and social progress. LED strategies are seen as one important instrument to be used by cities and towns to realize this promise.

The ‘LED problematic’ in Ghana

A determining and important cause of the current plight of many urban areas in Ghana is the lack of structural transformation characterizing the urban economies of the country, the vast majority of which remain as “consumption cities.” Over the last three decades there has been a steady flow of people in Ghana from rural to urban areas. Most new urban residents can be found in slum or informal settlements; most work in the informal service sector, and nearly all are excluded from formal wage labour and housing (it is estimated that up to 80 per cent of the workforce of more than 11 million find employment in the informal sector). Very few work in manufacturing and even fewer in tradable high-productivity services. Work, when it can be secured, is generally in low-productivity but highly...

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7 Today more than half of the country’s total population of some 27 million people resides in urban areas. Whereas the average annual growth rate of the rural population in Ghana is now less than 1 per cent, the corresponding figure for the urban population is around 3.9 per cent.... “The country is moving steadily ... towards cities.” (World Bank, 2015b)
8 For a more comprehensive discussion of the nature of Ghana’s consumption cities see Gollina, D. et al. (2013) and Jedwab, R. (2013).
9 The majority of those working in the informal sector are women engaged in low-growth, low-return and basically subsistent activities (See Amu, 2004). It is also estimated that currently some 91 per cent of women in employment and 81 per cent of men are working in the country’s informal sector (http://www.ghanaclass.com/can-ghanas-informal-sector-spur-growth).
competitive personal services.10 Few services can be found in Ghana’s towns and cities that are complementary to and support an expanding manufacturing sector.11

What has sustained the economy of Ghana has been the export of raw materials: cocoa and gold, with oil products coming on stream more recently.12 Even a cursory examination of the products maps for Ghana clearly indicates that the economy is lacking high value-added activities producing a range of products (see Annex III). Ghana is a classic case of a country that has posted high GDP growth rates based on the export to world markets of un- or semi-processed commodities. This form of growth has fuelled consumption, mostly driven by relatively small middle- and upper-class sections of society, and has not been associated with the structural transformation of the economy, a transformation that would increase the economic sophistication of the economy and enable improvements in society-wide living standards.13

The response in Ghana to the lack of economic development in urban areas has been the adoption of an entrepreneurial approach in which the state (national and urban local governments) seeks to facilitate the growth of the private sector, especially domestic formal-sector activities and foreign inward investment (FDI).14 Business-friendly planning regimes have been introduced, and in extreme cases urban land occupied by low-income groups has been expropriated for use by formal sector activities, including high-end residential development. Gillespie (2016), for example, maintains that the capital, Accra, is increasingly characterized by inequality, segregation and violent class struggles over urban space. He documents how Accra has witnessed the dispossession of the poor (via, for example, the privatization of communal urban land, and the eviction of squatters and slum-dwellers) as land is taken for luxury residential development and formal-sector industrial and commercial activities. Gillespie maintains that capital accumulation by urban dispossession is becoming a hallmark of urban expansion in Ghana, and contributes to the increase in inequalities in the capital.

The type of growth that continues to characterize urban areas in Ghana is not being translated into structural change in the economy and inclusive development. Indeed, some observers (Gillespie 2016) imply that the type of growth occurring at present precludes or worse prevents, structural transformation and the rise of an increasingly equitable and inclusive economy. The economy of towns and cities in Ghana remains undiversified, and characterised by low productivity low value added.

10 The lack of manufacturing is associated with the lack of structural economic change and transformation characterizing Africa. The stilted growth of the manufacturing sector is common across Africa; “Between 1970 and 2013…..Africa’s share of global manufacturing output fell from 3 per cent to 2 per cent; as a share of sub-Saharan Africa’s D+GDP, manufacturing has shrunk form almost 20 per cent to about half that. Almost the entire output is for domestic consumption, not export.” Source: The Economist, April16-22 2016.

11 The poor live off the consumption spending of the rich. In Accra: ...“the informal sector is responsible for 90 percent of goods and services. Street hawkers sell sachets of water, mobile phone top-up cards, fried plantain chips and pirated DVDs at busy intersections where traffic moves at an excruciating crawl during the rush hour. Tailors and barbers work out of tiny shops, many made from converted shipping containers — not only in low-income, high-density neighbourhoods like Nima or Madina, where informal businesses dominate, but also in affluent ones like East Legon or Cantonments...Affluent residents roll down their car windows to buy snacks and stop to get their shoes polished on street corners.” Source: Benzoni, S. (2013).

12 Three commodities currently make up over 80 per cent of Ghana’s exports (gold, cocoa and bauxite), and only around 25 firms account for over 60 per cent of total exports in value terms.


14 See Akuduguand Laube (2013) and Mensah (2013).
activities. Few sophisticated productive capabilities are visible, and the vast majority of towns and cities suffer from a range of co-ordination failures. LED strategies need to address these fundamental issues. In particular, the root causes of the lack of structural transformation and the continuing and increasing lack of inclusiveness characterising towns and cities, need to be identified, described and analysed. As discussed by Gillespie, it is important to fully understand the nature and politics of capital accumulation within Ghanaian towns and cities.

Delivering LED in Ghana

Although the challenges facing those in Ghana involved in preparing and delivering LED strategies are immense, the task is extremely important, and has been recognized as such by the government. Ghana clearly envisions a greater and more invested role for local governments in LED. Its Vision 2020 endorses the importance of local institutions and leadership in economic transformation, and Ghana’s Shared Growth and Development Agenda II promises to “facilitate the provision of training and business development services; promote the establishment of business incubators, technology parks and land banks especially at the district level to promote local economic development” (Ghana 2014). LED strategies are seen as one important instrument to be used to ensure that current decentralization efforts are effective and thus successful (National Local Economic Development [LED] policy document, 2013, Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development). District Assemblies are being empowered to take on greater LED functions through policy and technical support from the National Development Planning Commission, and Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development (Mensah, Bawole, et al. 2013).

However, the success of these measures is yet to be evidenced, with the macro-economy of Ghana showing signs of financial disrepair. The country fell two ranks to 114 (out of 189 countries) in the World Bank’s assessment of ease of doing business. The report shows that the economy has either remained static or moved down on important criteria such as starting and running a business, and getting licences and permits along with all necessary supporting infrastructure. Since 2012, the costs incurred starting a business have increased by around 70 per cent (ibid p. 19), and Ghana scores very poorly regarding the efficiency of land administration and nearly zero in transparency and reliability for electricity tariffs. The evidence could lead to the unpalatable conclusion that barriers to local economic growth are worsening with time (World Bank 2016a).

At the micro level, the transformative impact of small business on local development has remained largely untapped in Ghana in the absence of any institutionalized policy for their involvement, administrative reluctance for sharing development responsibilities (and consequently power) and resource constraints. Moreover, LED measures taken by individual local governments remain discrete and sporadic. For instance, the districts of Awutu-Efutu-Senya and Ajumako Enyan-Essiam created formal public-private forums to discuss strategies for benefiting the informal economy and reducing poverty with the help of the International Labour Organisation. These forums were considered unique in the LED practice in Ghana because they have a formal standing as District Assembly Sub-Committees\(^\text{15}\) (DASC) (2007).

\(^{15}\)DASCs are statutory bodies under the Local Government Act. They assist the Executive Committee of the District Assembly in exercising its executive and coordinating functions.
There are, however, few structured spaces for public-private dialogue within the framework of local governance in Ghana. Where they exist, they are often notional with local governments preferring to continue working alone. This is one of the reasons why the LED plans of district assemblies like Bongo, Tamale and Kassena Nankani East remain unimplemented (Akudugu & Laube 2013). Similar, studies on LED in the Ejisu-Juaben Municipal Assembly of Ghana show the poor LED performance of the Assembly, the result of weak financial and administrative decentralization, lack of resources, and poor institutional co-ordination. Where international agencies have not been involved, districts have continued LED activities in the traditional vein of prioritizing downtown development, hard infrastructure, revenue for the district and jobs (Ofori-Oduro 2011).

At a more granular level, evidence indicates that the way in which district assemblies are staffed and operated can impede the preparation and implementation of LED strategies. District officials are seconded; they are local civil servants “run” by the Ministry of Local Government; they don’t know how long they will be with the city or town to which they are posted; it could be one year, five years, or more. This uncertainty and potential lack of identification with the city or town in which they are working underpins and promotes the rigidly bureaucratic way in which many approach their job.

Furthermore, if opportunities for rent-seeking behaviour arise, it is sometimes taken (perhaps this is understandable as the remuneration for officials is often so poor that some feel that it is necessary to take a second job [for example, taxi drivers during the evening and/or weekends] or “take on the side”). This state of affairs means that innovative, risk-taking and professional managerial behaviour is often wanting in ULGs in Ghana, which are thus characterized by lacklustre management, with few, if anyone, attempting anything different, innovative or a bit risky. Creativity in designing and implementing LED strategies is often absent. Furthermore, effective institutional platforms for change, bringing together all relevant, but often competing, interests and stakeholders, are only infrequently created, as they impinge on protected institutional and individual turfs and take time, commitment, compromise and enthusiasm to establish and maintain (see Box 7.2).

**Box 7.2: Institutional fragmentation and LED possibilities in Tema, Ghana.**

The Tema Metropolitan District is an example of a complex local governance arrangement, and one that seems to militate against the preparation and delivery of effective LED actions. Tema is one of the 16 municipalities in the Greater Accra Metropolitan Region. The original new town of Tema was commissioned and laid out in the early 1950s, with much progress made following the construction of the harbour and port facilities in the early 1960s. Under the provisions of the Local Government Act (1993), the Tema Metropolitan Assembly is required to perform all local government functions within the metropolitan district. However, there are at least two major development actors who have overlapping roles in governing the delivery of urban government functions across the metropolitan district, namely, the Tema Development Corporation (TDC), which was established in 1952 and given a 125-year lease to manage the land known as the Tema Acquisition Area, and Ghana Port’s Authority, which has jurisdiction over the port of Tema.

Officially TDC’s core functions including (a) constructing roads and public buildings, (b) preparing and delivering housing schemes, (c) developing industrial and commercial sites, (d) providing public utilities such as sewage and

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16 One interviewee commented that many municipalities lack a “growth disposition” because of the difficulties encountered in trying to prepare and implement LED strategies requiring ownership across a range of stakeholders (Source: field work undertaken to prepare this research monograph during February 2016).

17 This section is based on field work undertaken to prepare this research monograph during February 2016.
street lights, and (e) undertaking such activities as are required for or conducive to the attainment of the development objectives of the corporation. These functions are supposed to be carried out with the prior approval of the Tema Municipal Assembly, though the relationship between the two organizations is often strained, with decisions being taken by the TDC with an assumption that the TMA must approve them. Control of land gives the TDC “power” over the TMA, and to generate important revenues. Further complications and potential frictions arise where the TMA is responsible for some of the TDC’s functions in extension areas to the original acquisition area.

To complicate matters, the area of land dedicated to Tema’s Port comes under the jurisdiction of the Ghana Port’s Authority, a Statutory Corporation. Tema has a port “expansion plan” that involves dredging of the port basin, creating deeper access channels and expanding container, passenger and transhipment terminals. The physical development of the port is carried out under the supervision of the parent ministry, the Ministry of Transport. As such, activities in the Tema district ordinarily governed by the TMA are in operational terms agreed by the Ministry of Transport, and (in theory but often not in practice) in consultation with TMA. Clearly, decisions made to expand the port’s activity have implications for the overall development of Tema, particularly in terms of urban infrastructure requirements to support such expansion. In addition to these main development actors, urban services are also managed, and to some extent governed, by a number of traditional authorities (including the “Nkusuohene,” the chief in charge of development), and private-sector and civil society organizations working in, for example, the education and health care sectors. The overall result is considerable institutional fragmentation and the lack of an effective institutional platform for change. It becomes difficult to deliver services effectively. Further, key development actors appear to be protecting their turf, and often this protection is blurred with an individual’s rent-seeking behaviour. The neopatrimonial and clientelist nature of Ghanaian economy and society colours how institutions “work” and significantly influences the success or failure of LED initiatives.

The evidence indicates that, despite the presence of national institutional frameworks designed to encourage the preparation and delivery of LED strategies, and encouraging policy signals related to LED, there has been little innovation at the district level in Ghana. This can be attributed to strong central government engagement in the management of districts, the bureaucratization of district assemblies, the dearth of professional managerial behaviour and the lack of financial resources and technical capacity available to many assemblies, coupled with administrative disinterest in sharing power at the local level. Many districts are inexperienced in managing partners and conflicting interests, and in committing to shaping their local economies. LED presents a new paradigm in planning and decision making, and the institutional frameworks to accommodate this shift in Ghana continue to be traditional and unyielding, and at times dysfunctional. Even where districts have introduced LED, planning functions have remained with the bureaucracy giving little room for local participation and inputs.
7.2. **LED as a municipal service**

A plan to exploit local resources and build local capacity and capabilities to stimulate economic development, reduce poverty and increase the overall “resilience” of a city or town is an obvious alternative to past top-down costly and often unsuccessful programmes of development. This has not escaped the attention of many in the Ghanaian government. As described above, district assemblies are being empowered to take on greater LED functions. Very few districts have prepared an LED strategy, however, and LED measures that have taken by ULGs remain discrete and sporadic. A number have established a business advisory unit, which often organizes training on various aspects of business such as marketing and finance. Many of these units assist business in preparing business plans and documentation required to obtain bank loans (although the interest rates are very high at 29 per cent-30 per cent).

Other Assemblies are involved in piecemeal one-off developments such as the building of a leisure facility. The mayor of Kumasi is more ambitious. He is keen to initiate smart technology projects for his city and is currently discussing with an Israeli company a US$4 million traffic control room and associated facilities. He is also investigating in building a light rail system (looking at the recent experience of the Chinese-funded light rail system in Addis Ababa in Ethiopia) and leading a delegation of local businessmen to China aiming to create business-to-business links and lever in Chinese investment into his city. Such LED activities are useful, but at present limited. In general, LED initiatives are small-scale and piecemeal.

7.3. **Politics and LED**

The importance of understanding and engaging the political economy of cities has been highlighted by many of those working on urban development in Ghana. For example, Paller (2015) maintains that “politics” is the root cause of a lack of inclusive development in towns and cities, not problematic planning. Power struggles, the political capture of institutions and self-interested behaviour, according to Pallar, are root causes of the lack of inclusive development. Further, he states that in today’s competitive multi-party environment too many urban leaders take short-term decisions to win votes rather than seek long-term solutions to urban problems. The provision of infrastructure and services by politicians to reward loyal supporters appears to be common. Importantly, the incentives structures within which those with the power to effect change work often lead them to prioritize, secure and defend the status quo.

The prevailing incentive structure is a mixture of the traditional and modern (tribal and culturally informed rights and duties and ways of behaving enshrined in the current Ghanaian Constitution), overlain with an economy that continues to offer a minority a relatively easy way to expropriate value through monopolistic or oligopolistic ownership of natural resources and their export, and involvement in residential and commercial property developments for national elites and foreign interests.

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18 Information obtained during field visits held in February and April 2016.

19 Ethnic and tribal identities, for example, often engender competition and conflicts over key resources such as land. This is exacerbated by inadequate land documentation, the presence of multiple agencies for land processing, and lack of guidelines for sale of lands by chieftains, which manifests itself in multiple sales and dubious dealings involving chiefs, government, individuals and groups in various permutations. All this has had a negative impact on both the economy and the process of urban development, which tends to become shrouded in corruption and a lack of transparency (Ayee et al. DATE?)
Furthermore, political and commercial power, often sought to attain monopolistic or oligopolistic rights, is strengthened through use of such rights (the catchphrase often heard in East Africa that it is “my time to eat” has a clear equivalence in Ghana). This mix often is toxic, and most certainly seems to impede if not prevent change leading to an inclusive and prosperous economy. Gillespie (2016) is one of a number of researchers who maintain that the way the economy “works” and the type of growth occurring at present in Ghana precludes, or worse prevents, structural transformation. The implication is that to effect transformational change, engagement with the prevailing political economy is vital and, perhaps, the only viable route to take.

Osei (2015) has also highlighted the importance of analysing the political economy of Ghana to understand how the economy works and, most important, what trajectories the economy is likely to take. They focus on the way in which deals are made between powerful groups and individuals, and maintain that the deal space is personalized and mostly closed to those outside elite political, social and commercial communities. The deal space is rooted in, and reflects and reinforces, the way in which value is created within the Ghanaian economy, and the inability of the economy to move through the product space, promote competition within the economy and increase the complexity of its economic output. Osei states that “the country has not been able to move to a more sophisticated area of product space, where goods and services produced embody more knowledge, command higher value, and provide greater returns from labour.”

Because economic growth in Ghana has not been of the transformative type, the deals space has remained closed, personal and dominated by powerful elites. Furthermore, Osei (2015) argues that had the deals environment in Ghana been more open, increased competition would have characterized the economy, which would have encouraged innovation and moved the country towards a more sophisticated product space. Osei concludes by echoing the sentiments expressed by Gillespie (2016) and Paller (2015): “one could argue therefore that Ghana finds itself in an equilibrium that makes change to a deals space that fosters sustained accelerated growth difficult.”

The economy is stuck; the functioning of deals space does not provide sufficient impetus to change the economy, which thus reinforces the strength of the prevailing deals space. Formulating and delivering LED strategies within this environment is difficult. A way to upset the equilibrium needs to be unearthed that will move the deals environment (and accompanying political settlement) towards an open, transparent, economically rationale and ordered space. How platforms for this type of change can be established through LED strategies (and thus affect change beyond LED) must surely be one of the key issues to investigate when seeking to improve the effectiveness of LED initiatives delivered by ULGs in Ghana.

This political economy perspective on urban economics is increasingly popular and is proving to be an effective way to highlight the fundamental drivers of towns and cities and economic transformation. As demonstrated by Hausmann 2013, a successful transformation is most likely to be characterized by improved productive capabilities, increased product diversification and sophistication, and the rise of high value-added, high-productivity activities. To understand how this transformation can be implemented, it is necessary to understand the prevailing political economy, how power is formed, used and brokered in a society, and more specifically how the deal space can be
opened up. This is certainly the conclusion of a number of LED practitioners in Africa, including Ravid Naidoo of the City of Johannesburg in the Republic of South Africa (see Figure 1).

Figure 7.1: Understanding the urban economy of Johannesburg, South Africa.

The political economy of social and gender relations is directly related to and underpins that associated with the economy and how value is created, extracted and expropriated. Exclusion and gender inequality are socially and politically constructed and deeply rooted in the cultural norms and ways of behaviour of a community. It matters that many of those working in the informal sector are women and that the vast majority of those working in the numerically large low-growth, low-productivity and low-return segment in the sector are women. Women face myriad challenges such as limited access to public infrastructure and services. Platforms of change, including LED initiatives delivered by ULGs, must address how these constraints can be overcome.

7.4. Conclusion and policy implications


The UNDP (2015) rates Ghana as 127th on its Gender Inequality Index out of 188 counties surveyed in the Human Development Index (HDI). In Ghana, 10.9 per cent of parliamentary seats are held by women, and 45.2 per cent of adult women have reached a secondary or higher level of education compared to 64.7 per cent of their male counterparts. For every 100,000 live births, 380 women die from pregnancy-related causes, and the adolescent fertility rate is 58.4 births per 1,000 live births. Female participation in the labour market is 67.3 per cent compared to 71.4 for men.

