THE DYNAMICS OF SYSTEMS OF SECONDARY CITIES IN AFRICA:

URBANISATION, MIGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT

Cities Alliance
Cities Without Slums
Hosted by UNOPS

BANQUE AFRICAINE DE DEVELOPPEMENT
AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK
AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT FUND
FONDS AFRICAIN DE DEVELOPPEMENT
AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK GROUP
GROUPE DE LA BANQUE AFRICAINE DE DÉVELOPPEMENT

Schweizerische Eidgenossenschaft
Confédération suisse
Confederazione Svizzera
Confederaziun svizra
Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation SDC

First published in 2022 by:

Cities Alliance
Boulevard du Regent, 37 (1st Floor) 1000 Brussels,
Belgium

African Development Bank
Avenue Joseph Anoma, 01 BP 1387 Abidjan 01
Côte d'Ivoire

Editors:
Brian H Roberts, Emeritus Professor, University of Canberra and Director Urban Frontiers, Australia
Godfrey O Anyumba, Assoc. Prof at the Department of Urban and Regional Planning, University of Venda, Limpopo, South Africa

Technical Supervision (Cities Alliance Secretariat):
Rene Hohmann, Head of Global Programmes
Joshua Drake, Urban Economic Development Specialist
Keith Tatenda Mudadi, Programme Analyst

African Development Bank:
Babati Mokgethi, Urban Development Officer

Communication Coordination (Cities Alliance Secretariat):
Yamila Castro, Communications Officer

Copyeditor:
Caryn M. Davis (Cascadia Editing)

Graphic design:
Formato Verde

Cover Photograph:
Agona- Swedru, Ghana (Brian H Roberts, 2019)

Acknowledgements:
The editors acknowledge the many inputs to the book by authors, reviewers, and other support personnel, including Dr. Luc Christiaensen, Lead Economist, Jobs Group, World Bank. Astrid RN Haas - Urban Advisor / Independent Consultant, Kampala. Kofi Amedzro, Urban Development Planner and Consultant, Accra Ghana, Samson Kassuhun, Professor of Urban Planning and Development, Ethiopian Civil Service University, Ethiopia, Dr Laure Criqui, International Urban Development Specialist & Deputy Mayor, Menglon, France, Allan Cain, Development Workshop, Angola, Dr Dickson Ajayi Senior Lecturer & Researcher, Department of Geography, University of Ibadan, Ibadan. Nigeria. Mr Libin. Mwacharo L. G, Architect, and Urban Design Consultant, Nairobi, Kenya., Professor Peter B. Bikam, Town Regional Planning, and Infrastructure Specialist, South Africa, Jean-Marie Ily, Independent Consultant, Specialized in Urban Development, based in Dakar, Senegal , Ale Badara Sy, Senior Officer, Waste Management Project Coordinator, Global Green Growth Institute, Senegal, Joe Wood, Urban Demographer, London, Ian Howie, Professor of International Studies, RMIT, Babati Mokgethi, Urban Development Officer, African Development Bank, William Cobbett, Dr Rene Hohmann and Joshua Drake from the Cities Alliance. Editing and research services were provided by Rosalie Roberts from Urban Frontiers, with other research inputs were provided by Ms. Simone Roberts and Ms. Suzanne Orr. They worked on the first report in 2013.

ABSTRACT

Secondary systems of cities in Africa (SSCA) have become the subject of renewed interest by scholars and international development organisations. This book explores the role played by secondary cities in the development of African countries and regions. It includes a review and discusses trends, influences, and challenges, including the forces of New Economic Geography, facing the development of secondary cities in Africa. Using a systems approach, it examines urban governance, economic, development, social, and environmental factors that have shaped the development of secondary cities. Eight country and city case studies illustrate how they have approached urbanisation, decentralisation, and other processes supporting secondary city development. Case studies include Cape Coast in Ghana, Dire Dawa in Ethiopia, Gabès in Tunisia, Huambo in Angola, Ibadan in Nigeria, Mombasa in Kenya, Gqeberha (formerly Port Elizabeth) in South Africa, and Touba-Mbacké in Senegal. These case studies provide insights and knowledge about challenges facing the development of secondary cities within the selected countries. Learning outcomes are presented for each country case study, followed by an outline of opportunities open to secondary cities in Africa to become more competitive, dynamic, and liveable. The roles that international development assistance agencies and organisations can play to support the development of secondary systems of cities are discussed. The book concludes with a call for a new urban age agenda for the management and development of African secondary cities. This is focused on the need for improved urban governance, management, planning and economic development, and for enhancing connectivity and logistic systems to build collaborative partnerships between secondary cities and create a strong network of national systems of cities across the continent.

Key Words: Africa, systems of cities; secondary cities; urban systems; urban development; development policy; international development assistance

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SECTION II.
Secondary City Case Studies From Eight African Countries.....204

TABLE OF FIGURES

TABLE OF TABLES

TABLE OF PHOTOS

TABLE OF BOXES

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AAPG	Annual Average Population Growth
AfCFTA	African Continental Free Trade Area
AfDB	African Development Bank
ANICT	Agence National d'Investissement des Collectivités Territoriales (National Agency for Investment in Local Regions)
CBD	Central business district
CCM	Cape Coast Metropolis
CCMA	Cape Coast Municipal Assembly
CDS	City development strategy
CEDS	City economic development strategies
CEMAC	Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa
CEN-SAD	Community of Sahel-Saharan States
CILSS	Permanent Interstate Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
COP26	2021 United Nations Climate Change Conference
COVID-19	Coronavirus disease 2019 (also known as novel coronavirus/2019-nCoV)
CUT	Coalition of Urban Transitions
DCP	Diaspora Community Projects – Kenya
DFLA	Development Fund for Local Authorities
DHS	Demographic and Health Surveys, Nigeria
DPAT	District Performance Assessment Tool
EAC	East African Community
EC	European Commission
ECCAS/ CEEAC	Economic Community of Central African States
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EDRI	Ethiopian Development Research Institute
EIU	Economic Intelligence Unit
EMR	Extended Metropolitan Region
EPZ	Economic Processing Zone
ESCAP	Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific
FBO	Faith-Based Organisation
FDI	Foreign direct investment
FONIC	Fonds National d'Investissement Communal (National Fund for Local Investment)
GC	Gini coefficient
GCIF	Global City Indicators Facility
GDP	Gross domestic product
GGGI	Global Green Growth Institute
GIS	Geographic information system
GIZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit
GNI	Gross National Income
GSS	Ghana Statistical Service
GTP	Growth and Transformation Plan
GVA	Gross value added
HDI	Human Development Index (indicators)
ICT	Information and communications technology
IDMC	International Displacement Monitoring Centre
IDP	Integrated development plan
IDPs	Internally displaced persons

IFAC	International Federation of Accountants
IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IIAG	Ibrahim Index of African Governance
INE	Instituto Nacional de Estatística
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IWI	International Wealth Index
JICA	Japan International Cooperation Agency
JWP	Joint Work Programme (Cities Alliance)
KNBS	Kenya National Bureau of Statistics
LED	Local economic development
LGA	Local government area
LGTAS	Local Government Turnaround Strategy
LGU	Local government unit
LMIC	Low- and middle-income countries
LVC	Land Value Capture
MAs	Municipal Assemblies
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MINUH	Ministério do Urbanismo e Habitação
MIS	Management information system
MLGRD	Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development
MSE	Micro and small enterprise
MSMEs	Micro, small and medium enterprises
NCE	New Climate Economy
NDRC	National Development and Reform Commission
NGOs	Non-governmental organizations
NMBM	Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality
NPDP	National Physical Development Plan
ODA	Official development assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OECD/ SWAC	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Library/Sahel West Africa Club
PEV	post-election violence
PNDAT	National Planning and Development Plan (Plan National d'Aménagement et de Développement du Territoire)
PNOTU	Política Nacional de Ordenamento do Território e Urbanismo
pp km^2	Population density (people per sq. km of land area)
PPP	Public-private partnership
RFGs	Responsiveness Factor Grants
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SCSP	Secondary Cities Support Programme Project
SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals
SEZ	Special economic zones
SMEs	Small and medium enterprises
SNG-WOFI	World Observatory on Subnational Government Finance and Investment
SSA	Sub-Saharan Africa
SSCA	Secondary systems of cities in Africa
UCCLA	União das Cidades Capitais de Língua Portuguesa
UCLGA	United Cities and Local Governments - Africa
UEMOA	West African Economic and Monetary Union
UESP	Urban Environmental Sanitation Project
UMA	Arab Maghreb Union
UMDF	Urban and Municipal Development Fund
UN DESA	United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs
UNCDF	United Nations Capital Development Fund
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDESA	United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs. (2020)

UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNECA	United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNFPA	United Nations Fund for Population Activities
UN-Habitat	United Nations Human Settlements Programme
UN-Habitat & ESCAP	United Nations Human Settlement Program & Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNIDA	United Nations Industrial Development Organization
UNRISD	United Nations Research Institute for Social Development
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
VAT	Value-added tax
WAMZ	West African Monetary Zone
WASH	Water, sanitation, and hygiene
WaSSIP	Water and Sanitation Service Improvement Project
WEF	World Economic Forum
WHO	World Health Organization

FOREWORD

The COVID-19 pandemic has presented a significant challenge to the future recovery and development of African cities. Africa's largest cities and metropolitan regions are expected to recover faster from the pandemic. Secondary and smaller cities are expected to recover much slower. Even before the pandemic struck, however, many of these cities struggled to gain an equitable share and benefit from national economic development, investment, and resource allocations. Subsequently, there have been growing disparities in the development of national systems of cities in Africa. These disparities are set to widen unless governments are prepared to take action to reverse this outcome.

Secondary cities play a vitally important role in supporting the livelihood of almost 80% of Africa's population that does not live in the large cities and metropolitan regions. They are centres of subnational government, logistics, employment and services. They range in size from 100,000 to 1,000,000 or more in some of the more populated countries of the continent. However, they have not been given prominence in the focus of national urban policy, capacity building and infrastructure investment. As a result, the national system and spatial pattern of development of cities in many countries have become distorted, with a single large metropolitan region dominating the economic, political and population structure in most African countries.

Africa cities are urbanising and developing rapidly. However, the current trends in the spatial pattern and development of national systems of cities are not sustainable. In many African countries, the very high concentration of urban populations in one sizeable metropolitan region poses a significant risk to the national economies, political stability, and resilience of those countries, should a disaster strike. Some of these metropolitan regions produce more than 40% of the national GDP. A more dispersed and equitable spatial pattern of urban and economic activities in African countries is needed to spread the risks of the high level of national wealth concentration in one city and create opportunities to realise the development potential of secondary city and regional economies. This potential needs to be recognised and realised if African countries are to grow and develop equitably and sustainably.

In recent years, the African Development Bank and Cities Alliance have supported various projects and programs for developing secondary cities across the continent. This common interest has brought the two organisations together on publishing this book. The book provide comprehensive insights into the dynamics of the system of secondary cities in Africa and how secondary cities are developing, performing and managing the challenges of urbanisation. It calls for a new urban age agenda for supporting the development of secondary cities and outlines how governments and international development agencies and organisations can play a role in this. Putting a greater focus on the development of secondary cities can help to improve their performance, while contributing to the fight against climate change and promoting sustainable development and post COVID-19 recovery. Above all, the many lessons and improvements outlined in the book can contribute to the maximisation of benefits of secondary cities in supporting the development of African countries and improving the lives of citizens that live in or benefit from them.

African Development Bank

Mike Salawou
Ag. Director,
Infrastructure and Urban Development Department

Cities Alliance

Greg Munro
Director
Cities Alliance Secretariat

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The populations of African cities are expected to grow by more than 900 million by 2050. Many of these people will live in secondary cities. These cities are a sub-set of cities within national systems of cities. Secondary cities play a critical intermediary role in the operation and development of local and regional economies of national systems of cities and regions. They are a vital part of the fabric of the production, distribution, and logistics systems of national economies. Unfortunately, they have become a neglected area of policy and economic development in the post-independence era in Africa.

African cities are dynamic places full of life, vibrant business, and social activities and are growing and changing very rapidly. Approximately 44% of Africa's population lives in cities. This figure is likely to be much higher, given the definitional problems with the term 'urban.' *Africapolis*, supported by the OECD, argues that urbanisation has already exceeded 50%.

An estimated 180–200 million people live in secondary cities of 100,000 to 1 million or higher in the case of Ibadan in Nigeria. These cities comprise between 12.5% and 15% of the total urban population of Africa, depending on how 'urban areas' are defined. They mostly perform second-tier level government and business functions and play a critical intermediary role in regional value-adding, logistics supply chains and subnational levels of education, governance, community and social services delivery and economic development. Some, like Luxor (Egypt), Touba-Mbacké (Senegal), and Stone Town (Zanzibar), have significant international links to tourism.

Since the early 1960s, scholars and international development organisations have shown an intermittent interest in researching issues affecting the management and development of secondary cities in Africa. However, there have been relatively few in-depth primary research studies conducted on secondary cities in recent years. For several decades, secondary cities have not been at the forefront of urban policy development and research; good data and information are unavailable or difficult to obtain.

There is a growing interest and need for research on systems of secondary cities in the region to underpin improvements in the planning, development and management of these cities in order to enable them to become better governed and more competitive. South Africa, Rwanda, Ghana, Egypt and Uganda have shown a strong interest in raising the conversation on the importance of secondary cities to the development of nations.

This book investigates the dynamics of systems of secondary cities in Africa. It builds on the considerable research on systems of secondary cities undertaken by the Cities Alliance. The book's first six chapters introduce the concept of secondary cities and examine the general trends and patterns of their development, policy, challenges, population and financial management. Eight-chapter case studies by different authors provide more detailed assessment data, information, issues and opportunities about secondary cities in eight countries, which offer new insights that expand the current knowledge base. The final two chapters synthesise the learning outcomes from the research and outline opportunities, frameworks, and initiatives for a new-age urban agenda for African secondary cities and possible roles for official development assistance agency support.

DEVELOPMENT OF SECONDARY CITIES IN AFRICA

While a considerable effort was made to collect data and information that provide indicators for the development status of secondary cities, that data was difficult to obtain from census and other records and often does not exist.

State of African Cities

Currently, there are an estimated 1,765 cities in Africa with a population of more than 50,000. Around 143 of these have populations of more than 500,000 people, based on United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA) estimates. This number is expected to increase to 245 by the year 2035. The most significant growth in the number of cities is expected in western Africa, a region with a population growth rate of 2.6% and an urbanisation growth rate of 4.1%. Most of this growth will occur in cities with populations between 500,000 and 1,000,000. It is expected that cities of 300,000 to 1,000,000 will absorb most urban population growth in eastern Africa.

The average densities of cities are around 4,070 persons per km^2 (pp km^2) but range from 6,265 pp km^2 in northern Africa to 2,454 pp km^2 in eastern Africa. Secondary cities tend to be higher and exceed 8,363 pp km^2 in northern Africa but fall as low as 2,571 pp km^2 in eastern Africa. The general level of services in secondary cities for water, sanitation, waste collection, roads and electricity is below that of metropolitan areas.

Policy Development

All but two African countries (Ethiopia and Liberia) experienced a significant period of colonial rule. As a result, the pattern of development in African secondary cities has been influenced strongly by colonial development policy, with that influence continuing to varying extents post-independence. Most African secondary cities are regional administrative centres of provincial governments. Most are small, except in South Africa and Nigeria, where several secondary cities have populations over 1 million.

Weakness in administration, e-government, education, health, and other online services effectively prevent many African secondary cities from having equal access to services, information and technologies available in large cities. Some countries, such as Rwanda and Kenya, seek to enhance connectivity along economic development corridors using the internet and other technology. However, secondary cities in these and most other African countries fall short of what is needed to support more competitive, inclusive and sustainable local economies.

Population and Migration

There are two primary sources of data used for the study: the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA) and Africapolis, a geospatial database for research and data visualisation supported through the OECD Sahel and West Africa Club (SWAC). Africapolis contains data on over 9,000 urban agglomerations in Africa. There are significant variations in the two sets of data, however, because of the way each organisation classifies 'urban'. The OECD (Africapolis) data uses a geographic information system (GIS) to measure the population of urban agglomerations; UN DESA uses official country measures based on administrative area and populations thresholds set for cities. Africapolis data shows significant agglomeration levels, with secondary cities for Africa between of 100,000 to 500,000 inhabitants growing at over 4% per year. United Nations DESA shows cities between 1 million and 5 million growing fastest, at 3.7%. Large primary cities have growth rates of around 2.6%. Still, cities such as Lagos (Nigeria) have many clustered secondary cities from spill over growth. The actual level and rate of growth in the population remains confusing because of the urban definition problem.

FIGURE E.1 | Percentage Distribution of African urban populations by city size, 2015 (Africapolis)



Source: Africapolis Database (2020).

Most urban growth occurring in African cities (based on spatial imagery) appears to occur in urban centres with populations between 300,000 and 500,000.

Migration, both internal and external, is a significant driver of the population growth of secondary cities across the continent and is expected to remain so in the future. Migrants living in urban areas comprise around 30% of the total urban population, or 75% are rural-urban or inter-urban migrants. Secondary cities play a significant role in migrant pathways from rural to metropolitan regions. In secondary cities, migrants are generally better educated, have lower dependency rates, comprise a higher percentage of the population, and a pyramid population structure varies significantly to that of city-born residents.

Many refugees from conflict zones settle in secondary cities close to borders — and this place enormous pressures on places like Kakuma in north-west Kenya. Refugees are found to make a significant contribution to secondary host-city local economies.

Development Challenges

While most African cities are experiencing severe urban growth management problems, secondary cities are experiencing significant and unique problems. These cities generally have poor urban governance and management systems. Many lack basic infrastructure, good education, and community and health services and have unreliable urban and regional logistics systems. While many African secondary cities have dynamic local economies, they are primarily consumption-driven, with a sizeable informal employment sector. Their peri-urban areas tend to be highly dispersed, with inhabitants engaged in semi-subsistence activities. In these cities, the population and labour force also tend to be transitionary, with migrants frequently returning to rural areas or moving into metropolitan regions when employment is not available. Urban slum proliferation is one of the most significant existing challenges.

The development of secondary city local economies is dominated generally by the transport, government, agriculture and trading services sectors. Some secondary cities, such as Sekondi-Takoradi in Ghana, Gqeberha (formerly Port Elizabeth) in South Africa, and Mombasa in Kenya, have significant industrial and transportation-based economies. Except for South Africa, industrialisation has been slow to develop within sub-Saharan Africa countries. This is due to poor infrastructure, logistics, lack of capital, skills and governance systems. Skills loss through emigration has weakened the development of all sectors of African economies.

The inefficiencies of urban governance, management and logistics systems add substantially to business and government transaction costs in secondary cities distant from large metropolitan regions. Many are becoming heavily reliant on domestic and foreign remittances to supplement household income and support local economic activities. Urban financial management, revenue, land management and administration systems are weak. Land and housing markets are distorted, uncertain, lack transparency and are influenced heavily by expatriate investment. Property and land tax evasion are widespread. Secondary cities struggle to attract investment and find it challenging to build and retain educated and skilled human capital.

The COVID-19 pandemic, and more recently the economic fallout and disruption to global supply chains from the crisis in Ukraine, has set back Africa's development for many years. Covid-19 recovery will be one of the most difficult challenges for African secondary cities. The coronavirus initially impacted the continent's largest cities, but as cases rose, unemployment and economic activities declined, and many urban migrants were forced to move back to secondary and other regional cities and rural areas. This led to the spread of the virus. African secondary cities have weaker economies, governance structures and resources to support recovery efforts. As a result, the gap between recovery efforts in large metropolitan regions and secondary cities will widen. Secondary cities must not be left behind in the focus of recovery efforts, as they, in turn, are needed to support extensive rural communities, towns and cities.

National governments have not shown a solid commitment to implementing administrative and fiscal decentralisation policies to encourage greater local autonomy, responsibility, and effort to promote local economic development by secondary city governments. While the development of some secondary cities has been driven strongly by natural resource extraction, productivity improvements in the agriculture and more advanced services sectors are low, especially in education, information, and business services. Failure to invest in these has undermined the ability of secondary cities to compete.

Many African secondary cities do not have the capacity and know-how to develop competitive, export-orientated economies and industries. The possibility of advanced economies decoupling from the global economy and their moves to reclaim greater economic sovereignty and re-shore manufacturing may well change the neoliberal economic development model of free trade. Should this occur, prospects for African export industries will be impacted substantially, and African countries and cities will need to focus more on stimulating endogenous growth, national markets, and trade between cities. Regardless of developments in the global economy, strategic change is needed to national urbanisation and regional economic development policies that recognise the importance of secondary cities in countries' social and economic development.

The lack of reliable data and information on African secondary cities, especially sub-Saharan Africa, is a significant inhibitor to developing urban policy and knowledge about the dynamics of secondary cities. Some countries such as Kenya and Ghana have good statistical bureaus that provide detailed information and make census and other data readily available in electronic form. In Nigeria, Senegal, Tunisia and Ethiopia, data on secondary cities is poor, making analysis of trends and preparing evidence-based policies difficult. Africapolis, an OECD-supported database, offers comprehensive information on the spatial geography of more than 8,000 urban agglomerations in Africa; however, there are significant differences between its population estimates and United Nations data because definitions of 'urban', and the envelope areas used to collect data are different. Africapolis provides a more realistic perspective on urban agglomerations in Africa.

Skills loss through emigration has weakened the development of all sectors of African economies.

CASE STUDIES

The case study cities show the diversity of approaches and efforts made to support the management and development of secondary cities in eight African countries. The case studies selected are as follows: Cape Coast in Ghana; Gabès in Tunisia; Huambo in Angola; Dire Dawa in Ethiopia; Mombasa in Kenya; Ibadan in Nigeria; Touba-Mbacké in Senegal, and Gqeberha in South Africa. Each case study includes a brief review of the history of national urbanisation and municipal government arrangements, demographics of primary and secondary city development, description of the economic geography of secondary cities, policies on urbanisation and secondary city development, decentralisation, problems and issues affecting secondary city development, and initiatives and policies necessary to support secondary city development.

The case studies provide valuable insight into the many challenges secondary cities face in developing and implementing a wide range of plans. The capacity to develop and the resources to implement plans is an issue raised in all case studies. The case study of Huambo illustrates the many challenges that secondary cities affected by conflict and civil war have in recovery. The case study of Touba-Mbacké is an excellent example of a secondary city facing development challenges from climate change and the impact of international tourism, being a significant Islamic religious centre.

Gabès is a significant port and industrial centre in Tunisia that is facing environmental problems, which are affecting investment attractiveness and human health and quality of life. Mombasa, another port city in Kenya, is facing significant development problems from population growth and social issues associated with employment. It is a city undergoing significant transformation as it redefines itself as one of Eastern Africa's major gateway ports. Gqeberha is a city experiencing transformation problems with the decline of heavy industries, especially businesses affected by automobile manufacturing closure.

Cape Coast is a secondary city that has not benefited significantly from the rapid economic growth in Ghana over recent decades. It struggles with urban management issues, especially the loss of forest lands and erosion of the coastal foreshore. It is a city with great potential and a good university but lacking the capacity to develop. Ibadan is a vast secondary city. Despite having a population of several million, it functions as a set of policy-centric networked secondary cities. This results in significant urban management challenges to metropolitan management planning and services delivery. It is a problem that many secondary cities will need to address as they expand in the future.