20 The UNDP (2015) rates Ghana as 127th on its Gender Inequality Index out of 188 counties surveyed in the Human Development Index (HDI). In Ghana, 10.9 per cent of parliamentary seats are held by women, and 45.2 per cent of adult women have reached a secondary or higher level of education compared to 64.7 per cent of their male counterparts. For every 100,000 live births, 380 women die from pregnancy-related causes, and the adolescent fertility rate is 58.4 births per 1,000 live births. Female participation in the labour market is 67.3 per cent compared to 71.4 for men.
Implementing infrastructure and service improvements, particularly those devised to encourage inclusive, equitable and resilient economic growth and social development, in the absence of an understanding of the relevant political economy context, would seem to be heading for difficulties if not failure. The impact of infrastructure and service interventions is mediated through social and political structures and norms of behaviour; in turn, this behaviour is grounded in the specific history and cultural and social traditions of the country (and city) in question. Indeed, exclusion and inequality are to a considerable extent socially constructed.

Much of the prevailing development literature emphasises the importance of institutions in the development process (see the Commission on Growth and Development, Working Paper No. 10, 2008). How institutions work, whether effectively or in a dysfunctional manner, is rooted in the prevailing political economy of the country in which the institutions operate. Before devising infrastructure and service interventions, it is necessary to understand how the institutional environment is most likely to affect and determine the provision, use and impact of the infrastructure and services, and how the prevailing political economy impels that institutional environment to affect provision, use and impact in the particular manner empirically witnessed in the past and present. From this analysis, pathways of change that constructively disrupt the equilibrium discussed above should be investigated, and related interventions should accompany the infrastructure and service development programmes.
8. Management of urban environmental services

The functional mandate of urban local governments varies from country to country across a range of municipal infrastructure and services such as water supply, sewerage, drainage, solid waste management, urban roads and transport as well as other utilities such as power, education, public health, etc. The overall framework that defines the roles, responsibilities, revenue and expenditure sources that govern service delivery is a function of the wider institutional and fiscal policy frameworks already discussed. The other key determinants for municipal service delivery include the institutional capacity to develop, design, structure, implement and manage urban infrastructure projects; the adequacy of funds for capital expenditure; the capacity to undertake the operations and maintenance of the assets created; and the political and administrative willingness to levy user charges.

The literature demonstrates that there are a wide variety of approaches to the delivery of municipal infrastructure, including in-house delivery modalities; engineering procurement and construction (EPC) models; management contracts and service agreements; public private partnerships modalities; corporatization of urban utilities; and privatization (Baietti et al. 2006). While different modalities are applied simultaneously across the range of services, there is a growing realization of the importance of a systems-based approach where infrastructure constitutes a network of physical structures, knowledge and institutions with a high degree of interdependence across networks (Chenal 2016). This chapter closely examines two environmental urban services: waste management and water supply. Even though urban water supply is not a function of assemblies in Ghana, it deserves closer examination because it is a basic urban service.

8.1. Municipal solid waste management

Solid waste management (SWM) is one of the main services delivered by metropolitan and municipal local governments the world over. Solid waste is increasingly an issue for urban areas in developing countries because of rapid urban growth, changing consumption patterns and the harmful health and environmental impacts of ineffective waste collection. While there is relatively clear municipal responsibility for waste management in most countries, the effectiveness of this service is often undermined by incoherent administrative and/ or fiscal decentralization frameworks as well as the specific challenges of waste operations, management and monitoring. The negative impacts arising from poor waste collection are typically felt the most by the poorest in a city.

The available literature suggests that the coverage and effectiveness of SWM services vary considerably between urban areas in developing countries (Zhu 2007). The literature highlights a number of factors that give rise to the current status of SWM in most cities and contexts. As well as the physical scale of the task, the amount of money spent on SWM is one critical factor in the effectiveness of this service, which is typically underfunded (Sida 2006). The Urban Institute shows some correlation between resources allocated to SWM and volumes of waste collected across 11 provinces in South Asia. Nunan & Satterthwaite (2001) find the wealth of a city and its residents to be important factors in the delivery of SWM and other environmental services across nine cities in Africa, Asia and Latin America. In addition to these factors, all available research indicates that governance issues are highly significant in the delivery of SWM. Some have even proposed that the effectiveness
of SWM can serve as a proxy indicator for the quality of governance in urban areas (Whiteman et al. 2001).

8.2. **Issues in municipal waste management**

Effective municipal waste management requires comprehensive and end-to-end services across the stages of household and commercial collection, transport, sorting, processing, recycling and disposal. In most developing countries disposal is undertaken through landfill rather than incineration. Providing an effective end-to-end service has proven to be a serious challenge for cities across the developing world and especially those in SSA and South Asia. However, there are many challenges in executing waste management projects; UNHSP (2010) outlines current trends and examines the links between waste management and United Nations development goals. Some of the most common challenges include lack of data for waste projections and waste characterization, resulting in poor planning for SWM projects; lack of an integrated end-to-end solution across all functions; poor waste processing and disposal; and poor utilization of land for disposal, resulting in the reduction in the lifecycle of land for waste disposal. Other challenges include lack of technical and financial sustainability of many planned waste projects and poor capacity and skills and lack of technical know-how of the municipal staff. These challenges, as well as lack of a sound regulatory setup to set standards and oversee user charges, affect the overall sustainability of waste management services (Annepu 2012).

Many municipalities in Africa and Asia have begun to devise alternative service provision arrangements for SWM, which range from contracting private operators to undertake all or part of the service to establishing PPP arrangements with a capital investment contribution from the private operator under the terms of the concession agreement. The World Bank has examined the determinants of effective waste management under PPP and has highlighted the various roles of policymakers and practitioners in designing and implementing sound PPP arrangements (Zhu 2007). There is a growing literature on the many and varied experiences of PPP in waste management in developing countries that highlights a number of the challenges faced in effective implementation. One issue is that of multiple providers and hence multiple concession agreements for the collection and transportation of waste and for processing and disposal, all of which results in unproductive competition, conflicts and poor accountability, undermining the overall service outcomes.

In Ghana waste management is a critical problem for cities throughout the country, exacerbated by the rapid increase in urban population and concomitant increases in the volume of waste generated, as well as changing consumption patterns that impact on the composition of waste. A report on the status of urban services in Ghana indicates a fourfold increase in the volume of waste generated in the GAMA region over the last two decades (Cities Alliance 2016).

**Composition and character of solid waste**

The literature provides some insights into the character and composition of waste in Ghana. Around 60 per cent–65 per cent of total waste is compostable organic while 90 per cent–95 per cent is combustible waste, indicating good potential for composting. This high moisture content of 40 per cent–60 per cent, however, is likely to provide a challenge for any waste-to-energy operations. Case studies also suggest that there is potential for more recycling of waste, which is currently quite limited. There are more than 40 plastic-producing firms in Ghana, for example, producing more than 30,000 metric tonnes per
annum of assorted plastic products. In addition, about 12,000 metric tonnes of finished plastic products are imported annually into the country. Plastic waste ends up being part of the waste chain and is often disposed of informally, rather than being recycled.

Case studies in Accra and Kumasi suggest that the average per capita waste generation stands at around 0.7 Kgs per day. While Accra generates the highest amount of waste of all cities, at over 1,362 metric tonnes per day, closely followed by Kumasi, the port city of Tema has the highest per capita waste generation at 1.2 Kgs per capita as compared to the average. Based on these assessments the average per capita waste generation in Ghana is significantly higher than in equivalent cities in South Asia, for example. This could be partly the result of the high-floating population in many cities as well as a much less well-developed informal and semi-formal waste recycling industry as compared to cities in developing countries in Asia, for example. Extractive industries such as mining will also result in a higher ash content in the waste chain accounting for a higher proportion of inert material as compared to some other places (Fobil et al. 2010; Oteng-Ababio 2010; Owusu-Sekyere et al. 2013).

While 90 per cent of all waste generated is either biodegradable (60 per cent) or recyclable (30 per cent) representing a potentially valuable resource, very little enters the value chain. Instead, the vast majority of waste is either disposed of at a municipal dump or in one of the four engineered landfill sites or is indiscriminately discarded within and around the municipal area. Poor waste management reduces the resilience of the city as drains become choked and prone to flooding. This problem has a significant impact on the overall cost of waste management because minimal value is extracted from the current waste chain and all operational costs must be borne either by the assembly directly or by households that benefit from a waste collection service through a user charge or tariff that is subject to political pressure. This problem is further exacerbated by the fact that limited waste treatment and minimal recycling has a significant knock-on cost in terms of disposal because the additional volume of waste will reduce the lifecycle of any municipal dump site or engineered landfill while also increasing the frequency of demand for capital to purchase new sites in future.

**Solid waste management and contracting**

The National Environmental Sanitation Strategy and Action Plan (2010) proposes that environmental services be delivered on a full cost-recovery basis, with at least 80 per cent of all waste operations being undertaken with private sector participation (PSP). The national sanitation policy also advocates the “polluter pays” principle whereby all costs are recovered through user charges levied on households and business.

Municipal solid waste collection efficiency at household level varies considerably across cities. Household waste collection services across nine municipalities in the GAMA region, for example, stands at around 55 per cent. However, while six of these nine municipalities collect between 69 per cent (Adentan) and 86 per cent (Ga East), others such as Ga South and La Dadekotopon are reported to collect as little as 9 per cent and 26 per cent of household waste, respectively (Ghana Living Standards Survey GLSS Round 6 2014). Detailed case studies in Accra and Kumasi confirm that household waste collection services cover around 50 per cent of all households in many areas.

A variety of PSP arrangements have emerged over the years. These have largely been based around private sector participation in waste collection, transport and disposal of waste, including
franchising and contracting out of services on a competitive bidding basis (Obeng-Odoom 2013; Fobil et al. 2008). Solid waste services are provided through multiple private operators who recover their costs from user charges and fees from Accra Metropolitan Assembly (AMA). Under the franchise model, the operator charges a fee to the end user that must be agreed upon with the assembly at the annual rate-fixing meeting. Under a contracted-out model, the operator receives a fee from the assembly calculated based on the quantity of waste collected and transported to a final disposal site. Although most waste collection and transportation contracts are on a franchise model, with operators assigned a specific area within the municipal boundary, some areas have been contracted out.

Waste disposal is a major problem as there are only three or four engineered landfill sites in the country serving the larger metropolitan areas. Many assemblies that do not have access to the engineered sites are left to dispose of their waste in one of many authorized private landfills, often located in disused quarries and mining pits. Although official estimates indicate that 80 per cent of all collected waste is disposed of in an authorized landfill, given that an average of 40 per cent of all waste generated is not collected through official channels, it is likely that the vast bulk of this, along with some portion of the collected waste, simply ends up in an unapproved dump or in drains and open spaces, especially in and around low-income settlements (see Cities Alliance 2016).

Authorized landfill operators will tend to receive a fee from the assembly that is then partly recovered through tipping fees charged to transporters. Because waste collection and transport operators face difficulties in achieving cost recovery, it is unlikely they could afford a tipping fee calculated to cover the full operational costs and profit margins of the landfill operators. Even where government has invested over US$12 million in the construction of an engineered landfill site, as at Kpone in Tema, for example, there has been a fourfold increase in the amount of waste disposed of, which has a knock-on effect in terms of operator costs and debt and a reduction in the lifespan of the site. Typically, the landfill operator will maintain the site and assist the assembly in charging a tipping fee from transport operators to recover some of the operational costs of site management. This fee is fixed annually by the assembly, and the current tipping fees for Kumasi Metropolitan Assembly, for example, have recently been raised to US$20 per metric tonne for domestic waste; US$40 for commercial waste and US$80 for industrial waste. There is no determined fee at present for hazardous waste. Though these fees have been adjusted upwards to cover a higher percentage of the operating costs, transport operators are worried that the new charges will make their services even less viable, and they may resort to illegal or informal dumping to avoid such costs.

In addition to waste collection, transport and disposal, MoLGRD operates an umbrella contract for cleansing and sweeping of public areas, including roads and markets, which was launched in 2008 on a pilot basis with Zoomlion Ghana Ltd. This contract has subsequently been expanded to cover public cleansing interventions in all 216 MMDAs across the country. In addition, Zoomlion also operates waste collection and transport contracts on a franchise basis in metropolitan and municipal assemblies. The company currently employs 3,000 core staff and 50,000 project staff.

**Governance and management issues**
There have been a number of initiatives to develop capacity in designing, structuring and transacting PSP contracts, including under the World Bank Urban Environmental Sanitation Project (UESP). However, almost all assemblies and many of the 35 private waste operators experience varying problems with the viability of such contracts that affect their overall performance. Much of the problem relates to the structuring of the terms and conditions of the solid waste franchise contracts in a context where user charges are intended to generate full cost recovery. This is more difficult given the fact that user charges are politically determined and that there are high transaction costs in administering and collecting user fees. These problems are now further exacerbated by the fall in the exchange rate and the rising cost of capital equipment, fuel and debt servicing. In such circumstances, many households paying lower tariff slabs and those whose transaction costs are high either opt out or are left out of the franchise catchment and instead resort to using informal private waste collectors who dump indiscriminately around the city. In low-income areas, municipal assemblies provide communal bins that are either serviced directly by the municipality or contracted out to an operator.

A central issue here is the degree to which the full project costs and returns have been accurately assessed as part of the technical and financial model. This is even more important in a context where revenues are exclusively dependent on user charges that remain subject to political endorsement. Given that operators are expected to pre-finance equipment and operating costs against a deferred revenue stream, the contract terms and conditions need better provisioning for cost escalations, risks and transactions costs associated with tariff collections at the household level. This could, for example, include some kind of intercept mechanism to ensure a more secure revenue stream to the operator.

However, neither MMDAs nor private operators can access finance to fund any gap in the viability of running waste management as a public service within a political environment and a local authority structure. At the same time, private operators must shoulder the risk of households and neighbourhoods opting out of the system as fee-paying customers and instead reverting to the local informal waste collectors charging low fees, or simply using public bins, transfer bins or dumping waste indiscriminately, all of which will reduce the income available to operators while simultaneously raising costs of clearing waste from public places within the franchise zone.

Elsewhere, municipal solid waste management concessions often include a capital subsidy from central, regional or local government as a means of lowering project costs through viability gap financing, recognizing the inherent risks and public benefit nature of the service. Such contracts also tend to de-link operator revenues from politically determined tariffs in favour of a more neutral escrow-type arrangement.

All these factors have contributed to a situation where waste operators face an uncertain future. The failure of many metropolitan and municipal assemblies to pay private operators in a timely fashion results in much disruption to services and informal disposal. Given the imbalance in risk sharing and the challenges associated in achieving breakeven, while municipalities are concerned about the problem of less economic areas being left unserviced as well as the wider problem of a total breakdown in service. This has happened periodically in the past when government has been forced to bail out municipalities and operators unable to recover costs from tariffs alone. This is altogether a sub-optimal arrangement that could be addressed through better project structuring. This would require an enhanced understanding of costs and returns on the part of both municipal assemblies and private
operators. At present the transaction process is highly problematic, as neither municipalities nor operators have a sufficiently neutral approach to the determination of rates and returns and hence the overall viability of projects.

Another key waste management issue concerns the nature of the contract for cleansing and street sweeping with Zoomlion on account of the steady expansion of the contract since pilot inception in the absence of any competitive tendering. There are some risks for the operator caused by late payment, which in recent months has led to some staff having to go for 3-4 months without pay, but overall the operator appears to have been keen to protect the contract, which has not been competitively tendered and therefore not subject to market scrutiny. Individual assemblies are unable to hold the operator to account, as no contact has been signed with them; nor can they question payments that are deducted at source. Assemblies have pointed out that they have had major difficulties in attempting to verify the cost of capital equipment that has been bulk-purchased on their behalf and for which payments have been centrally deducted from the assembly account.

8.3. Politics and waste management

Overall there is a distinct lack of transparency around such procurements in a context in which municipal assemblies are unable to obtain accurate information on the cost of the capital equipment bought on their behalf, even when the local assembly has attempted to obtain values for insurance purposes.

These critical governance issues relating to the design, contracting and management of municipal solid waste services are a direct outcome of the underlying political economy in Ghana. The early push for contracting out of waste operations has been an outcome of post-structural adjustment policy of government with strong pressure from the donor community to seek alternative service delivery models in public service delivery. This stems from an implicit assumption that the private sector will be better placed to operate services at lower cost and with greater efficiency. However, in an imperfect market, where the institutional structures and arrangements governing management contracts are still somewhat immature, and where wider political and economic interests are accommodated through a variety of informal and semi-formal mechanisms and channels, public service outcomes are variable and problematic. This is illustrated by the fact that certain contracts have been established, expanded and rolled out country wide without competition, creating a monopoly-like situation over certain aspects of waste management, a situation that is in turn bolstered by a variety of informal arrangements and subtle pressures that have maintained the status quo over two “rival” political incumbencies. The contract is administered through a set of non-transparent deductions from one tier of government to another.

Another feature of the political economy of waste management relates to the fact that contracting out is perceived to be a way in which government can outsource its functions without assuming any shared financial responsibility, despite maintaining full political control over the charges and fees to operators. This arrangement is fully consistent with a wider political economy driven by the economic principle of extraction rather than production and supported by a political structure that derives its wealth from this process.
8.4. Conclusion and policy implications

The analysis above has highlighted a number of issues with the management of solid waste in metropolitan and municipal assemblies in Ghana. The analysis of the composition of solid waste suggests that there is considerable scope for generating added value from the waste chain through waste recycling and composting. However, it is unlikely that this potential will be realized within the prevailing solid waste management system in most cities and towns because no single operator has responsibility for collection, transportation and disposal.

The absence of an integrated waste chain operator means that it is difficult for any stakeholder to realize sufficient economies of scale and to maintain sufficient control of the chain to maximize the potential from waste processing and recycling. This would require reconsidering how to organize the management of solid waste in such a manner as to provide efficiency and economy incentives over the entire waste chain operation, rather than discrete parts of the chain each of which may respond to different economic logic and incentives.

The analysis above also demonstrates that neither local governments nor potential waste operators have in most cases undertaken any in-depth technical and financial modelling of waste operations to derive a robust estimate of project costs and returns. In the absence of such an exercise it is extremely difficult to ensure that any contract or concession agreement embodies realistic costs and returns for all parties. The lack of rigorous technical and financial analysis in contract preparation has resulted in a situation where either the private sector may be offering a sub-standard service at high cost or, conversely, and as commonly reported, the private sector may be subject to unrealistic and unprofitable terms and conditions resulting in a sub-standard service for sub-standard returns. All of this has resulted in high socio-economic and environmental costs that ultimately must be borne by a combination of urban assemblies, private operators and citizens.

A key policy implication here relates to the nature of solid waste management as a public service and the need to balance the provision of an efficient, inclusive and affordable service on a cost-effective and sustainable basis. Given the need to balance these objectives within a politically oriented context, such as that of a local assembly, it is inevitable that any partnership arrangement between the local government and the private sector will require some element of subsidy to address viability gaps and offset risks. However, the analysis above has shown that such partnerships have not embodied these principles. Rather, the reverse has happened, whereby local assemblies have attempted to offload all capital and recurrent expenditure responsibilities on to the private partner and households. In such a situation, private operators face numerous difficulties; assemblies may be reluctant to impose necessary increases in user charges, and the operator faces difficulties and costs in applying and collecting such charges.

Given the politics of local tariffs, it might be better if local assemblies retained responsibility for setting and collecting user charges and the revenue stream for the operator were based on the costs and returns of performing the service to an agreed-upon standard. In the absence of such an arrangement, operators quickly withdraw from servicing sections of the city when they face difficulties in collecting user charges. At the same time, to ensure cost recovery, they may bypass disposing of waste in official landfills and dumps to avoid incurring additional cost of tipping fees. Many private operators point out that they face difficulties in ensuring cost recovery, but municipal assemblies lack access to any
viability gap funding mechanism that could help offset this problem. The net result at best will be an ineffective solid waste service and at worst a complete service breakdown resulting in the city having to intervene at high cost.