LESSONS

The challenges facing African secondary cities are of a different scale and magnitude to those experienced in the large metropolitan regions, and local context factors such as climate, culture and civil unrest often exacerbate problems. These differences call for national governments to develop policies and programs that are more specific and responsive to the needs of secondary cities within their countries. The following summarises some of the key lessons and learning outcomes of the research.

Colonial Government Legacies continue to Influence Urban Development Policies: Despite many former colonial countries reforming their planning systems, laws, and practices over recent years, many former colonies still rely on old systems to resolve issues, e.g., master plans and court systems. Some changes occur due to political reform; however, as an area of policy focus, secondary cities are not a policy priority for most African countries.

The Dominance of Primacy in Africa Cities: Africa's urbanisation is dominated by the high levels of primacy in its systems of cities. In 41 out of 51 countries, more than 15% of the urban population live in the largest city, while in 27 countries, more than 30% live in a metropolitan region. In Togo and Djibouti, more than half of the urban population lives in the country's largest city. The dominance of urban primacy has led to significant distortions and inequities in the development of cities and regions.

Economic Geography: Studies have shown that the economic geography of secondary cities has similar characteristics. Most secondary cities are driven by consumption and trading activities, with a significant proportion of the labour force engaged in informal sector employment. They are generally much poorer, less competitive, have weaker economic governance, and have lower value-adding industry activities.

Decentralisation and Devolution: None of the African countries studied adopted national decentralisation and devolution policies focusing on the planning and development of secondary cities. Decentralisation and devolution are necessary to empower secondary cities to be more autonomous, responsible and accountable in developing and delivering on localised approaches to policy, economic and financial management for dealing with urbanisation problems. Public sector management and governance processes in secondary cities need to be resourced, and people must be trained and given technical support and technology to do this.

Urban Governance: Governance is a challenge revealed in all the case study cities. The source of most of these challenges is the growing centralisation of political power and control of development finance at the expense of local autonomy. The centralisation of power has dire impacts on local governance because of the dependency on the political will and controls at the 'centre'. Many gains of decentralisation and devolution from earlier decades have been lost, especially because of the COVID-19 pandemic, which has seen central governments take back a lot of responsibilities and functions.

Financial Management: All secondary cities studied faced significant municipal finance and budgetary challenges. The failure to improve revenue generation; reform financial and budget management practices; and address financial mismanagement, wasteful expenditure, insolvency and corruption make countries unattractive – especially to international investments. The reliance on central government grants to pay wages and develop and maintain infrastructure and basic services results in insufficient monies being available to fund essential services adequately. Outlays on salaries often exceed 70% of budget outlays. There is a need for secondary cities to become more financially sustainable and self-sufficient.

Economic Development Policies: There are considerable variations in national/secondary city investment. While petroleum and resource-rich countries can generate the revenues for investment, such as in Angola, Botswana, Ghana, and Nigeria, most African countries struggle to attract foreign direct investment. Many still rely heavily on bi-lateral and multi-lateral assistance and remittances to support their development and wellbeing. Most countries are still applying an export growth development model to create an environment attractive to foreign investment in order to develop export markets. Only South Africa has a strong export manufacturing sector. Some countries, such as Kenya, South Africa, Nigeria, and Senegal, are mobilising domestic investment through reform. However, most benefits occur in metropolitan/metropolitan regions with little flow-on to secondary cities and subnational regions.

Infrastructure: Without exception, all of the case study cities have old or obsolete infrastructure, large un-serviced urban areas, and insufficient capacity to accommodate high population growth rates. Very few secondary cities have integrated infrastructure plans, public investment plans or capital works plans linked to long-term funding and budgeting.

Land Administration and Management: Land is a complex issue in all secondary city case studies. All of the countries studied have gone through 'experiments' to try to solve the challenges. Land problems in all cities are multifaceted and multi-layered: examples include `nationalised' land in Nigeria and Ethiopia; millions of live landmines in Angola, which plague the development of regional towns and cities; and the tiered jurisdiction system, fraudulent land agents, and land disputes that make orderly development of land in expanding urban areas difficult.

Human Capital Development: Data on human capital and skills development indicators for African secondary cities is poor. Human Development Index data is seldom available at a state, provincial, or local government level. Within Africa, the case study countries and cities have low rankings in human capital development (where data is available), compared to the rest of the world. Where data is available, location quotient data at the region and city levels show low levels of educated and skilled human capital

development in the 25 to 45 age group. There is a significant hollowing out of skills in this age cohort. Many with an education or with professional or trade skills migrate to the larger cities to seek greater economic opportunities and higher salaries.

Quality of Urban Environment: While there are well-kept urban residential and parkland areas in the case study cities, the majority of secondary city environments are of poor quality due to the general lack of autonomy of local government arrangements, the poor economic base, rapid urbanisation, the lack of appropriate policies and funding, the lack or deterioration of infrastructure, complicated land transaction issues and the poor or complete lack of investment in municipal services. The result is poor street lighting, a prevalence of overcrowded, poorly built, high-density informal housing; overflowing solid and sanitary wastes; polluted waterway systems; a failure to control air pollution; a lack of access to clean water; and the prevalence of controllable human diseases. Few secondary cities are prepared for or have plans to manage climate change.

Social Development: Clear articulation in the case studies of social issues associated with education, health, housing, wellbeing, crime and security was difficult because of a lack of reliable data. The migration studies showed that secondary cities are often the first receiver for refugees, rural-urban and economic migrants. Unemployment is often high, particularly among the youth; informal employment exceeds 70% of working-age adults in many inland secondary cities; and the range of economic opportunities is limited. Secondary cities are less able than metropolitan regions to provide adequate social services due to poor governance (lack of outlets for inhabitants to participate in planning their futures), inaccessibility to land, the lack of or slow service delivery, unmet expectations, issues of social diseases (e.g., STD, HIV/AIDS), poor housing and lack of funding. These conditions often result in anti-social behaviour; racism, crime, vandalism, and drug-related crime is a significant problem in border and cross-border secondary cities.

Doing Business: Most secondary cities currently are not competitive enough to attract secondary city investment on their own accord. Gqeberha is one of a very few secondary cities globally to be a centre for the motor vehicle assembly industry. Some secondary cities have developed a competitive position in national education, such as the University of Cape Coast, Ghana, while Ibadan, Arusha (Tanzania), Marrakesh (Morocco) and Luxor have developed competitive advantages in tourism, although they have been drastically affected by the COVID-19 pandemic.

Weak Policies and Initiatives to Support Secondary City Development: Secondary cities' competitiveness and economic efficiency require the effective devolution of powers and responsibilities in order to manage their affairs, develop local economic development plans, and develop more robust networks of competitive and collaborative trading cities, where this is advantageous. Collaboration between secondary city governments, institutions, and businesses would help overcome economies of scale for small businesses and reduce business and services transaction costs. The case studies show very few attempts to improve collaboration and cooperation between secondary cities and adjacent local governments.

Lack of Planning Data and Information: One of the most significant impediments to planning development and services delivery is the lack of population, economic, social, land-use, and infrastructure data and information. Collection and records management to improve local planning, infrastructure management, and services delivery is poor. National statistical, census, and household income survey data and information are not sufficiently disaggregated or available in digital format to enable detailed studies, research and analysis at the secondary city level to support better planning, infrastructure, and services delivery.

A NEW AGENDA FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF SUSTAINABLE SECONDARY CITIES

A new era is dawning for the development of African cities. In 2016 the United Nations Human Settlement Programme (UN-Habitat) launched the New Urban Agenda, which most countries signed. To date, slow progress has been made so far with its implementation. However, the document's focus was on large metropolitan regions, with minimal recognition of the critical role secondary cities can play in the development of national systems of cities. Much greater attention must be given to the development of policies and an agenda for secondary cities in Africa.

A new urban-age agenda and framework are essential to developing a dynamic and robust system of secondary cities in Africa. In urban policy planning and development, secondary cities must be given the same priority as metropolitan regions. While their contribution to economic development may be lower than metropolitan regions, secondary cities play a crucial role as the conduit for many goods and services to reach the large proportion of the national population living in smaller urban and rural areas. People living in those areas deserve more equitable access to the goods, services and employment opportunities of residents of metropolitan regions.

Moving from Sector to Systems Approach to Secondary City Urban Governance

The approach to African countries' national urban and regional economic development policies is mainly structurally administrated through vertical hierarchical governance systems. Horizontal integration between sectors is very weak. Infrastructure and services delivery at the secondary city/region level is overly dependent on the resources of line agencies at multiple levels of government. The current sectoral and siloed system of government agencies and departments both vertically and horizontally leads to poor planning and delivery of infrastructure and services.

This situation is exacerbated at the secondary city level, where local governments depend on the central government to provide many services. A convergence of the right delivery and mix of resources, infrastructure, personnel, and services are essential to efficiently functioning urban systems. A more coordinated and systems approach to urban management and governance is required in African secondary cities to make them more effective and sustainable.

A Framework for Urban Systems Policy and Development for Secondary Cities

TABLE E-1 | Functional elements of urban subsystems supporting the development of secondary cities

Systems/ functions	Governance	Economics and Finance	Built Environment	Social	Environmental	Connectivity
Organisation and Structure	• Collaborative governance • Teams based management	• Economic development policies • One-Stop Business Centre	• The integrated development approval system • Public participation	• Employment and poverty alleviation • Single social services centre	• Integrated environmental management	• Online information • Data exchange • E-governance • Focus groups
Policy and Strategy	• Integrated public policy management	• Urban financial management • Investment Incentives	• Integrated strategic planning • Public investment plans	• Public health and wellbeing	• Climate change adaptation • Emergency management plans	• Support for self-organising network partnerships • Suggestion boxes
Resource Management:	• Legal systems and regulation • Financial management	• Value-added business • Co-financing	• Building regulation enforcement	• Lifelong education and learning • Community colleges	• Pollution and congestion • Forest and land rehabilitation	• Public transport apps • Share-use ride and logistics apps

Systems/ functions	Governance	Economics and Finance	Built Environment	Social	Environmental	Connectivity
Planning and Development	• Corporate planning and management	• Productivity and competitiveness targets • Economic risk management assessment	• Housing and shelter strategies • PPP infrastructure delivery	• Community services	• Environmental health and safety	• Communications and information
Capacity Building	• Accountability and transparency • Human resources management	• Research and development • Technology and Innovation	• Development control • Citizen science groups	• Peace and security • Community crime watch • Community policing	• Cleaner production and industrial ecology • Recycling	• Communities of interest • Diaspora networks • Supply chains and dynamics
Resilience and Regeneration	• Participatory and inclusive governance • Social media networks for disaster recovery	• Industry diversification grants • City-city trade partnerships	• Asset maintenance • Heritage conservation • Local area energy networks	• Human resource development • Migrant integration programs	• Green economies and design • Risk and hazard management	• Community support networks • Local area support services • Community wardens

Source: Author.

The concept of 'urban systems' is a new way of thinking about the operations of cities, planning and operations, and approaches to management and development. This book sets out a framework for an urban systems approach to the sustainable development and management of secondary cities, classifying areas for support/intervention as governance, social, economic, environmental, built environment, and connectivity (flow/logistics) systems. These six urban systems functions are explained in the final chapter of the book. Urban plans and networks operate well when the opportunities for links/connections are strong and choices are available for alternatives and substitutions when the need arises. Well-developed urban systems for secondary cities need to be more self-organising and be able to adapt and adjust when supply chains fail, resources are constrained, or there are unexpected failures in parts of the networks.

A systems-approach framework to manage and support development opportunities for secondary cities in Africa is outlined in Table E.1. This approach can also be applied to analyse national urban systems. It is presented to conceptualise the various elements of managing the development and operation of secondary cities. In Table E.1, six urban systems (top In row across) and six functional (first column) groups of activities provide a decision-making framework for managing activities to support the operations and development of secondary cities. (These systems and functions can be changed or adapted if desired.) Many connections, flows, and combinations of activities occur across these various networks of urban systems and functions at different levels on a day-to-day and annual operations basis in secondary cities. The table shows a sample of initiatives that secondary cities and adjacent region governments could take to build capacity and support opportunities for development and regeneration.

Well-developed urban systems will enable the facilitation of multiple connections and mobilise resources, skills, and technologies in many different places, spaces, and times to enable things to be done quickly. Critical to the introduction and development of a systems-management approach to secondary cities is the need to carefully analyse the constraints preventing these systems from functioning efficiently. These constraints may be political, financial, or technological; related to skills, knowledge, or information, or a combination of all of these. The critical issue for secondary city local governments is to know the most significant constraints to the efficient operation of urban systems and remedy them as a matter of priority.

A New Spatial Economic Model for Development of Secondary Cities

The key to implementing a new urban agenda for supporting secondary cities is a new spatial economic development model. The research indicates the need for a decentralised and integrated, spatially networked system of cities. Three spatial strategies can be applied to support this model, as shown in Figure E-2. These are:

- A. Economic Development Corridors
- B. Regional Cluster of Cities and Towns
- C. Metropolitan Regional Clusters

FIGURE E-2 | Three broad spatial strategies for enhancing the development of secondary cities



The above involves building networks and clusters and enhancing connectivity for secondary cities surrounding metropolitan regions, economic development corridors, and subnational regions. The principles behind the development of all three strategies are similar. In most countries, a combination of each can be applied, depending on economic geography and population density.

These principles underpinning each of the three strategies involve building a framework to foster the development of the following:

- Networks of trading-city partnerships.
- Frameworks for enhancing connectivity.
- A focus on linking value-chains and industry clusters.
- Strengthened rural-urban linkages.
- The mix of exogenous and endogenous growth.
- The growth of competitive subnational corridors and regional markets.

The figure below shows a concept for using three spatial approaches for developing collaborative networks to support the development of secondary cities. The scale and development of these networks will vary within countries, depending on the nature and size of secondary and associated smaller cities and the willingness of cities to collaborate. There can be some overlap between the three spatial networks of secondary cities, especially

between the corridor and regional networks. The economic structures and connectivity arrangements for each spatial framework will be different. Regional networks of secondary cities are likely to develop where a denser network of secondary cities is distant from a large metropolitan region.

A ROLE FOR INTERNATIONAL OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE

Africa has received substantial international official development assistance to the urban sector from the United Nations system; international and regional development banks; pan-European, American, and Chinese institutions; and NGOs. Secondary cities receive less than an equitable share of official development assistance (ODA). Their role in supporting national and regional supply chains and value-adding to the nationwide delivery of products and services to rural and metropolitan areas is generally not reflected in development assistance programs. Official development assistance to secondary cities to improve functions and logistics systems could significantly enhance economic and employment multipliers in rural and urban sectors. This form of assistance to secondary cities has tended to be piecemeal, sectoral and poorly integrated. A more integrated, multi-sectoral and collaborative effort is required for managing secondary cities, that is tailored to a country's needs – rather than a 'one size fits all' approach. An integrated approach is crucial to support the development and management of secondary cities in the post-pandemic era of recovery. The final chapter in this book sets out a framework for improving ODA assistance to support the sustainable development of secondary cities.

A more integrated, multi-sectoral and collaborative effort is required for managing secondary cities, that is tailored to a country's needs – rather than a 'one size fits all' approach.

PRIORITISING AREAS OF ASSISTANCE FOR SECONDARY CITIES IN AFRICA

The development of secondary cities in Africa is falling well behind the rest of the world. While many are dynamic centres of commerce and trade, most are struggling to develop the advanced economies that will enable countries to become self–sufficient and prosperous. A conversation is needed at the higher national political and technical echelons, across all African countries, on the importance of secondary city development. Substantial investment is necessary for human capital development to support the development of cities and jobs, as Africa transitions to a post-agriculture economy. The regeneration of local governance capacity in finance, urban management, land and infrastructure development, markets, and logistics systems is needed urgently. This begins with the rehabilitation of existing urban systems in order to provide a basic minimum level of urban services to support the operation and maintenance of cities.

There is a need to identify how to transform local secondary city economies to support more endogenous economic growth and development to support the expansion of the domestic economy. Economic development policies focused on exogenous export growth involving growth poles and economic enterprise zones in secondary cities have not worked, except where they are linked to major ports and good highways, such as in Morocco. The transaction costs of operations are high, supply-chain support services and enabling environments are weak.

Developing local business networks, fostering collaboration, industry clusters, and specialisation will be essential to reduce common-user costs of providing infrastructure and services, leveraging resources and creating economies of scope and scale. Building a network of collaborative, competitive cities will be essential. Global, continental and local urbanisation `best practice' should be showcased and accessible to stakeholders.

A conversation is needed within African countries about a change in the direction of economic and urban development policies and how to integrate these. A more balanced approach to exogenous and endogenous growth and spatial development policy is needed if African countries are to address inequality and more sustainable development of cities. Such a conversation must recognise the importance of integrating spatial and sectoral policies and plans supporting the development of cities' national systems, especially secondary cities. It is important to foster home-grown solutions to development problems and open opportunities for development that benefit all parts of countries, not just large metropolitan regions. The conversation needs to address the following:

- Developing local capital markets to realise the potential for capitalising land and public assets in order to provide pool funding to supplement private and public-private partnership (PPP) investments.
- Focusing on urban land administration and management systems reform is necessary to underpin the development of and confidence in urban land and property markets.
- Addressing the immediate and long-term data and information deficiencies so that the planning, management and development of secondary cities will not be hampered. Modern cities rely on information and data to plan the physical, economic and social development and infrastructure and monitor environmental impacts and performance.
- Setting up existing African and international research infrastructure centres of excellence that will openly address cross-continental, regional, national, and local urbanisation issues and make them available to any stakeholder interested in the planning, management and development of cities in the region.
- Reviewing the impacts of international, national, and subnational policy agendas on their intended outcomes. Other and official development assistance (ODA) directed towards developing secondary cities in Africa are not well coordinated. Leveraging and stretching of ODA with institutional, NGO, and private sector resources is weak.
- Ascertaining why government institutions and public corporations continue to pursue detrimental and failed policies that do not deliver the planned results. This problem calls for a much more spatially integrated approach to development and financial planning and to operations and maintenance at the secondary systems of cities level.

Responding to these issues is crucial to advancing a new urban age agenda for reforming the planning, management, and development of more inclusive, equitable and sustainable secondary cities in Africa.

CONCLUDING COMMENTS

Secondary cities are not on the urban policy agenda for most African countries. However, as the book identifies, they are an important urban policy issue demanding significant attention from governments and ODA. They are important in building and maintaining a well-run national system of cities that can support a more equitable and efficient national economic and industrial development structure in African countries. Their critical roles in national economic, urbanisation and population policy need to be recognised and advocated for strongly by secondary city governments, businesses, and community leaders throughout Africa.

Secondary cities should be given priority in national urban and regional economic development policy. They need significant institutional capacity-building support, investment in hard and soft infrastructure and human capacity development to become more dynamic, creative, and welcoming places for investors and developers. Stronger enabling environments and economic, environmental, and social governance systems must be created and sustained to create new jobs and industries that will help build subnational wealth and prosperity in African countries.

African countries need to revise their national urban policies and strategies to recognise the crucial role secondary cities play in supporting countries' development, operation, and competitiveness and provide adequately for their needs through more equitable allocation of national resources and budgets. These are all part of a new urban-age agenda that recognises a greater role for secondary cities in Africa and their importance.

SECTION I.

Development Challenges for Secondary Cities

1

INTRODUCTION

BRIAN H ROBERTS AND
GODFREY O ANYUMBA

Currently, around 600 million or 43.4% of Africa's population live in urban areas. Most live in more than 1,765 urban centres with populations over 50,000 (OECD/SWAC, 2020). Around 200 million live in secondary and other intermediate-sized cities. Many of these cities are growing rapidly, yet they have not benefitted from development to the same extent as metropolitan regions.

Urbanisation has been the primary driver of development in Africa for more than five decades. However, the development of cities and the benefits of urbanisation have not been uniform or equitable. The poverty gaps between secondary cities and national systems of cities are widening. The gross domestic product, income and wealth per capita in secondary cities are well below those of large metropolises. These gaps will not close unless there is a change in structural and spatial urbanisation and economic development policy for national systems of cities and regions, with a greater focus on the role of secondary cities (Satterthwaite et al., 2007).

The systems of urban settlements in Africa are trending towards a high level of primacy, with the proportion of people living in secondary and smaller intermediate size cities (40%) being lower than that of Europe (42%) or Asia (50%) (UCLG, 2015). Urbanisation rates exceed 1.1% per annum, but these are predicted to remain constant over the next few decades in Africa, unlike in other regions of the world. By 2030, an additional 250 million people are expected to live in urban areas, with 900 million by 2050. Many of these will live in secondary and intermediate cities. These cities are experiencing many urban development problems and have fast-growing populations, due to rural-urban migration and refugees.

PHOTO 1.1
Agona Swedru, Ghana



Secondary cities[1] play a crucial intermediary role in the development and operations of African economies. Most are subnational centres of government, manufacturing, recreation, education, and tourism. They play a crucial second tier-level role in the functioning of national supply chains and distribution and regional services. Their populations range from 100,000 to 1 million, or more in the case of Nigeria. Many struggle to compete with large metropolitan regions for jobs, trade and investment.

Many secondary cities are located inland, far from the coast or river ports or in land-locked countries such as Ethiopia, Zambia, and Mali, and are Africa's poorest and most disadvantaged secondary cities. Many have high levels of informal- and under-employment; large, sprawling slums with impoverished populations; weak local governance structures and urban management capacity; and poorly developed infrastructure, community, and public services. Climate change, land degradation, civil unrest, and the COVID-19 pandemic continue to impact secondary cities across Africa

The development of secondary/intermediary cities in Africa has suffered disproportionate public and private investment in large metropolitan regions. Many secondary cities, like Bulawayo (Zimbabwe) and Kisumu (Kenya), were once dynamic and prosperous places with good growth and development prospects, but state failure, corruption and weak local government, urbanisation, infrastructure, and economic development policies have held them back from realising their potential. Africa needs a strong, more balanced and equitable system of cities and regional development. The development of a dynamic and robust system of secondary cities will be crucial to achieving this goal.

For African secondary cities to play a more meaningful role in national development, there must be a significant shift in thinking on national urban and economic development policies on decentralisation, devolution and competitiveness. National and regional development and investment policies also need to focus on improving the management of urbanisation, population growth and migration, infrastructure, connectivity, productivity, human capital development and climate change to create more dynamic secondary and smaller-sized cities. To overcome secondary cities' many challenges, a greater focus is needed on adopting collaborative governance, regional endogenous growth, economic sovereignty and investment, increased sub-national region aggregate demand for goods and services, and diversified employment outside the large metropolitan regions. For this to occur, Africa needs a new age-urban agenda for secondary cities. These are the themes that are the focus of this book.

1.1 What are Secondary Cities?

There are many differing viewpoints about what constitutes a secondary city. Few African countries recognise secondary cities, also called intermediate or middle-sized cities as a category of cities or incorporate them into national urban policy plans and development strategies (Muawwad & Hassan, 2015; Kenawy, 2017). Some countries recognise secondary or second-level cities as part of political and administrative structures or capital of a region, province, state, or district. However, African governments have an emerging awareness and recognition (UNICEF and UN-Habitat, 2020) that secondary cities are important in terms of their administrative role and in supporting devolution, decentralisation, connectivity, functionality, logistics, value-adding, trade, and production within national systems of urban settlement (Roberts, 2014).