All of this reinforces the policy imperative that solid waste service arrangements should be based on a careful calculation of costs and returns and structured in such a manner that encourages a genuine financial and managerial partnership. Another important policy consideration relates to the nature of the bidding process, as many assemblies complain about the imposition of a single ubiquitous contract for street cleaning that has been centrally procured on their behalf and over which they have little or no control. Given that the services are rendered locally and that the costs of delivery are loaded on to each assembly, there is an urgent need for greater contractual transparency and local autonomy over such a contract if this is to meet the needs of locally accountable unit of government.

8.5. Urban water supply

Effective water and sanitation relies on strong institutions and good governance to ensure that all citizens, including the poorest, receive sufficient quantity and quality of water (Bakker et al. 2008). The political responsibility for water resource management in most countries is placed with national governments, while utility companies or local government are tasked with water supply and sanitation services. There is a fragmentation here; sector reforms have tended to promote private sector participation in sanitation while water supply is often undertaken through public utility companies. South Africa, widely regarded as a leader in SSA on water sector policy, has overhauled its water management system since the mid-1990s, with reforms that cut across the sector, including cities and towns. These reforms place considerable emphasis on the role of local stakeholders and local governments, as well as other decentralized structures.

The evolution of water sector institutions in SSA has varied among countries, and between francophone and anglophone countries. Decentralization has been less prevalent in francophone countries, where the trend has been towards single national water utilities. The National Office of Water and Sanitation (ONEA) in Burkina Faso and the Société Nationale des Eaux du Sénégal (SONES) have developed reputations as being among the most effective service agencies in the continent, serving the larger urban centres. In anglophone Africa, urban water has typically been more decentralized to local jurisdictions, in the form of commercially oriented utilities, as in the case of the Uganda National Water and Sewerage Company (NWSC) and the Ghana Water Company Limited (GWCL) formed in 1999 out of the erstwhile Ghana Water and Sewerage Corporation. A World Bank/WSP study in 2008 found only 10 percent of countries achieved private sector investment in the sector (Banerjee et al. 2008).

In anglophone countries such as South Africa, Uganda, Nigeria, Tanzania and Kenya there have been overt drives for decentralization of water to city-based utilities. In Ghana, GWCL has a deconcentrated arrangement with offices in urban districts that are not directly coterminous with municipal districts. South Africa has had perhaps the most comprehensive decentralization in sub-Saharan Africa, with implications for the water sector. The 1996 Constitution allocated the responsibility for water supply and sanitation to local government and water supply and sanitation assets previously owned by national government were transferred to municipalities. Local
governments were also restructured based on recommendations outlines in a White Paper of 1998. These reforms redefined the role of the national government in terms of policy making and funding of services, supported by a two-channel municipal grant mechanism comprising a conditional capital grant for capital investment and an unconditional grant for operations, where funding seeks to achieve greater equity in municipal services between better-off and poor households.

8.6. Issues in urban water supply

The management of water and sanitation in Ghana is based on a hierarchy of institutions with constitutionally and legally derived responsibilities and authorities for policy, regulation and service provision. The Ministry of Water Resources, Works and Housing (MWRWH) is responsible for overall water resource management. The Public Utilities Regulatory Commission (PURC) regulates tariffs of for all public utilities, while the Water Resources Commission (WRC) is responsible for water-use regulation. The Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development (MLGRD) is responsible for the sanitation sector. Water and Sanitation Development Boards (WSDBs) are responsible for the management of piped systems.

Urban water supply in Ghana

Urban water supply in Ghana is the responsibility of the Ghana Water Company Limited (GWCL), which operates and manages the supply of drinking water to all urban areas through 86 water supply systems covering 10.8 million people. GWCL emerged out of the former Ghana Water and Sewage Corporation (GWSC) that was formed in 1965 under an Act of Parliament (Act 310) as a legal public entity responsible for the supply of drinking water and wastewater management countrywide.

However, the government’s ability to operate and maintain services after the debt crisis and structural adjustment period of the 1980s and 1990s was severely constrained as a result of a decline in public subsidies. By the late 1990s the pipe connections and pumping systems had significantly deteriorated, negatively affecting the overall operational efficiency of GWSC. Moreover, the annual subsidy was either not released on time or often not released at all before the end of the budgetary year (see http://www.gwcl.com.gh/pgs/history.php).

GWCL was thus established in response to this problem by enhancing the corporatization concept and confining activities exclusively to urban water supply to attract private investment. This process was strongly endorsed by the World Bank, which incentivized the restructuring process with financial assistance while making private sector participation contingent on receiving further aid. The initial restructuring plan was based on a lease arrangement that meant that the urban sector would be operated by two private water companies for 10 years with capital investment from the operators. However, it became apparent that international water companies were not willing to enter in under the terms stipulated in the contract. The World Bank subsequently recommended changing the lease to a 5-year management contract with no investment responsibility for the private company. This was agreed to by the government in 2000, and another bidding process was started for the management contact (see Whitfield et al. 2015).

In 2006, GWCL entered into a 5-year management contract with Vitens Rand Water Services BV of Netherlands, a consortium of Vitens International BV of the Royal Netherlands and Rand Water
Services Pty of South Africa through its subsidiary Aqua Vitens Rand Limited (AVRL). This arrangement was primarily intended to reduce the levels of non-revenue water by increasing the reliability (pressure and flow rate) and quality of potable water, ensuring greater financial sustainability and customer service. It was also intended to help to increase access to potable water at affordable prices to low-income consumers. Obeng-Odoom (2013) notes that between 2005 and 2013 access to water in urban areas increased from 75 per cent to 83 per cent. This was seen to be the result of attempts made by AVRL to improve the infrastructure. AVRL spent over €700,000 to provide water to approximately 50,000 people in seven deprived communities.

During the period of the management contract, the quality of pipe-borne water supplied by AVRL was generally high. Although there were a few cases of water contamination this was mainly because of contaminated water sources, such as bore holes, wells and rivers, rather than a failure in the production process. Even though access to water increased under the management of AVRL, water shortages, water rationing and interruptions to supply were common occurrences, often the result of frequent electricity cuts and breakdowns. The gap between production and consumption also widened during this period. Evidence from the Accra region shows the gap widening from 74 million gallons per day in 2008 to 170 million gallons per day by 2010 (Cities Alliance RCRA 2016).

These problems were exacerbated by the incidence of non-revenue water arising from losses from leaks and system failures as well as theft. Between 2006 and 2008, approximately 51 per cent of water could not be accounted for, and AVRL was not able to meet its target of reducing non-revenue water to 40 per cent. Part of this problem was AVRL’s inability to remove illegal connections, but the poor physical condition of the infrastructure itself remained a major cause of continued distribution losses. AVRL estimated it would require an investment more than US$1.5 billion to rehabilitate major parts of the network. Although some targets were met, such as improved water quality, increased access to low-income settlements and improved finances, AVRL was not able to increase supply in line with demand nor was it able to have any discernible impact on non-revenue water, which decreased only marginally from 53 per cent in 2006 to 50 per cent by the end of 2010. Various technical, financial and audit reports concluded that the overall level of performance improvement over the contract period was low, especially in areas such as non-revenue water. Given this situation, by the end of the contract period the government concluded that the private management of the urban water supply system had not brought about the level of improvements that were anticipated; consequently, the contract with AVRL was terminated, with GWCL taking full responsibility for all aspects of the system from 2011 onwards.

GWCL assumed full responsibility for the production, transmission and distribution of water in all urban areas beginning in 2011. GWCL is a government-owned water utility established under the Statutory Corporations (Conversion to Companies) Act 461 of 1993 as amended by LI 1648. The company operates under the Ministry of Water Resources, Works and Housing and manages 86 water systems serving just under 11 million people nation-wide with a customer base of 0.5 million.

The company has around 3,500 staff with a ratio of 6.5 staff per 1,000 connections. The company operates through 15 regional and 64 district offices and 4 special business units and produces an average of 0.708Mm3/day (156MGD) of water against an estimated total demand of 1.13Mm3/day (249MGD) resulting in a demand gap of 0.422Mm3/day (93MGD). In 2014, the company sold and
billed around 142 million m3 in 2014 against 260 million m3 of treated water produced, with around 5 per cent daily production losses and 86 per cent daily capacity utilization. The average water tariff in 2014 was GHC 2 ($0.50) per m3, yielding a total revenue of GHC 307 million and total income of GHC 314 million and total operating cost of GHC 288 million. By the end of 2014 the company had succeeded in reducing non-revenue water to 45 per cent.

GWCL has many highly qualified and competent professionals and well-established operations maintenance and management systems for water production, distribution, billing and revenue collection, but most of the business processes are still manual and staff motivation levels are low. At the same time, GWCL operations are based on inadequate and aging infrastructure, inadequate capital investment and a weak financial base. All this has meant that there have been no obvious signs of improvement in operations to most customers, with water shortages continuing to be a common occurrence (see Obeng-Odoom 2013). The rising costs of inputs have had a major impact on operating expenditure, and the automatic tariff adjustments do not compensate for rising costs. All these challenges have resulted in a 10-fold rise in the consumption of pre-packaged water, in particular, sachet water; in recent years consumers have perceived pre-packaged water to be of higher quality and hence safer for drinking.

**Governance and service issues**

The analysis above highlights a number of critical governance issues associated with water reform in general and privatization in particular, some of which are common to countries in SSA. As seen from the above, rapid urbanization, old and deteriorating infrastructure, poor management, high levels of non-revenue water, low tariffs and lack of investments have all served to undermine water provision over the years. The main reforms introduced to address these issues have included private sector participation and strengthening water utility management, but these reforms have themselves been subject to a number of problems as discussed below.

Currently, the provision of utilities and services is governed by the various institutions that provide the services, with weak coordination among them and with the respective MMDAs. In many instances, there are overlaps of institutional mandates, and the lack of capacity of the MMDAs has constrained their coordinating role. Another issue is the lack of coordination between the GWCL and the MMDAs in their respective jurisdictions in terms of service planning and operations and maintenance activities that can lead to considerable physical disruption and duplication of effort as different agencies engage in service extensions, repairs and maintenance.

Private sector participation has been seen as one of the planks of reform over the years and a means to improve corporate utility management. As elsewhere in Africa, this process reflects an initial neo-liberal enthusiasm for private sector involvement in service delivery as a panacea for improved service provision and has been strongly supported by the World Bank and other donors since the post structural adjustment period. Subsequently, however, many private operators faced a host of difficulties in operating networks. These stemmed largely from the lack of required capital investment to upgrade and extend network coverage as a prerequisite for enhancing system efficiency, as well as the reluctance of governments (national or local) to adjust tariffs in line with costs and returns on O&M. The subsequent reluctance of many established private operators to venture into long-term
concession arrangements explains why the procurement process for private management in Ghana became a protracted problem from the early 2000s until the AVRL contract was reformulated into a 5-year management contract with reduced risk for the operator.

Despite reformulation of the contract, it became difficult for the operator to meet the performance targets because the underlying prerequisite for increased and sustained capital investment to extend and upgrade the network was not adequately forthcoming. This is well illustrated by the fact that AVRL was unable to meet a number of performance targets that depended on the larger issue of addressing the accumulated deficit in infrastructure for water production and supply. Here, AVRL performance was undoubtedly affected by the inability of GWCL to disburse the planned capital investment funding of US$80 million, which severely compromised the operator’s ability to reduce NRW. Obeng-Odoom (2013) notes that, despite several safety nets that were proffered to AVRL such as the option of increasing tariffs based on trends in inflation and currency devaluation to insulate it from risks, these were not sufficient to address the underlying infrastructure deficit.

The main opportunity going forward is presented by a growing customer base keen to access adequate and reliable water supply, but this can only be addressed if GWCL can, in turn, access sufficient capital for infrastructure investment and at the same time establish an accurate and fair billing system based on consumption. Minimizing leakages as well as other losses will also lead to increased revenues, reduced costs, and hence increased profitability. However, GWCL faces a number of threats that, if not addressed, will undermine performance. These include:

- Insufficient operational autonomy, especially in relation to tariff setting
- Rising energy costs (30 per cent of GWCL expenditure)
- High incidence of illegal connections and by-passing of metering; climate change leading to the drying up of water sources
- Poor customer perception of GWCL; activities of illegal small-scale miners.

A critical issue for any water supply system relates to the need to ensure reliability and quality of potable water. Reliability in turn depends largely on the ability to maintain or improve pressure and flow rates in the distribution system. This is a difficult task if the agency responsible for water does not have access to sufficient capital to invest in planned preventive maintenance and system upgrading and a reliable electricity supply to maintain distribution levels, regardless of whether the agency is a public entity or a private entity. In recognition of this issue, water pressure, which had originally been a contractual target, was removed from the AVRL contract, as regular power cuts meant it would be impossible to maintain pressure over any sustained period while GWCL was responsible for the capital investment programme required for system refurbishment.

Although there was little improvement in the pressure and flow rates of potable water over the period of the private management contract with AVRL, there was improvement in terms of water quality. AVRL introduced systematic monitoring of pH, colour, turbidity, residual chlorine and e-coli and consequently met all its targets for each parameter by the final year of the contract, despite continued pollution of many of the raw water sources.

Another important governance issue relates to the provision of access to potable water for low-income households. In most cases this requires an extension to the piped network and an increase in
the number of connections to low-income settlements. The number of consumers in low-income settlements rose from 364,000 to 438,000 over the contract period (2006-2011). Despite increasing the coverage of the piped network to reach 59 per cent of all households, only 20 per cent of low-income households and 5 per cent of the poorest households had an individual connection. The disparity in coverage was even greater in the Accra region, where 90 per cent of households in high-income areas had a connection compared to just 16 per cent in low-income areas (see Cities Alliance 2016). This problem is compounded by the fact that most poor communities are located on the fringes of the urban area and that the informality of the built settlement can make laying of pipes and aligning of drains a difficult task. In such circumstances, residents of poorer communities are forced to get water from private vendors and other unapproved sources.

Another critical issue relates to ensuring financial sustainability of the entity responsible for water supply. This was achieved during the AVRL period, during which the annual revenue for water increased from GHC 57 million to GHC 143 million, with the operating surplus growing from GHC 9 million to GHC 36 million per annum. However, the increase in revenue was to a large extent the result of an 80 per cent increase in tariffs, although AVRL did increase billing and revenue collection efficiency.

Increasing the financial sustainability of water supply systems is a crucial objective for more efficient system operations and maintenance, but this must be balanced against issues of affordability for low-income households. Poorer households consume lower volumes of water than middle- and upper-income households, and the way the tariffs are structured means that they end up paying a higher price for the water they use than those who consume high volumes, which does not adequately reflect the true cost of the water used. This is confirmed in a study by (Banerjee & Foster 2010) for the World Bank on cost recovery, equity and efficiency in water tariffs in Africa. They point out that those who survived on the minimum subsistence level of 4 m3/month ended up paying US$0.77/m3 as compared to those at the higher end using 40 m3/month, who paid just $0.08/m3. As a result, standposts have emerged as an alternative to piped water. Managed by utilities, NGOs or private operators, standposts are a good choice for many households. Those managed by utilities or that supply utility water are expected to use the formal utility tariffs. The price is kept low to make improved water available and affordable to low-income households. But the price actually charged for water withdrawn from public taps and then resold through informal channels can be several orders of magnitude higher (and much higher than the price paid by consumers of small volumes of piped water (Banerjee & Foster et al. 2010). Recent work by Cities Alliance in Ghana confirms that residents in low-income communities, however, pay three or four times what those on the GWCL network typically pay and, in Accra, people living at or below the poverty line may often pay 10 times more for their water than residents in high-income areas.

Other issues that have a direct bearing on service quality relate to the ability, willingness and authority of the operator to tackle the persistent problem of illegal connections. These have tended to proliferate across the distribution network, often with support from politically influential elements that treat free access to public resources as a legitimate part of the political patronage system designed to generate and maintain support factions.
This problem combines with entrenched managerial practices that allow for inaccurate meter reading, inefficient bill distribution and non-payment of bills in return for informal payments that provide direct cash benefits to operational staff at all levels of the management hierarchy. This stems from and is exacerbated by low worker motivation and inefficiency, which further undermines the effective operation of the entire system. The consequence of such practices is that consumers and customers end up not paying bills as a means of objecting to poor service, which further undermines service provision.

The lack of any robust baseline data is yet another problem in the management of service provision, as it becomes difficult to measure performance and progress. This is not only a problem for internal management and monitoring of service delivery but also a problem for the proper monitoring of management contracts. This problem is well illustrated in the case of the termination of the AVRL contract, where the lack of robust baseline data meant that the claims against AVRL in terms of non-performance could be problematic in the absence of any accurate measurement of performance.

8.7. Politics and urban water supply

Although poor performance was stated as the official reason for the termination of the AVRL contract, Obeng-Odoom (2013) and Whitfield (2015) argue that continued political opposition to the privatization of water from various coalitions of interest also played a strong role in deciding the final outcome. Whitfield highlights several political factors that affected the performance of water supply before and during the period of the management as noted below.

Politically determined tariffs: from 1990 onwards, tariff increases were set at very low levels and well below the levels required for cost recovery of operations and maintenance, let alone the capital investment requirements for urgent system rehabilitation. Ruling elites have consistently used the setting of tariffs to gain short-term political advantage and blocked increases at the time of elections given the prominence of water and tariff issues during election campaigns.

Political appointments: selection of senior staff, including managing directors and Board members, is also highly politicized. The President and the ruling elite select and appoint individuals aligned to the ruling party. Following any change in government, the incoming party will reconstitute the board and senior management to reward supporters and clients. Such management reshuffles have resulted in a degree of instability and lack of professional continuity, all of which affects the operations of the utility. Between 1987 and 2007, there were eight different managing directors appointed to run the water utility.

Informal practices and corruption: procurement is used as a means for company staff to make personal gains through various practices, including contract fixing, tacit agreement to the operation of cartels, over-pricing and manipulating technical and or financial evaluation. AVRL brought in more robust and transparent procurement practices by systematizing the procurement process, but procurement practices continue to provide opportunities for informal gain in the post-AVRL period. In addition to procurement, there are many other practices such as over-invoicing that have not yet been eradicated and continue to provide avenues and opportunities for a host of rent-seeking behaviours.

Although the introduction of the management contract with AVRL was intended to increase efficiency and reduce politicization and corruption, the contract itself was designed in a “politicized
and volatile context.” The fact that GWCL held full control over the contract also meant that it could protect a number of avenues for rent seeking. Whitfield (2015) argues that a good part of the reason that AVRL was not able to deliver intended results was the persistence of informal institutions and behaviour that continued to exist during the period of management contract and subsequently with very restricted attempts to reform these practices in any significant manner.

Both the NDC and NPP are umbrellas of elite factions and contain multiple patron-client networks. For parliamentarians to maintain their positions, it is essential to build strong patron-client networks, and this depends on campaign financing and being in a government position that enables delivery of goods and services to constituency members. Power within ruling coalitions has become increasingly fragmented over the years. One outcome of the presence of a number of strong factions in the ruling coalition is that distributional politics, as described above, absorbs a large amount of resources. In addition, decisions on resource allocation are often contested. At times of competitive elections, ruling elites seek to appeal to members and supporters of the other party; subsequently, ruling elites employ distributive policies that meet the demands of the largest section of the population. As a result, subsidies are introduced for basic services such as water and electricity, and ruling elites are reluctant to remove subsidies and raise prices for households in the future. Therefore, in Ghana, both political parties have frequently delayed tariff increases in election years.