In countries with demographically low-level urbanisation and small national spatial territories such as Burundi, Djibouti, Eswatini (formerly Swaziland), Eretria, Lesotho and Somaliland, the ratio of the population of the capital city to the next largest city does not fit the traditional mould of secondary cities based on population size. In these smaller countries, functionality plays a more important role in defining secondary cities. At the other extreme, large cities such as Ibadan in Nigeria and Mombasa in Kenya (DCP Kenya, 2019), with populations over 1 million, are considered secondary, not metropolitan regions. In addition, there is variance in the nomenclature for secondary cities by different countries. Rwanda refers to them as `niche secondary cities' (Urban Gateway Organisation News, 2016), Kenya and South Africa refer to them as `secondary cities' (Otiso, 2005; South African Cities Network, 2012). Ethiopia refers to them as `intermediate cities' (OECD/PSI, 2020), Uganda refers to them as `regional' and `strategic' cities (Arup, 2016), and Egypt refers to them as 'new urban communities' (Ellahham, 2014).

Most countries have a hierarchical system of cities classified by population size. Secondary cities tend to be classified as having a range in population between 100,000 and 1 million. However, secondary cities are not defined exclusively by population size: function and economic status are more significant factors in defining their role within national urban systems (Roberts, 2019). Secondary cities play a crucial intermediary role as value-adding hubs in national supply-chain, production, logistics, distributions, and network systems for goods, services, information, and passengers between metropolitan regions and more dispersed and settled rural-regional development areas and smaller urban settlements. Most African countries have 5-10 secondary cities. In Nigeria, Egypt, and South Africa, population size and functions of secondary cities need to be adjusted according to national population size.

1.2 Three Spatial Characteristics of Secondary Cities

There are three broad spatial characteristics associated with the development of secondary cities (Figure 1.1): regional, metropolitan cluster and corridor.

FIGURE 1.1 | Spatial Typologies of Secondary Cities



Source: Roberts (2014).

Regional: These are states or provincial centres of local secondary-level government or a new national capital city, such as Dodoma in Tanzania. These may focus on large industrial manufacturing, agriculture, or mineral extraction or processing, or be port-based economic-based cities. Others are major transportation, tourism, religious, education, or military-based centres. All play a crucial role in supporting well-functioning national economies and systems of cities. Regional secondary cities are often the hub of a network of smaller intermediate cities and towns. Examples of secondary-city regional hubs include Takoradi in Ghana, Bulawayo in Zimbabwe, and Gqeberha (formerly Port Elizabeth) in South Africa.

Metropolitan cluster: These are peripheral cities that cluster around a large urban agglomeration. Most are fast-growing interdependent new industrial or satellite cities, growth poles, or rapidly expanding towns within a 100-km radius of large metropolitan regions or fast-growing regional secondary cities. Examples of this include Sagamu outside Lagos, Nigeria, and Kisumu in Kenya. On a smaller scale, some regional hub secondary cities have smaller clusters of satellite towns.

Corridor: These are a series of small towns and cities that have merged – or are emerging – that function as a linear urban agglomeration corridor along a highway, river, or coastline. These corridors include examples like Ceuta (the autonomous Spanish city) to Tetouan in Morocco, Freetown to Jamestown in Sierra Leone, and Bugembe-Jinja-Njeru in Uganda.

1.3 Growing Interest in African Secondary Cities

Secondary cities in Africa play a significant role in developing national economies, but they remain a neglected area of research and policy development, especially in improving governance, logistics, infrastructure, and job creation, and attracting investment. Most secondary cities lag well behind the development of larger metropolitan cities in the region. Catching up will be a significant challenge and will require a substantial shift in policies to avoid situations where one or two cities dominate an entire nation's economy.

A growing library of reports documents the development of secondary cities in Africa. The first studies, conducted in the 1970s and 1980s, focused on these cities as extensions of the agriculture sector. Initially, the primary function was to act as secondary logistics and production hubs to support the flow of products and materials to larger cities and overseas markets. From the early 1990s until recently, except for some UN-Habitat studies, interest in secondary city development waned. In the mid-2000s, interest in secondary cities' development was renewed by international agencies and researchers.

The literature shows that challenges facing the development of secondary cities are also growing. The issues of weak urban governance, and the need for improved planning and urban management, basic infrastructure, environmental, health, education, and social development have been covered in this book.

Secondary, intermediate, and middle-sized cities are not well recognised in urban policy development in Africa. A few countries like Ghana, Morocco, Rwanda, Senegal, and Uganda (Thompson, 2021) have developed policies to support secondary city development as part of national urbanisation policies. But in South Africa, where there is a well-developed system of secondary cities, bringing them into the focus of debate and discussion is still a challenge (Brand, 2021).

1.4 Outline of the Book

African secondary cities are home to around 15% of Africa's population. They perform essential functions as intermediary hubs and centres of production, governance, services, and logistics; however, many do not function effectively. Some have become dysfunctional and have areas of civil unrest. Government problems associated with corruption, poor staffing, and environmental and social issues are common with rapid, unplanned urban growth. Connectivity, especially transport and communications systems between secondary cities, is inadequate.

While COVID-19 has added to the problems of secondary cities in the region, these problems are not peculiar to secondary cities but are a global problem.

Despite poor planning and management, secondary cities in Africa are dynamic places. Government and international development agencies are beginning to recognise their importance. As a result, secondary cities are garnering growing policy interest from governments and international development agencies like the World Bank and UN-Habitat (Roberts, 2019; UNICEF & UN-Habitat, 2020). However, a policy paradigm shift is needed to recognise their potential and key role as the future frontiers of sustainable social, economic, and spatial growth and development in the national systems of cities in Africa (WEF, 2019).

The Cities Alliance has been researching for a decade on secondary cities (Roberts 2014; Roberts 2019). It has produced a series of knowledge products published in multiple languages on the management and connectivity within systems of secondary cities. Given the many urbanisation challenges facing African cities, Cities Alliance commissioned this book, and the African Development Bank has joined for its publication and dissemination. The underlying rationale for the book is to investigate how national urban and regional economic and spatial urban development policy and international development assistance could help national and local governments in Africa to support the sustainable development of secondary cities.

The book also explores the opportunities for urban and regional development policy changes that would enable secondary cities to play a more significant role in national, regional, and local area development. Finally, it identifies the possible role that central and local governments, institutions, businesses, international development agencies, and civil society interest groups can play in creating new opportunities for developing secondary cities across the continent.

This book seeks to extend previous research and policy development work on systems of secondary cities in Africa. It sets out to explore reasons why secondary cities have struggled to develop, attract investment, and manage urban growth. It uses literature and case studies to gather data and information and explain some of the underlying dynamics and challenges facing the development of secondary cities. Case studies are included from Anglophone, Francophone, Lusophone, and Arabic-speaking countries in Africa. This is important because of the historical differences in the former colonies' legal and planning systems.

The book comprises 16 chapters and is divided into three sections. The first section includes six chapters that set the context and analyse the historical and current situation concerning development patterns, challenges, policies, population, economics, and financing of African secondary cities. This introductory chapter outlines the context, rationale, scope, and structure of the book. Chapter 2 examines urbanisation trends and patterns over recent decades. Chapter 3 explores challenges facing the development and management of secondary cities. Chapter 4 presents a historical perspective on urbanisation policy and the development of secondary cities. Chapter 5 addresses population growth and migration factors shaping the demographic makeup of African secondary cities. Chapter 6 examines issues facing the financial operations, investment, and economic development of secondary cities.



Section 2 (Chapters 7.15) contain case studies of eight secondary cities, each in a different country:

- Cape Coast in Ghana (Chapter 7)
- Dire-Dawa in Ethiopia (Chapter 8)
- Gabès in Tunisia (Chapter 9)
- Huambo in Angola (Chapter 10)
- Ibadan in Nigeria (Chapter 11)
- Mombasa in Kenya (Chapter 12)
- Gqeberha in South Africa (Chapter 13)
- Touba-Mbacké in Senegal (Chapter 14)

The case studies were selected to provide both the national context as well as more detailed insights into development issues, opportunities and information availability at the level of a secondary city in each country. The authors of the case study chapters either live or have long work experience in the selected countries. Each chapter presents a national and local perspective of the economic geography, trends, policies, issues, and challenges affecting national systems of secondary city development . The secondary city case studies are structured to review and summarise the history of urbanisation and municipal government arrangements in the country of study. They include brief descriptions of the administrative arrangements, powers, and responsibilities between levels of government and the laws/constitutional arrangements.

Chapter 15 brings together the findings from the country and city case studies and to offers some strategic directions for governments, businesses, and international development assistance agencies to improve the development and management of secondary cities. In the final section of the book, Chapter 16 outlines opportunities to support the development of secondary cities and argues the need for a new-age urban agenda for secondary cities. It presents a framework with initiatives based on a systems approach that African countries could apply to support the development of secondary cities, including their recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic. It addresses how secondary cities might respond to the trend towards the decoupling of economies and a focus on economic sovereignty.[2] These two issues will pose significant challenges to the development of African secondary cities in the immediate future.

1.5 Data Issues

Data and information on African cities are generally poor — which has made studies about secondary cities difficult. Information on metropolitan region cities is improving, but it remains poor for smaller urban centres below 500,000 in population. Outside the metropolises, data on urban areas is not often broken down in sufficient detail to separate rural from urban areas. Many administrative areas for towns and cities include large rural populations. This creates difficulties in a book spanning eight diverse African countries when comparing population densities and other types of ratio-analysis related to urban land area.

Part of the problem related to the above is the definition of 'urban areas'. National census organisations use more than 25 definitions of 'urban' in African countries (United Nations, 2005). The United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA) does not have a standard definition for urban areas, but uses definitions applied according to national statistical offices, census, and administrative boundaries. It also uses various methods to interpolate data to estimate urban population size when census data is unavailable (Moreno, 2017). Other organisations like the OECD use different definitions (Dijkstra et al., 2019; USCB, USAID & UNFPA, 2020).

The book uses UN DESA, OECD and other sources of data. However, the lack of a uniform definition of urban areas or agglomerations presents significant problems in analysing data from different sources and making spatial demographic comparisons between countries (OECD/SWAC, 2020). These problems are exacerbated at an aggregate level by a lack of consistency in countries included in geographic regions for data collected by various international agencies. The research for this book has highlighted the need for consistent definitions and classifications of urban and geographic areas to improve future analysis and reporting on urbanisation and development in Africa.

REFERENCES

Arup. (2016). *Future Proofing Cities: Uganda-Secondary Cities*. Arup and Cities Alliance.

Brand, A. (2021). Differentiated outlook to portray secondary cities in South Africa. *AIMS Geosciences*, 7, 457-477. https://doi.org/10.3934/geosci.2021026

DCP-Kenya-Diaspora Community Projects – Kenya. (2019). *Development Corridors in Kenya: A Scoping Study*. https://developmentcorridors.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/Development-Corridors-in-Kenya_Scoping-Report-2019.pdf

Dijkstra, L., Poelman, H., & Veneri, P. (2019). *The EU-OECD definition of a functional urban area.* OECD Regional Development Working Papers 2019/11. https://doi.org/10.1787/d58cb34d-en

Ellahham, N. (2014). Towards Creating New Sustainable Cities in Egypt- Critical Perspective for Planning New Cities. World SB 14 Barcelona, October 28th/30th, 2014.

Jacques, S. (2020). Basic Principles of Economic Sovereignty and the Question of the Forms of Its Exercise. *Studies on Russian Economic Development*, 31(2), 129-135.

Kenawy, A. (2017). Encouragement of settlement and population attraction in the new towns – Egypt. *International Journal of Architecture and Urban Development* 7(No. 3, Summer): 17–24 http://dx.doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.2.36339.27689. https://ijaud.srbiau.ac.ir/article_11520_9d3a09478e3c220c63a60815a5f5b99a.pdf

Muawwad, M. A. S., & Hassan, I. (2015). New urban communities in Egypt (Policies & Useful Lessons). https://www.researchgate.net/publication/281555340_New_Urban_Communities_In_Egypt

Moreno, E. L. (2017). *Concepts, definitions and data sources for the study of urbanisation : the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.* UN Expert Group Meeting on Sustainable Cities, Human Mobility and International Migration UN-Habitat. New York. https://www.un.org/development/desa/pd/sites/www.un.org.development.desa.pd/files/unpd_egm_201709_s2_paper-moreno-final.pdf

Moriconi-Ebrard, F., Heinrigs, P., & Tremoloeres, M., eds. (2020). *Africa's Urbanisation Dynamics* 2020: Africapolis, Mapping a New Urban Geography. OECD, Sahel and West Africa Club, Paris.

OECD/PSI-Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development/Public Sector Information. (2020). Ethiopian intermediate cities and their roles for rural development. In: *Rural Development Strategy Review of Ethiopia: Reaping the Benefits of Urbanisation.* OECD Development Pathways, OECD Publishing, Paris.

OECD/SWAC-Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Library/Sahel West Africa Club. (2020). *Africa's Urbanisation Dynamics 2020: Africapolis, Mapping a New Urban Geography.* West African Studies, OECD Publishing, Paris. https://doi.org/10.1787/b6bccb81-en

Otiso, K. M. (2005). Kenya's secondary cities growth strategy at a crossroads: which way forward? *GeoJournal* 62, 117-128.

https://doi.org/10.1007/s10708-005-8180-z

Roberts, B. H. (2014). *Managing Systems of Secondary Cities: Policy Responses in International Development.* Cities Alliance/UNOPS, Brussels.

Roberts, Brian H, and Rene Hohmann. *"Secondary Cities: Managing Urban Land Governance Systems."* World Bank Conference on Land and Poverty 2014: Integrating Land Governance into the Post 2015 Agenda: Harnessing Synergies for Implementation and Monitoring Impact, World Bank, 2014.

Roberts, B. H. (2019). *Connecting Systems of Secondary Cities.* Cities Alliance, Brussels. https://www.citiesalliance.org/newsroom/news/cities-alliance-news/introducing-connecting-systems-secondary-cities

Satterthwaite, D., Huq, S., Pelling, M., Reid, H., & Romero, P. (2007). *Adapting to climate change in urban areas : the possibilities and constraints in low and middle-income nations.* International Institute for Environment Working Paper. International Institute for Environment, London. 107.

South African Cities Network. (2012). *Secondary cities in South Africa: The start of a conversation.* Background report. March 2012.

Thompson, N. M. (2021). *National Enablers for Infrastructure: Investment and Economic Development In Secondary Cities in Ghana And Uganda.* Cities Alliance. https://www.citiesalliance.org/themes/secondary-cities

UNICEF & UN-Habitat-United Nations Children's Fund & United Nations Human Settlement Program. (2020). *Analysis of Multiple Deprivations in Secondary Cities in Sub-Saharan Africa.* UNICEF, UN-Habitat, Nairobi. https://www.unicef.org/esa/reports/

ENDNOTES

(1) For definition of secondary cities, see Roberts (2014).

(2) The term economic sovereignty refers to the power of national governments to make decisions independently of those made by other governments (Jacques, 2020).

2

STATE OF AFRICAN SECONDARY CITIES

BRIAN H ROBERTS AND
GODFREY O ANYUMBA

PHOTO 2.1
Stone Town, Zanzibar

Africa is the least urbanised but fastest urbanising continent on Earth. Many studies have examined trends, patterns and impacts of urbanisation and the urban development process (UN-Habitat, 2010a; World Bank, 2010; Saghir & Santoro, 2018; UNICEF & UN-Habitat, 2020), leading to a growing body of knowledge about African cities (OECD/SWAC, 2020). In recent years, information and data on larger African cities have improved due to improved census, surveys, studies, and satellite imagery (SWAC, 2020); however, information and data on secondary cities remain poor. Primary data on economic development, employment, poverty, public administration and finance, energy and water use in secondary cities is often unavailable, outdated in most countries, or is not in a digital format. More detailed data and information are needed on secondary and smaller medium-sized cities in Africa to understand trends, the role and importance of these cities in supporting sustainable national and local development, and how governments, businesses, institutions, and communities can support this development.

African secondary cities have been a neglected area of research and policy development, despite being home to approximately 15% of the continent's overall population and 28% of the urban population. However, recent studies (Zimmer et al., 2020; UNICEF & UN-Habitat, 2020b; World Economic Forum, 2019; Haysom & Fusieni, 2019) are beginning to highlight their growing importance in supporting the development of national and subnational economies. While secondary cities in Africa face many challenges of urbanisation and development, there is a vibrancy and sense of local entrepreneurship and optimism that thrive in these cities and smaller regional towns, which provide hope and can be harnessed to create jobs, improve living conditions and incomes.

African cities have shown they are good at self-organising and mobilising community efforts to improve living conditions and the built and natural environments, as well as managing development — provided local government and business are given the resources and freedoms to do so. Local governments are key to developing resilient, robust, and dynamic secondary cities.

This chapter presents an overview of the state of development of African secondary cities. It covers regional urbanisation and spatial trends, development patterns, urban developments, sustainability, and prospects for African and secondary cities.

2.1 Growth of African Cities

Table 2.1 shows the number of cities by population threshold size for Africa and the five sub-regions from 1990 projected to 2035. Currently, there are an estimated 1,765 cities in Africa with a population of more than 50,000. Around 143 of these have populations of more than 500,000 people, based on UN DESA estimates, and this number is expected to increase to 245 by 2035. The most significant growth in the number of cities is expected in western Africa, a region with growth rates of 2.6% in population and 4.1% in urbanisation. Most of this growth will occur in cities of between 500,000 and 1 million people. Cities with populations between 300,000 and 1 million are expected to absorb the most urban population growth in eastern Africa.

TABLE 2.1 | Number of cities classified by size class of urban settlement, 1990-2035

Africa	1990	2000	2010	2015	2020	2030	2035
10 million or more		1	2	3	3	5	5
5 to 10 million	1	2	2	3	6	13	19
1 to 5 million	24	37	42	51	59	81	93
500,000 to 1 million	29	35	56	60	75	111	128
300,000 to 500,000	43	48	65	90	92	117	121
100,000 to 300,000*	171	255	351	485	715		
50,000 to 100,000*	290	454	636	782	815		
Total	558	832	1 154	1 474	1 765		
			Eastern Africa				
10 million or more	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
5 to 10 million	0	0	0	1	1	4	5
1 to 5 million	5	9	9	10	14	17	17
500,000 to 1 million	5	3	11	14	13	30	40
300,000 to 500,000	8	13	10	18	21	35	38
100,000 to 300,000*	25	37	60	107	157		
50,000 to 100,000*	35	81	128	162	182		
Total	78	143	218	312	388		
			Middle Africa				
10 million or more	0	0	0	1	1	2	2
5 to 10 million	0	1	2	1	1	2	2
1 to 5 million	2	6	5	9	10	16	22
500,000 to 1 million	5	5	9	8	16	17	15
300,000 to 500,000	8	6	13	19	13	12	14
100,000 to 300,000*	18	36	39	53	82		
50,000 to 100,000*	32	36	60	87	95		
Total							

Africa	1990	2000	2010	2015	2020	2030	2035
Northern Africa							
10 million or more	0	1	1	1	1	1	1
5 to 10 million	1	0	0	1	2	2	2
1 to 5 million	6	7	8	7	8	12	12
500,000 to 1 million	4	7	10	13	14	17	21
300,000 to 500,000	13	14	18	21	21	224	25
100,000 to 300,000*	46	76	109	136	205		
50,000 to 100,000*	104	140	189	210	208		
Total							
Southern Africa							
10 million or more	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
5 to 10 million	0	0	0	0	1	2	2
1 to 5 million	4	5	6	6	5	5	6
500,000 to 1 million	3	5	4	5	7	9	8
300,000 to 500,000	3	2	3	5	3	5	5
100,000 to 300,000*	15	23	36	42	48		
50,000 to 100,000*	26	54	57	61	71		
Total	7	10	14	19	22		
Western Africa							
10 million or more	0	0	1	1	1	1	1
5 to 10 million	0	1	0	0	1	3	8
1 to 5 million	7	10	14	19	22	31	36
500,000 to 1 million	12	15	22	20	25	38	44
300,000 to 500,000	11	13	21	27	34	41	39
100,000 to 300,000*	54	71	90	126	191		
50,000 to 100,000*	82	120	170	210	202		
Total	166	230	318	403	476		

Source: UN DESA (2020) *Africapolis (2020).

2.2 Spatial Nature of African Cities

The geographic primacy and dispersion of African cities vary significantly between countries and regions. Figure 2.1 shows a snapshot of the spatial pattern of urbanisation in Africa. Table 2.2 shows the high level of primacy for systems of cities in Africa. In 41 out of 51 countries, more than 15% of the urban population lives in the largest city. In 27 countries, it is more than 30%, while in Togo and Djibouti, more than half of the urban population lives in the country's largest city.

In 13 countries, more than 20% of the total population lives in the largest cities. Middle African countries such as Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, São Tomé, and Príncipe, have more than 20% of their total population living in the largest city. The same occurs in northern African countries of Egypt, Tunisia, Western Sahara. Some countries, such as Ghana and South Africa, have a duopoly structure of primacy. In Ghana, close to 30% of the urban population lives in Accra and Kumasi metropolitan regions.

FIGURE 2.1 | Snapshot of the spatial pattern of urbanisation in Africa



Source: Mapbox Africapolis Database.

Figure 2.2 shows a Zipf's graph of population size and ranking log for the 10 largest cities in 9 African countries (Angola, Ethiopia, Egypt, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa and Tunisia). A well-developed hierarchical system of cities plots typically as a straight line. The graph shows uniformity in the hierarchical structure of the systems of cities; however, in Angola, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya and Senegal, there is a relatively sharp drop off from the largest to the next levels of secondary cities. This indicates a distorted structure in the system of cities and the dominance or primacy of the country's largest city. In Nigeria and South Africa, the drop off is much smoother, due to a more dispersed geographic distribution of urban agglomerations by population, according to city size.

FIGURE 2.2 | Zipf's Law population size ranking of 10 largest cities for eight African countries



Source: (UN DESA 2019).

TABLE 2.2 | Number of cities classified by size class of urban settlement, 1990-2035

Region	Country	Urban (000)	Level of Urban %	Largest City	Largest City (000)	Primacy %	Total Population 2020 (000)	% of Total Population
Eastern	Burundi	1,637	13.0	Bujumbura	332	20.3	11,216	3.0%
	Djibouti	781	77.8	Djibouti	624	79.9	971	64.2
	Eritrea	2,246	40.1	Libreville	834	37.1	5,188	16.1
	Ethiopia	24,463	20.8	Addis Ababa	2,758	11.3	107,535	2.6
	Kenya	14,975	27.0	Nairobi	4,735	31.6	50,951	9.3
	Malawi	3,535	16.9		932	26.4	19,165	4.9
	Mozambique	11,978	36.0	Maputo	1,706	14.2	30,529	5.6
	Rwanda	2,281	17.2	Kigali	745	32.7	12,501	6.0
	Somalia	7,431	45.0	Mogadishu	2,587	34.8	15,182	17.0
	South Sudan	2,749	19.6	Juba	450	16.4	12,919	3.5
	Uganda	11,775	23.8	Kampala	3,298	28.0	44,271	7.5
	Tanzania	22,113	33.8	Dar es Salaam	6,702	30.3	59,091	11.3
	Zambia	8,336	43.5	Lusaka	2,774	33.3	17,609	15.8
	Zimbabwe	5,7	32.2	Harare	1,53	26.8	16,913	9.0
Middle	Angola	21,937	65.5	Luanda	8,33	38.0	30,774	27.1
	Cameroon	14,942	56.4	Douala	1,338	9.0	24,678	5.4
	Central African Republic	2,077	41.4	Bangui	889	42.8	4,737	18.8
	Chad	3,83	23.1	N'Djaména	1,423	37.1	15,353	9.3
	Congo	3,857	66.9	Brazzaville	1,285	33.3	5,400	23.8
	Democratic Republic of the Congo	40,848	44.5	Kinshasa	7,786	19.1	84,005	9.3

Region	Country	Urban (000)	Level of Urban %	Largest City	Largest City (000)	Primacy %	Total Population 2020 (000)	% of Total Population
	Equatorial Guinea	1,028	72.1	Bata	415	40.4	1,314	31.6
	Gabon	1,938	89.4	Libreville	578	29.8	2,068	28.0
	Sao Tome and Principe	162	72.8	Sao Tome	53	32.9	209	25.5
Northern	Algeria	31,951	72.6	Algiers	2,768	8.7	42,008	6.6
	Egypt	44,041	42.7	Al-Qahirah (Cairo)	20,901	47.5	99,376	21.0
	Libya	5,376	80.1	Tripoli	1,151	21.4	6,471	17.8
	Morocco	23,552	62.5	Casablanca	3,145	13.4	36,192	8.7
	Sudan	15,349	34.6	Khartoum	5,829	38.0	41,512	14.0
	Tunisia	8,281	68.9	Tunis	2,365	28.6	11,659	20.3
	Western Sahara	519	86.7	Laayoune	196	37.9	567	34.6
Southern	Botswana	1,712	69.4	Gaborone	208	12.2	2,333	8.9
	Lesotho	674	28.2	Maseru	118	17.6	2,263	5.2
	Namibia	1,403	50.0	Windhoek	268	19.1	2,588	10.4
	South Africa	39,551	66.4	Johannesburg	5,783	14.6	57,398	10.1
	Eswatini	348	23.8	Manzini	111	31.8	1,391	7.9
Western	Benin	5,869	47.3	Cotonou	80	13.3	11,486	6.8
	Burkina Faso	6,398	29.4	Ouagadougou	1,087	17.0	19,752	5.5
	Cabo Verde	378	65.7	Praia	113	30.0	553	20.5
	Côte d'Ivoire	13,532	50.8	Abidjan	3,677	27.2	24,906	14.8
	The Gambia	1,435	61.3	Banjul	451	31.4	2,164	20.8
	Ghana	17,626	56.1	Accra	2,514	14.3	29,464	8.5
	Guinea	5,071	36.1	Conakry	1,938	38.2	13,053	14.8
	Guinea-Bissau	884	43.4	Bissau	83	43.9	1,907	20.3
	Liberia	2,659	51.2	Monrovia	940	35.3	4,854	19.4
	Mali	8,907	42.4	Bamako	2,618	29.4	19,108	13.7
	Mauritania	2,647	53.7	Nouakchott	661	25.0	4,54	14.6
	Niger	4,003	16.4	Niamey	1,292	32.3	22,311	5.8
	Nigeria	107,113	50.3	Lagos	14,368	13.4	195,875	7.3
	Senegal	8,277	47.2	Dakar	3,14	37.9	16,294	19.3
	Sierra Leone	3,454	42.1	Freetown	1,202	34.8	7,72	15.6
	Togo	3,332	41.7	Lomé	1,828	54.9	7,991	22.9
Cites > 15% of Urban Pop = 41	Cities > 30% Urban Pop = 25			Cities > 50% of Urban Pop = 2	>20 % National Population = 13			

Source: UN DESA (2020).

The geographic pattern of urban settlements is becoming more concentrated in parts of some western and northern African countries. This is a product of climate and geographic constraints. Primacy is growing at the expense of secondary cities, especially in Egypt, Nigeria, Kenya, Uganda and Angola. These shifts will significantly impact population distribution and economic activities in these and other African countries in the future.

2.2.1 Networked Systems of Cities

All cities form part of a network or an interconnected system and sub-system of cities within countries or across regions. Cities grow and develop as the result of trade between them; the rate at which populations grow naturally or through migration; the levels of investment in government services, business and infrastructure becoming more efficient in producing goods and services; and the extent to which hinterlands become more developed, productive, and accessible. These require a well-developed, organised network or system of communications, trade, investment, and the freedom of population movement between towns and cities.

FIGURE 2.3 | Development of urban network systems of cities



Random Network
- Nearly always homogenous.
- Most nodes have approximately the same number of links and flows between hubs and nodes.
- Lowly urbanized countries, Ethiopia.

Regular Network
- Mostly homogeneous.
- Links and separation of hubs and nodes tends to be uniform.
- More densely populated countries.
- India, Brazil, and Nigeria.

Hierarchical Networks
- Tend to mostly homogeneous, but some can be more heterogeneous.
- Hubs and nodes not uniform and function mainly through a primate city.
- Feature of many African, South American and some Asian countries.

Scale Free Networks
- Not homogeneous.
- Two or three strong links within systems of secondary cities.
- Numerous but varying strength of links to smaller nodes.
- North American, Europe and China.

Historical → Future

Source: Author.

There are evolutionary and sometimes cyclical stages in developing networks and systems of cities (Figure 2.3). Countries and regions transit through these development phases as they become more urbanised, industrialised and internationalised. Transition is driven through the development of trade, communications, industry, services and investment. In times of crisis, war, disaster, civil unrest or unpredictable political change, networked systems of cities can revert to a lower development stage, especially if nations are forced to become more self-sufficient. This reversion is occurring because of the COVID-19 crisis in some parts of the world.

African cities have undergone significant changes in network development over the centuries. Historically, smaller cities and towns in different geographic regions formed patterns of networks that were linked and defined mainly by tribal or empire boundaries. City size was determined, primarily, by the productivity and population-carrying capacity of hinterland food and resource production. Precolonial cities were relatively uniform and homogeneous in size and spatial distancing. Most were engaged in localised trade, but some engaged in limited coastal and river trade. The spread and development of broader trade across the northern and later the sub-Saharan regions of Africa led to a more regular system of cities developing in locations where soils, climate and resources were favourable (Coquery-Vidrovitch, 2016). What emerged in Africa was a system of city-states, many of which formed parts of ancient empires. Not all were homogenous in terms of regular connections to smaller urban settlements. Some, like Carthage and Alexandria, became engaged in long-distance trade.

Arab and European colonial settlements led to the development of more regular networks of cities across the continent. Extensive trading began to occur across sub-Saharan Africa. Several large cities such as Ouagadougou (Burkina Faso) and Sokoto (Nigeria) grew prominent and influential in the nineteenth century, with large metropolitan regions at the time having populations around 100,000 (Kusimba et al., 2006). A well-developed, regular networked system of cities was important to colonial expansion. As a result, many secondary provincial cities have well-developed infrastructure, local governments, and services supporting agriculture or mining hinterland economies. This led to the building of railways in many parts of the continent. Many remain crucial to the export of raw materials and minerals from the continent.

By the end of the colonial era, a more hierarchical networked system of cities had emerged across the continent. Local governments and administrative territories were well developed, many with good basic infrastructure. In the post-colonial era, subnational local governments' power and responsibilities became weakened, often due to military coups. Policies aimed at nationalism and self-reliance gave way to foreign direct investment (FDI), industrialisation, and economic development focused on food, cash crops and minerals exports. This narrowed the base of local government economies and reinforced a strongly hierarchical and metropolitan-centric networked system of cities in Africa. The African systems of cities are increasingly hierarchical and metropolitan focused in politics, economic, social, and physical development.

By the end of the colonial era, a more hierarchical networked system of cities had emerged across the continent.

The development of a hierarchical system of cities and a focus on exogenous (export-driven) growth models of national economic development has led to little or no investment in city-to-city sub-networks of road, air and rail connecting cities and towns within countries. Competition between cities has given way to more structured hierarchical systems of regional feeder roads supporting metropolitan regions or metropolises. Many of these cities have become major river or coastal ports cities, such as Kinshasa (the Democratic Republic of the Congo), Lagos (Nigeria), Luanda (Angola), and Dar es Salaam (Tanzania). Others such as Addis Ababa (Ethiopia), Harare (Zimbabwe), Nairobi (Kenya), Ouagadougou (Burkina Faso) are now large metropolitan inland cities. As a result, secondary cities that are not significant transport hubs or border gateway cities, such as Mombasa (Kenya) or Lomé (Togo), have become locked into, or are increasingly dependent upon, a hierarchical metropolitan-region networked system of cities. Many are losing significant development, trade, and investment opportunities.

Consequently, many secondary cities have little political or economic choice but to focus on conducting national subsidiary public-administration functions, acting as distribution and logistics centres for goods and services supplied by metropolitan regions, and as exporters of mainly agriculture commodities and natural resources. Many have neither the capacity, the critical mass of skills and resources, nor the know-how to look for opportunities to develop trade and competition between themselves. Many, especially in Kenya, Ghana, South Africa, and Nigeria, have missed out on development opportunities because of how the systems of cities across the continent have become configured towards a dominant hierarchy. Reconfiguring the systems of cities to more regular or scale-free systems of cities will become extremely difficult and take a long time to achieve.

The more recent phenomenon of the hierarchical networked system of cities has occurred along development corridors, for example, in western, eastern, and north-western Africa (see section 2.2.6, Emerging Spatial Patterns of Urban Development).

In Morocco, and to a lesser extent Algeria, Egypt and Tunisia, a new form of a scale-free network of cities is beginning to develop, driven mainly by more dispersed FDI in manufacturing and tourism. Firms in Casablanca, secondary and other smaller cities are becoming more integrated into global (especially European) value-adding industry supply chains and industry clusters (Amraoui et al., 2019). This integration of supply chains and clusters has led to collaborative partnerships between firms in the larger cities, producing and exporting agricultural produce (citrus fruits and market vegetables), semi-processed goods and consumer goods (including textiles) and phosphate products. These emerging scale-free networked systems of production, logistics and trade in value-adding between Morocco cities mimic many emerging European countries.

However, sub-Saharan African cities, except for South Africa, have not reached the stage of developing scale-free networked systems of cities. There is little evidence of inter-regional, solid city links, competitive trading cities and value-adding to production processes within development corridors or regional networks of cities. There is some potential for scale-free network development in Nigeria and Kenya involving clustered city development around Lagos and Nairobi, but this is limited (Musbau, 2019; Splinter and Van Leynseele, 2019).

Sub-Saharan economic development's focus is still very much on exogenous (export) growth and national supply chains servicing a hierarchical network of towns and cities. The trade flow system tends only to support the real growth of metropolitan regions and limited export industries. Secondary cities tend to gain only from the import flow of consumer goods and import services, with little localised value-added manufacturing. This situation is not sustainable and does little to create decent jobs, attract investment, or boost secondary cities' economic development. Sub-Saharan African national economic development policies must move to create a more free-scale networked system of cities and towns with a stronger focus on endogenous growth. Competition, co-production, innovation, trade and investment must be encouraged between cities along transport-orientated economic-development corridors and clustered secondary cities and towns forming a regional network of cities or surrounding large metropolitan regions.

2.2.2 Coastal and Inland Secondary Cities

Africa has 17 land-locked countries within which live 29% of the continent's population. More than 28% of the continent's population live within 100 km of the coastline, many in flood-prone or swampland areas. Table 2.3 estimates the percentage of urban agglomeration, total population, and urban populations living in urban coastal areas. Approximately 6% of all urban settlements in Africa with populations of less than 10,000 are located on coastlines. This figure rises to 29% for cities above 100,000 and 38% for metropolitan regions (OECD/SWAC, 2020). Inland metropolitan and secondary cities appear to be urbanising faster than coastal cities, but this varies across regions.

TABLE 2-3 | Coastal urbanisation of Africa's main regions

Region	Number of coastal agglomerations	Share of coastal agglomerations in total (%)	Coastal urban population (million)	Share of coastal urban population in total (%)	Coastline (km)
Central	15	2	4.7	8	1,998
Eastern	36	2	11.6	10	8,386
Northern	178	10	40.0	28	8,201
Southern	100	10	24.1	29	8,440
Western	96	4	40.7	25	6,065
Total	424	6	121.1	21	33,090

Source: OECD/SWAC Africapolis Database (2018).

Secondary cities located on coasts or large navigable river systems tend to perform better than inland cities with poor road or rail transport services. Border crossings add significantly to landlocked African countries' transaction costs (Arvis et al., 2007). River systems have not played as significant a part in developing African cities as they have in Europe and Asia, except along the lower reaches of the Congo, Niger, Nile, and Zambezi rivers. Road transport continues to be the dominant means of transporting goods and services in supporting the operations and development of national systems of cities. Coastal secondary port cities such as Calabar (Nigeria), Tangiers (Morocco) and Mombasa (DCP Kenya, 2019) have benefited from a long history of trade, which continues, but at a much-reduced scale, as containerisation becomes more centred on metropolitan region coastal ports.

Inland secondary cities in sub-Saharan Africa have much narrower based economies than coastal cities. The growth of these inland cities is being driven by migration from rural areas that have become increasingly prone to drought, desertification, land disputes, and overcrowding, conditions that are pushing more people into secondary cities and towns. These areas often have a large, low-density peri-urban settlement inhabited by residents involved in semi-subsistence farming, which supplements any income they may earn from casual/informal work in the city. Levels of informal sector employment in inland secondary cities tend to be much higher than in coastal cities, although this can vary from country to country.

2.2.3 Cross-Border Secondary (Twin) Cities

An emerging feature of secondary city growth is the growing number of cross-border agglomerations located on borders between two or more countries. More than 635 cross-border cities in Africa (see Figure 2.4) play a significant role in trade and logistics between countries. More than 42 million people live in these agglomerations or almost 8% of the continent's total urban population (Curiel, 2020). Africa has 10 national capitals that are located at a national border: Bangui (the Central African Republic), Brazzaville (the Congo), Bujumbura (Burundi), Gaborone (Botswana), Kinshasa (the Democratic Republic of the Congo), Lomé (Togo), Maseru (Lesotho), Mbabane (Eswatini), N'Djamena (Chad), Porto Novo (Benin). Seven of these are secondary cities, although being the largest cities in each country.

The highest concentrations of border cities are in West Africa, the Great Lakes region and South-Central Africa. More than half of all agglomerations are cross-border in Benin, Gambia, Lesotho, Eswatini, and Togo. Cross-border cities and towns are not a significant feature of North and Northeast Africa.

Many cross-border or twin cities developed as a product of the colonial era road transport network. In most cross-border cities local languages and customs are similar, and there are strong family connections and trading ties. Colonialism created an artificial boundary over tribal areas, preventing people's freedom of movement: foreign language, laws, and constraints on free trade necessitated official border crossing requirements and passes. Closures of borders at night and delays in border crossing created a demand for accommodation and restaurants, laying down the basis of other trade and economic development opportunities in towns on either side of the border.

Cross-border cities located on the transcontinental highways and rail corridors, such as in West Africa and the African Great Lakes region, have benefited from increased trade and passenger movement at a border crossing. Unfortunately, these border crossing points have also provided opportunities for

FIGURE 2.4 | Cross border cities Africa

Source: Africapolis (2018).

illegal contraband goods and people smuggling, due to corruption and rent seeking by corrupt border officials and crime syndicates. Cross-border cities have also witnessed high COVID-19 and HIV/AIDS transmission (Lone & Ahmad, 2020).

African cross-border secondary cities play a crucial role in trade, logistics and tourism; however, many have become chokepoints or constraints to the free and efficient flow of goods and services. Free trade across the border is crucial to the growth and development of secondary cities located on borders. Streamlining of customs and administrative procedures and the introduction of e-passes can help develop strong regional and corridor development for trade, tourism, and investment between secondary cities. The establishment of cross-border special economic free-trade and manufacturing zones will create new job opportunities.

2.2.4 Urban Population Density

There are significant differences in population density between the types and sizes of cities in Africa, and it is not easy to estimate the density. Census data is often not refined enough at the secondary and smaller cities level. Household and income surveys are infrequent. Transient or temporary population levels can be high, as can day visitors to cities from rural areas and smaller towns. Absolute density, therefore, varies not only during seasons but daily. his lack of data makes planning for infrastructure and services in smaller towns and secondary cities difficult.

Table 2.4 shows the population density per square kilometre for African cities and regions derived from Africapolis data. Average densities of cities are around 4,070 persons per km^2, but ranged from 6,265 persons per km^2 in northern Africa to 2,454 in eastern Africa. The two largest cities in Africa, Cairo (Egypt) and Lagos (Nigeria), are denser. There are significant differences in densities between the population threshold levels of cities and regions. However, cities with 1–10 million people have the most significant variations in densities by regions. Secondary cities (0.1–1 million) tend to be denser in population than cities with populations of 1–5 million in most parts of Africa, except southern Africa. Northern African secondary cities have high densities, especially for secondary cities with a population between 300,000 and 500,000. Water, arable land, and climate have a significant impact on settlement pattern in this region of Africa. The density of secondary cities in eastern Africa is significantly higher than in metropolitan regions, a product of rapid rural-urban migration, household size, and poor planning policies associated with regional cities' management.

TABLE 2.4 | Density of population per square kilometre for African cities and regions

Density (pp/km^2)	Africa	Eastern Africa	Middle Africa	Northern Africa	Southern Africa	Western Africa
10 million or more	12,151			12,960		10,839
5–10 million	3,748	2,369	2,287	16,810	4,811	3,146
1–5 million	3,685	1,881	3,911	5,226	4,035	5,136
0.5–1 million	4,053	1,803	6,454	6,646	4,910	5,050
300,000–500,000	4,144	2,571	5,910	8,363	4,229	4,413
100,000–300,000	3,792	2,395	5,823	4,936	3,396	4,811
50,000–100,000	4,130	3,301	5,230	5,192	2,847	4,973
10,000–50,000	4,110	3,721	4,463	5,693	2,259	4,944
Less than 10,000	4,074	2,454	4,183	6,265	3,412	5,009

Source: Estimates derived from Africapolis Data (2015).

Average density, however, presents a misleading picture of the concentration of population in secondary cities. The continent's largest cities are characteristically dense at the inner core but become progressively less dense as the city spreads out and grows. Peri-urban areas feature a significant number of rapidly expanding villages and towns. In metropolitan regions of less than 5 million, the inner core areas have become denser, but there is still a steeper drop off in the density gradient as the city spreads. Over several decades, however, densities have increased away from the core with infilling, but have dropped off rapidly as peripheral development becomes more scattered with in-filling. Few secondary cities have developed dense inner cores; their density gradient curve is much flatter, with the population spreading outwards in a more dispersed manner (Figure 2.5) shows the aggregate pattern of density shift for the development of large (>5 million), medium (1–5 million) and small (<1 million) cities.

FIGURE 2.5 | The distance decline of the urban land density in concentric rings for three aggregated levels of cities in Africa



Source: Tables Replicated from Xu et al. (2019).

Population density has a significant impact on income in African cities. One study found that "there are large household income premiums from being in bigger and particularly denser cities over rural areas in Africa, indicating migration pull forces remain strong. Second, the marginal effects of increases in density on household income are large, with density elasticities close [to] 0.6" (Lall et al., 2017, p. 32). These and other findings (Linard, et al., 2013) show the need for secondary cities to increase the intensity and density of urban development if incomes and productivity are to rise.

2.2.5 Urban Footprints

The total built-up area of land used for African cities is difficult to assess, given the variation in population densities in built-up urban areas (Seto et al., 2011). Estimates derived from Africapolis data of urban agglomerations with populations greater than 10,000 suggest that more than 139,200 km^2 of the continent is urbanised – less than 0.5% of the landmass (see Table 2.5). However, it may be larger than this estimate, given the data and census information gaps.

Little information is known about the rates and amount of land converted to urban use annually in the region. Based on the estimates of one report (Tuholske et al., 2019), the continuation of the current land conversion to urban use would result in the land occupied by cities having 100,000 people or more increasing between 2010 and 2030 by a factor of 2.75. With densities falling (Mboup, 2019; Henderson & Kriticos, 2017), land demand may well exceed this estimate.

Estimates derived from Africapolis data of urban agglomerations with populations greater than 10,000 suggest that more than 139,200 km^2 of the continent is urbanised – less than 0.5% of the landmass.

TABLE 2.5 | Urban land area for African cities and regions (km²), 2015

Urban land area (km²) by region of Africa						
Area (km²)	Africa	Eastern	Middle	Northern	Southern	Western
10 million plus	2,867			1,774		1,093
5–10 million	15,791	9,079	3,179	392	3,179	2,712
1–5 million	36,724	13,751	3,460	5,526	4,345	9,642
0.5–1 million	10,929	4,402	952	1,418	1,495	2,662
300,000–500,000	7,509	3,052	533	764	1,141	2,020
100,000–300,000	21,147	7,518	1,084	4,647	3,575	4,323
50,000–100,000	13,130	3,326	1,037	2,844	2,987	2,935
10,000–50,000	31,107	6,926	3,631	5,570	7,440	5,556
Total	139,205	48,054	13,877	22,935	24,162	32,943

Source: Estimates derived from Africapolis data (2015).

A study of 25 African cities on the rate of land-use conversion and population growth showed:

> "Between 2000-2014, the average annual growth rates of population and built-up area are 4.04% and 5.13%, respectively. Regarding the disparities among different-sized cities, the average annual growth rates of population in small, medium-sized, and large cities are 3.74%, 4.28%, and 4.35%, respectively, during 1990-2014. Correspondingly, the average annual growth rates of the built-up areas in 1990-2014 are 5.41%, 5.28%, and 5.42% in small, medium-sized, and large cities, respectively" (Xu et al., 2019, p.802-810).

Based on these estimates, an additional 120,000 km² of land may be converted from rural to urban in Africa by 2030. More than 30,000 km² is likely to be converted for urban development in secondary cities. Significant work is required to provide better conversion estimates of forest and rural to urban land in Africa, especially at the secondary city level. Currently, the lack of data, technology and expertise makes more reliable estimates of the demand for land and other urban services difficult in most secondary cities. Without a better understanding of conversion rates from rural to urban, it will become challenging for cities to plan for infrastructure and other urban services.

2.2.6 Emerging Spatial Patterns of Urban Development

Land use has become more intensified in the central business districts of Africa's most prominent cities. Premium upmarket housing areas have developed as gated communities around airports and shopping centres in some middle-income housing areas. This spatial intensification has generally not occurred at scale in sub-Saharan primary or secondary cities outside of South Africa (Lall et al., 2017, p. 32). Secondary cities in northern Africa have a denser and tighter urban form and scale than sub-Saharan cities due to climate, water, and cultural factors.

In sub-Saharan Africa, secondary cities are predominantly low-rise, dispersed, and poorly constructed. Some have small, tight, urban-commercial and government business centres, with a mix of congested and conflicting land-use activities around bus and rail stations and central marketplaces. Many have extensive peri-urban settlement areas of low-density urban development, often where inhabitants may be involved in home-based horticulture, animal keeping and trade services/repairs activities to supplement the family income. Despite the low-density housing construction, urban population densities remain high in these peri-urban areas because of high household sizes. In many countries, peri-urban areas comprise two households per house, each having more than six persons. They are home to high numbers of migrants, seasonal workers and transient visitors seeking low rent.