The nature of competitive clientelism that characterizes much of the political settlement in Ghana means that a fragmented ruling coalition is eager to maintain cohesion over lower-level factions while combating powerful excluded elites. In such circumstances, ruling elites seek to find informal ways of maintaining political stability through patron-client networks. This creates pressure for the ruling elites to redistribute resources to accommodate both supporters and groups that may bring about political instability. Important political constituencies are offered “off-budget transfers” either through financing the coalition or providing organizational support. As stated by Whitfield (2015), “Powerful constituencies demand transfers for themselves, but they are often organised in the form of patron-client networks in order to get access to the scarce resources that states dispense.”

Much of the problem here stems from the very nature of an underlying political economy characterized by low levels of production and attendant low economic productivity. This restricts the ability of the government to raise sufficient revenues from taxation to fund public investment. Instead, high levels of extraction, informality and unproductive rent seeking all service to channel resources away from public investment in goods and services and divert these towards private investment, explaining much of the logic and behaviour of agencies such as GWCL responsible for the delivery of urban water.

8.8. Conclusion and policy implications

The analysis above has examined the institutional evolution of urban water supply in Ghana along with a brief assessment of the performance of the sector in terms of production and distribution, service coverage, quality and efficiency. The analysis highlights the various institutional arrangements that have evolved over the years in response to growing demand in the urban sector and the challenges associated with inclusive supply and cost-effective delivery. Consequently, the sector has witnessed different institutional arrangements at different points in time, each intended to address the challenge
of effective service delivery in the context of rapidly growing demand, constraints on the availability of investment capital, low tariffs preventing cost recovery and a deteriorating distribution network.

The main policy implications arising from the analysis relate to the institutional structure of urban water supply along with the fiscal management of water supply as a critical basic service, within the contemporary political economy of Ghana. These twin issues that determine the corporate structure of provisioning and the financing of the infrastructure network have a very significant impact on service delivery and service outcomes in terms of distributional equity.

A key policy consideration is how best to capture the advantages of a corporate utility-based model for urban water provisioning capable of delivering services in an efficient, effective and inclusive manner. A corporate utility structure has a number of inherent advantages in terms of economies of scale of operation, specialization and managerial professional, but in the absence of sufficient capital for investment in network repair, rehabilitation and extension, it will be extremely difficult to bring about improvements in access, quality and cost recovery, whatever institutional model is adopted.

This, in turn, raises a number of policy issues concerning the relevance and efficacy of privatization of water production and supply to improve service delivery. In a context where the commercial viability of service operations will be undermined by a politically determined tariff structure designed to protect the poor as well as other vested interests, it is unlikely that any private operator would wish to assume full commercial responsibility for service operations over any lengthy concession. At best, the private sector may be willing to undertake a management contract to operate aspects of the service without having to assume any investment risk. However, in such a scenario and without adequate complementary public investment to extend the network coverage and/or rehabilitate dilapidated infrastructure, it may not be possible for anticipated efficiency gains associated with private management to be realized.

Indeed, this is exactly the situation that occurred because of a management contract granted to AVRL in Ghana intended to improve performance in a number of critical areas of production and supply including the following: access to piped network, frequency and quality of supply, reduction in non-revenue water and recovery of operating costs.

The Ghana experience clearly illustrates the difficulties in implementing traditional public private partnership on a long-term concession arrangement within an unstable political economy and a politicized regulatory and investment regime. The experience of Ghana, as well as similar experiences in other countries such as Tanzania, also illustrates the challenges of operating medium-term management contracts in an environment where the private operator’s revenues are derived wholly or partly from a politically determined tariff and where a lack of complementary capital and recurrent investment results in high operating costs associated with continual network breakdowns, leaks and theft, thereby preventing the operator from meeting anticipated performance targets. At the same time, continued political interference over appointments and decision making within the public bodies responsible for regulation and operation of water supply tends to lead to a situation where those with vested interests in day-to-day operations work to undermine the role of the private operator, in an attempt to reconstitute all operations within the former agency.
A key policy lesson arising from this experience would seem to imply that any sector reform intended to enhance performance of water supply in a rapidly expanding urban environment should place greater focus on strengthening fiscal arrangements to assure adequate public investment in capital and O&M than on the organizational arrangements of public or private delivery. The benefits of private management will be marginal at best if the network itself is inadequate in terms of physical coverage or reliability. Moreover, if any benefits are to accrue from private management of the network, without negatively affecting access to services or quality of supply, especially for the poor, these will only materialize if the source of revenue for the private operator is de-linked from the user tariff, as this is a politically contested issue and is unlikely to provide scope for full cost recovery, let alone any operating profit. In such a situation, it would be preferable to earmark certain guaranteed revenues for the operator to implement key management reforms independent of user tariffs that will be subject to political pressure to ensure access for all as well as access on favourable terms for some. The overall level of capital and recurrent subsidy is ultimately a political choice, but bringing about greater efficiency in the management of service delivery need not conflict with prevailing political imperatives. However, in the absence of adequate capital and recurrent investment, it will be extremely difficult to deliver greater efficiency in operations in terms of extending network coverage, reducing non-revenue water or improving cost recovery.

A final issue in the context of devolved governance of local services is that water utilities rarely function in close collaboration with municipal authorities. This can lead to an uncoordinated approach to the planning and delivery of serviced land for residential and or commercial/industrial purposes. The lack of coordination between piped water network maintenance operations undertaken by the utility and road and drain maintenance undertaken by the municipality means that it is difficult to synchronize maintenance in such a manner as to minimize cost and physical disruption to roads and access routes. Meanwhile, the level of response to citizens’ problems and issues may be less in an organizational structure without democratic accountability. Such coordination and accountability issues could be addressed, in part at least, through municipal representation on local or regional utility management boards, although it is not clear the degree to which this would resolve these issues.

Key Issues

The private sector and other informal actors are increasingly filling the gap in urban service delivery created by these sub-par institutions. On the one hand, this has imposed additional costs on households, even for basic services such as the management of solid waste and water supply. On the other, it has exposed the isomorphic mimicry of governance reforms as governments have failed to deliver on their commitments under PPP arrangements, resulting in delivery failures. The growing incidence of self-provisioning of services by the middle and upper classes, most prominent in the supply of water, security, education and sanitation, has weakened conditions for bottom-up support from citizens to end status quo. Self-provisioning, as well as capture of the limited services provided by the state by the elites, is unlikely to provide incentives for city-wide agitations for improved services provision for all (especially the poor).
9. Competitive clientelism and the political economy of urban governance

While much of the earlier scholarship on urban service delivery focused on technical concerns and the implementation of “good” or “best” practices, there is now strong recognition that political economy factors are important in determining the effective delivery of public services, including in urban areas (Jones et al. 2014; Resnick 2014). This observation has gained substantial buy-in among mainstream international development agencies, which have increasingly recognized that the limited impact of their development programmes in developing countries has been, in part, because of their limited attention to domestic political processes and actors (Hyden 2008; Brown 2009; DFID 2010). Yet, and as a recent detailed review of the literature on the governance of urban service delivery in developing countries concludes, our knowledge of the specific ways in which political economy factors affect public service delivery in urban areas remains poorly understood (Jones et al. 2014). The normative framework on good urban governance proposes that cities may become truly effective in the delivery of basic services upon application of the principles of sustainability, subsidiarity, equity, efficiency, transparency and accountability, civic engagement, security of individuals and their living environment within their administration. This approach typically assumes that whether city governments can provide public services effectively depends on the internalized characteristics/effectiveness of sub-national governments. In such accounts, the importance of the wider structures of power within which sub-national authorities are embedded are rarely recognized or examined.

This chapter draws insights from the emerging literature on political settlements to explore how political economy factors shape service delivery in urban Ghana and, consequently, the creation of inclusive cities in the country. In particular, it focuses on an understanding of the politics of central-local relations in Ghana and how this relationship shapes the commitment and capacity of city governments in the delivery of public services for city dwellers.

The chapter is organized as follows: Section 2 briefly discusses the politics of service delivery through a political settlement lens, while Section 3 discusses the nature of the political settlement in Ghana. Section 4 discusses the impact of the political settlement on urban governance and service delivery. Section 5 concludes and highlights avenues for future research.

9.1. Political settlement theory

In recent years, political settlement theory has gained ground as means to analyse the politics of development. The political settlement has been defined as “the balance or distribution of power between contending social groups and classes, on which any state is based” (Di & Putzel 2010). For Khan (2010), a “political settlement emerges when the distribution of benefits supported by its institutions is consistent with the distribution of power in society, and the economic and political outcomes of these institutions are sustainable over time.” In contrast to the good governance approaches that emphasise the adoption of “best-type” institutions, political settlement theory pushes development thinking beyond an institutionalist approach by focusing on the power arrangements that underpin the emergence, stability and performance of institutions.
An important contribution of this framework for understanding urban development challenges in developing countries is the primacy it accords to informal institutions. The political settlements framework explains the prevalence of clientelism in developing countries as a structural problem, underpinned mainly by the limited availability of fiscal resources. In all countries, ruling elites face pressures to redistribute resources to accommodate both their supporters and groups in society that can threaten political stability. Khan (2010) argues that the inherited distributional power by ruling political coalitions in developing countries cannot be supported by the income created by formal institutions alone, primarily because of the limited size of the formal productive economy. Therefore, “informal institutions play a vitally important role in all developing countries because informal institutions are the only feasible mechanism for sustaining economic benefits for powerful groups…” (Khan 2010: 26).

Recent research has further distinguished between two basic types of clientelist political settlements (Levy 2014). In the first type, power is concentrated largely in the hands of a dominant party/leader. In this settlement type, the ruling coalition has a reasonably assured grip on power, and it will take an extraordinary level of effort by regime opponents to wrestle power from the ruling group through the ballot box. The second, contrasting settlement is competitive clientelism, which is characterized by a high degree of competition for power and a strong likelihood of power changing hands through the electoral process. These two different settlement types create different kinds of pressures on ruling political elites, including the time horizons over which they are incentivized to invest in building “impersonalized” and formal institutions that operate in the public interest.

Within the competitive clientelist type of political settlement, ruling elites tend to be inclined towards immediate and visible policy outcomes that contribute to their short-term political survival. Precisely because ruling political elites are credibly at risk of electoral loss, “political elites within the ruling coalition continually manoeuvre to sustain stability and to assure the continuing loyalty of clients” (Levy 2014: 49). One result is that the time horizons of political leaders tend to be shorter, and the calculated political return of public investment decisions is shaped by how visible a good is because, as (Batley & Mcloughling 2015) explain, “the potential political returns from responding to visible problems and producing visible outputs are greater than those from tackling lower profile challenges or improving systems and processes that are obscured from public view.” Levy (2014: 35) similarly explains that, because a competitive clientelist political settlement is based on a credible prospect of power alternation, “whichever faction is in power is likely to have a short time horizon.” In this respect, ruling elites’ incentives are geared towards addressing localized development problems that require visible solutions, particularly around elections time so as to please voters. It is this preoccupation with regime survival that helps explain why competitive clientelist political settlements are generally characterized by “weak implementation and enforcement capabilities” (Khan 2010: 8), especially around reforms that take a long time to bear fruit, and which require the cooperation of several “principals” within the ruling coalition.

In such contexts, countries are likely to experience “a growing disconnect between a rapid expansion in the provision of resources for service provision and corresponding expansion in access to services, but continuing shortfalls in service quality and results” (Levy 2014: 139). This explains
why public service delivery in most competitive clientele list settings are typically of low quality” (Levy & Walton 2013), a problem that is likely to persist until incentives within the dominant coalition shift away from the impersonalized use of public institutions in pursuit of short-term gains (Kelsall & Heng 2016: 251).

9.2. Competitive clientelism

Ghana transitioned from decades of political instability in the immediate post-independence era to a decade of a stable quasi-military experiment (1982-1992) and then to a stable multi-party democratic rule from 1993 to date. The current Fourth Republican Constitution promulgated in 1992 is the longest-surviving constitutional order in Ghana’s history and has survived two electoral terms in 2000 and 2008, thereby consolidating democracy as demonstrated by having met Samuel Huntington’s “two-turnover” test, an achievement that remains rare in Africa, where, since 1989, only three other countries have met the test (Cheeseman 2010).

Although several parties have contested all six sets of elections since the return to multi-party democracy in 1992, only two parties dominate, with the New Patriotic Party and the National Democratic Congress consistently winning over 90 per cent of presidential votes. Between these parties, the presidency has changed hands twice. Having won both the presidential and parliamentary elections in 1992 and 1996 under J.J. Rawlings, the NDC lost to the NPP in 2000 and 2004 under the leadership of J.A. Kufuor, which in turn lost to the current ruling NDC in December 2008 under the leadership of J.E.A. Mills. Tragically, President Mills died while in office in July 2012, and Vice President John Mahama was sworn in as a president and later selected by the NDC to take his place as the presidential candidate in the 2012 national elections, which the party won.

There is broad agreement that the nature of the political settlement in Ghana since the return to multi-party democracy in 1992 has been characterized by competitive clientelism (Abdulai & Hickey 2016; Hirvi & Whitfield 2015; Whitfield et al. 2015; Oduro et al. 2014). This means that ruling elite coalitions are not entrenched, but must instead compete for electoral power against similar coalitions of clientelist networks organized as factional alliances. Since the December 2000 elections, the NDC and NPP have become increasingly equal in terms of power, resources and membership, and the margin of votes separating them has narrowed overtime (Table 1). This increasingly competitive electoral environment became especially evident in 2008, when it took three rounds of presidential elections to determine the winner by a narrow margin of less than 0.5 per cent of total valid vote casts, down from 28.11 per cent in 1992 (Figure 1). Despite this equal strength, the party that wins elections in the current political system monopolizes power and state resources irrespective of the margin of its electoral victory. This means that contemporary Ghanaian politics is characterized by a winner-takes-all normative logic in which “the winner in electoral

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21 The two-turnover test was set as a way of assessing whether a democracy has consolidated. Thus, when power changes twice from an incumbent to an opposition in a new democracy a democracy is said to have satisfied the conditions for consolidation (Huntington 1993).

22 Attah-Mills died while in office in July 2012, and was replaced by the Vice President John Dramani Mahama, until the scheduled national elections on 7 December 2012.
contest marginalizes and excludes actors in opposition groups from access to resources, other entitlements and incentives” (Abdulai & Hickey 2016; Oduro et al. 2014).

**Figure 9.1: Increased electoral competition in Ghana, 1996-2012**

![Graph showing increased electoral competition in Ghana, 1996-2012](image)

*Source: Author, based on Electoral Commission of Ghana, Accra.*

Therefore, each ruling coalition in Ghana is characterized by a high degree of vulnerability in power, leading to the politicization of public institutions and the allocation of public goods according to an electoral logic (Abdulai & Hickey 2016). A major feature of Ghana’s competitive clientelist political settlements relates to the politicization of state institutions through patronage appointments, with significant adverse implications for the capacity of the state bureaucracy to deliver public goods. Every transition of power in Ghana’s highly competitive electoral environment is accompanied by wholesale removal of public servants perceived to be associated with the previous regime (Gyimah-Boadi & Yakah 2012). Extreme partisanship in public appointments has been an enduring feature of competitive clientelism in Ghana, as members of the two dominant parties see the control of the state as the most lucrative avenue for group and individual wealth and influence.

The high degree of inter-party competition between the NDC and NPP, which stemmed from each party having roughly the same number of core voters, has resulted in competition over swing voters who play crucial roles in winning elections. As elections in most regions have become increasingly close contests, presidential parliamentary candidates rely not only on their core voters, but even more so on support from swing voters (Lindberg & Morrison 2005; Lindberg & Morrison 2008). Thus, for many observers, democratic politics has deepened rather than reduced patron-client relations in Ghana. Keefer (2007: 178) notes that, although multi-party competition has contributed to a shift towards more “responsive politics” in Ghana, with Ghanaian politicians increasingly becoming more sensitive to “distributional issues” (p.175), this responsiveness has been “especially to the particular demands of narrow or targetable groups of citizens” (p.178).

The persistence of clientelist forms of politics has been enabled by the excessive concentration of political power in the President by the 1992 Constitution. Although Ghana is considered a successful African democracy, the executive dominates the legislature, and individual
legislators have little influence on the President’s policy agenda. Fox et al. (2011: 26) argue that this executive/presidential dominance has “created a parallel system of political patronage in which members of the winning party are rewarded for their allegiance.” The president can directly appoint an estimated 4,000 individuals, including the heads of local/urban governments and the boards of numerous state agencies and parastatals. In addition, the Constitution requires the President to appoint a majority of ministers from members of Parliament. This provision results in a blurred line between the executive and legislature, and contributes to undermining parliamentary oversight over executive actions. The weaknesses in government accountability have enabled grand and petty corruption to thrive.

As democracy has become increasingly consolidated, so has the Ghanaian electorate become increasingly sophisticated, evident for example in the growing phenomenon of “skirt and blouse voting” during the past three elections. Nevertheless, ethno-regional bloc voting remains salient, and the two main parties both resort to ethnic appeals in mobilizing votes and building their political coalitions. The ethno-regional strongholds of the NPP have been the Ashanti and Eastern regions, home to the Ashanti and Akyem (sub-groups of the Akan ethnic group), who are linked to cocoa production and to the tradition of Danquah-Busia. The NDC strongholds have been the Volta Region, from which former president J.J. Rawlings hails, as well as the three northern regions: Northern, Upper West, and Upper East. Studies of voting behaviour have also identified an urban/rural cleavage in Ghanaian politics, with the NDC and NPP considered to be dominant in rural and urban communities, respectively (Bawumia 2012; Nugent 1999). However, more recent election results show that this pattern is waning (Whitfield 2009).

Having discussed the nature of Ghana’s political settlement, we now turn to a brief discussion on the economic impact of competitive clientelism in Ghana. We focus specifically on the economic strategies of political elites in maintaining their ruling coalitions and the implications of these strategies for the effective provisioning of public goods. One central defining feature of competitive clientelism in Ghana is the use of electoral competition as a vehicle to gain control of the realms of state and then distribute patronage to the rank and file of ruling coalitions (Oduro et al. 2014). As electoral competition has become increasingly intense within the context of a four-year electoral cycle, politicians are motivated to think of short time horizons and the provision of “quick-fix actions” to secure political capital and stay in power. This has often fuelled the politicization of state-business relations whereby ruling parties favour business allies and discriminate against opponents. Opoku (2010) has drawn attention to the antagonistic relations between ruling parties and specific businesses across the political divide and argued that such relations have often been motivated by politicians’ strategies aimed at weakening sections of the business community who are seen to be sympathetic to, and financed by, the opposition. Building ruling coalitions, thus, simultaneously involves strategies to redistribute resources towards members of the ruling coalition, while weakening economic classes perceived to be real or potential members of the political opposition (Opoku 2010).

Unsurprisingly, for many observers, the roots to grand corruption and adverse implications for service delivery in Ghana are the growing cost of election campaigns and the funding sources of political parties. In the 2007 World Bank’s Enterprise Survey, 61.23 per cent of companies in
Ghana reported that they were expected to give a “gift” to secure government contracts, compared to the regional average of 36.34 per cent (World Bank 2007). Similar observations were made in the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness survey for 2010-2011. Here, on a 7-point scale (where 1 represents “always show favouritism” and 7 implies “never show favouritism”), Ghanaian business executives gave the country a score of 2.8, indicating a high degree of “favouritism of government officials towards well-connected companies and individuals when deciding upon policies and contracts.”

The high cost of election campaigns in Ghana’s “winner-takes-all” political system has raised suspicions of political party campaign investors who expect to “recoup their investments” with astronomical profit margins after political victory. This has given rise to systemic corruption in Ghana, especially through the awards of contracts. Thus, for most close observers of Ghanaian politics, “political investors” have been the main cause of corruption within political circles in Ghana because:

“They provide money for you to become the president, they provide money for you to become the District Chief Executive, they provide money for you to become the parliamentarian and clearly when you have won to become the president, when you are now the Member of Parliament, when you are now the District Chief Executive, he will expect to get his money back and … this goes to promote corruption in the country.”

We now turn to explore how these political settlement dynamics play out at the sub-national level and their implications for service delivery in urban areas.

9.3. Politics of decentralization and participation

The 1992 Constitution of Ghana, which marked the transition to multi-party democracy, endorsed the principles of decentralization and popular participation in government, with detailed structures and processes outlined in the Local Government Act of 1993, Act 462.

Thus decentralization enjoys both constitutional and legal guarantees, and there is a general political consensus in favour of decentralization as the means to improved service delivery in local/urban communities. In practice, however, questions of partisan advantage within the country’s competitive clientelist setting effectively undermine both the democratic nature of decentralized governance and the potential of decentralization to contribute to improved service delivery in urban areas. In what follows, we discuss the specific ways in which electoral incentives have shaped local/urban governance reforms in Ghana. We focus specifically on central government control of sub-national authorities through presidential appointments and budgetary controls, how this

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undermines the downward accountability of sub-national authorities to local populations, and how these in turn shape prospects for effective service delivery in urban areas.

**Central government appointments**

One of the key features of Ghana’s local governance system is the persistence of central government appointees in highly influential positions at the district level. While democratic decentralization requires the transfer of power and resources to elected sub-national authorities, there remains a lingering direct central government influence on the composition of MMDAs in Ghana. The main means by which direct central government control is exerted at the local level is the appointment of 30 per cent of all MMDA members and of the MMDCEs, whose loyalty is first and foremost to the President and party that appointed them. The main argument in favour of one-third appointees has historically hinged on the idea of ensuring the inclusion of people with specific requisite skills and expertise. Government appointees, it was envisaged, would help bring advantages of knowledge, professional and technical skills and expertise to bear on the work of local authorities, as well as ensure the representation of marginalized groups such as women, youth and persons with disabilities (Ayee & Dickovick 2010)

In practice, however, the appointment system has become a means of providing the party in power with the opportunity to appoint party loyalists at the expense of opposition party supporters. Thus, rather than strengthen meritocracy in local governance, the current system has contributed to providing the President a means by which to patronize local elite groups. Much of the evidence also suggests that the President does not consult traditional authorities and other interest groups within the district as required by law. Instead, “the political party in power selects the government appointees from a party list drawn by the MMDCE and the Regional Minister” (Ayee & Dickovick 2010: 12). MMDCEs are typically appointed from among the key office-holders in the local branch of the governing party, and have accordingly tended to serve as conduits through which governing elites exert control on local politics and development (Crawford 2010: 118). Consequently, key local government officials such as MMDCEs have become little more than extensions of the executive branch at the local level and, as such, remain largely unaccountable to local populations. As such, central government appointees within the MMDAs “owe their allegiance to the president and the ruling party nationally, not to the electorate locally, and are therefore upwardly, not downwardly, accountable” (Crawford 2009: 72).

In focus group discussions with officials from three municipal assemblies in the Greater Accra region, local authority staff and stakeholders highlighted several adverse implications of the unaccountable nature of MMDA officials. These included the award of dubious contracts to party cronies, leading to the shoddy execution of projects, and the wrong siting of projects, sometimes at unapproved/inappropriate locations like waterways. Participants cited the example of one MMDCE constructing a 40-seat toilet block without the provision of water that is necessary for the functionality of the toilet facility. This observation, while seemingly irrational, is fully consistent with the logic of competitive clientelism, which incentivizes political elites to focus on the provision of visible goods like infrastructure, without a consideration of what holds the greatest promise in improving the welfare of the wider citizenry. As David Booth and Ole Therkildsen note,
there is often a high “tendency of competitive clientelism, especially in its democratic form, to
generate policy incoherence – bold policy gestures that are neither followed up with implementation
nor accompanied by the necessary complementary measures” (Booth & Therkildsen 2012: 18).

Our focus group discussions also drew attention to cases when MMDCEs put pressure on
local development planners to set aside municipal development plans and reallocate resources in
ways that are deemed more politically suitable in enhancing the electoral fortunes of ruling parties.
These observations are not unique to MMDA politics in Ghana, but are instead a reflection of the
character of national-level political economy dynamics in which high-level government officials
frequently set aside what the budget says and dispose of public monies in line with the logic of
winning and maintaining political power (Killick 2008; Abdulai 2016; Abdulai & Hulme 2015;
Abdulai & Hickey 2016).

Together, these problems explain why public opinion in Ghana is now increasingly pressing
for full democratization of the MMDAs, with 100 per cent elected members and locally elected
MMDCEs (Crawford 2009; Institute of Economic Affairs 2010). Although the two political parties
have both indicated their commitments to a fully devolved local government system, none in power
has initiated the necessary reforms aimed at changing the status quo. These parties advocate for the
election of MMDCEs only when they are in opposition, but often backtrack from such
commitments when they are in power. During the 2000 presidential elections, the NPP pledged to
amend the Constitution to allow the election of MMDCEs, but abandoned this idea soon after
winning the elections. Instead, and as Crawford (2009) has noted, the NPP fully used its
appointment power upon election, immediately revoking the mandates of all MMDCEs and all DA
appointees put in place by the NDC and appointed those allied to the new ruling party.

Once the ruling NPP abandoned its calls for greater decentralization, the NDC, then in
opposition, embraced it and pledged to reform and deepen democratic decentralization in its 2008
election manifesto (NDC 2008: 14). However, and as with the NPP in 2001, the ruling NDC now
faces incentives to perpetuate a status quo in which the central government has considerable
appointment power over officials at sub-national levels (Ayee & Dickovick 2010). Interestingly, as
the November 2016 presidential elections drew closer, both the presidential and vice-presidential
candidates of the main opposition NPP reverted to making renewed pledges towards the election of
all MMDA officials. But given experiences to date, significant questions remain concerning the
prospects for implementing such reforms without strong external pressures from donors and civil
society.

Driven in part by donor pressures, the Government of Ghana undertook a decentralization
policy review in 2007 that outlined three policy options for deepening decentralization. Option 1
entailed the abolition of presidential appointees, with all Assembly members being elected by 2010
and all MMDCEs elected by 2014 (Government of Ghana 2007: 13). Option 2 required the election
of all Assembly members but kept the MMDCE a presidential appointee (GoG, 2007: 13), while
Option 3 was to retain to status quo, but with “clear guidelines on the appointment of Assembly
members” (ibid p.15). After nearly a decade of such proposed reforms, Option 1 remains
unappealing to ruling parties, apparently because of the in-built advantage and control that the current appointment system provides for the governing party.

So why then do political parties often tend to favour more decentralized governance and a broader distribution of power through the election of sub-national authorities only when in opposition? One recent USAID-sponsored study explains these political dynamics in terms of the partisan advantage associated with the appointment system for ruling parties, particularly as it relates to the multiple opportunities for district level patronage that comes with the current system. Electoral calculus is central to understanding the political elite behaviour towards a fully devolved local governance system. While the election of MMDCEs can provide parties in opposition an opportunity to maintain some sub-national level support even as they are out of power nationally, the party holding the presidency has little incentive to alter arrangements that favour central appointment power (Ayee & Dickovick 2010: 18).

**Limited citizen participation in local and urban governance processes**

One frequently highlighted principle of good urban governance is the existence of formal and informal avenues that allow civil society to influence what city governments do and hold them to account (Satterthwaite 2009). In what appears to be an acknowledgement of the significant democratic deficits embedded in previous decentralization reforms, the 1992 Constitution speaks of decentralization as the means to “making democracy a reality”\(^\text{24}\) and goes on to affirm the importance of the principles of citizen participation and downward accountability of local officials to the populace: “To ensure the accountability of local government authorities, people in particular local government areas shall, as far as practicable, be afforded the opportunity to participate effectively in their governance.”\(^\text{25}\)

However, while formal sub-district structures such as the Town and Zonal Councils as well as the Unit Committees (UCs) have been established to serve as mechanisms for promoting citizens’ participation in city management, in reality, the sub-district structures have largely failed to perform their functions effectively. Three major factors account for the weakness of the sub-district structures: First, like most MMDAs, the sub-district structures lack the requisite human and material resources to perform their functions effectively. Second, there is general apathy towards the operations of the sub-district structures because most people who are working on them are not paid; being a member of these structures is completely sacrificial and voluntary. Third, and because of their non-lucrative manner, some of the sub-district structures (specifically the UCs) cannot operate because they lack the required number of memberships (Ayee & Amponsah 2003: 70). In this context, citizens’ participation in decision making and development planning at the sub-national level remains generally ad hoc, depending largely on the benevolence of a few Assembly members. Effective civic engagement within Ghana’s local government system suffers from two other weaknesses that require discussion, namely, voter apathy in MMDA elections and gender inequalities in representation.

\(^{24}\) See Article 35[ ][d] of the 1992 Constitution.

Voter apathy in MMDA elections

Although elections provide an important formal mechanism for holding city governments to account, voter apathy in MMDA elections in Ghana has remained consistently high since the return to multi-party democracy in 1992. Turnout for the most recent 2015 MMDA elections was an abysmal 22 per cent, the lowest since the introduction of the current local government system in 1988. As the table below shows, average voter turnout for the last MMDA elections is 33.4 per cent, compared to 71.4 per cent at the national level. This problem is an apparent manifestation of the low confidence of citizens about their control of, and benefits from, local-level decision-making processes that tend to be dominated by political appointees, particularly the upwardly accountable MMDCE.


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Source: Electoral Commission of Ghana.

Although no single reason can sufficiently account for these variations, one crucial factor relates to the different contexts within which national and local-level elections are conducted: unlike the non-partisan DA elections, presidential and parliamentary elections are fought on a partisan competitive basis, incentivizing political parties to encourage and mobilize their supporters to vote.

In contrast, current law bars political parties from endorsing or sponsoring candidates for local and urban government elections, with individuals thus required to stand for elections as “non-partisan” candidates. The 1993 Local Government Act (Act 462) states:

“a candidate seeking election to a District Assembly or to a lower local government unit shall personally appear before the electorate as an individual, and shall not use a symbol associated with a political party.” It states further that “a political party shall not endorse, sponsor, offer a platform to or in any other way campaign for or against a candidate seeking election to a District Assembly or to a lower local government unit.”

One frequently advanced argument in support of non-partisan sub-national-level elections is that the introduction of party competition would promote divisive tendencies and undermine consensus building in ways that would derail prospects for community mobilization and development. In this respect, non-partisan local government elections were expected to “facilitate the mobilization of the people, and is more conducive to consensus formation, factors that are crucial to development at the grassroots” (Government of Ghana 2014: 148). Professor Kwamena
Ahwoi, Ghana’s most renowned local government expert and former Minister for Local Government explain that this idea was based on historical experiences when political parties “hijacked” local government and “imposed” candidates on the people with the result that “whoever won the election was more the choice of the party than the choice of the people.” Prof. Ahwoi reminds us, therefore, that:

“By making local elections non-partisan, the electorate were enabled to make choices based on the acceptability, conduct and performance of the candidate and not the political party that he represented. This was the basis of the decision to make the District level elections non-partisan…” (Ahwoi 2010: 43).

We argue that this argument can no longer hold in the current political environment where the Ghanaian electorate has become increasingly sophisticated, and where national-level political elites have become fully aware of the adverse consequences of “imposing” candidates on local voters. The emerging phenomenon of “skirt and blouse” voting in Ghana’s Fourth Republic draws attention to the increasingly sophisticated nature of the Ghanaian electorate, in which voters can punish parties that impose candidates on them. Within Ghana’s electoral environment, “skirt and blouse” is a term used referring to voters supporting the presidential candidate of one party and the parliamentary candidate of another. In the most recent presidential and parliamentary elections in December 2012, 7 constituencies voted for the NPP’s presidential candidate (Akufo Addo) and an NDC parliamentarian, while 15 voted for the NDC’s presidential candidate (John Dramman Mahama) and an NPP parliamentarian (Kelly & Bening 2012). These results are very significant for Ghanaian democracy, in that electors in all regions of the country indicated an awareness to vote for the local candidate of their choice while selecting a President based on party affiliation and perceived suitability. The party machines might be powerful, but local issues and opinions can clearly resist them. Indeed, in some constituencies there was a significant rejection of the particular candidate chosen by the party (ibid). There is thus sufficient basis to envisage that when local/urban government elections are opened up to political party competition, the selection procedures of candidates will more likely be driven by an objective assessment of individual candidates’ capabilities.

So, what then is the real reason for the continuous resistance to the introduction of multi-party competition in Ghana’s local government system? Two related factors account for this.

First, non-partisan politics at the local level is believed to have the potential of preventing the central government from victimizing opposition MMDAs in the distribution of public resources while also preventing opposition party officials from sabotaging the implementation of central government policies at the local level. In this respect, ruling politicians can avoid the problem of vertically divided authority that has come to define the nature of central-local relations in several African countries, with important implications for the effective delivery of services for the urban poor (Resnick 2014). As Resnick (2014) shows in the context of Uganda and South Africa, the vertical division of authority, where opposition parties control city governance, may dissuade central governments from being fully cooperative with city managers.
Second, and more important, political parties have resisted the election of MMDCEs on partisan political basis because they’ve devised strategies to circumvent the legal requirements of non-partisanship, while at the same time avoiding the political implications of an explicitly partisan electoral system. The two dominant political parties have both been interested in maintaining the status quo for the fear that partisan MMDA elections can cause them to lose control over certain parts of the country, especially in the electoral strongholds of their opponents. However, whereas the current system of non-partisan elections (at least formally) enables ruling elites to avoid the likely occurrence of the problem of “vertically-divided authority” as has been experienced elsewhere in Africa, in reality, the so-called non-partisan nature of MMDA elections in Ghana “is effectively a myth” (Crawford 2008: 252) because “the District Assembly election has become partisan despite its non-partisan orientation” (ISSER 2015). Both politicians and ordinary citizens are aware of the heavy influence of political party networks on the MMDA elections, with former President Kufuor once describing the current system as “a huge exercise in self-deception.”

Indeed, covert and overt political party interference in district-level elections is not new in Ghana’s local government system despite constitutional proscriptions against such practices. In its pre-election report on the 2015 district-level elections, the Coalition for Domestic Election Observers (CODEO) bemoaned how political parties “discreetly, or in some cases, support candidates openly” (Ghana News Agency 2015). One clear way by which candidates for local-level elections appeal to candidates based on partisan considerations is by using party colours in their posters. Believing that their affiliation with their parties would enhance their prospects of winning elections many candidates often use a variety of partisan strategies, including printing their posters in party colours while avoiding the symbols of the parties.

Another recent manifestation of the partisan nature of the MMDAs relates to the election of Presiding Members (PMs) within the Assemblies. While in theory, they are required to be elected from among the non-partisan assembly members, recent developments have drawn attention to the heavy politicization of the MMDs in which PMs are often elected along partisan lines. The question of who becomes the PM has become increasingly important to ruling parties, because MMDCEs necessarily require the support of PMs who share the partisan political ideologies of the latter to garner the requisite support for their administrations (Adamtey 2010).

For example, since its inauguration in October 2015, the Kumasi Metropolitan Assembly has not been able to elect a PM despite five attempts to do so. Media reports show that the two candidates competing for the position, namely, Nana Kofi Senyah and Nana Baffour Agyei, are perceived to have been sponsored by the NPP and NDC, respectively. Indeed, in October 2015, some supporters of Nana Kofi Senyah were reported to have openly invoked curses and insults on some assembly members who were purported to have voted for Nana Baffour Agyei (the NDC’s preferred candidate) on grounds that those assembly members not only used the NPP’s name in campaigning and winning their seats, but also “promised to support any person aspiring to be presiding member whose sympathies was towards the NPP” (see graphiconline.com). The curses

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26 See the Daily Graphic, 17 September 2002.
were, therefore, because most of the people who had won their seats “on the ticket of the NPP” turn around to vote for a government appointee who was probably sympathetic to the NDC.

In July 2013, the Daily Graphic reported a similar story regarding the failure of the Asante Akyem North Municipal Assembly to elect a PM after conducting 16 elections in seven different sittings. As in the recent case of the KMA, the deadlock resulted mainly from efforts of the two dominant parties to ensure that their preferred candidate became the PM of the Assembly. Importantly, this deadlock occurred at a time that the Assembly needed a PM before it could confirm the President’s nominee for the position of an MCE. Consequently, the Assembly was without an MCE for almost 3 years, with the results that “many development projects and other foreign donor funding such as the District Development Facility (DDF) eluded it” (graphiconline.com, 06/07/2013).

Finally, it is important to address the question of whether the introduction of multi-party elections would improve MMDA management in Ghana. There are important reasons why opening up local-level elections to partisan political competition can be expected to improve the responsiveness of city governments to local populations. At least in theory, the introduction of competitive partisan elections at the district level will enhance the degree of popular control over local government officials. This will in turn promote the downward accountability of local authorities and thereby lead to more responsive forms of governance. This is to emphasize that, when the entire assembly system is partisan, elected assembly members will be compelled to champion the cause of their electoral areas, similar to what pertains at the national level. For example, even though MPS are not obligated to champion the socio-economic development of their constituents, competitive partisan elections incentivize most MPs to strive in providing community development benefits to their constituents as a way of getting re-elected. The pressure of competitive elections and the possibility of losing one’s job can therefore motivate local government officials to be more accountable and responsive to the needs of their electorates.27 Moreover, whereas individual DA members contesting elections on a non-partisan basis is unlikely to have significant influence on public policymaking, the involvement of political parties is likely to enable broad programmes of alternative local policy options to be put forward for selection by the electorate. The presence of organized political parties in the Assembly will allow more effective scrutiny of local government practices and serve as a mechanism for channelling public concerns to government.

However, and although desirable from a democratic perspective, some close observers of Ghanaian politics argue that a fully devolved local government system will not, on its own, be sufficient for the effective management of local or urban economies. First, the problem of the over-concentration of power in the MMDCE will remain a huge constraint, potentially leading to the

“strong mayor” phenomenon whereby an elected mayor with executive powers dominates the local council (Olowu & Wunsch 2004). Second, the election of mayors for metropolitan and municipal assemblies will not necessarily lead to transformed urban economies because, as noted earlier, only a minority of Ghanaian electorates vote on issues: the majority vote along tribal and party lines (Obeng-Odoom 2013a).

**Gender inequalities in representation**

Another fundamental weakness that undermines local/urban governance in Ghana relates to the marginalization of women in local-level power structures. Despite constituting over half of the Ghanaian population, women constituted only 3 per cent of elected members to the MMDAs in 1994 (Ofei-Aboagye 2000). In 1998, the government introduced an Affirmative Action Policy that required that at least 30 per cent of government appointees to the DAs be women. While this may have been partly responsible for the slight increase of the overall women representation in the DAs from 3 per cent in 1994 to 5 per cent in 1998 and to 10 per cent in 2007 (Pobee-Hayford & Awori 2008), there remains an overwhelming dominance of men in the work of the MMDAs. Since 1994, none of the MMDAs in Ghana has ever recorded more than 10 per cent representation of women (Boateng & Kosi 2015).