The low-density, dispersed, and poorly constructed dwellings in many African secondary cities nevertheless require essential urban services, which results in infrastructure expenses. The challenge for local governments is how to achieve more significant urban consolidation to reduce unit transaction costs and improve the quality of services delivery. Degradation of soils and loss of vegetation through farming and firewood collection in peri-urban areas surrounding many secondary cities, especially in the Sahel region, has become a significant issue, adding to environmental damage, more intense ambient air temperatures and declining food production. The future impact of climate change in many secondary cities can be significant, not just in arid zones, but also in coastal and recently cleared forested areas.

2.3 A New Economic Geography of Agglomeration

A new geography is emerging in the spatial patterns and development of secondary systems of African cities. A recent OECD report (OECD/SWAC, 2020) noted:

> *"The diverse and multifaceted nature of Africa's contemporary urban transition gives rise to new dynamics, new urban forms and new scales of urban development. In several countries, new settlement and mobility patterns lead to the emergence of large metropolitan regions around metropoles in areas of high urban concentration. This regionalisation of urban dynamics, in some cases across borders (e.g., Greater Ibadan Lagos Accra corridor), displays strong functional integration at scales beyond the agglomeration, while at the same time reinforcing spatial decoupling from the rest of the territory and increasing discontinuities within national urban systems" (p. 16).*

FIGURE 2.6 | Urban agglomeration patterns emerging in West African Corridor

Border
Urban agglomeration (above 300 000 inhabitants)
Urban agglomeration (bellow 300 000 inhabitants)

Sources: OECD/SWAC 2018, Africapolis (database); Geopolis 2018 - Map : François Mariconi E-brard

In densely populated parts of Africa, especially in the West African coastal corridor (see Figure 2.6), Lake Victoria Basin, and the countries of Ethiopia and South Africa, an urban spatial pattern of dispersed agglomeration has emerged in rural areas close to metropolitan regions and large secondary cities. Many secondary and small cities (less than 50,000) have sprung up in these peri-urban-rural areas, becoming catalysts for daily employment or longer distance commuting to large urban centres. The resultant dispersed patterns are an urban agglomeration form of rural-urban, regional, low-density cluster development. These clusters of cities and towns create permanent and part-time formal and informal jobs, mainly in warehousing, trading, repairs, logistics, housing construction, education and training, health, security, transport, and personal services industries. Very few have high value-adding economic activities.

2.4 Economic Density, Growth and Trade

Cities have only recently begun to play a more significant role in the development of sub-Saharan economies. Northern and southern Africa have had the advantages of high levels of urbanisation, agglomeration, and industrialisation. Generally, the links between urbanisation, agglomeration and prosperity appear weak in Africa (Sulemana et al., 2019). As one World Bank report has noted: "Cities in Africa are not delivering agglomeration economies or reaping urban productivity benefits; instead, they suffer from high costs for food, housing, and transport. These high costs – rising from coordination failures, poorly designed policies, weak property rights, and other factors that lower economic density – lock firms into producing non-tradable goods and services" (Linard et al., 2013, p. 32).

Typical African cities share three features that constrain urban development:

- Crowded, not economically dense — investments in infrastructure, industrial and commercial structures have not kept pace with the concentration of people, nor have investments in affordable formal housing; congestion and its costs overwhelm urban concentration benefits.
- Disconnected — cities have developed as collections of small and fragmented neighbourhoods lacking in reliable transportation, which limits workers' job opportunities while preventing firms from reaping scale and agglomeration benefits.
- Costly for households and firms — high nominal wages and transaction costs deter investors and trading partners, especially in regionally and internationally tradable sectors; workers' high food, housing and transport costs increase labour costs to firms and thus reduce expected returns on investment.

2.4.1 Economic Productivity in Cities

TABLE 2.6 | Economic performance data for selected sub-Saharan African cities (2015)

City	Country	GDP/Capita City (US$)	Population (million)	Density (pp/km²)	Area (km²)	Est GDP $bn	$m/Ha	GDP/Capita (US$)	City/ GDP/ capita
Luanda	Angola	6,769	5.30	7,233	733	35.9	49.0	5,657	1.2
Cotonou*	Benin	968	0.68	4,266	159	0.7	4.1	836	1.2
Gaborone	Botswana	13,427	0.25	2,452	102	3.4	32.9	5,616	2.4
Bujumbura	Burundi	430	0.95	3,62	315	0.4	4.2	288	1.5
Kinshasa	Democratic Republic of the Congo	282	9.2	16,924	544	2.6	4.8	253	1.1
Libreville	Gabon	22,746	0.69	4,04	170	15.6	91.9	15,268	1.5
Bamako	Mali	964	0.73	5,571	132	0.7	5.4	593	1.6
Windhoek	Namibia	9,774	0.34	4,01	84	3.3	39.2	8,781	1.1
Niamey	Niger	763	1.03	6,298	316	0.8	5.2	393	1.9
Zaria*	Nigeria	777	0.69	9,002	77	0.5	7.0	1,603	0.5
Bloemfontein*	South Africa	7,896	0.42	2,761	152	3.3	21.8	7,544	1.0
Cape Town	South Africa	10,211	3.80	5,825	652	38.8	59.5	7,544	1.4
Durban	South Africa	8,221	3.05	3,908	780	25.1	32.1	7,544	1.1

City	Country	GDP/Capita City (US$)	Population (million)	Density (pp/km²)	Area (km²)	Est GDP $bn	$m/Ha	GDP/Capita (US$)	City/ GDP/ capita
Gqeberha*	South Africa	7591	1.14	5794	196	8.6	44.0	7,544	1.0
Johannesburg	South Africa	11,608	8.10	3,755	2157	94.0	43.6	7,544	1.5
Pretoria	South Africa	11,925	1.82	1,668	1091	21.7	19.9	7,544	1.6
Bangui	The Central African Republic	671	0.73	9,446	78	0.5	6.3	619	1.1
Banjul	The Gambia	805	0.40	13,681	29	0.3	11.0	494	1.6
Lomé	Togo	860	1.55	4,913	315	1.3	4.2	569	1.5

Source: Godfrey, N. and X. Zhao (2015) * Secondary cities.

Economic data on GDP, investment and productivity for African cities is difficult to obtain and, in many cases, unreliable and outdated. For secondary cities, data is extremely poor and not easily estimated, given the informal sector economy's size. Most secondary cities produce or export little in the way of manufactured goods and services. The exceptions are cities in northern Africa and in the country of South Africa; more heavily populated countries have many service industries supporting systems of secondary cities. While franchising is an important element in advanced economies' business activities, it is not widespread in African cities, apart from the fast-food and fuel industry sectors. Local economies' multiplier effect can be high for secondary cities, which are significant primary exporters of agriculture products, minerals, petroleum, and tourism; however, profits, dividends, royalties, and tax benefits flow to metropolitan regions, overseas, or central governments. Consequently, there is little flow back of these transfers into the local economy in reinvestment, and little value is captured from taxes to build local infrastructure and improve services.

The productivity of African cities is low compared to Asian and Latin American cities (Linard et al., 2013). Data from a report by LSE/Oxford economics (Godfrey & Zhao, 2015) show that GDP per capita for secondary cities correlates closely with national average GDP per capita. A measure of GDP economic density and cities' performance is production or GDP per square kilometre (World Bank, 2009, p. 440). In 2012 nominal prices, GDP per km² was extremely low for African cities (see Table 2.6), compared to Asia, which averaged over $100/km². This position is the product of African cities' low density, low productivity, and low capital investment per capita. The lack of adequate infrastructure and services adds significantly to business transaction costs, especially for inland cities, undermining most African cities' competitiveness.

The increasingly rapid integration of the global information economy will be among the most critical factors shaping urban economies' viability in all countries in the coming decade. Except for a few cities with economies based on natural resources and tourism, African primary and secondary cities are integrated poorly into global economic systems. . As a result, they are struggling to attract investment into the urban sector, with most cities growing primarily from the expansion of government services and consumption. There are very few examples of prosperous cities with expanding export-orientated industries in sub-Saharan Africa. If secondary cities are to grow and develop, there must be a much stronger focus on endogenous growth, particularly in developing small-scale enterprises which could capitalise on regional advantages in natural resources, human capital and communications.

In 2012 nominal prices, GDP per km² was extremely low for African cities, compared to Asia, which averaged over $100/km².

2.4.2 The Concentration of Wealth in Primate Cities

TABLE 2-7 | Nominal wealth of African cities (2017)

City	Country	Percentage of Country's Population	City Wealth (US$ billion)	Country Wealth (US$ billion)	Percentage of Country's Wealth	GDP/ Capita (US$)	Wealth (US$ million/ km²)	US$/ adult	Wealth Adult / Capita (US$)	City Wealth/ Country
Johannesburg	South Africa	17.9	276	761	36.3	6,132	120	44,966	12,9	3.5
Cape Town	South Africa	7.9	155	761	20.4	6,132	237	57,339	12,9	4.4
Cairo	Egypt	27.0	140	330	42.4	2,495	73	8,53	3,168	2.7
Lagos	Nigeria	6.7	108	253	42.7	1,969	91	14,957	4,881	3.1
Durban	South Africa	6.6	55	761	7.2	6,132	67	24,119	12,9	1.9
Nairobi	Kenya	8.9	54	104	51.9	1,568	37	12,176	1,809	6.7
Luanda	Angola	36.6	49	81	60.5	4,096	48	9,404	3,649	2.6
Pretoria	South Africa	4.7	48	761	6.3	6,132	35	29,717	12,9	2.3
Casablanca	Morocco	12.9	42	254	16.5	3,448	76	17,316	11,118	1.6
Accra	Ghana	17.3	38	63	60.3	2,026	30	12,98	4,292	3.0
Abidjan	Cote d'ivoire	21.0	27	46	58.7	3,76	64	9,239	3,352	2.8
Alexandria	Egypt	5.1	25	330	7.6	2,495	74	8,061	3,168	2.5
Dar Es Salaam	Tanzania	12.4	25	60	41.7	1,005	21	7,698	3,069	2.5
Abuja	Nigeria	1.1	13	253	5.1	1,969	24	9,443	4,881	1.9
Windhoek*	Namibia	15.5	13	21	61.9	5,646	140	55,199	16,101	3.4
Addis Ababa	Ethiopia	3.7	13	60	21.7	768	22.4	5,39	3,085	1.7
Tangier	Morocco	3.1	11	254	4.3	3,448	90	14,337	11,118	1.3
Kampala	Uganda	9.9	11	16	68.8	632	16	7,088	1,603	4.4
Marrakesh	Morocco	3.1	11	254	4.3	3,448	85	18,566	11,118	1.7
Maputo	Mozambique	5.8	10	21	47.6	461	11	6,388	880	7.3
Lusaka	Zambia	15.9	10	20	50.0	1,535	15	6,856	1,064	6.4
Gaborone*	Botswana	17.5	9	12	75.0	7,893	53	33,925	8,917	3.8
Mombasa*	Kenya	2.9	8	104	7.7	1,568	47	8,43	1,809	4.7

Sources: Adapted from New World Wealth, AfrAsia Bank (2018); * denotes secondary cities.

Significant differences and disparities are witnessed in the concentration of public and private wealth and wealth per capita in African cities. Credit Suisse (2017, p. 165), a global financial services firm, conducts regular national wealth surveys that include some larger cities' wealth. A report on the wealth of African cities (AfrAsia Bank, 2018) compiled from Credit Suisse data estimates the wealth for 23 African cities at US$1.15 trillion, based on a set of measures related to cash and fixed deposits, income, commodities, real estate, interests, etc. Table 2.7 gives a breakdown of city wealth, wealth per adult, and wealth per km². More than half of the total wealth of these 23 cities is tied up in Johannesburg, Cape Town, Cairo, and Lagos. These metropolitan regions are financial cities, with significant investments in commercial, industry and government assets.

There is significant variation in the city and national wealth levels per capita, with a mean difference of 2.8 for the cities measured in Table 2.7. Maputo and Nairobi have the highest inequity levels between city and national wealth per capita. Generally, the higher the level of inequity between city wealth and national wealth, the higher the Gini coefficients in poverty within national systems of cities. The wealthier cities attract and control a disproportionate share of a country's wealth and capital to the detriment of the development of secondary, middle, and smaller cities.

Should these and other metropolitan regions in Africa be affected by significant disaster, civil unrest, crime and climate change in the long term, the impacts on national economies could be significant.

A more progressive and dispersed but clustered approach to public and private investment in hard and soft infrastructure, commerce, education, health and endogenous industry in secondary and smaller regional cities is needed to avoid national wealth concentrations in metropolitan regions. Government should aim to enhance and build strong national systems of cities to achieve greater dispersion of wealth through African countries. This would lift the overall economic performance of the national system of cities and reduce risk exposure to metropolitan regions.

2.4.3 Foreign Direct Investment

The 2018 UN-Habitat State of African Cities Report included an extensive investigation into African cities' FDI (Wall et al., 2018, p. 127). Africa's total world FDI share is small, at roughly 5%, given its approximate 15% global population share. In recent years, Chinese firms' significant increase in FDI has helped establish and complete industrial chains in Africa, mainly in minerals, transport and energy.

Foreign direct investment to Africa for 2003–2016 totalled US$605.2 billion (World Bank Data, 2020). Of this, an estimated US$157.2 billion (26%) was invested in African cities. The sector breakdown of FDI into cities is not readily identifiable. A proportion of this was in public investment in urban infrastructure services. Other investments have supplemented this under national loan programs for urban infrastructure, which have also benefited smaller cities. Private FDI has mainly been directed into commercial and residential real-estate, economic processing zones (EPZ), industrial parks and upmarket accommodation development.

TABLE 2.8 | The FDI ranking of African cities at the African and global scale (2003–2016)

City	Country	Region of Africa	(US$ millions)	Growth (%)	Percentage of Africa	Cum %	US$/capita
Cairo	Egypt	Northern	13,716	-1.25	8.7	8.7	669
Johannesburg	South Africa	Southern	13,211	6.23	8.4	17.1	1,651
Tangier*	Morocco	Northern	10,542	23.84	6.7	23.8	10,04
Lagos	Nigeria	Western	9,213	7.23	5.8	29.6	439
Casablanca	Morocco	Northern	8,37	9.38	5.3	34.9	3,488
Algiers	Algeria	Northern	8,016	-14.74	5.1	40.0	1,002
Cape Town	South Africa	Southern	6,434	0.33	4.1	44.1	1,609
Nairobi	Kenya	Eastern	5,978	25.01	3.8	47.8	1,495
Abidjan	Côte d'Ivoire	Western	5,534	25.44	3.5	51.4	1,203
Dakar	Senegal	Western	4,775	-1.75	3.0	54.4	1,687
Rabat	Morocco	Northern	4,737	-6.54	3.0	57.4	8,056
Marrakech	Morocco	Northern	4,258	-17.2	2.7	60.1	7,217
Accra	Ghana	Western	4,066	34.72	2.6	62.7	1,402
Dar es Salaam	Tanzania	Eastern	3,482	-4.75	2.2	64.9	1,075
Tunis	Tunisia	Northern	3,453	-7.78	2.2	67.1	5,481

City	Country	Region of Africa	(US$ millions)	Growth (%)	Percentage of Africa	Cum %	US$/capita
Tete *	Mozambique	Southern	3,441	-6.23	2.2	69.2	9,831
Luanda	Angola	Southern	3,022	2.06	1.9	71.2	581
Maputo	Mozambique	Southern	2,915	13.86	1.8	73.0	1,869
Djibouti	Djibouti	Eastern	2,899	-3.95	1.8	74.8	4,676
Oran*	Algeria	Northern	2,845	-5.08	1.8	76.6	3,428
Port Elizabeth*	South Africa	Southern	2,827	0.09	1.8	78.4	2,376
Durban *	South Africa	Southern	2,701	7.1	1.7	80.2	1,185
Alexandria	Egypt	Northern	2,553	-4.07	1.6	81.8	824
Addis Ababa	Ethiopia	Eastern	2,512	12.58	1.6	83.4	1,047
Port Harcourt	Nigeria	Western	2,47	-6.55	1.6	84.9	1,328
Kampala	Uganda	Eastern	2,377	8.38	1.5	86.4	925
Kigali	Rwanda	Eastern	2,302	11.21	1.5	87.9	2,677
Abuja	Nigeria	Western	2,294	10.19	1.5	89.3	1,687
Midland	South Africa	Southern	2	-4.93	1.3	90.6	3,333
Khartoum	Sudan	Eastern	1,963	-15.8	1.2	91.9	373
Beira*	Mozambique	Southern	1,886	-5.2	1.2	93.1	3,627
Pretoria	South Africa	Southern	1,615	11.27	1.0	94.1	1,003
Lusaka	Zambia	Southern	1,572	15.43	1.0	95.1	683
Mombasa	Kenya	Eastern	1,386	4.9	0.9	96.0	1,711
Kinshasa	Democratic Republic of the Congo**	Central	1,363	-2.75	0.9	96.8	114
Gaborone *	Botswana	Southern	1,139	-0.01	0.7	97.5	4,556
East London *	South Africa	Southern	1,084	5.66	0.7	98.2	3,097
Port Said	Egypt	Northern	1,022	-7.06	0.6	98.9	1,503
Windhoek *	Namibia	Southern	958	9.11	0.6	99.5	2,521
Harare	Zimbabwe	Southern	415	-0.63	0.3	99.7	277
Walvis Bay*	Namibia	Southern	401	-6.1	0.3	100.0	8,02

Source: Credit Suisse (2017, p. 165); *denotes secondary cities. ** NDRC (2008, p. 122).

Table 2.8 shows the estimated FDI into African cities from 2003 to 2016. Nine large cities received over 50% of the FDI of the 41 cities for which data is available. Per-capita investment within cities also varied significantly between countries, with Morocco benefiting mainly from FDI. Cities such as Tangier (Morocco) and Djibouti have benefited from significant investment in port infrastructure, while Gaborone (Botswana), Windhoek (Namibia) and Tete (Mozambique) have benefited from global firms and mining interests. The extent to which there have been flow-on effects and benefits of FDI into other secondary cities, such as in EPZs, is unknown. Secondary cities, however, have tended to fare poorly in the allocation of both public and private sector FDI. This imbalance in the flow of FDI to secondary cities is an area in need of research.

2.4.4 Special Economic and New Enterprise Zones

Many African countries have embarked on developing special economic zones (SEZ) to replicate the success of Asian economies. Chinese investment has played a significant role in the development of SEZs in recent years. There are an estimated 237 SEZs in Africa, with many more under construction, as well as several free ports (UNCTAD, 2019). Special economic zones operate in 38 of the 54 economies on the continent, with the highest number in Kenya (61). Most African economic zones are traditional EPZs and industrial parks designed along the lines of the Asian model. Most are clustered around the major cities or ports; others are dispersed to regional areas, and some to secondary cities. Unfortunately, few African SEZs have been successful (Farole & Moberg, 2017). There has been some initial success in Kenya and Lesotho. For the most part, however, African SEZs "have failed to attract significant investment, promote exports, and create sustainable employment and failed to generate significant improvements in investment, employment, and exports, both relative to their internal targets and in international comparison" (Farole & Moberg, 2014, p. 23). Their failure is due, essentially, to the nature of the political economy of SEZ schemes, which results in the prevention of the replication of best practices; coordination failures from institutional incentives; poor locational choices; weak enabling environments and logistics systems; and a failure to encourage the development of industry clusters to spawn innovation and creativity and reduce costs and access to common user services.

In a strong critique of EPZs, one author (Stein, 2012, pp. v) notes:

> **"Most zones in Africa have remained rather small, with few linkages to the local economy and small foreign-exchange earnings. The main problem is that aid agencies have driven many zones in SSA with promises of special access to foreign markets, which have proven to be quite limited... In addition, the vision has been driven by the rather faulty theoretical notions in World Bank policy papers and elsewhere that EPZs are simply the second-best solutions to the total liberalisation of economies. In contrast, in many successful export zones in Asian countries, EPZs have been part of a broader industrial policy where zones are not an end in themselves but a component of the broader strategy to transform institutions to improve developmental competitiveness and industrialise the country."**

One of the biggest challenges for governments has been to promote industrial deconcentration in secondary cities. Where this has occurred, such as in Kenya and Nigeria, it has been done poorly. Generally, SEZ policies support infrastructure, tax provisions and job-creation incentives and ensure connectivity to agricultural value chains and primary cities and ports. However, policies seeking to create industrial parks and SEZs in regional secondary cities or apply the concept of 'one industry one district', as in Ghana[1] (Mensah, et al. 2020), to disperse industry development across secondary cities have not worked in many less populated African countries.

Secondary cities need more than hard infrastructure and a few incentives to be successful. They must have a critical mass of competitive infrastructure to provide a catalyst for innovation and the creation of spin-off industries. Few secondary cities have the critical mass of hard, and especially soft, infrastructure and the concentration of input business into local supply chains to operate at scale to support export development zones. In secondary cities, foreign businesses in SEZs are often the first to be closed when large multinationals economise or re-shore operations. Special economic zones in secondary cities need to create endogenous growth and import-substitution opportunities to support the development of domestic markets, as well as subnational aggregate demand for value-adding and green industry services outside metropolitan regions. This outcome requires a more balanced approach by national governments to spatial economic and urban development policy, focusing on endogenous growth and the development of regional hard and soft infrastructure supporting more decentralised regional development.

One of the biggest challenges for governments has been to promote industrial deconcentration in secondary cities.

Secondary cities need to build economic enterprise zones, not SEZs. These zones require a new superstructure to support specialised export and localised/domestic endogenous-growth employment and investment opportunities. This superstructure is necessary to support the development of industry clusters and collaboration opportunities for high local and regional value-added processing, manufactured products, personal, community and business services that are engaged with intercity trade, not just metropolitan regions. Until secondary cities can build this new superstructure, it is difficult for local firms and institutions to create the critical mass to compete and operate at scale, generate efficiencies and cost-savings, build human capital skills and competencies, raise productivity, and reduce transaction costs to compete against metropolitan regions. If African governments want industrial development and jobs to grow in secondary cities, they must move away from an export model of SEZs to a more localised and enterprise-driven development model to increase domestic market demand and production of goods and services. Every effort should be made to reduce the current propensity to import goods and services if the prospects of export growth industries are poor.

> *Secondary cities need more than hard infrastructure and a few incentives to be successful. They must have a critical mass of competitive infrastructure to provide a catalyst for innovation and the creation of spin-off industries.*

2.4.5 Trade Between Cities

While international manufacturing merchandise trade between regional cities in advanced and developing economies continues to grow, this is not the case for most African countries. Trade corridors are developing strongly along the western and north-western coasts of Africa and internally in Rwanda, Uganda, Kenya, Zambia, Tanzania, Zimbabwe and South Africa. Trade development between western and northern African primary and secondary cities is generally more developed than in eastern Africa. However, trade is impeded by poor infrastructure, regulations, customs arrangements, rent-seeking, and poor integration of supply chains and logistics facilities in towns and cities along rail and road corridors. As a result, unlike in Asia, there is little competition for trade and development between primary cities and systems of secondary cities within countries. This leads to significant regional disparities in the development of secondary cities, many of which are little more than subnational and local government services and large regional market and passenger transport centres.

Since colonial times, the value-added trade activities involving trade in materials, resources, manufactured goods, parts, and other commodities and processing between the network of secondary and metropolitan systems of cities have substantially slowed. Historically, there were much higher localised integration levels of trade between national systems of cities in process and production value-adding activities and supply chains. This allowed Zimbabwe to be a significant exporter of farm machinery and mining equipment, for example, and Ghana to produce a wide range of clothing and textile items for the domestic and regional export markets (Madonko, 2016; Amankwah-Amoah, 2015). There was significant integration between supply chains and value-adding between firms in cities both within the country and in adjacent countries.

The shrinkage of these activities, owing to the adoption of free-market and free-trade, a lack of capital to invest in the modernisation of industry and improved transport, energy, and telecommunications networks required to remain competitive, led to a collapse in higher value-adding industries and city-to-city investment and trade in goods, services, materials, and products. What remains today is an economic system where trade and value-adding between secondary and smaller cities have become metropolitan-city centric, involving imported commodities and consumer products and services, with limited production and trade in higher value-added products and services in the other direction.

2.5 Structural Characteristics of Secondary City Economies

Three broad economic structural characteristics can be associated with the development of different secondary cities. The first characterises cities that have strong growth paths and dynamic local economies. For example, Wolfsburg, the headquarters of Volkswagen in Germany, is well connected nationally and internationally to a competitive trade, development and investment system. Other examples include are tourist, resource industry, and specialised manufacturing cities. All tend to have a strong export focus or an outward business orientation. Although few secondary cities in sub-Saharan Africa fit this category, there are some, such as Luxor (Egypt), Tangier (Morocco), Arusha (Tanzania), Stone Town of Zanzibar (Tanzania) (Zanzibar Tourism Authority, 2010), and Touba (Senegal). However, the COVID-19 pandemic has shown how exposed these economies can be to a high reliance on international tourism growth.

The second structural characteristic consists of logistics and boomtown economies, driven by migration and industrial development. Secondary cities such as Mombasa (DCP Kenya, 2019), Gqeberha (South Africa), and Sekondi-Takoradi (Ghana) (Government of Ghana, 2015, p. 435) fall into this group. This group has a diverse range of economic activities servicing local and national markets. They may be larger agriculture, resource industry and manufacturing cities. Many struggle to attract investment and to create sustainable jobs. Some are located at the peri-urban fringe of large metropolitan regions and form part of a clustered-city network. Many are growing rapidly due to inner-city deindustrialisation and relocation associated with developing export processing zones, which provide the catalyst for their development. Many struggle to manage urban development and environmental issues. Others are regional capital secondary cities. They have meritocracy economies that are striving to become more competitive.

The third characteristic is that of laggard, economically depressed, and underperforming cities. These fall into two broad types: the first type includes cities experiencing increasing urbanisation levels, with large numbers of urban poor people, migration and refugees. These cities have extremely low public investment levels in infrastructure and services delivery and high informal-sector employment levels. The fast-growing refugee cities of Kakuma and Dadaab in Kenya (DCP Kenya, 2019) and Yida in South Sudan are examples of this type of secondary city. The second type includes secondary cities undergoing post-industrial restructuring and economic decline, with ageing and declining populations; these are mainly located in Europe, North America and Japan. African cities are more likely to fall into the first secondary city type than the second, although the city of Bulawayo (Zimbabwe) was once an important manufacturing centre.

Little data is available on the flow of trade, capital and investment within African secondary cities. Anecdotal evidence suggests that trade in most secondary cities is not balanced and is dominated by net imports of construction materials and fittings, personal and consumer household goods, and services. There is a remnant of localised general services, some small-scale engineering, manufacturing, and export of agriculture products and materials; however, these are becoming less significant economic activity drivers in secondary cities. Regional shortfalls in income to pay for imported goods and services from overseas and metropolitan regions are being met by increased levels of household debt from lending (Ntsalaze & Ikhide, 2017), forced land sales, increased rents, and domestic and international remittances – 30% to 40% of which go to rural and regional economies (IFAD, 2009, p. 20) – with a significant proportion of this spent in secondary and smaller cities.

Secondary city economies in Africa are significantly different from the economies of metropolitan regions and secondary cities in advanced economies. This can be illustrated by comparing secondary cities and metropolitan regions in Ghana and Canada (see Table 2.9). The table provides a breakdown of the industry employment structure for the secondary cities of Cape Coast (pop. 170,000) and Tamale (pop. 223,000) and the metropolitan region of Accra (pop. 1.6 million) in Ghana; and the secondary city of Kingston (pop. 115,000) and the metropolitan region of Toronto, Ontario (pop. 5.5 million) in Canada for 2010–2011. (Kingston was chosen because the Canadian government supported the 2010 census, and the categorisation of industry groups is the same for the two countries.) The contrast in employment and economic structure between two secondary and primary cities varies, with Accra dominating the wholesaling, transport, retail and information services sectors. Cape Coast (see case study Chapter 7) has a clear competitive position in education services.

Compared to Kingston, Ontario, clear differences are seen in the service sector economy's structure and development. Almost half of the total employment is in government, education, health and social services, compared to less than 20% in Cape Coast and 10% in Tamale. The retailing and wholesaling sectors in the two Ghanaian secondary cities contribute to more than 50% more jobs than in Kingston. These differences provide important indicators of where structural changes are likely to occur in these economies in the future.

TABLE 2.9 | Comparison of industry employment structure of secondary and metropolitan regions – Ghana and Canada

	Employment by sector (%)				
Industry Sector	Cape Coast	Tamale	Metro Accra	Kinston Ontario	Metro Toronto
Agriculture, forestry and fishing	7.4	18.2	2.4	0.1	0.3
Mining and quarrying	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.1
Manufacturing	13.1	12.5	14.1	4.8	9.1
Utilities	0.9	0.4	0.7	0.5	0.5
Construction	5.3	3.8	4.2	3.4	6.0
Wholesale and Retail; repairs of vehicles	25.1	33.4	35.2	14.4	15.2
Transportation and storage	4.0	4.2	5.3	1.9	5.4
Accommodation and food service activities	10.0	7.6	10.0	8.6	6.3
Information and communication	0.9	0.3	1.5	1.6	3.4
Business, financial and insurance activities	1.2	0.6	1.9	3.3	8.0
Real estate activities	0.0	0.0	0.2	1.8	2.7
Professional scientific and technical activities	1.9	1.7	2.1	4.2	10.9
Administrative and support service activities	1.3	1.2	1.8	1.9	4.9
Public administration and defence; social security	3.3	1.9	3.0	15.5	3.9
Education	14.1	6.5	4.0	16.1	7.3
Human health and social work activities	3.3	2.0	2.0	15.6	9.4
Arts entertainment and recreation	1.2	0.6	1.5	1.1	1.9
Other service activities	6.1	3.8	8.6	3.2	4.3
Activities of households as employers	0.8	1.1	1.4	1.9	0.3
Activities of extraterritorial organizations and bodies	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.1
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Sources: 2010 Ghana Census District Analysis; City of Kingston, Ontario (Watson & Associates Economists, 2019, p. 170).

Given that services offer the most significant potential for job creation and growth in African secondary cities, the challenge for Ghanaian and most other African secondary cities is how to transition to greater investment and employment in higher value-added services, such as finance, education and health, when the employment base is heavily embedded in wholesale, retail and a declining manufacturing base. Some means of doing this are explored in the case studies.

Similar differences can be seen in the labour force professional groups and skill levels between secondary and primary cities (Table 2.10). Because of its university, colleges, and tourism industry, Cape Coast has developed a higher level of professional skills in these industry clusters than Tamale has. However, both cities are significantly weaker than the national capital in management occupations. In comparing the metropolitan regions of Toronto and Accra, the significant structural differences in advanced business, finance, education and health services are clearly shown.

TABLE 2.10 | Occupational economic structure for secondary cities in Ghana and Canada (2010)

	Labour force by occupation (%)				
Occupation	Cape Coast	Tamale	Metro Accra	Kingston Ontario	Metro Toronto
Managers	3.7	2.4	5.3	9.8	12.2
Professionals	13.2	8.1	7.9	14.0	18.4
Technicians and associate professionals	3.5	2.0	4.0	5.7	8.7
Clerical support workers	3.5	1.4	3.7	18.3	5.7
Service and sales workers	32.5	33.0	38.5	24.2	11.5
Skilled agricultural forestry and fishery workers	6.8	17.6	1.7	1.3	3.9
Craft and related trades workers	23.6	21.5	20.1	11.6	23.0
Plant and machine operators and assemblers	4.9	5.1	6.1	10.2	11.1
Elementary occupations	8.2	8.6	12.6	2.8	0.7
Other occupations	0.0	0.1	0.2	2.0	4.7
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: 2010 Ghana Census District Analysis; (Watson & Associates Economists, 2019, p. 170).

The analysis of both secondary cities shows that significant thought must be given to examining ways to diversity and specialise the economic bases of secondary cities in the two cities of Cape Coast and Tamale. Ethiopia is also a country where urban development policies have also focused on promoting planned secondary city development in advance of urbanisation, largely as industrial enterprises are relatively clustered (Songwe, 2018). In 2009–2010, Addis Ababa had 11 times the number of manufacturing enterprises as the secondary city of Awassa (Gebreeyesus, 2016). As noted in Hommann and Lall (2019, p. 59), "Few secondary cities have substantial local specialisation in manufacturing. For cities that do have a local specialisation, much of that industry concentration is in very traditional activities such as textiles and clothing — minor industries".

2.5.1 Competitiveness of Cities

Many global studies have been undertaken on the competitiveness of cities. The notion of competitiveness conveyed in the literature is one of a league of competing cities measured with sets of indicators. International companies and organisations like McKinsey, Mercer and the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) have investigated economic competitiveness, business dynamics and liveability of mega and larger secondary cities (EIU, 2012). The EIU defines a city's competitiveness as its ability to attract capital, business, talent and visitors. Few reports have focused specifically on African cities' competitiveness (Wall et al., 2018, p. 127; Mitullah, 2020). Many economists argue that competitiveness is more than a focus on business, but involves a broader range of factors, some of which are intangible and not easily measured.

TABLE 2.11 | Competitive ranking of African cities by Economic Intelligence Unit

Ranking	City	Overall Ranking	Score
1	Johannesburg	67	50.5
2	Cape Town	73	47.4
3	Durban	94	41.2
4	Cairo	113	42.9
5	Nairobi	115	36.9
6	Alexandria	116	34.6
7	Lagos	119	29.9

EIU (2012) Hot Spots 2025 Benchmarking the future competitiveness of cities.

Despite strong economic growth over the past two decades in many African countries, the continent's cities lag the rest of the world in competitiveness ranking. Table 2.11 shows the EIU's (2012) report on the ranking of African cities. The rankings are based on city performance across eight broad categories: economic strength, human capital, institutional effectiveness, financial maturity, global appeal, physical capital, environment and natural hazards, and social and cultural character. In terms of global competitiveness, these cities rank low on the global index, with Johannesburg ranking the highest at 67.

Care is required in comparing the competitiveness of African cities to other world cities. African cities have a significantly different economic structure from that of developed and developing economies in Asia and elsewhere. They are less economically diversified and developed within the industrialisation cycle, have much higher informal sector employment, and have a lower level of infrastructure and public services. Cities like Nairobi and Bangkok are not comparable because they have different economic structures and infrastructure development stages. Cities Like Nairobi and Accra are comparable, but not Mombasa and Casablanca. The competitiveness of cities in Africa is best compared to the similarity of economic and workforce employment structure, GDP, and governance arrangements.

> *Many economists argue that competitiveness is more than a focus on business, but involves a broader range of factors, some of which are intangible and not easily measured.*

2.5.2 Competitiveness of African Secondary Cities

The idea that the competitiveness of secondary cities can be compared in the same league as large cities is not realistic or helpful. It is akin to comparing the competitiveness of league divisions for sports. Large cities are well-resourced, enjoy agglomeration advantages and are often the primate centres of national government, finance, business, and cultural institutions. Some secondary cities do have unique factors which enable them to compete against large cities, however.

In the context of secondary cities, the focus of competitiveness should be on optimising factor costs of inputs and outputs of products and services. Population size, scale and function significantly affect the magnitude and extent to which these can be optimised. The competitiveness of secondary cities can be lifted by improving local factors linked to production, such as infrastructure, demand, other factor conditions, and governance, but this does not overcome scale and other issues when competing against larger cities and international factors. However, secondary cities can collaborate to enhance their competitiveness based on the principle of collaborative advantage. This dual focus of enhancing the competitiveness of secondary cities' performance at the local level and collaboration to compete at scale is advocated strongly as a competitiveness model by this book.

One study on South Africa's secondary cities (Marais, 2015) notes that "local economic development strategies for these cities pay too little attention to creating effective links with their rural hinterlands." Also, globalisation has increased both vulnerabilities and opportunities for secondary cities, but most are ill-prepared to manage the impacts of the former or benefit from the latter. Local economic development strategies focus on industry cluster initiatives (Viviers et al., 2015). Such strategies increase competition with the larger metropolitan areas. South Africa's secondary cities are too small to achieve the scale and critical mass to overcome the agglomeration advantages of Cape Town and Johannesburg (Leipzig & Dimitrov, 2015).

A study of 74 African cities (50 metropolitan and 24 secondary cities) with a specific focus on 13 competitiveness indicators, including household consumption expenditure, government effectiveness, and ease of doing business, shows that secondary cities fare much worse in the competitive rankings (Angelopulo, 2016, p.69): 'A key focus of competitiveness relates to Inclusive' urbanisation. That is the way cities function as "gateways to investment and global markets, as generators of wealth, hubs of innovation and business formation, leading to prosperity and a rising quality of life for their citizens". Using a score rating system of 100, the sampled metropolitan regions had an index score of 36, compared to 29 for the secondary cities. There was an 11-point difference between Tshwane (Pretoria) and Nelson Mandela Bay (see case study Chapter 13), both two secondary cities in South Africa.

A significant factor undermining the competitiveness of cities in South Africa is a high level of parochialism, a feature common to other federated states such as Nigeria and Ethiopia. Within unitary states, gaps in competitiveness between capital and metropolitan region cities appear wider, with the central government having a more direct role and control over economic development and investment activities. Enhancing the competitiveness and performance of secondary cities will be crucial to the development of national economies. This calls for better research into factors and drivers that can help make secondary cities perform better and contribute to national development.

In an increasingly competitive world of cities, the lack of knowledge about the competitiveness of secondary cities in Africa calls for better research using a range of rapid assessment tools and techniques to measure and analyse the dynamics, governance, logistics, and supply chain systems and deficiencies gaps in the local economies of secondary cities. This is needed to identify the strategic infrastructure, enabling environments, and human capital development gaps that need to be addressed, build competitive advantage, attract investment, and become more prosperous and liveable cities.

Other reports and studies have sought to measure economic and governance factors and sustainability by ranking cities in terms of the prosperity performance and development of African cities. (Jackson, 2015; Arimah, 2017) The City Prosperity Initiative (UN-Habitat & ESCAP, 2012) is a tool from UN-HABITAT that measures sustainable urban development across the globe in a comparative manner using indices that cover productivity and infrastructure, quality of life, equity, and social inclusion, as well as environmental sustainability. The tool shows that the economic development and competitiveness of cities is not dependent on economic factors alone. Other factors, such as social and cultural capital, liveability, and cities' essence, are important factors in attracting capital to cities.

2.6 Connectivity within Systems of Secondary Cities

Connectivity is defined as "the state or quality of being connective or connected" (Merriam-Webster, 2018). The term can be applied widely to many types of network systems and how the different elements or components of those systems interact. Connectivity has both physical (Mariyappan et al., 2005, p. 66) and metaphysical (Clifford, 1992, p. 49) attributes. These attributes can be measured in terms of exchanges and flows of information, knowledge, goods and services between hubs and nodes that make up national and regional systems of cities involving infrastructure and enabling environment networks. Physical connectivity, i.e., roads, telecommunication, etc., is relatively easy to document and measure flows across networks. Metaphysical connectivity, i.e., knowledge and information sharing between cities and firms, social capital, etc., on the other hand, is much more challenging to identify and measure. Although countries like Morocco and Tunisia seek to improve connectivity, overall, African cities, businesses and institutions are poorly connected, both physically and metaphysically.

Factors that affect connectivity and development within systems of cities include:

- Physical nature and ease of access to cities and connectors that provide seamless access to infrastructure networks that support the flow or exchange of information, physical, or spatial movement of many types of goods and services.
- Economic, governance, ideological, social, legal, and other non-physical types of rules, regulations, technologies and modalities that provide access to public and private goods and services within cities and to other locations.
- Freedom of movement between places, ideas, immigration and speech.
- General levels of literacy, education, skills and language that give equitable access to knowledge and learning.
- Quality, scope, scale, density, flexibility and capacity of infrastructure and networks to deliver services and respond to change.
- Opening of local economies to competition, change, foreign investment, international exchanges and foreigners.
- Shared community values, beliefs, tolerances, welcomeness, and belonging to country, place and society.

The need for improved connectivity within and between systems of cities in Africa has been documented in several reports. The World Bank's *Africa's Cities: Opening Doors to the World (Lall et al., 2017) notes:*

> *"The lack of connectivity, particularly the absence of reliable transportation, limits job opportunities for workers and prevents firms from reaping scale and agglomeration benefits" (p. 36); and "urban Africans have little connectivity in their neighbourhoods, as shown by the low exposure and high fragmentation in the intensity of land occupation" (p. 69).*

FIGURE 2.7 | Low density of airline connectivity in Africa countries

Source: Flight Connections 2020.

The report, *Analysis of Multiple Deprivations in Secondary Cities in Sub Saharan Africa* (UNICEF & UN-Habitat, 2020, p. 24) notes further:

> *"The quality of major link roads in a country's system of cities generally deteriorates by their distance from the primary cities. In addition to poor road connectivity, transportation systems are inefficient, marked by unreliability, low levels of passenger comfort and poor road safety (Arup, 2016). Additional challenges include weak data systems for monitoring growth and informing decision-making, inadequate critical infrastructure and optimal connectivity, and weak economies and low human capital development, all of which can be attributed to weak governance and institutional deficiencies in secondary towns and cities."*

Figure 2.7 shows the frequency of flight connections per day for Africa, the Middle East and southern Europe. Many African countries, e.g., Ghana, with a similar or higher population and network densities of secondary cities similar to that of Turkey, have a substantially less dense network of connectivity for air and bus services. The number of flights from capital cities to metropolitan regions and from city to city are substantially less than 50 per day, except for in a few countries. Most services to secondary cities consist of less than 10 connections per day. Low levels of air services of less than 10 per day between metropolitan and larger secondary cities indicate low-level business services connectivity. Even countries like Vietnam, which has a similar GDP capita to that of Egypt and Tunisia, have a substantially higher density and air traffic flow to secondary cities. According to Songwe (2018, p. 1),

> *"Unbalanced national urban systems often characterise African countries with a very large primary city and less competitive smaller cities. Urban systems tend to be top-heavy with expensive and crowded primary cities, and secondary cities are too small to be viable alternatives for competitive industries. In response, some African countries have put in place policies to rebalance urban systems, which risks wasting resources."*

In recognition of the need to improve connectivity within systems of African cities, much of the focus in reports and other studies has been on building hard or physical infrastructure networks for improved access to urban and inter-regional services. This involves substantial investment in arterial roads, air and road transport facilities, electricity, and telecommunications systems – especially Wi-Fi networks. However, in the context of African cities, improved connectivity needs to expand beyond improved physical infrastructure, utilities, transport, and logistics facilities to support the movement of materials, goods, services, and people. Factors such as quality, density, choice, flexibility, and adaptability of infrastructure networks and the level of social capital development also influence the nature of connectivity and performance within systems of cities and the way they function. The means, type, and levels of soft infrastructure connectivity in developing national and regional economies and cities in a modern world matter just as much as hard infrastructure connectivity.

Factors such as quality, density, choice, flexibility, and adaptability of infrastructure networks and the level of social capital development also influence the nature of connectivity and performance within systems of cities and the way they function.

The 2014 World Economic Forum Report (World Economic Forum, 2014, p.6), describes soft connectivity as follows: "the city's social capital is as important as hard connectivity in the 21st Century's knowledge economy – while soft and hard connectivity is mutually reinforcing, soft connectivity is also about supporting an open society in the city, which spurs ideas, entrepreneurship, innovation, and growth."

Many soft connectivity elements — like information and data sharing, collaborative governance, knowledge capture and formalized information networks, smart city systems, communities of interest and creativity in building social capital — are poorly developed in many parts of Africa – especially sub-Saharan Africa. There is an intense vibrancy and dynamism in many secondary cities, which has built strong local social capital connections within communities, but this tends not to develop into solid business networks across and between countries, except for consumer goods trade. Some diaspora networks are well-developed at the secondary city level, but tend not to be cross-tribal and cross-country. Tribalism remains a significant impediment to cross-cultural, business, and trade connectedness in developing national economies in Africa (Okogu & Umudjere, 2016). This barrier must be overcome to develop a shared vision for national economies and a dynamic regional system of competing, creative, innovative and trade-linked cities.

Enhancing the development of hard and soft infrastructure networks to improve connectivity remains one of Africa's most challenging problems. Countries such as Ghana, Kenya, Morocco, Rwanda, Tunisia, and South Africa recognise the importance of enhancing connectivity within national systems of cities and secondary cities (Parilla & Trujillo, 2015; GGGI-Global Green Growth Institute, 2016). However, there is still a long way to go, especially in building stronger networks of secondary cities. The means of achieving this are explored in Chapter 16.

2.7 Sustainability of Secondary Cities Development

TABLE 2.12 | Best cities ranking and report of African Cities

	RANK - Adjusted Liveability Index	Change in Rank	Green Space	Sprawl	Natural Assets	Cultural Assets	Connectivity	Isolation	Pollution
Johannesburg (South Africa)	40	4	2.8	4.2	2.7	4	2.8	2.5	3.5
Casablanca (Marroco)	53	-2	3.2	1.8	4	4	3.8	4	2
Cairo (Egypt)	55	3	2.5	1.3	3.7	2	3.3	3.8	5
Nairobi (Kenya)	62	-1	2.8	3.5	2.7	5	3.8	4.8	3
Lusaka (Zambia)	63	-1	4.8	3	1.7	5	5	5	4
Dakar (Senegal)	66	-2	4.5	2.3	3.3	4	4.8	4.8	5
Abidjan (Côte d'Ivoire)	67	-1	4	2.8	2	5	4.8	4.5	3.5
Lagos (Nigeria)	69	-1	4.8	2.7	4	5	4.5	3.3	4.5
Harare (Zimbabwe)	70	-1	4	3.8	3.3	5	5	5	4

Source: EIU (2019) (1 = best; 5 = worst).

The EIU report (Table 2.12) provides a measure of the liveability of 140 cities. It includes 10 African cities, not one of which is a secondary city. Factors such as cultural assets, connectivity, isolation, and pollution all rank as 'poor' or 'extremely poor' for the major cities listed; however, secondary city indicators are generally worse. Metropolitan and capital cities are endowed with national cultural, transport, education, sports facilities, and other government assets, which secondary cities are seldom given the capital to build and maintain. As a result, the standard of public assets, utilities and facilities in secondary cities are poor, and the funds needed to keep and maintain them are limited.

However, some African countries are showing greater interest in improving the sustainability and quality of their assets, the urban environment, and public open space in secondary cities to make them more attractive to investment and development. For example, as Gubic and Baloi (2020, p. 129) note, "Rwanda's secondary cities, identified as economic nodes of growth, are currently undergoing revision of their masterplans in consideration of climate change realities and the pressure on infrastructure and services due to rapid urbanisation. Currently, cities in Rwanda do not yet have a system of public open spaces".