**Table 9.2: Female representation in District Assemblies in Ghana (1994-2015)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Contested Female</th>
<th>Contested Male</th>
<th>Contested Total</th>
<th>Elected Female</th>
<th>Elected Male</th>
<th>Elected Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>1376</td>
<td>15939</td>
<td>17315</td>
<td>412</td>
<td>5681</td>
<td>6093</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>1772</td>
<td>13084</td>
<td>14856</td>
<td>478</td>
<td>4254</td>
<td>4732</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>965</td>
<td>12625</td>
<td>13590</td>
<td>341</td>
<td>4241</td>
<td>4582</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>547</td>
<td>14696</td>
<td>15243</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>4624</td>
<td>4820</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>4082</td>
<td>4204</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Boateng & Kosi (2015).*

Common factors that have been identified as inhibiting women’s proactive participation in local governance include the burden of household chores, low levels of literacy, lack of funds to contest elections on a non-partisan basis, and deep-seated socio-cultural structures, systems and practices that discount the competence and capabilities of women in the spheres of political power (UNDP 2007: 167; Ofei-Aboagye 2000: 4). While there are no laws that prohibit women from engaging in decision-making processes in Ghana, there are also no legally binding affirmative action policies aimed at enhancing gender equality in representation. Within the patriarchal nature of Ghanaian society and the relatively limited financial resources available to women, the absence of legally binding affirmative action policies necessarily amounts to some subtle forms of gender exclusion.
Table 9.3: Gender Distribution of DCEs/MCEs and MPs, by Region, 2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>MMDCEs</th>
<th>Women’s Share (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ashanti</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brong-Ahafo</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greater Accra</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper East</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper West</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volta</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The non-binding nature of the 1998 Affirmative Action Policy has also meant that governments have so far paid only lip service to the problem of gender inclusion, often making unfulfilled promises addressing the problem during election years. For example, in its 2008 election manifesto, the current ruling NDC claimed that it would “introduce major gender policy and legislative reforms, … in government and public service” (NDC 2008: 25); this never materialised. Indeed, on the contrary, the proportion of women elected as members of the MMDAs declined from 11 per cent in 2008 to 7 per cent in 2010, while the proportion of women appointees also fell substantially, from 28 per cent in 2008 to 7 per cent in 2009 (GoG & UNDP 2015). Moreover, of the 204 MMDCEs in 2013, only 19 (a mere 9.3 per cent) were women. At the regional level, women’s representation ranges from 0 per cent in the Eastern Region to 25 per cent in the Volta Region (Table 3).

These patterns reflect national-level problems in which women remain significantly under-represented in virtually all spheres of public life. Despite the appointment of women as Speaker of Parliament (2009-2012) and Chief Justice, the proportion of women in other key public offices remains low. Less than a quarter of ministerial appointments were allocated to women, a moderate increase from 18.9 per cent in 2010. Similarly, women represented 23.5 per cent of Deputy Ministers in 2014 (Table 4). In the Judicial Service, only 29 per cent of Supreme Court judges were women in 2008-2010, rising to 30.8 per cent in 2011-2013. At the High Court, women judges accounted for 25 per cent in 2008 and 2010 and this declined to 12.8 per cent 2011-2013. In the civil service, only 24 per cent of Chief Directors were women in 2008-2010, and this dropped substantially to 8.3 per cent in 2011 and has not changed since then (Table 4).

Table 9.4: Share of women in key political and administrative positions, 2008-2013 (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>POSITION</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ministers</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>22.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy Ministers</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>23.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supreme Court Judges</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>30.8</td>
<td>30.8</td>
<td>30.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Court Judges</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>12.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief Directors</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Members of Parliament</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appointed District Assembly Members</td>
<td>28.0</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elected District Assembly Members</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Clearly, Ghana’s performance in ensuring gender equality and women empowerment has been quite disappointing and requires strong commitment of the state to reverse the situation through affirmative action and advocacy in the area of education and political appointment without compromising competence.

### 9.4. Politics of intergovernmental fiscal transfers

There is broad recognition that the provision of adequate financing is an important driver of the effectiveness of urban services (Jones et al. 2014). In most developing countries, IGTs remain an essential building block for sub-national financing, as they provide the bulk of revenue for most city governments. In Ghana, the most significant IGT is the District Assembly Common Fund, which provides a constitutionally guaranteed minimum share of central government’s grants to MMDAs. The 1992 Constitution created the DACF into which a portion of total government revenue (7.5 per cent at the moment) is paid for disbursement to MMDAs based on criteria to be approved by Parliament. Since its establishment in 1994, the DACF has been the most significant source of revenue for most MMDAs, accounting for well over 80 per cent of annual revenues in some assemblies. Data obtained from the DACF National Secretariat for this study show that total DACF releases to MMDAs have been substantial, amounting to GH₵2,459,394,520 billion during the past two decades (1994-2014).

In its current implementation, the DACF provides substantial financing for MMDAs, but urban local governments are negatively affected by a number of interrelated factors. First is the unpredictable and untimely allocations and transfers; while the government has committed to transferring some proportion of total national revenues to MMDAs quarterly via the DACF, this has not always been accomplished, especially since 2011. Relatedly, although the NPP government increased the DACF allocations from the minimum of 5 per cent of governmental revenue guaranteed by the constitution to 7.5 per cent in 2007, this amount remain very low, particularly when compared to the proportions of government revenue transferred to sub-national governments in other African countries like Uganda (30 per cent) and in Ethiopia (over 40 per cent) (Smoke 2000: 20).

Second are the increased deductions of the fund at the centre without consultation with MMDA officials, and the use of earmarks to fund central government priority programs that are not necessarily spatially targeted to individual MMDAs. In many cases, the central government engage in the procurement of useless equipment through such statutory deductions. MMDA control over financial matters is limited by the constitutional provision that the Ministry of Finance and the
Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development will determine the areas of expenditure regarding the use of Common Fund by the MMDAs. This budgetary control has practically turned sub-national government institutions into deconcentrated agencies, rather than fiscally autonomous authorities (Ayee & Dickovick 2010: 77). While the current-ruling NDC government promised in its 2012 election manifesto to amend the DACF Act to “stop the central withholdings, deductions and directives and to allow for the entire allocation of the MMDAs’ shares of the DACF to be released to them” (NDC 2012: 63), this has not happened to date. In 2014, as much as 58 per cent of DACF allocations were earmarked at the centre (Republic of Ghana 2015: 230), implying that less than half of resources from the fund were transferred directly to MMDAs for implementation of their respective programmes. Indeed, in some years, central government directives to the MMDAs determine about 75 per cent of DACF expenditure via “earmarks,” leading to an almost complete loss of operational autonomy by city authorities (Ayee & Dickovick 2010: 11). Apparently, this has the potential to erode the confidence of local populations in the ability of MMDAs to deliver services promptly.

Third is the adoption of allocation formulas that result in relatively limited per capita DACF financing for cities and towns. Although some scholars have sought to characterize the DACF as an urban-biased intergovernmental transfer mechanism (Botchie 2000; Tsekpo & Jebuni 2008), there is evidence to argue that DACF allocation patterns have rather often short-changed urban populations. The World Bank recently shows that, whereas Ghana’s six metropolitan assemblies accounted for 22 per cent of the population during 2009-2014, they received only 11 per cent of DACF transfers, that is, less than half of the transfer received by District Assemblies in rural areas (World Bank 2015).

This observation is supported by the evidence in Figure 2, which points to a close association between a region’s level of urbanization in Ghana and its share of DACF resources. The evidence shows that the most urbanized regions received the lowest DACF per capita in 2010. The Greater Region, which has highest the rate of urbanization (90.5 per cent), received the lowest DACF per capita (GH₵ 2.9), while the Upper West, the least urbanized in Ghana (16.3 per cent) enjoyed the highest DACF per capita (GH₵ 9.6). Given the extensive responsibilities assigned to metropolitan and municipal authorities and the increased pressure on urban infrastructure due to rural-urban migration, such limited per capita allocations draw attention to the limited contribution of the DACF to improved service delivery in urban areas.

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28 The problem of these studies is that their conclusions were drawn based on absolute figures rather than based on per capita analyses.
One reason is that of the four key criteria that determine the fund’s sharing formula, the only one that disproportionately favours the more populous urban-based assemblies, is the “service pressure” factor – an allocation based on population density as an indicator of pressure on financial needs. While this factor is expected to compensate urban areas for the pressures put on their facilities because of rural-urban migration (Republic of Ghana 2014: 13), it has historically received too small a weighting in computing DACF allocations to have any visible impact on improved service delivery in urban areas. Evidence from the Annual Reports of the Ghana Shared Growth and Development Agenda shows that since 2012, the service pressure factor has consistently received the least weight of around 2 per cent, down from 10 per cent in 2010 and 6 per cent in 2011.
The limited weighting assigned to the service pressure factor is based on grounds that urban areas have a much larger capacity to generate internal revenues than their rural counterparts where poverty is also much more pronounced. In absolute terms, it is certainly the case that the large urban centres generate much larger internal revenues. However, and as the evidence in Table 1 shows, average revenue per capita remains feeble in most cities and towns. In 2014, average annual revenue per capita for some of the 20 best performing MMDAs in terms of IGF generation was as low as GH₵10, less than US$3 (Table 1). This is certainly marginal, especially when compared to the infrastructure needs in urban areas, and the numerous functions that urban-based assemblies are supposed to perform. This analysis is consistent with a recent World Bank observation that, although Ghana’s large urban centres have higher OSR incomes, metropolitan assemblies still have less overall revenue available at their disposal than their rural counterparts (around GH₵19 per capita versus GH₵ 28 for rural districts [World Bank 2015: 39]). In this respect, it is important to rethink recent suggestions that “Financially weak assemblies should be the focus of DACF with metros and financially strong municipals weaned off the DACF” (Awusi 2015). Such proposals, if implemented, have the danger of exacerbating the already weak financial base of urban areas that has been central to the numerous challenges in Ghanaian cities, ranging from poor access to basic services to growing levels of unemployment.

**Table 9.5: The 20 best-performing MMDAs in terms of IGF in 2014**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REGION</th>
<th>MMDAs</th>
<th>TOTAL IGF</th>
<th>IGF/capita (GH₵)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Greater Accra</td>
<td>Accra Metro.</td>
<td>33,182,700.67</td>
<td>18.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ashanti</td>
<td>Kumasi Metro.</td>
<td>20,124,935.38</td>
<td>11.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greater Accra</td>
<td>Tema Metro</td>
<td>13,939,316.83</td>
<td>34.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western</td>
<td>Tarkwa Nsuaem Municipal</td>
<td>4,968,637.31</td>
<td>54.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greater Accra</td>
<td>La Dade-Kotopon</td>
<td>4,045,019.67</td>
<td>22.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greater Accra</td>
<td>Adentan</td>
<td>3,238,941.69</td>
<td>41.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greater Accra</td>
<td>Kpone-Kantamanso</td>
<td>3,043,055.70</td>
<td>27.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western</td>
<td>Prestea Huni Valley</td>
<td>3,015,521.64</td>
<td>18.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greater Accra</td>
<td>Ga East</td>
<td>2,843,549.77</td>
<td>11.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern</td>
<td>New Juaben</td>
<td>2,754,380.56</td>
<td>15.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greater Accra</td>
<td>Ga West</td>
<td>2,706,294.10</td>
<td>10.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greater Accra</td>
<td>Ashaiman</td>
<td>2,514,008.36</td>
<td>13.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The DACF also seems to suffer from the impact of the clientelist character of contemporary Ghanaian politics, whereby resource allocation decisions tend to be driven more by the logic of electoral calculus than by some rational bureaucratic norms. In “Do Institutions Limit Clientelism,” (Banful 2009; Banful 2011) investigated the question of whether the political characteristics of MMDAs (specifically their voting patterns) have any bearing on their annual DACF allocations. Utilizing DACF expenditures during 1994-2005, she found evidence of political incentives in the determination of DACF allocations and disbursements. In particular, her analysis showed that MMDAs with lower difference between the vote shares of the two dominant parties in the previous presidential election received higher per capita DACF allocations and disbursements, suggesting that swing voting areas were disproportionately targeted.

We sought to complement Banful’s findings by examining the level of changes across each of the five main criteria that have guided DACF allocation patterns over time, covering the period from 1994-2008. This period involves an alternation of power between Ghana’s two dominant parties, and thus allows us to ask whether changes in government and the resultant changes in the composition of ruling political elites resulted in changes in the service pressure factor that affect urban areas the most, and then explore the specific mechanisms through which such changes might have occurred. This is an especially useful exercise given the rural-urban image that characterize these parties, with the NPP considered to be more dominant in urban areas. We observed that the service pressure factor experienced the most dramatic changes in the DACF allocation formula, with the NDC government being more favourable to urban areas. Average weighting for the service pressure factor during the first two terms of the Rawlings-led NDC government was 13 per cent, compared to 6 per cent during the 8-year rule of the Kuffuor-led NPP government (2001-2008). These findings are not only in line with Banful’s observations but also in line with the swing voter theory more broadly. For example, André & Mesplé-Somps 2011’s analysis of the spatial

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>District/Geographical Unit</th>
<th>Allocation</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ashanti</td>
<td>Obuasi Mun</td>
<td>2,432,631.15</td>
<td>14.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greater Accra</td>
<td>La Nkwantanmang Medina</td>
<td>2,416,862.19</td>
<td>21.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greater Accra</td>
<td>Shai Osoduku</td>
<td>1,765,612.61</td>
<td>34.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greater Accra</td>
<td>Ningo Prampram</td>
<td>1,583,303.45</td>
<td>22.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central</td>
<td>AwtuSenya East</td>
<td>1,460,257.53</td>
<td>16.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greater Accra</td>
<td>Ga Central</td>
<td>1,377,662.94</td>
<td>11.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern</td>
<td>Yilo Krobo</td>
<td>1,057,305.11</td>
<td>12.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western</td>
<td>Wassa Amenfi East</td>
<td>761,157.55</td>
<td>11.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>17.4</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Authors, based on data from DACF National Secretariat and 2010 population census data.
distribution of a wide range of public goods in Ghana during 1998-2000 found that districts that voted for the opposition party received more public goods than others, mainly in an attempt by the then ruling NDC to consolidate its position by appeasing potential opposing forces.

Table 9.6: Formula for the allocation of the DACF (1994–2008) (percentage)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Equality</th>
<th>Need</th>
<th>Responsiveness</th>
<th>Service Pressure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NDC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>30</td>
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<td>1996</td>
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<td>2000</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPP</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>40</td>
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<td>2007</td>
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<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>4</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Banful draws attention to two main mechanisms through which ruling political elites can assure DACF allocation patterns that maximize prospects of their re-election bid. First, although the DACF sharing formula is determined annually by a supposedly neutral Fund Administrator and approved by Parliament, it needs to be noted that the administrator is an appointee of the president (for a renewable 4-year term) who is required to submit the proposed formula and the various MMDA’s resulting DACF shares to the office of the President before making a recommendation to Parliament for approval. Importantly, the administrator’s proposed formula often entails three different DACF distribution scenarios that cannot be submitted directly to Parliament without the approval of the presidency. This implies that the resident is invariably the de facto authority that decides what formula gets submitted to Parliament. Indeed, Banful’s analysis showed that the DACF formula was significantly altered in all but one year over the period 1994-2005, “with particularly remarkable changes occurring in election years and in 2002, the year after a political
regime switch” (Banful, 2011: 381). Such formula changes resulted in higher allocations to districts that had lower percentage vote margins in the previous presidential elections than they would have received under the status quo. This led Banful to conclude that the amendments to the formula were made to help retarget resources to MMDAs with a higher prevalence of swing voters. These findings are in line with André and Mesplé-Somps’ (2011) analysis of the spatial distribution of a wide range of public goods in Ghana during 1998-2000. They found that districts that voted for the opposition party received more public goods than others, mainly in an attempt by the then ruling NDC to consolidate its position by appeasing potential opposing forces. These observations need to be understood within the context of the increasing importance of swing voters in winning presidential elections in Ghana. The percentage of swing voters in Ghana in the early 2000s was estimated at 18 per cent by Lindberg and Morrison (2003), but 20-40 per cent by the Ghanaian pollster Ben Ephson. At the end of the 2000s, the percentage of swing voters was estimated to be even higher, with 44-53 per cent of citizens surveyed being persuadable (Weghorst & Lindberg 2013).

Second, although the approval function of parliament may be a form of oversight that will potentially limit the role of political considerations in determining DACF allocation patterns, this expectation is undermined by the vast appointive powers entrusted in the President and the general subordination of Parliament to the executive arm of governed in Ghana’s Fourth Republic. In other words, the fact that the President can reward or punish parliamentarians based on their votes implies that the latter cannot be wholly relied upon to play an effective oversight role over the former. In effect, the President has informal agenda-setting powers over the formula recommended to the Parliament as well as the ability to reward and punish parliamentarians based on how they vote (Banful 2011: 381). Together, these observations draw attention to the patronage-based character of Ghanaian politics, and the ways in which ruling coalitions can employ informal institutions achieving sophisticated political targeting goals even within the confines of well-established formal institutions that emphasise needs-based allocation of public goods.

9.5. Conclusion

This chapter set out to explore the political economy drivers of urban governance in Ghana. More specifically, the chapter focuses on exploring the ways in which electoral incentives and power relations between national and sub-national governments have shaped the politics of local/urban governance in Ghana, and how these in turn shape prospects for effective service delivery in urban areas. Three main conclusions are worth highlighting from this analysis.

First, despite the deepening of democracy in Ghana, informal political networks dominate the governance of urban areas, as decentralized governance has in effect been used as a political tool to maintain central government control, investing significant powers in the unelected.

In this respect, competitive clientelism and the associated power struggles that take place in the ranks of Ghana’s political parties have had negative consequences for urban governance and service delivery. Local assembly representatives are formally apolitical, but have close ties to political parties – and party priorities often direct resources into election campaigns, rather than
investing in the provision of public goods. Rather than professional competence, party political affiliation is the main basis of appointing local assembly officials, while the transfer of fiscal resources to sub-national governments is determined by the voting behaviour of various MMDAs rather than need. This analysis suggests that, to understand the breakdowns in Ghana’s public service delivery system and urban development, it is important to move beyond technocratic fixes and analyse the networks of political interference and informal practices and the effects of the informal institutional context, particularly the country-specific political settlements within which sub-national governments operate.

Key Issues

Ghana’s lack of urban transformation can in part be attributed to its urban areas behaving as consumption cities with expanding slums, majority workers in informal sector, high dependence on export income from unprocessed raw materials (oil, gold, cocoa) and a negligible manufacturing base. The type of growth that continues to characterize urban areas in Ghana is not being translated into any structural change in the economy and inclusive development.

Political economy considerations hold the key to most infrastructure and service provision reforms in Ghana. For instance, formal mass transit systems can work only if informal public transport operations are curtailed on the main routes and potentially translated into “feeder” route services elsewhere; this can be a threat to the current livelihoods of the many informal service owners, drivers and fair collectors. This is a very sensitive political concern. Therefore, considerable efforts need to go into managing negotiations with the transport unions, for getting buy in, and for redeployment of those currently involved into new business and employment opportunities.

Services remain uncompetitive because of political intervention in appointments, allocation of contracts to service providers, determination of tariffs and allocation of funds. A lack of complementary capital and recurrent investment has resulted in high operating costs, continual network breakdowns and user dissatisfaction. These factors have been preventing operators from meeting anticipated performance targets. This is especially evident in the management of water supply and waste.