The European Investment Bank has recently given support to capacity-building technical assistance support through the African Sustainable Cities Initiative (ASCI) to enable up to 10 secondary cities in four sub-Saharan African countries to better access financing for their investment needs. Secondary cities have been targeted in recognition of their high need to become more competitive and sustainable; for a long time, they have not received equitable donor funding, as these programs have tended to be directed to capital or larger cities (EIB, 2020).

Metropolitan and capital cities are endowed with national cultural, transport, education, sports facilities, and other government assets, which secondary cities are seldom given the capital to build and maintain. As a result, the standard of public assets, utilities and facilities in secondary cities are poor, and the funds needed to keep and maintain them are limited.

2.8 Infrastructure Investment

It is not just the gap in urban infrastructure but also the lack of city planning, inefficient land use, regulatory blockages, and vested interests that hold back African secondary cities' development. The result is sprawling, fragmented and hyper-informal cities that are expensive to live in. According to the World Bank, the cost of living in African cities is 29% more expensive than in comparable Asian cities: "Locals pay 100% more for transport, 55% more for housing, 42% more for transport and 35% more for food. All of this slows down business, cutting firm productivity by close to half while dramatically increasing the input costs of consumer goods" (Muggah & Hill, Jun 2018).

The World Bank's *African Cities Diagnostic Kit* (World Bank, 2021) provides a helpful tool for diagnosing the state of infrastructure. It has been applied in 31 African cities, in all the metropolitan regions. There is little evidence of the kit being used in the analysis of secondary cities. However, another report, *The Analysis of Multiple Deprivations in Secondary Cities in Sub Saharan Africa* (UNICEF & UN-Habitat 2020) provides detailed insights into infrastructure investment problems, especially water and sanitation, for secondary cities, primary cities, and rural areas in four countries.

FIGURE 2.8 | Sources of drinking water in four African countries for primary and secondary cities and rural area



Source: DHS, Nigeria, 2018.

Figure 2.8 Sources of drinking water in four African countries for primary and secondary cities and rural area shows that there are significant differences in the availability of drinking water between primary and secondary cities. Secondary cities fare marginally worse in terms of piped water to dwellings in Namibia, Guinea, and Ethiopia, but are better off in Tanzania. For secondary cities, the variation between countries in water, sanitation, waste management services, formal roads and transport services is significant; however, countries with lower GDP per capita or landlocked countries tend to have poorer urban services levels.

Economically, secondary cities in Africa remain underexploited because of under-investment in city infrastructure, compared with large cities – a factor that slows local investment. One study, however, argues that the ability of secondary cities to provide basic infrastructure does not differ much from that of metropolitan municipalities (Marais, 2016. p. 34). However, secondary cities rank low in central governments' priorities regarding infrastructure funding and budget allocations when decision-making power is concentrated in large capital cities (Kriticos, 2019). The provision of infrastructure is becoming more unbalanced in meeting the development needs of national systems of cities, further stalling their productivity and growth potential. African secondary cities will struggle to become more competitive and efficient unless the infrastructure investment and assets maintenance funds increase substantially. Without this, urban growth pressure in metropolitan regions will increase in the coming decades, further accentuating congestion costs.

2.8.1 Industry Clusters

Industry-cluster development is an initiative that has been used to boost secondary cities' productivity and competitiveness in Africa (Hoffman, 2015; Nallari, 2013). Industry clusters can form part of a program of economic and industrial reforms to support the acceleration and structural transformation of the production system in its cities. Morocco has been a territorial development model incorporating a cluster development policy (Amraoui et al., 2019). However, efforts at supporting the development of industrial clusters have met with limited success (Oyelaran-Oyeyinka & McCormick, 2007), mainly due to poor decisions about location, the importance of well-developed and integrated industry supply chains, and limited investment in research and development.

A key issue for secondary cities wishing to develop competitive industry clusters is how to operate at a scale and generate critical mass to become more competitive. Critical mass can be achieved by developing inter-regional collaboration, resources, and information sharing between competitive firms in regional towns and secondary cities by creating regional networks or corridor development associations of collaborating businesses, institutions, and local governments. Rwanda has recognized the importance of collaboration between regional city governments (Francioni, 2017), but few other countries have advanced to intercity regional collaboration between competing industries and firms to create a scale of industrial development that is internationally competitive.

FIGURE 2.9 | Comparing Wealth Index



2.9 Human Development Indicators and Poverty

The United Nations Human Development Index (HDI) (UNDP, 2011, p. 185) is used to measure and benchmark countries' health and well-being and the performance of countries in meeting the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Comparatively, few HDI studies have been conducted on secondary cities' social and human development in Africa. Some studies of cities have been undertaken in a few developed countries (de la Torre & Moreno, 2010, p. 47; UNDP, 2010) . Household income and health data are available for several African countries (Fink et al., 2012; Ilinca et al., 2019, p. 196), but in many cases, data is not disaggregated to the secondary city level. The paucity of

socio-economic data on secondary African cities makes it difficult to assess or draw conclusions about the extent to which large metropolitan and secondary cities are any better or worse in terms of social and human capital development levels. *The Analysis of Multiple Deprivations in Secondary Cities in Sub Saharan Africa* (UNICEF & UN-Habitat, 2020) and the *State of Arab Cities* (UN-Habitat, 2012) suggest household in secondary cities are significantly more deprived of access to public goods and services than those in large metropolitan regions.

2.9.1 National Sub-Indices in Health, Education and Wealth

A study published by the London School of Economics (LSE) explored the relationships between the design of the built environment, health, and well-being in cities, focusing on how urban density affects different population groups' experiences (Paccoud, 2011). The research drew upon a dataset of health, socioeconomic, and density data indicators for more than 129 cities worldwide, including 12 in Africa (Table 2.13). The LSE study was one of the first attempts to create HDIs at the metropolitan level for a regionally representative sample of comparable African cities. The HDI indicators for a selected number of metropolitan and secondary cities in Africa provide indicators to measure health, wealth, and education. Table 2.13 includes national benchmark indicators for health, education and wealth; the ratio between LSE cities and nations on these indicators; and indicators for LSE cities' EMR indices.

Gini coefficients (GC) also can be good indicators of poverty levels in cities. The UN-Habitat (2010, p. 224) *State of the World Cities Report 2010/11* lists GCs gathered for several large and secondary cities in different regions. Much of this data is more than 10 years old, so the figures should be treated cautiously. Many countries have seen a significant reduction in GCs in recent years. For African cites, GCs are high, ranging from 0.43 for Uganda to 0.75 for South Africa. By comparison, GCs for Asian cities lie between 0.3 and 0.4.

There are significant differences in GCs between secondary cities in some countries, with GC rates in some secondary cities rising fastest. There are push factors in Nigeria, related to land and other social factors driving people into cities, that are causing GCs to rise. Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality (Gqeberha), South Africa, is an example of a city where push factors have resulted in one of the highest GC rates for a country's secondary city.

TABLE 2.13 | National Sub-Indices in Health, Education and Wealth for extended metropolitan regions and cities

Extended metropolitan region (EMR)	Nation	EMR population	LSE cities, national indices			EMR to nation ratios on			LSE cities EMR indices		
			Health	Education	Wealth	Health	Education	Wealth	Health	Education	Wealth
Cotonou	Benin	1,523,836	0.358	0.320	0.375	1.039	1.246	1.08	0.372	0.399	0.405
Kinshasa	Congo DRC	9,426,523	0.183	0.305	0.185	1.179	1.177	1.161	0.215	0.36	0.214
Abidjan	Côte d'Ivoire	7,845,100	0.331	0.258	0.384	1.075	1.192	1.09	0.356	0.308	0.419
Alexandria	Egypt	9,433,514	0.543	0.479	0.534	1.016	1.035	1.024	0.551	0.496	0.547
Nairobi	Kenya	7,806,748	0.316	0.463	0.384	1.077	1.093	1.145	0.34	0.506	0.44
Bamako	Mali	4,414,117	0.208	0.187	0.346	1.066	1.237	1.075	0.221	0.232	0.372
Johannesburg	South Africa	11,191,700	0.283	0.593	0.593	1.045	1.044	1.048	0.295	0.619	0.622
Cape Town	South Africa	5,223,900	0.283	0.593	0.593	1.113	1.028	1.023	0.315	0.61	0.607
Dar es Salaam	Tanzania	4,149,873	0.331	0.295	0.362	1.096	1.13	1.122	0.363	0.334	0.406
Kampala	Uganda	3,840,400	0.285	0.397	0.351	1.068	1.139	1.161	0.304	0.452	0.408
Lusaka	Zambia	2,467,467	0.183	0.387	0.363	0.994	1.056	1.105	0.182	0.409	0.402
Harare	Zimbabwe	3,847,834	0.201	0.463	0.126	0.986	1.072	1.026	0.199	0.496	0.129

Source: Paccoud, 2011.

2.9.2 Income and Employment

Africa has the highest wage inequality levels in the world, with significant GC differences between primary and secondary cities and rural areas. Unemployment rates in secondary cities are high, including youth unemployment, which does not bode well for improved economic and social development in the youth population cohort (aged 0–24 years). This cohort is projected to experience an increase of nearly 50% between 2017 and 2050 (UNICEF & UN-Habitat, 2020). The projected sub-Saharan Africa 'youth bulge' offers the opportunity for a high working labour force, innovation associated with youth, and a reduced dependency ratio.

An analysis of the Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) wealth index, a composite index measuring a household's cumulative living standard in four sub-Saharan African countries, shows that populations in primary cities are significantly wealthier than populations in secondary cities (Figure 2.9). The UNICEF and UN-Habitat (2020 p. 27) analysis of the impacts of economic deprivations in sub-Saharan African cities revealed that "people living in secondary cities are more deprived than those in metropolitan regions in terms of income and employment, which increases the chances of experiencing almost all the other deprivations, key ones being housing, WASH, and education".

Research by Mayer (2002 p. 66) concluded that low parental income is one of many risk factors that affect children both as they grow up and when they reach adulthood, underlining that "on average the life chances of poor children are worse than the life chances of more affluent children". And as De la Barra (1998 p. 46) noted, "Being poor is a health hazard; worse, however, is being urban and poor. Much worse is being poor, urban, and a child".

2.9.3 Environmental Factors and Climate Change

No comprehensive data is available to allow water and air quality, waste, and ecosystem conditions to be compared between African countries. The Global Cities Index (A.T. Kearney, 2012) and Global Cities Indicators Facility (GCIF, 2013) have a small sample of data on African cities, but this is not sufficient to make meaningful comparisons about trends and environmental quality changes. Africa's diverse climate also exerts a strong influence on particle pollution and other pollution levels in countries that experience wet and dry seasons, with air pollution noticeably peaking during the dry season (Petkova et al., 2013). Figure 2.10 shows a map of African cities and regions associated with significant climate change risk.

With limited environmental monitoring capacity outside a few large cities, much evidence of rising air pollution and climate change impacts for all cities remains scattered or anecdotal. Resilience efforts to address environmental issues is most dominant in the literature on capital cities. There is less emphasis on secondary cities and towns. However, the information is vital for a deeper understanding of the role played by inter-municipal and inter-metropolitan collaborations (Kareem et al., 2020).

The WHO Database on Outdoor Air Pollution in Cities (2012) lists many cities with recorded annual mean air pollution for PM10 $\mu g/m^3$ levels. Compared with other regions of the world, sub-Saharan Africa has low air pollution levels, although these are rising in primary cities such as Nairobi, Lagos, and Johannesburg. Little data is available for African secondary cities, except for a few documented small studies (Petkova et al., 2013).

Environmental problems associated with water pollution and flooding have become more acute for inland secondary cities, where government funds for mitigation works are limited. Many secondary cities, such as Warri in Nigeria, are located on floodplains or at the estuary of river systems, making them highly prone to tidal storm surges. Coastal ecosystems also tend to be more heavily polluted and degraded than inland ecosystems, as they accumulate downstream pollutants – especially plastics. Many coastal cities often contain large slum housing areas built over coastal swamps and wetlands, giving rise to significant public health problems (Feiden, 2011, p. 27).

The impacts of climate change on African secondary cities' development and management are significant but varied. Figure 2.10 shows a map of African cities and regions associated with climatic risks. While steps are being taken to prepare for climate change, most cities do not have baseline data or indicators to measure and track climate change or manage its impacts. At best, secondary cities in Africa will need to focus on adaptation, as they have neither the capacity nor resources to support intensive mitigation programs – other than conversions to solar. As Kareem et al. (2020 p. 15) note,

> *"More research is needed on the role played by inter-municipal and inter-metropolitan collaboration in enhancing resilience to climate change in Africa. The growing magnitude of risks and impacts in African cities means that interdependence amongst actors and decisions in capital and secondary cities is critical for effective planning on the resilience of urban systems".*

FIGURE 2.10 | Map of African cities and regions associated climatic risks



Source: Kareem et al. (2020).

2.10 Secondary Cities Crucial to the Economic Development of Africa

Although African cities are the powerhouses of national economic growth and development for the continent, it is the metropolitan regions and large metropolitan regions that are primarily responsible for this. The largest 69 cities, representing 16% of Africa's population, account for over 36% of GDP, with this proportion expected to rise in the future. Secondary cities are being outpaced and left behind in the development stakes. This leads to growing spatial inequalities in investment, wealth, income and access to government, education, and health services. The trend towards increased primacy (as previously noted, for more than half of all African countries, 30% of the urban population lives in the largest city) undermines the growth and development potential of creating strong national systems of secondary cities. It also places national economies at more significant risk than when wealth, population, and production are more evenly geo-spatially distributed within countries. This trend is not sustainable and does not provide a pathway for the future development of African cities.

While the primary cities are absorbing a significant proportion of urban growth, it is the secondary cities of between 500,000 and 1 million that are likely to experience high growth rates in the future. African governments must give greater attention to supporting the development of these cities – especially improvements to the capacity and efficiency of logistics, supply chains and value-adding systems. The McKinsey Global Institute (MGI) has predicted that the 'middleweight' cities with populations between 150,000 and 1 million will be making a more significant contribution to global GDP than they have in the past. The implications of the MGI prediction and other research findings point to secondary cities playing an increasingly prominent role in developing nations in the years to come. However, there will be significant regional differences in secondary city development across Africa, as there is much less dispersion of economic activities from national systems of cities to secondary cities. At the same time, economic growth rates per capita for cities in Asia and other regions are expected to increase substantially.

In contrast, those for Africa are expected to be more subdued. These findings suggest that significant structural adjustment is needed for secondary cities' economic governance and economies in the sub-Saharan region. They will have to run hard and reform quickly if they are to catch up with more rapidly developing regions of the world.

The impact of an additional 900 million people living in African cities by 2050 will be enormous in terms of the consumption of land, water and food, along with the increased demand for shelter, infrastructure and jobs. By then, employment growth will almost entirely occur in cities. Over 450 million additional jobs will be added to urban workforces over the three decades. Rural populations and employment prospects will decline due to continued – but slowed – migration and natural population growth rates. Stabilization of urban areas' population growth is not expected until the latter part of the century (United Nations, 2012). The challenge for governments will be to shape national spatial and economic development plans to support migration to secondary cities and to equip these cities with the resources and governance systems needed to manage more staged and targeted internal migration. This means that some regions and secondary cities may need to grow faster. In contrast, the growth of others may need to be slowed – especially where climate change and other environmental factors call for the reduction of population growth to provide a basis for sustainable city development and to manage urban growth.

The challenges of increased urban-rural migration, the post-COVID-19 impacts of more technology-driven development and systems, the decoupling of economies and a greater emphasis on economic security, and the need to address the growing problems of climate change, as well as ethnic prejudice and declining foreign aid all place additional pressures on the governments, business and citizens of Africa in the way they plan for the sustainable development of its cities over the next two decades. For all the challenges facing the development of Africa, there is a vibrancy, liveliness and optimism that thrives in its cities, especially the secondary cities and smaller towns, which can be harnessed to create jobs and improve living conditions and incomes. African cities have shown they are good at self-organizing and mobilizing community efforts to improve living conditions and the built and natural environments, as well as managing development — provided that local government and business are given the resources and freedoms to do so. It is worth repeating that local governments are key to developing resilient, robust and dynamic secondary cities.

African cities have shown they are good at self-organising and mobilising community efforts to improve living conditions and the built and natural environments, as well as managing development — provided local government and business are given the resources and freedoms to do so. Local governments are key to developing resilient, robust, and dynamic secondary cities.

This chapter has explored trends, patterns, impacts, and changes created by the African continent's urbanisation, focusing on secondary cities. More detailed research is needed on the economic, business, management, governance, liveability and environmental issues facing the future development of these cities. What are the prospects for the growth and development of sustainable secondary cities in Africa? How are some secondary cities going about improving their economic prospects, governance, well-being, and liveability? Later chapters that focus on specific countries will explore how central and local governments support the development of secondary cities, with a more in-depth case study of a secondary city for each country. The learning outcomes from these studies can be used to develop a framework that can help support national urban and economic development policy to enable secondary cities to play a more decisive role in developing national and local regional/rural economies.

The impact of an additional 900 million people living in African cities by 2050 will be enormous in terms of the consumption of land, water and food, along with the increased demand for shelter, infrastructure and jobs.

REFERENCES

A.T. Kearney. (2012). *Global Cities Index and Emerging Cities Outlook.* A.T. Kearney & Chicago Council of Global Affairs, Chicago.

AfrAsia Bank. (2018). Africa Wealth Report 2018. https://www.afrasiabank.com/media/3205/africa-wealth-report-2018.pdf

SWAC/OECD. Africapolis Data. (2015). https://africapolis.org/en/data/?country=Angola&keyfigure=totalPop&type=abs&year=2015

SWAC/OECD. Africapolis. (2018). https://africapolis.org/en/data/?country=Angola&keyfigure=totalPop&type=abs&year=2015

SWAC/OECD. Africapolis. (2020). https://africapolis.org/en/data/?country=Angola&keyfigure=totalPop&type=abs&year=2015

Amankwah-Amoah, J. (2015). Explaining declining industries in developing countries: The case of textiles and apparel in Ghana. *Competition & Change, 19*(1), 19-35.

Amraoui, B., Ouhajjou, A., Monni, S., El Amrani El Idrisi, N., & Tvaronavičienė, M. (2019). Performance of clusters in Morocco in the shifting economic and industrial reforms. *Insights into Regional Development,* 1(3), 227-243.Angelopulo, G. (2016). A Competitive Assessment of South Africa's Leading Cities — National, Continental and Global Perspectives. *Strategic Review for Southern Africa*, 39, 65-93.

Arimah, B. (2017). Infrastructure as a Catalyst for the Prosperity of African Cities. *Procedia Engineering*, 198, 245-266.

Arup. (2016). *Future Proofing Cities: Ethiopia - Regional Cities.* Arup International Development, Cities Alliance, Department for International Development, London. 50.

Arvis, J.-F., Raballand, G., & Marteau, J.-F. (2007). *The Cost of Being Landlocked: Logistics Costs and Supply Chain Reliability.* World Bank Policy Research.

Clifford, M. (1992). Soft landing for housing prices. 49.

Coquery-Vidrovitch, C. (2016). *The History Of African Cities South Of The Sahara.* eBook Publications.

Credit Suisse. (2017). *Global Wealth Data Book.* Credit Suisse Research Institute, Switzerland. 165.

Curiel, R. P. (2020). Urban Agglomeration Network. Last accessed: 30 October 2020.

DCP-Kenya – Diaspora Community Projects – Kenya. (2019). Development Corridors in Kenya - A Scoping Study. A Country Report of the Development Corridors Partnership (DCP). Contributing authors: Olago, D., Waruingi, L., Nyumba, T., Sang, C., Githiora, Y., Mwangi, M., Owira, G., Kago, F., Omangi, S., Olonde, J., & Barasa, R. Institute for Climate Change and Adaptation (ICCA) the University of Nairobi and African Conservation Centre (ACC), Nairobi, Kenya. e-Published by UNEP-WCMC, Cambridge, UK.

De la Barra, X. (1998). Poverty: the main cause of ill health in urban children. *Health Educ Behav, 25(1)*, 46-59. https://doi.org/10.1177/109019819802500105

DHS, Nigeria – Demographic and Health Surveys, Nigeria. (2018).

EIU - Economic Intelligence Unit. (2019). Best cities ranking and report: A special report from the Economist Intelligence Unit. In: *The Global Liveability Index 2019.* Economic Intelligence Unit, London.

EIU - Economic Intelligence Unit. (2012). *Hot spots: Benchmarking global city competitiveness.*

EIB - European Investment Bank. (2020). *Technical Assistance to support the African Sustainable Cities Initiative (ASCI).* European Investment Bank, Luxembourg.

Farole, T. & Moberg, L. (2017). Special Economic Zones in Africa: Government—Business Coordination in Africa and East Asia, 234-254.

Farole, T. & Moberg, L. (2014). The practice of Industrial Policy – Lessons for Africa (WIDER Working Paper 2014/152). World Institute for Development Economics Research, Seoul. 23.

Feiden, P. (2011). *Adapting to Climate Change: Cities and the Urban Poor.* International Housing Coalition, Washington. 27.

Fink, G., Weeks, J. R., & Hill, A. G. (2012). Income and health in Accra, Ghana: results from a time use and health study. *The American Journal of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene, 87*(4), 608-615.

Flight Connections. (2020). - All flights worldwide on a map! https://www.flightconnections.com

Francioni, A. (2015). *Achieving Sustainable Development: from the emergency response towards sustainable urbanisation.* UN-Habitat, Nairobi.

GCIF - Global City Indicators Facility. (2013). Last accessed: 21 January 2013. https://www.iso.org/organization/660833.html

Gebreeyesus, M. (2016). Industrial policy and development in Ethiopia. In: *Manufacturing Transformation: Comparative studies of industrial development in Africa and emerging Asia,* ed. Newman, C. et al. 27–49. UNU-WIDER, Helsinki.

Ghana. (2010). Ghana Census District Analysis. Ghana Statistical Services. https://statsghana.gov.gh

GGGI - Global Green Growth Institute. (2016). *Rwanda Launches Roadmap for Green Secondary City Development.* Global Green Growth Institute, Kigali, 10th May.

Godfrey, N., & Zhao, X. (2015). The Contribution of African Cities to the Economy and Climate Population, Economic Growth, and Carbon Emission Dynamics. In: *Technical Note.* LSE and Oxford Economics, London. 22.

Government of Ghana. (2015). Ghana National Spatial Development Framework (2015-2035). Government of Ghana, Accra. 435.

Gubic, I., & Baloi, O. (2020). Public open space initiatives for healthier cities in Rwanda. *The Journal of Public Space, 5*(2).

Haysom, G., & Fusieni, I. (2019). Governing Food Systems in Secondary Cities in Africa. In: *Consuming Urban Poverty Project, 2019*. African Centre for Cities, University of Cape Town, Cape Town.

Henderson, J., & Kriticos, S. (2017). The Development of the African System of Cities. *Annual Review of Economics.* 10.

Henderson, J. V., Nigmatulina, D., & Kriticos, S. (2018). Measuring Urban Economic Density (World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 8678). https://ssrn.com/abstract=3302954

Hoffman, R. (2015). The Systems of Secondary Cities: The neglected drivers of urbanizing economies. In: *Ciudades Sonstenibles.* Cities Alliance, Brussels.