Benefits have been slow to trickle down to the urban poor as Ghana has settled into a pernicious equilibrium as a competitive clientelist economy wherein the elites capture resources exploiting them for short-term gains and preventing the reinforcement of institutions to challenge the status quo.
10. Conclusion

Ghana is experiencing a crisis of capacity both in the way its various institutions and governance frameworks have been authorized to work and the delivery of these limited functions. This is reflected in the poor devolution of functions, the curtailed fiscal freedoms of urban local governments and the multiplicity of legislative instruments and agencies with overlapping mandates for management of infrastructure, assets, services and planning. There is substantial deficit of investment in public infrastructure, including networks for water supply and transportation, and a capacity and capability deficit in terms of institutions, systems and technologies for independent, competitive and accountable governance. The preceding chapters have shown the factors and arrangements that are creating a mismatch between urban growth and the growth of services and infrastructure to serve the growing number of urban residents. These arrangements have prevented the development of the full potential of the state’s administrative capacity, resulting in weak institutions providing weak delivery.

Poor decentralization and fragile institutions
Achievements in service delivery have been modest and marginal because of restricted sub-national autonomy resulting from controls exercised by several top-down forces, especially controls by central government and dominant political parties, suggesting continuation of centralized patterns of governance. District officials are appointed by the central government and not locally. Poor salaries often mean that if opportunities for rent-seeking behaviour arise they are often explored. This means that innovative, risk-taking and professional managerial behaviour in urban governance is limited. Creativity in designing and implementing LED strategies is often absent. Moreover, effective institutional platforms for change, bringing together all relevant but often competing interests and stakeholders, are only infrequently created, as they impinge on protected institutional and individual turfs and take time, commitment, compromise and enthusiasm to establish and maintain.

Incomplete decentralization has constrained the ability of urban assemblies to own the local development agenda and innovate. Inadequate and poor funding of city governments because of limited fiscal decentralization has had an impact on the effectiveness and responsiveness of all assemblies, and accounts in part for the citizens’ relatively low rate of participation in local government elections in Ghana. The increasing number of local government bodies and the fragmentation of local government areas into smaller units reduce scale economies of effective metropolitan functioning.

High dependence on central and external assistance and poor OSR has meant little stability in planning, and reduced scope for market-based borrowing. The IGT framework is fragmented, with the division of responsibilities and expenditure between local authorities and central governments unclear. The performance-based grant system within the intergovernmental fiscal framework mechanism provides discretionary powers to local governments to plan and utilize financial resources, but there are a number of constraints on the quantity and quality of funds made available. This has negatively affected the expenditure management system and urban service delivery.
Internally generated revenue does not contribute significantly to local government total revenue (no more than 20 per cent-30 per cent at an aggregated level), although the situation within the country varies significantly between the large and the small MMDAs.

Growing role of private sector in delivery
The private sector and other informal actors are increasingly filling the gap in urban service delivery created by sub-par institutions. On the one hand, this has imposed additional costs on households even for basic services such as the management of solid waste and water supply. On the other, it has exposed the isomorphic mimicry of governance reforms, as governments have failed to deliver on their commitments under PPP arrangements, resulting in delivery failures.

The growing incidence of self-provisioning of services by the middle and upper classes, most prominent in the supply of water, security, education and sanitation, has weakened conditions for bottom-up support from citizens to end the status quo. Self-provisioning, as well as the capture of the limited services provided by the state by the elites, is unlikely to provide incentives for city-wide agitations for improved services provision for all (especially the poor).

Weakened enforcement and local government accountability
With the privatization of services, there has been a decline in the place of assemblies as key service providers. Assemblies that are unable to provide direct basic services to their citizens tend to perform poorly, with the responsibilities of regulating the provision and management of these services by other non-state actors such as the private sector. This is evident from the weak governance and management of private contracting in water and solid waste. The trend to outsourcing is alienating urban citizens from their local city governments and institutions, further reducing the latter’s incentives for improvement, accountability and transparency in operations.

Further compounding the lack of visibility of assemblies among citizens are the weak and non-functional sub-structures of the assemblies. Functional sub-structures could have served as the basis for monitoring the conformity or otherwise of private operators with respect to regulations and could have served as liaison structures among communities and city authorities and the state.

The actual experience of implementation of decentralization so far in Ghana suggests that the policy may be a popular and conceptually viable development strategy. However, it is unlikely to lead to positive outcomes in its current framework. Serious efforts would be required to strengthen and broaden accountability mechanisms, at both national and local levels, and augment capacities, particularly in the area of service provision to benefit the ever-expanding urban populace in an inclusive manner.

Institutional biases distorting urban growth
The ongoing bias towards centralization and reluctance to implement a more fundamental process of political decentralization, with greater resources and autonomy at the local government level has constrained the remit of urban planning. The challenges facing the implementation of urban planning policies and schemes coupled with lack of enforcement of planning requirements has generated deficiencies, distortions and conflicts in the ongoing development of urban Ghana, with
resulting regional disparities, expansion of slums, growing informal activities, haphazard development and urban sprawl, congestion and deterioration in transport system and services. While the metropolitan centres of Accra, Kumasi, Tema and Sekondi-Takoradi have clearly benefited from major investment in infrastructure and building development to some degree, large areas of these cities and the vast majority of other urban areas remain in a sub-standard condition. Past metropolitan planning efforts have failed to gain purchase in the face of the political fragmentation and the growing numbers of district assemblies.

**Failing political settlements in land management**

Land management is caught up in a complex web of formal and informal institutions often operating on contrarian views preventing land optimization for inclusive urban development. Indigenous land management institutions have become less and less accountable to their communities, and in many places management has ceased to be for the benefit or in the interest of communities. Land, the most useful asset at government disposal, cannot be leveraged fully because of powerful actors with vested interests. Most urban residents have built properties without full title and have little motivation to change their status, thus affecting government revenue from title registration, building permits and property tax payments.

On the other hand, investment in commercial property development is growing. With the wider loss of urban land price uplifts to private gain on the urban periphery, mechanisms for capturing are resulting in increases in land value for public benefit, including the provision of associated public infrastructure and services.

**Political economy underpinning urban transformation**

Ghana’s lack of urban transformation can in part be attributed to its urban areas behaving as consumption cities with expanding slums, most workers in the informal sector, high dependence on export income from unprocessed raw materials (oil, gold, cocoa) and a negligible manufacturing base. The type of growth that continues to characterize urban areas in Ghana is not being translated into any structural change in the economy that would lead to more inclusive development.

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Benefits have been slow to trickle down to the urban poor as Ghana has settled into a pernicious equilibrium as a competitive clientelist economy wherein the elites capture resources exploiting them for short-term gains and preventing the reinforcement of institutions to challenge the status quo.

**Entry points to inclusive urban transformation**

This monograph has attempted to show that if we accept the definition of urban governance as a form of governance that promotes inclusive decision making and implementation; efficient use of resources (including supporting the livelihoods of the urban poor); and transparent and accountable political authority, then much needs to be done using decentralization in Ghana as the vehicle for this transformation. Much of the analysis here has emphasized the importance of institutions in the development process. How institutions work, whether effectively or in a dysfunctional manner, is rooted in the prevailing political economy and nature of elite settlement.

Implanted reforms based on best practices models and neo-liberal modernizing theory that remains detached from the realities of institutional and political economy dynamics are bound to suffer. Examples of failed reforms in water, land management and transport discussed in the chapters above all show how in the absence of any systemic change, actors and institutions simply mimic the process of reform under a camouflage that provides ample cover for continued rent-seeking behaviour.

Political settlements that maintain the status quo are embedded in and intrinsic to the current functioning of urban service delivery. These generally change rather slowly, evolving over time, until every so often a tipping point is reached, leading to a more or less prolonged period of upheaval or conflict, before a new settlement is formed. A key issue raised through this monograph is how to encourage the emergence of new settlements that are not only inclusive of the most powerful actors but also based on mechanisms for elite coordination, rather than a simple sharing of spoils. The challenge is to identify policies and strategies that can address institutional isomorphic mimicry and premature load bearing that leads to persistent failure. Box 10.1 provides some suggestions in this regard.

At the same time, it will be important to consider how to stimulate a process that would begin to transform a competitive clientelist political settlement into post-clientelism. This would require political actors and agents to shift focus away from a traditional reliance on striking accommodations and bargains with intermediaries based on patronage to win elections and instead to adopt a strategy that can deliver more effective development and growth as a more powerful, cross-cutting and sustainable strategy for re-election to office.
Constructive disruption

For cities and towns in Ghana to become engines of growth, and the locus of inclusion and equality, they must be the site of transformational change. It was argued above that in order to understand how to promote and sustain such a change it is important to adopt a political economy perspective. Crucial to this perspective is an understanding of where the power lies in a nation (and city), how it operates, how it influences the way in which the economy works and the possible trajectories for the economy, and how legitimacy for the prevailing power structures is maintained. More specifically it was argued that Ghana has settled into a pernicious equilibrium; commercial, political and social elites control a form value extraction from the economy that both requires and then reinforces the non-inclusiveness of the economy, the uneven distribution of the fruits of the economy, and relative powerlessness of many state institutions, including district assemblies, to change society or the economy.

Box 10.1: Potential future policies and strategies

1. Avoiding imposition of sophisticated models reflected in new organizational policies, structures, charts and best practices seen to work elsewhere without creating conditions in which local innovation can emerge and be replicated
2. Tailoring policies to the available implementation capability – this is usually seen as unattractive as it doesn’t follow a normative approach that is more popular
3. Expanding capability in ways that will help strengthen the organization and make it more robust but not trying to make it conform to an ideal form
4. Specifically focusing on trying to address organizational failure – which means trying to introduce ways to stop or avert rent seeking/ collection and the ways these are capitalized into the political system which then prevents anyone championing reform.
5. Developing pockets of effectiveness through problem driven iterative adaptation. Andrews (2013) demonstrates that successful reform is most often brought about in response to encountering a problem rather than a desire to impose a particular solution. Evidence also demonstrates that the implementation process is most often characterized by experimentation and trial and error rather than a blueprint model, led by multiple actors resulting in reform outcome that are a mix of many influences, external practices and internal ideas. A problem oriented process is more likely to succeed as awareness of the issue will reinforce ownership of the reform and the problems create a sense of urgency needed to bring about context specific. This contrasts with a solution driven process which is fully planned around a normative framework.

The system works to maintain the status quo; the economy changes in aggregate only; it gets bigger because more resources are extracted and life improves, slowly, through a trickle-down process. Structural transformation, however, is lacking; movement in the product space is hardly visible; productivity in the urban economy stagnates; and inequalities rise. This is not an Africa Rising scenario. The prevailing political settlement in Ghana, constantly managed by elites with uneasy acquiescent by the majority, impedes change to the prevailing economic growth regime. The current way in which social and the economy is structured and functions seems to prevent innovation in LED from ever touching the ground, but this current state of affairs isn’t inevitability. A way to upset the equilibrium needs to be unearthed. Pathways of change based on how this equilibrium can be constructively disrupted must be investigated through future research (see Figures 2 and 3).

Figure 10.1: Pathway to a future equilibrium for Ghana

One pathway might be the construction at the local level of social and institutional platforms (including social media platforms) that cross the public, private and civil society sectors, creating structured spaces for effective public-private-community dialogue, and devising ways through these platforms whereby pressure can be placed by citizens and businesses on both those who politically control and those who technically manage the district assemblies. Maintaining legitimacy (which provides space to influence the way in which the economy works) is difficult when the access to public services such as paved, and maintained roads, drinking water, sanitation, power and primary health services are unsatisfactory and visibly getting worse. The decentralization process in Ghana is not yet complete and remains only partly successful; perhaps one way to strengthen the process and improve access to and the delivery of urban services is to focus on creating institutional thickness at the local level of action (Coulson & Ferrario 2007).
Figure 10.2: LED as a “disrupter” allowing a pathway to inclusive and resilient growth

Economies that are characterised by Equitable Economic Growth
- Changed factor endowment and dynamic comparative advantages of cities (underpin and promote improved competitive advantages of firms)
- Upgrade Production Process:
  - Increase product sophistication
  - Increase product diversity (move to ‘nearby’ but higher VA products)
  - Deepen and expand value chains / increase value added in economic activities
  - Inclusive innovation
- Move from informality to formality – development of hybrid informal-formal economy - integration of formal and informal
- Built-in economic and climate change resilience
- Enhanced human capital (build capabilities and competencies in target disadvantaged groups) so that individuals can respond to, participate in, and drive the above
- Engagement and inclusion of women as an end-to-end part of infrastructure planning, development, delivery and utilisation
- Move towards and embed low carbon energy systems and sustainability in city economies
- Minimised urban transactions costs (physical, economic and social)

Structural Change and Transformation
(Increased diversification and sophistication of production - increased value addition
Most likely to occur in urban and urban-industrial environments)

Social Inclusion Measures
(to ensure equal access to economic opportunities)

Enhanced Provision of and Access to Infrastructure & Services
(e.g. water, roads, electricity, public health interventions, etc. - tackling important and binding constraints on structural change and transformation, and value addition)

LED as a service
(providing infrastructure and services to underpin change)

The Current Uneven and Ossified Growth Process
- Growth not leading to structural change or significant poverty reduction
- Jobs increasing, but so are inequalities (gender, inequalities persist)
- Jobs generated by low productivity, low value added activities in the informal service sector
- Lack of expansion of manufacturing (particularly in Africa)
- Movement in the ‘Product Space’ hardly visible
- The structure of many LIC economies has not changed much since the 1980s
- Industrialisation in Africa is lower than in the 1970s
- Too many LIC economies are largely ‘commodity driven’
- Real estate booms related to ‘commodity economy’ rents
- Too many LIC countries locked into high carbon energy production / consumption regimes
- Too many LIC cities characterised by congestion, pollution, environmental degradation
- The economy changes in aggregate only; it gets bigger because more resources are extracted and life improves, slowly, through a trickle down process.

Inadequate Provision and Restricted Access to Infrastructure and Services
- Political Economy constraints (e.g., weak Government accountability; rent seeking behaviour; political capture of institutions; lack of incentives... etc.)
- Policy and institutional constraints (e.g. weak fiscal decentralisation... etc.)
- Capital constraints (e.g., tariffs below costs; Government borrowing capacity weak; inadequate funds for maintenance... etc.)
Indeed, it has been argued (Paller 2015; 2016) that grassroots political economy, and social and political networks that characterize urban Ghana, are central to achieving transformative growth and inclusive urban development. More specifically, an analysis of the structure and functioning of the economy of selected towns and cities is required, as is an associated assessment concerning how the ways and means whereby politics and political struggles determine economic outcomes. These issues can be investigated through city ethnographic case studies as well more formal economic analysis of the structure and functioning of town and city economies.

The policy implications drawn here have relevance not just for Ghana but for many other African countries as they urbanize and implement decentralization and local government reforms with an eye to reaping the benefits or urbanization faster.
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# Annex I: Institutional mapping framework

## Table 1. Institutional Mapping Framework: Urban Governance and Management

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<tr>
<td><strong>National Development Planning Commission</strong></td>
<td>1. The core mandate of the Commission is to &quot;advise the President on development planning policy and strategy&quot; and, &quot;at the request of the President or Parliament, or on its own initiative,&quot; 2. Propose, design and oversee implementation of medium- to long-term national development planning framework at sector level and sub-national levels 3. Responsible for the development of the 40-year development plan for Ghana</td>
<td>(a) Study and make strategic analyses of macro-economic and structural reform options; (b) Make proposals for the development of multi-year rolling plans taking into consideration the resource potential and comparative advantage of the different districts of Ghana; (c) Make proposals for the protection of the natural and physical environment; (d) Make proposals for ensuring the even development of the districts of Ghana by the effective utilization of available resources; (e) Monitor, evaluate and coordinate development policies, programs and projects</td>
<td>6,173,672.00 (0 % apportioned to Urban) National Budget 2015</td>
<td>National</td>
<td>A.</td>
<td>B.</td>
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A key institution with which FCA has an opportunity to support the structuring of metropolitan governance arrangements in Ghana (starting with GAMA) Support for framework to guide Inter-jurisdictional coordination Providing well-argued proposition for inclusion of climate change and resilience in 40-year national development plan

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<p>| Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development Unit | Lead agency for local governance (implicitly including urban governance and management) urban policy formulation and coordination | Key ministry that supervises and directs policy on cities. Critical and major influence on cities Establishing sector medium-term development plan in accordance with National Development plan framework Oversight of local governance practice Oversight of environmental health and sanitation Oversight of LED practice Oversight partner of fiscal decentralization and financial management Monitoring and evaluation; program and projects Urban policy formulation and coordination | GHC 290,983,971 (US$ 90,932,490) National Budget 2015 (Exchange rate 3.2) [47,721,743] | National | a | b | c | d | Strengthening coordination of urban policy implementation (inter-ministerial &amp; jurisdictional) Promoting the alignment of development partner support in urban development (Urban Development Advisory Group) It is very important that the ministry's capacity to appreciate resilience and to input it in policy as well as guidelines be realized in the near term City Development Strategies - (MMDA Department of) |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Ministry of Environment, Science, Technology and Innovation | National Environment and Climate Change Policy development Key partner with MLGRD in steering urban governance and management | Environment and climate change Policy development Ensure environmentally sound and efficient use of both renewable and non-renewable resources | GH₵243,399,833.00 National Budget 2015 (Exchange rate 3.2) | National | a | b | c | d | Strengthening sector focus on climate change and urban resilience Supporting develop city tier protocols for Green Climate Fund framework |
| Ministry of Water Resources, Works and Housing | Water resources policy formulation &amp; coordination Housing policy formulation and coordination | Major influence through water and housing | GH₵463,103,420.00 (US$ 144,719,819) National Budget 2015 (Exchange rate 3.2) | National | a | b | c | d |  |</p>
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Environmental Protection Agency</th>
<th>The Environmental Protection Agency is the leading public body for protecting and improving the environment in Ghana. Monitoring of GHG emissions in major cities and towns Approval of Environmental Impact Assessment for projects Approval of Strategic Environmental Assessment for policy formulation</th>
<th>National</th>
<th>a. b. c. d.</th>
<th>Municipal Finance Guidelines for Fiscal Responsibility Act (for sub-national parties)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Department of Urban Roads</td>
<td>1. The DUR is responsible for the Administration, Planning, Development and Maintenance of the urban road networks. 2. Traffic management in cities and towns</td>
<td>National</td>
<td>a. b. c. d.</td>
<td>Municipal Finance Guidelines for Fiscal Responsibility Act (for sub-national parties)</td>
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### Greater Accra Regional Coordinating Council

- **Oversight of MMDAs in each region**
- **Coordination of district planning, budgeting and plan implementation**

### Local Government Service Secretariat

- **Public service institution established by the Local Government Service Act 2003; Act 656 to secure effective administration and management of local government**
- **Personnel management of local government staff and oversight of local government service delivery standards**

1. Assists the RCCs and MMDAs in the performance of their functions under Act 462, Act 480, and any other enactment, etc.
2. Supports MMDAs and RCCs to perform functions effectively
3. Conducts organizational and job analysis, management audits
4. Designs and coordinates management systems and processes for RCCs and MMDAs
5. Sets performance standards within which District Assemblies and Regional Coordinating Councils shall carry

### Regional

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- **Strengthening coordination of spatial planning and physical development**
- **Collaboration in capacity building of urban local governments (municipal and metropolitan assemblies) on**
  - spatial planning,
  - integrated service delivery,
  - climate change & resilience
  - low-income housing development
  - municipal finance
out their functions and discharge their duties
6. Monitors and evaluates the performance standards of District Assemblies and Regional Co-coordinating Councils

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<tr>
<th>LOCAL GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS WORKING ON URBAN GOVERNANCE AND MANAGEMENT</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>ACCRA METROPOLITAN ASSEMBLY</strong></td>
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<td>1. Highest authority for the development and coordination of socio-economic development of Accra Metropolitan Assembly</td>
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<tr>
<td>City Authority</td>
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<td>Newly Devolving Depts.:</td>
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<tr>
<td>1. Central Admin</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Legal Dept.</td>
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<td>3. Budgeting and rating</td>
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<td>4. Physical Planning Dept.</td>
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<td>5. Waste Management Dept.</td>
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<td>6. Urban Roads Dept.</td>
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<td>7. Works Dept.</td>
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<td>8. Transport</td>
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<td>9. Social Welfare and Community Development</td>
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<td>10. Trade and Industry Dept.</td>
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<td>Local Government jurisdiction</td>
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<td>City Development Strategies - (MMDA DPCU)</td>
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<td>LEDZORKUKU KROWOR MUNICIPAL ASSEMBLY</td>
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<td>1. Highest authority for the development and coordination of socio-economic development of Ledorkuku-Krowor Municipal Assembly</td>
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**RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTIONS INVOLVED IN URBAN GOVERNANCE AND MANAGEMENT**

| Institute of Local Government Studies (ILGS) | Capacity building for local government sector | | a. | b. | c. | d. | | | Key partner for FCA in the strengthening of capacity at the local government level |
|-----------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|----------------|----|----|----|----|----------------|-------------------------------|
| | | | A. | | | | | | |
| | | | B. | | | | | | |
| | | | C. | | | | | | |
| | | | D. | | | | | | |
| | | | E. | | | | | | |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Centre for Democratic Development (CDD)</th>
<th>The CDD-Ghana is dedicated to the promotion of society and government based on the rule of law, appropriate checks on the power of the state, and integrity in public administration.</th>
<th>1. Afrobarometer Surveys</th>
<th>2. Elections credibility enhancement,</th>
<th>3. Human rights promotion,</th>
<th>4. Constitutional development,</th>
<th>5. Environmental / natural resource governance,</th>
<th>6. Local government decentralization,</th>
<th>National</th>
<th>Research and development in governance</th>
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Institute for Democratic Governance

Contributes to the “establishment of a just and free society” in Ghana that is democratic, prosperous, integrated and secure in the West African sub-region and beyond.

1. Carries out research and analysis of public policies, including monitoring their impact on democracy and good governance;
2. Publishes and disseminates information on research findings to enlighten public policy debates and strengthen advocacy for alternative development strategies;
3. Develops ideas and methods for effective participation of civil society and private sector actors in the public policy process through the formulation, implementation and evaluation of economic and social

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National</th>
<th>a.</th>
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1. In collaboration with UNDP, also issues the Ghana Human Development Report

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<tr>
<th>Institute for Statistical, Social and Economic Research</th>
<th>Conducts research in the social sciences to generate solutions for national development</th>
<th>a.</th>
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<th>Research and Development in Governance</th>
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<td>1. In collaboration with UNDP, also issues the Ghana Human Development Report</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>WIEGO</strong></td>
<td>WIEGO is a global network focused on securing livelihoods for the working poor, especially women, in the informal economy. Helps build and strengthen networks of organizations of informal workers. Undertakes field research and policy studies on the informal economy as well as improves the collection and tabulation of national labour force and other economic statistics. Provides policy advice and convening policy dialogues, together with our MBO members and partners, on the informal economy.</td>
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Source below: Budget Statement 2015.
**Annex II: Legal, institutional, administrative issues in fiscal governance**

| Sources of Revenue | The 1992 Constitution of the Republic of Ghana makes legal provisions for the successful implementation of decentralization. The Local Government Act of 1993 identifies the specific traditional sources of revenue: Rates (Section 94-98), Fees and Fines (Section 34), Licences (Section 50, 76-78), Land (Section 84-85), Rent (Section 34) and Investment (Section 89). The law, however, does not make a clear distinction between “tax” and “nontax” revenue. The functional distinction between tax and non-tax revenues is not kept separate, and this does not help in the analysis, administration, mobilization, management and utilization of local revenues. The Legal provisions in Act 462 Sections 99 (1) - which grants exemption to some property owners - is not helping certain MMDAs to expand the property rate base. Legislative provision on the amount paid for basic rates, which is GH¢ 0.10p, makes it an unattractive source. |
| Revenue Mobilization and Collection | IGF collection and monitoring are guided by legislations including the Local Government Act, 1993, Act 462; the Financial Administration Act (FAA), Act 654 of 2003; Financial Administration Regulations (FAR), 2004 L.I. 1802; Financial Memoranda, 2004; the Audit Service Act, 2000, Act 584; and the Internal Audit Agency Act 658 of 2003. Limitations in the law that impede mobilization and collection include the following: Conflict between the provisions of the Section 94 of the Local Government Act 462 and Section 95 (1) of the Electronic Communication Act 775, 2008. The Electronic Communication Act 775, 2008, states that “NCA shall without the approval of any other Authority determine the rate to be paid by a Network operator or Service operator in respect of its business within the district,” while section 94 of the Local Government Act 462 mandates the MMDAs to fix their own fees without prior approval from any other institution. Because of this conflict, the rates for the Telecommunication Companies are predetermined by the National Communication Authority (NCA) and are incongruent with the rates set by MMDAs. The Financial Memoranda (FM) of 2004 is outdated and is not consistent with the provisions of Financial Administration Regulation (FAR), as well as the current operations of the assemblies. Legislative instruments (LIs) establishing MMDAs often fail to explicitly demarcate spatially the DAs boundaries or the area of jurisdiction. This has generated conflicts, which consequently affects revenue collection. Similarly, some Paramount Chiefs are unwilling to be part of districts they are assigned and this becomes a major source of conflict and hindrance to assembly operations and consequently IGF collection. |
| Utilization and Service Delivery | IGFs utilization is also guided by legislations including the Financial Administration Act (FAA), Act 654 of 2003; Financial Administration Regulations (FAR), 2004 L.I. 1802; Financial Memoranda, 2004; the Local Government Act, 1993, Act 462; the Audit Service Act, 2000, Act 584; and the Internal Audit Agency Act 658 of 2003. However, there are no clear guidelines on the areas of expenditure. MMDAs use IGF mainly to cover their overhead costs related to running the assemblies; these include assembly member allowances, transport and general running of the assembly, including fuel for vehicles. In some assemblies, some of the IGF are used for the provision of security and sanitation services, maintenance of lorry parks, etc. There is also arbitrariness in setting the emolument for a assembly members as per Article 250 (2) of the Constitution, and this gives considerable discretion to the General Assembly to fix these emoluments, which are sometimes too high. |
| Rights and Responsibilities | The legal provisions to support active engagements of citizens in public financial management are adequate: Article 35 Clause 6 (d) provides under the directive principle of state policy that the state shall take appropriate measures to “make democracy a reality by decentralizing the administrative and financial machinery of government to the regions and districts and by affording all possible opportunities to the people to participate in decision-making at every level in national life and in government”. Article 240 (2e) specifically states that “to ensure the accountability of local government authorities, people in particular local government areas shall, as far as practicable, be afforded the opportunity to participate effectively in their governance”. Section 10(5) of Act 462 further empowers assemblies to exercise their planning authority by coordinating and executing programmes and projects promoted or carried out by ministries, Public Corporation and other statutory bodies and non-governmental organizations in the district. Section 2(1) of Act 480 gives direction for MMDAs to initiate and prepare district development plans and settlement structure plans in a manner prescribed by the NDPC and to ensure that plans are prepared with full participation of the local community. Section 3(1) of Act 480 requires MMDAs to conduct a public hearing on any proposed district development plan and should consider the views expressed at the hearing before the adoption of the proposed district development plan. Again, the sub-district structures mandated to prepare sub-district or local action plans are required to conduct public hearing before adoption of such plans. However, requirements for participatory budgeting, including fee fixing and monitoring, are not mandatory, and most assemblies do not involve citizens in any other process apart from the planning process and remain largely unaccountable to the local citizens. |

### Institutional Arrangements

| Sources of Local Revenues | The availability of approved local planning schemes facilitates the identification of immovable properties, which can then be taxed to generate revenue for MMDAs. In developed countries, existing immovable property rate contributes 40 per cent-80 per cent of local revenue, but in Ghana the property rate is only 21 per cent of total internally generated funds. Inadequate local planning schemes hamper easy |
identification of properties; as such, a lot of property owners are not registered accurately on the tax base and thus do not pay any rates to assemblies. Specifically, out of the 216 MMDAs only 90 have qualified physical planners capable of fulfilling their spatial planning obligations to the assemblies. Thus, preparation of local plans lag before physical developments. Therefore, a considerable number of the physical developments are not authorized and consequently no payment of fees is made to the assemblies. As a result, payment of building permits and property rates, which have huge potential, are not generating the required revenues to assemblies. The Land Valuation Division (LVD) of the Lands Commission is responsible for capturing the value of properties in Ghana. However, the LVD is understaffed and lacks the capacity to deliver the required services in all districts. Property values, except in areas served by Development Partner-supported projects, have largely not been increased since the 1980s, and this is affecting the amount of revenues that can be generated from the property rate. MMDAs are also not able to access the services of the LVD because of the high cost of the services they provide.

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<tr>
<th>Revenue Mobilization and Collection</th>
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<tr>
<td>There are no reliable databases with geo-location parameters to make billing and collection easy. In addition, most assemblies hand-write bills, which is a cumbersome and time-consuming process. The absence of experts in the revenue mobilization unit of MMDAs affects their forecasting and collection capacity. The absence of databases has led to limited and inadequate target setting; therefore, IGF performance tracking of the MMDAs has been weak. The MMDAs are comfortable with the little they collect because there is no basis for estimating the available potential to establish whether they are doing well or not. There are no specific guidelines for managing outsourcing arrangements to private companies and individuals. Issues plaguing this area of the operations of the assemblies include: high commissions ranging from 18 per cent to 40 per cent or higher in a few cases; limited or no performance requirements; no termination clauses; and no clauses on data ownership among others. Specific challenges confronting management of outsourcing contracts that need to be addressed include: Inability to predetermine the revenue potential for the segment to be outsourced prior to contracting and what the performance/sanctioning requirements are; Inability to develop robust monitoring and tracking systems to cross-check how much the private operators collect; Delays by private operators in reporting revenues collected; Delays in payments of commission to private operators; Unclear and weak contract terms that are mostly to the advantage of the private operator, since the assemblies do not have the capacity to draft the contracts; and Lack of transparency in the revenue collection processes. The collection system is heavily cash-based and therefore is fraught with a lot of leakages. Because most collections are not computerized, it is extremely difficult to have an effective tracking system to check leakages. There is also a high compliance cost associated with public responsiveness to the payment of the rates, fees and other charges by the assembly.</td>
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<th>Utilization and Service Delivery</th>
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<td>IGF is mainly used to support recurrent operations of MMDAs, which narrows the scope of IGF utilization. IGFs are generally not used to support certain components of Medium Term Development Plans as well Action Plans of MMDAs. Even though trends show that local revenues as a percentage of total MMDA expenditure is</td>
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increasing, it has not been reflected in either service delivery or provision of capital projects. This is because there are no clear policy guidelines for the utilization of IGFs, in contrast to what pertains for the utilization of the DACF or other development funds such as the DDF. As such, MMDAs have abused flexibility in the utilization of local revenue. Recruitment of staff without regard to human resource needs of the MMDA has led to an increase in staff numbers at the MMDAs and a high emolument bill for such recruitments at the local level; this situation places additional pressure on the IGFs.

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<tr>
<th>Rights and Responsibilities of Citizens</th>
<th>MMDAs have overall responsibilities for the preparation, execution and monitoring of approved district development plans and budgets, and for ensuring that proximity to constituents or citizens will result in responsive, equitable and affordable services to all the targeted communities. The methodology for consulting the general public is not clear. Even though innovations towards good local governance, such as public hearings for the participatory planning and budgeting including revenue mobilization exist, these are poorly used in most MMDAs to facilitate processes.</th>
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**Administrative Issues**

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<tr>
<th>Sources of Local Revenues</th>
<th>The local revenue structure has too many items (sometimes between 86 and 90 or more), which makes it difficult to administer. In most cases, however, only 10 of such revenue items generate about 90 per cent of the total revenue. MMDAs often do not give serious attention to the main productive revenue sources. MMDAs are unable to identify the tax base and define easily the appropriate rate and fees payable to establish the revenue potential for collection</th>
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<tr>
<td>Revenue Mobilization and Collection</td>
<td>The factors that limit revenue mobilization and collection include; Inadequate data on revenue sources, leading to an ad hoc approach to revenue collection, thus the setting of persistently over- or underestimated targets; Weak costing practices in the assemblies, including lack of assessments of the private benefit component of services in the determination of user fees; Manual delivery of rates, notices and bills for licence and fees by local revenue collectors to individual property owners; Negligible usage of street names and property addresses to locate revenue points; Use of manual systems for recording revenue receipts, which results in revenue leakages; Use of cash payments, limited supervision and monitoring of revenue collectors at the assembly level, which leads to leakages; there is connivance between revenue collectors and cashiers and misappropriation of funds; High default rates in payment of property rates and other charges resulting from lack of effective sanctioning and enforcement; The fact that the Finance Officer at the assembly level doubles as the Principal Revenue Mobilization Officer as well as the Chief Accountant as per the current structure of the assembly and directly supervises the work of the revenue staff; this dual role of mobilization and accounting of revenues by Finance Officers in the assemblies is a structural and functional misnomer in terms of financial accountability and prudence. In most cases, this situation has resulted in collusion and</td>
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misappropriations of internally generated revenues, weakened internal controls and ineffective monitoring of IGF mobilization processes of the MMDAs

| Utilization and Service Delivery | Budgeting and budgetary control are essentials in managing and controlling local government finances, yet MMDAs employ varied processes in the disbursement of IGF because of poor guidelines governing the utilization of IGFs. There is laxity in the management of IGFs. There is poor adherence to the financial management regulations when it comes to the utilization of IGFs. For example, the “Warrant” system was institutionalized to ensure that no expenditure on public fund would be incurred without recourse to the budget and that all expenditures would be covered by a “warrant” emanating from the ACTIVATE. MMDAs do not strictly adhere to this when it comes to the use of IGFs. |

1975 product map

2000 product map

2012 product map - Ghana Export Treemap by Product

![2012 product map](image)

2014 product map - Ghana Export Treemap by Product

![2014 product map](image)
Source: http://atlas.cid.harvard.edu/explore/tree_map/export/gha/all/show/2012/
Annex IV: List of primary documents

1. Tema Metropolitan Assembly (2015) Composite Budget
2. (Government of Ghana) – Local Government (Borrowing) Bill, 2016
22. (Government of Ghana) – Act 123 – Administration of Lands Act, 1962
31. COWI In Association with Maple and CERSGIS (n.d.) The Planning Model Volume 2 Spatial Development Framework
32. COWI In Association with Maple and CERSGIS (n.d.) The Planning Model Volume 3 Structure Plan Guidelines
38. Ghana’s constitution (1992)

DATABASE

1. Local Government Service Staff List for
   a. Kumasi Metropolitan Assembly
   b. Tamale Metropolitan Assembly
   c. Bolgatanga Municipal Assembly
   d. Sunyani Municipal Assembly
   e. Accra Metropolitan Assembly
   f. Tema Metropolitan Assembly
   g. Ashaiman Municipal Assembly
   h. Ledzokuku Municipal Assembly
   i. La Dadekotopon Municipal Assembly
   j. La Nkwantanang Municipal Assembly
   k. Ga East Municipal Assembly
   l. Ga West Municipal Assembly
   m. Ga South Municipal Assembly
   n. Ga Central Municipal Assembly
   o. Adenta Municipal Assembly
2. Organogram of Bolgatanga Municipal Assembly
3. Data on TMA Landfill Site (n.d.) – Database from Tamale Metropolitan Assembly
### Annex V: List of people interviewed

#### JANUARY 2016 VISIT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Key Contact in Organization</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UN Ghana office</td>
<td>Christine Evans-Klock UN Resident Coordinator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Development Planning Commission (NDPC)</td>
<td>Dr. Isaac Mensa-Bonsu Director Plan Coordination Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana Real Estate Developers Association</td>
<td>Sammy Amegayibor Executive Secretary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>Vincent Langdon-Morris Advisor, Livelihoods &amp; Climate /Environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Government Service</td>
<td>Dr. Kesse Head of Research, Management Information Systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tema Metropolitan Assembly</td>
<td>Hon. Isaac Ashai Odamatten Tema Mayor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Ghana - Rural Urban Linkages Group, comprising Regional Institute for Population Studies (RIPS) &amp; Department of Geography and Resource Development</td>
<td>Professor Samuel Nii Ardey Codjoe Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Professor Yankson Senior Lecturer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Professor Delali B. Dovie Ecologist &amp; Environmental Change Scientist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institute of Local Government Studies</td>
<td>Edward Aboagye Head of Urban Projects</td>
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#### APRIL 2016 VISIT

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<th>Organization</th>
<th>Key Contact in Organization</th>
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<tr>
<td>Ghana Water Company Ltd</td>
<td>Michael Botse-Baidoo Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Seth Atiapah / Faustina Boachie Corporate Planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning</td>
<td>Joseph Antwi Head of Fiscal Decentralisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development - Environmental Health &amp; Sanitation Department</td>
<td>Samuel Allotey</td>
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#### Workshop / Focus Group Participants

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<tr>
<td>Tema Metropolitan Assembly</td>
<td>Chelpang Yakubu Assistant Development Planning Officer</td>
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<td>Komey Elsie Naa Dedei Assistant Human Resource Manager</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Hope Dziekpor Municipal Budget Officer</td>
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<td></td>
<td>M.K. Joshua Deputy Director</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Dela Gbedemah Human Resource Manager</td>
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<td>Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Adenta Metropolitan Assembly</strong></td>
<td>Lilian Baeka Municipal Planning Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>Moira Nancy Ewa Municipal Coordinating Director</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Ledzokuku Krowor Municipal Assembly</strong></td>
<td>Taylor-Appiah Municipal Development Planning Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kodjoe Dekpo Municipal Coordinating Director</td>
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<td>Cecilia Ofori-Asante Municipal Budget Officer</td>
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<td><strong>Shai Osu-Doku District Assembly</strong></td>
<td>Wendy Wiredu Assistant Human Resource Management</td>
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<tr>
<td>Angelina Asare Assistant Director</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Ga-East Municipal Assembly</strong></td>
<td>Alex Amoah Assistant Planning Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Ga-West Municipal Assembly</strong></td>
<td>Joyce Barnes Assistant Human Resource Manager</td>
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<td>Yayra Akude Assistant Planning Officer</td>
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<td>Barbara Acquah Assistant Budget Analyst</td>
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**FIELD / ON-SITE MEETINGS**

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<td>Ledzokuku Krowor Municipal Assembly</td>
<td>Taylor-Appiah Planning Officer</td>
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<td>Adenta Metropolitan Assembly</td>
<td>Rebecca Annan</td>
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<td>Kumasi Metropolitan Assembly</td>
<td>Metropolitan Chief Executive</td>
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<td>Head of Finance</td>
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<td>Head of Human Resource Management and Administration</td>
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<td>Municipal Planner</td>
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<td>Heads of Service Depts. – SWM</td>
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<tr>
<td>Environmental Services Providers Association</td>
<td>Ama Ofori-Antwi Executive Secretary</td>
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