Hommann, K., & Lall, S.V., eds. (2019). *Which Way to Livable and Productive Cities? A Road Map for Sub-Saharan Africa.* International Development in Focus. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Washington, DC. 59.

IFAD – International Fund for Agricultural Development. (2009). *Sending Money Home to Africa: Remittance markets, enabling environment and prospects.* IFAD, Rome. 20.

Ilinca, S., Di Giorgio, L., Salari, P., & Chuma, J. (2019). Socio-economic inequality and inequity in the use of health care services in Kenya: Evidence from the fourth Kenya household health expenditure and utilization survey. *International Journal for Equity in Health, 18*(1), 196.

Jackson, M. (2015). *The prosperity of African cities: Governance, Human Rights, Sustainability.* African Centre for Cities, Cape Town.

Kareem, B., Lwasa, S., Tugume, D., Mukwaya, P., Walubwa, J., Owuor, S., Kasaija, P., Sseviiri, H., Nsangi, G., & Byarugaba, D. (2020). Pathways for resilience to climate change in African cities. *Environmental Research Letters, 15*(7), 073002.

Kriticos, S. (2019). The costs of urban giants in sub-Saharan Africa. In: *Cities that Work.* International Growth Centre, London School of Economics and Political Science, London.

Kusimba, C., Kusimba, S., & Agbaje-Williams, B. (2006). *Precolonial African cities size and density.* 145-158.

Lall, S. V., Henderson, J. V., Venables, A. J. (2017). Africa's Cities: Opening Doors to the World. World Bank, Washington, DC. https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/25896 License: CC BY 3.0 IGO. http://hdl.handle.net/10986/25896

Leipzig, K. V., & Dimitrov, D. (2015). Cluster Development in the SA Tooling Industry. *The South African Journal of Industrial Engineering, 26*(3), 110-124.

Linard, C., Tatem, A. J., & Gilbert, M. (2013). Modelling spatial patterns of urban growth in Africa. *Applied Geography (Sevenoaks), 44,* 23-32.

Lone, S. A., & Ahmad, A. (2020). COVID-19 pandemic – an African perspective. *Emerging Microbes & Infections, 9*(1), 1300-1308.

Madonko, V. (2016). Bulawayo: a faded industrial giant. In: *Urban Africa Net.* Cape Town.

Mapbox . is the Marais, L. (2015). Local economic development beyond the centre: Reflections on South Africa's secondary cities. *Local Economy, 31*(1–2), 68–82.

Marais, L. (2016). *The role of secondary cities in managing urbanisation in South Africa.* Development Southern Africa. 34.

Mariyappan, J., Bhardwaj, N., De Coninck, H., Van der Linden, N. (2005). *A Guide to Bundling Small-scale CDM Projects.* European Commission, Brussels. 66.

Mayer, S. E. (2002). The Influence of Parental Income on Children's Outcomes. https://www.msd.govt.nz/documents/about-msd-and-our-work/publications-resources/research/influence-parental-income/influence-of-parental-income.pdf

Mboup, G. (2019). Africa's Smart City Foundation: Urbanisation, Urban Form and Structure, Land Tenure and Basic Infrastructures. In: *Smart Economy in Smart African Cities. Advances in 21st Century Human Settlements,* ed. Mboup, G., & Oyelaran-Oyeyinka, B. Springer, Singapore.

Mensah, C. N., Dauda, L., Boamah, K. B., & Salman, M. (2020). One district one factory policy of Ghana, a transition to a low-carbon habitable economy? *Environment, Development and Sustainability.* https://doi.org/10.1007/s10668-020-00604-5 Mitullah, W. V. (2020). African Cities and Competitiveness. In: *Urban Competitiveness in Developing Economies,* ed. Kresl, P. K. Taylor & Francis, London.

Muggah, R., & Hill, K. (2018). African cities will double in population by 2050. Here are four ways to make sure they thrive. In: *The World Economic Forum COVID Action Platform.* 27 Jun 2018, The World Economic Forum COVID Action Platform.

Musbau, R. (2019). On Lagos satellite cities' initiative. *The Guardian.* London.

Nallari, Raj; Griffith, Breda. 2013. Clusters of Competitiveness. Directions in Development--Private Sector Development;. Washington, DC: World Bank. © World Bank. https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/15788 License: CC BY 3.0 IGO."NDRC–National Development and Reform Commission. (2008). *The Outline of the Plan for the Reform and Development of the Pearl River Delta (2008-2020).* The National Development and Reform Commission. 122.

Ntsalaze, L., & Ikhide, S. (2017). The threshold effects of household indebtedness on multidimensional poverty. *International Journal of Social Economics, 44*(11), 1471-1488.

OECD/SWAC-Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Library/Sahel West Africa Club. (2020). *Africa's Urbanisation Dynamics 2020: Africapolis, Mapping a New Urban Geography.* West African Studies, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/b6bccb81-en

Okogu, J. O., & Umudjere, S.O. (2016). Tribalism as a Foiled Factor of Africa Nation-Building. *Journal of Education and Practice 7*(7), 92-94.

Oyelaran-Oyeyinka, B., & McCormick, D., eds. (2007). *Industrial clusters and innovation systems in Africa: institutions, markets, and policy.* United Nations University, Tokyo. Paccoud, A. (2011). Cities, health and well-being: Methodology for an international analysis. In: *Urban Age Hong Kong Conference.* LSE Cities, London School of Economics and Political Science, Hong Kong.

Parilla, J., & Trujillo, J. L. (2015). *South Africa's Global Gateway: Profiling The Gauteng City-Region's International Competitiveness and Connections.* The Brookings Institution Metropolitan Policy Program, Washington, DC. 56.

Petkova, E., Jack, D. W., Volavka-Close, N. H., & Kinney, P. L. (2013). Particulate matter pollution in African cities. *Air Quality, Atmosphere & Health 6,* 603-614.

Saghir, J., & Santoro, J. (2018). *Urbanisation in Sub-Saharan Africa: Meeting Challenges by Bridging Stakeholders.* Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Rhode Island.

Seto, K. C., Fragkias, M., Güneralp, B., & Reilly, M. K. (2011). A Meta-Analysis of Global Urban Land Expansion. *PLOS ONE, 6*(8), p. e23777.

Songwe, V. (2018). *Africa's Urban Transformation.* Urban Age, London. https://urbanage.lsecities.net/essays/africa-s-urban-transformation

Splinter, E., & Van Leynseele, Y. (2019). The conditional city: emerging properties of Kenya's satellite cities. *International Planning Studies 24*(3-4), 308-324.

Stein, H. (2012). Africa, Industrial Policy, and Export Processing Zones: Lessons from Asia. In: *Good Growth and Governance in Africa: Rethinking Development Strategies,* ed. Noman, A., Botchwey, K., Stein, H., & Stiglitz, J. E. Oxford Scholarship Online.

Sulemana, I., Nketiah-Amponsah, E., Codjoe, E. A., Andoh, J. A. N. (2019). Urbanisation and income inequality in Sub-Saharan Africa. *Sustainable Cities and Society, 48,* 101544.

SWAC-Sahel and West Africa Club. (2020). Africapolis Data Sets, in: *Africapolis Agglomeration Data.* OECD, Paris.

de la Torre, R., & Moreno, H. (2010). Advances in the sub-national measurement of the Human Development Index: The case of Mexico. Human Development Research Paper 2010/23. United Nations Development Program, Nairobi. 47.

Tuholske, C., Caylor, K., Evans, T., & Avery, R. (2019). Variability in urban population distributions across Africa. *Environmental Research Letters, 14*(8), 085009.

UNCTAD. (2019). Foreign direct investment to Africa defies the global slump, rising eleven per cent. Last accessed: 25 November 2020. https://unctad.org/news/foreign-direct-investment-africa-defies-global-slump-rises-11#:~:text=There%20are%20an%20estimated%20237,number%20in%20Kenya%20(61)

UN DESA-United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs. (2019). Urbanisation Prospects. Data Base https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.URB.TOTL.IN.ZS

UN DESA-United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs. (2020). Urbanisation Prospects. Data Base https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.URB.TOTL.IN.ZS

UNDP-United Nations Development Programme. (2010). Gorontalo Province Development Report: Planning with Human Development Index. BAPPENAS & UNDP, Jakarta, Indonesia.

UNDP-United Nations Development Programme. (2011). Human Development Report: Sustainability and Equity: A Better Future for All. In: *Human Development Report.* UNDP, New York. 185.

UN-Habitat & ESCAP-United Nations Human Settlement Program & Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific. (2012). City Prosperity Initiative. Last accessed: 8 December 2020. https://unhabitat.org/city-prosperity-initiative

UN-Habitat-United Nations Human Settlement Program. (2010a). *State of the World's Cities 2010/2011- Bridging The Urban Divide.* United Nations Centre for Human Settlements, Nairobi. 224.

UN-Habitat-United Nations Human Settlement Program. (2010b). *The State of African Cities 2010: Governance, Inequality and Urban Landmarks.* UN-HABITAT, Nairobi. 268.

UN-Habitat-United Nations Human Settlement Program. (2012). *The State of Arab Cities 2012: A comprehensive analysis of the urbanisation processes in the Arab States.* United Nations Centre to Human Settlements, Nairobi.

UNICEF & UN-Habitat-United Nations Children's Fund & United Nations Human Settlement Program. (2020). Analysis of Multiple Deprivations in Secondary Cities in Sub-Saharan Africa. Cardno, Nairobi. 56. https://unhabitat.org/sites/default/files/2021/04/analysis_of_multiple_deprivations_in_secondary_cities_-_analysis_report.pdf

United Nations. (2012). *World Urbanisation Prospects: The 2012 Revision.* Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations, New York.

Viviers, W., Pisa, N., & Rossouw, R. (2015). Identifying Industrial Clusters For Regional Economic Diversification: The Case Of South Africa's North West Province. *International Business and Economics Research Journal 14*, 501-524.

Wall, R. S., Maseland, J., Rochell, K., & Spaliviero, M. (2018). *The State of African Cities 2018: The geography of African investment.* UN-Habitat and IHS-Erasmus University Rotterdam, Nairobi. 127.

Watson & Associates. (2019). *Economists, Population, Housing and Employment Growth Forecast, 2016 to 2046, City of Kingston.* Watson & Associates Economists, Kingston, Ontario. 170.

WHO-World Health Organization (2012). *Outdoor Air Pollution in Cities.* Word Health Organization, Geneva.

World Bank. (2009). Reshaping Economic Geography. In: *World Development Report, 2009*. World Bank, Washington. 440.

World Bank. (2010). *Africa's Infrastructure: A Time for Transformation*, ed. Foster, V., & Briceño-Garmendia, C. World Bank, Washington, DC. 27.

World Bank Data, 2020 Database Indicators. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator

World Bank. (2021). *African Cities Diagnostic.* World Bank, Washington, DC.

World Economic Forum. (2014). *The Global Competitiveness Report 2014*. World Economic Forum, Geneva. 2014-2015SRC.

World Economic Forum. (2019). *Why Africa's economic future lies in its smaller cities.*

Wu, J. J., Sun, H. J., & Gao, Z. Y. (2008). Dynamic urban traffic flow behavior on scale-free networks. *Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, 387*(2), 653-660.

Xu, G., Dong, T., Cobbinah, P. B., Jiao, L., Sumari, N. S., Chai, B., & Liu, Y. (2019). Urban expansion and form changes across African cities with a global outlook: Spatiotemporal analysis of urban land densities. *Journal of Cleaner Production 224*, 802-810.

Zanzibar Tourism Authority (2010). Zanzibar Tourism Policy. http://www.zanzibartourism.net/docs/policystatement.pdf

Zimmer, A., Guido, Z., Tuholske, C., Pakalniskis, A., Lopus, S., Caylor, K., & Evans, T. (2020). Dynamics of population growth in secondary cities across southern Africa. *Landscape Ecology, 35*, 2501-2516.

ENDNOTES

(1) One District One Factory (1D1F) initiative, Ghana. https://1d1f.gov.gh/

3

DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGES

BRIAN H. ROBERTS AND
GODFREY O. ANYUMBA

Secondary cities — often called intermediate middle-sized, and second-level cities — present conceptual, administrative and definitional challenges for African governments. Only a few African countries recognise this typology of cities or incorporate the term 'secondary cities' into national urban policy frameworks or urban settlement development (Muawwad & Hassan, 1999; Kenaway, 2017). Others recognise secondary cities only as part of political and administrative structures and for the de facto roles they play as economic centres important to connectivity within rural hinterlands. However, recent literature shows an emerging awareness of the importance of secondary cities by African governments (UNICEF and UN-Habitat, 2020), not just in terms of their administrative role, but also their significance in supporting devolution, decentralization, connectivity, functionality, logistics, value-adding, trade and production within national and global systems cities (Roberts, 2014). There are varying viewpoints about the characteristics and functions of secondary cities (as discussed in Chapter 1).

Although population size has been used as a basis for determining what constitutes a 'secondary city', functionality may play a more important role – especially for smaller secondary cities in some countries. For example, in countries with small national spatial territories and demographically low-level urbanisation, such as Burundi, Djibouti, Eswatini (formerly Swaziland), Eretria, Lesotho and Somaliland, the ratio of the population of the capital city to the next largest city does not fit the traditional mould of secondary cities based on population size. At the other extreme are large cities with populations of over 1 million, such as Ibadan (Nigeria) and Mombasa in Kenya (DCP Kenya, 2019), which are nevertheless considered 'secondary cities' rather than 'metropolitan regions'. The nomenclature for secondary cities also varies by different countries: in Rwanda, they are referred to as 'niche secondary cities' (Rwanda Governance Board, 2016), while Kenya and South Africa refer to them as 'secondary cities' (Otiso, 2005; South African Cities Network, 2012). In Ethiopia, they are referred to as 'intermediate cities' (OECD Policy Studies Institute, 2020); in Uganda, they are known as 'regional' and 'strategic' cities (Cities Alliance, 2016a); and in Egypt, they are referred to as 'new urban communities' (Ellahham, 2014).

PHOTO 3.1
Korhogo, Côte d'Ivoire: many people use motorbikes as vehicles to get around the rural and urban areas

This chapter seeks to summarize the main challenges facing the development of Africa's secondary cities. It draws on an extensive range of studies on urbanisation, urban systems, planning and development of African cities (Pumain & Moriconi-Ebrard, 1997; Nwaka, 2005; Njoh 2007; Matos et al., 2009). However, the literature on secondary cities is not substantial, it is geographically uneven, and it varies in content and detail. Data is generally limited, with few primary research studies available.

Along with development challenges, the chapter covers themes related to social planning, poverty alleviation and community development; land administration and management; environmental management; and social issues.

3.1 Development Challenges facing Secondary Cities

The challenges and problems facing African cities have been documented extensively (JICA Research Institute, 2013), but with minimal focus on secondary cities. In national urbanisation policy debates, plans and strategies, secondary cities are seldom considered part of the solution to connectivity issues. Their potential role in fostering equitable economic growth and balanced migration is seldom recognised. Secondary cities have a strategic role in producing and distributing agricultural products consumed in metropolitan regions. They are centres for 'the preservation of traditions', architecturally, culturally, religiously, linguistically. In this respect, secondary cities are "an extraordinary heritage to be safeguarded and can play the fundamental role of preserving the environment, traditions and diversity" (Monica, 2020).

Secondary cities have many issues in common with smaller and large cities across the continent, but some issues are unique or more challenging to secondary cities. The following sections focus on secondary cities in Africa and review some of the literature on the development challenges and problems they face. A section on policy responses to these issues then follows.

Secondary cities have many issues in common with smaller and large cities across the continent, but some issues are unique or more challenging to secondary cities.

3.1.1 COVID 19

The most immediate challenge to African secondary cities is COVID-19 recovery. No country was prepared for the local or global impacts of the pandemic. But the impact on already vulnerable African countries and cities has been catastrophic (Cillers et al., 2020). The COVID-19 pandemic is simultaneously both a severe health problem and a severe economic problem, which will have profound, ongoing economic, governance, health, social and poverty impacts (Onzili, 2020). The conditions that prevail in Africa's urban areas – the unplanned nature of cities, the prevalence of informal areas and slums (see Photo 32), poor governance, lack of infrastructure and services, poor economic and logistics capabilities, high poverty levels and overcrowding – aggravate the pandemic's transmission. These conditions have also impeded the roll-out of vaccination programs (UN Habitat, 2020).

While the impacts of COVID-19 have been most pronounced in Africa's largest cities, they are likely to be prolonged and just as significant in secondary cities and rural regions, where testing facilities, medical services and logistics are especially inadequate.

PHOTO 3.2
Izwelethu, also known as 'Covid', is an informal settlement outside Cape Town

The pandemic has also had significant impacts on international and local trade and the flow of international development assistance worldwide. This is likely to have marked repercussions for many African countries and cities, irrespective of their size. Therefore, significant international development assistance is essential to aid the recovery of African countries and cities. Development assistance must be given equitably across all cities, including secondary cities, and not be focused on the metropolises.

Central governments have deployed national budgets and central banks to mitigate the impacts of the pandemic, but significant shortfalls and cutbacks are expected in other 'less essential' areas as governments prioritise spending on COVID-19 response and recovery. Such restrictions will affect all sectors of the economy at both national and local levels. The economies of secondary cities in particular, which have a high dependency on transfers from central governments, will be significantly impacted. A recent OECD-CoR survey found that sub-national governments in medium and highly decentralised countries are more likely to experience higher revenue losses due to COVID-19 than are those in more centralised countries (OECD-CoR, 2020).

The unpredictability and disruptions caused by COVID-19 create challenges to managing the spread of and recovery from the pandemic. These challenges include providing adequate finances, supplies, and logistics support needed to minimise short- and long-term impacts and restore a degree of normality and recovery to people's lives and the economy. Meaningful recovery will require well-developed and equitable national and local policies, as well as international support.

3.1.2 Urban Development Policies

The previous chapter provided an overview of urban development policies in Africa. The development of secondary cities is being hindered by ineffective national urban policies that have become biased towards the development of metropolitan regions. Few secondary cities have updated spatial or land-use plans or have enforced the provisions of these. Most plans are unrealistic in terms of the financial and human resources needed for their implementation. Many secondary cities do not have qualified planners or building inspectors. Secondary cities lack essential services such as energy, water, roads and communications networks, and their installation occurs at a much slower rate than does the growth of urbanisation (Monica, 2020).

The bias towards the development of metropolitan regions runs throughout Africa. Nairobi's domination within Kenya's system of cities has had very negative consequences for secondary city development (Otiso, 2005). South Africa's National Development Plan of 2011 noted that a principal focus of urban development was towards the country's largest cities – in contrast to the stagnation of small rural towns (South African Government, 2011). Kigali, Rwanda's capital, accounts for 50% of the country's urban population and has received the most investment in urban development; however, this will change with the current decentralisation plans. Similar concerns are expressed about the over-concentration of urban development in Accra and Kumasi in Ghana (Yankson et al., 2017) and Kampala City in Uganda (Sladoje et al., 2019).

Many secondary cities do not have qualified planners or building inspectors.

3.1.2.1 Urban Planning

The planning policy frameworks for the development of secondary cities across Africa are relatively weak and ineffective. This applies to secondary cities in regional areas and those on the periphery of large metropolitan regions. Most large cities have master plans to guide the physical development of the metropolitan regions, including plans for satellite secondary cities. Unfortunately, many are outdated, are poorly formulated, carry no risk assessment and do not have the funding sources for implementation. Even where cities have moved to structure planning in order to provide more flexibility in the planning process, implementation at both primary and secondary city levels has proved problematic (UN-Habitat, 2004, p. 52).

Urban planning and management in Africa are ineffective – and are key reasons for poor quality urban development, growth of informal settlements and the lack of infrastructure in many secondary cities (Kessides, 2005, p. 116; Silva, 2012, p. 50). Secondary cities have been more adversely affected than metropolitan regions (John, 2012, p. 73; UN-Habitat, 1991, p. 154) by the ineffectiveness of urban planning and management, as many have no planning and development control capacity.

The education of planners in Africa is inadequate but is fundamental to addressing the planning and management issues. There are insufficient numbers of adequately trained graduates or experienced planners to meet demand. Urban planner education and training need to be improved and be more responsive to Africa's urbanisation problems (Lwasa, 2012; Odendaal, 2012, pp. 50–51), especially for planning peri-urban and informal settlement areas.

Some countries, such as Ghana, Kenya and South Africa, have introduced planning reforms and legislation, but few have advanced beyond land-use planning to more strategic and integrated planning. Many have adopted participatory (stakeholder engagement, consultation) planning. None have developed integrated, online development-approval systems where progress on development applications can be tracked. The reform and

use of e-based platforms for managing planning land-use and development-control processes are crucial to the modernisation of planning in secondary cities. Integrated planning, including online systems for development approval, monitoring and evaluation, is essential to modernising the planning systems and overseeing progress in implementing the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) at national and local levels.

3.1.3 Economic Development

Studies show a widening gap between primary and secondary cities in economic development and investment opportunities (Roberts, 2014; UNICEF and UN-Habitat, 2020). This gap has occurred because African secondary cities have not advanced in the development cycle as far as other regions of the world. Governments have been slow to enact policies and investment regimes that narrow the gap.

All cities go through an evolutionary stage of development. A set of dynamic changes can take a secondary city from a regional service-centre economy shaped by population size to a higher level, for example, the development of a large-scale mining project. Figure 3.1 shows the dynamics of growth and diversification in the development of secondary cities. Regional population growth and migration combined with locational advantages and good transport and logistics systems influence factors that trigger the growth and development of secondary and metropolitan regions. Secondary cities eventually reach a level of agglomeration where economies of scale create opportunities for diversification and development. Secondary cities then begin to specialise, create local growth industries and compete against each other for trade, investment and development opportunities. Governments often intervene to stimulate new growth industries, which lead to greater specialisation and spin-off supply chain industries. This gives secondary cities a competitive advantage, from which to develop trade and export markets.

FIGURE 3.1 | Dynamics of growth and diversification in secondary cities



Source: Rondinelli (1983).

During the 1980s in other regions of the world, especially Asia, globalisation led to many secondary cities capturing and creating new industries, supported by cheap semi-skilled labour and land, good infrastructure, limited environmental approval conditions and tax incentives (see discussion on EPZs, section 2.4.3). As a result, secondary cities become fully integrated into global supply chains, financial networks and new technologies. By being flexible and innovative in responding to change, and by creating significant productivity gains, many secondary cities in developing and middle-income countries have diversified and added depth to the development of their local economies. Many secondary cities compete internationally for markets, trade, and investment in more advanced countries, increasing competitive and collaborative advantage.

Few secondary cities outside southern and northern African countries have moved beyond the comparative advantage stage of development. Some have managed to capture a competitive advantage in tourism, such as Arusha in Tanzania and Warri in Nigeria, but economic diversification is low. African economies have remained broadly protective, and governments have failed to develop strategic infrastructure and foster competition nationally and internationally between cities. As a result, they are often inefficient, uncompetitive, and weak in trade negotiations. Most African secondary cities have developed and remain primarily consumption-driven regional market centres that produce few value-added primary, manufacturing, or service industry products. This is not sustainable if these cities are to create decent jobs in the future.

The policy challenge for governments is how to turn around the economic development and diversity of secondary cities. National urban and regional development policy has failed to adequately support secondary cities' development and instead has focused on inequitable spending in metropolitan regions. African secondary cities are endowed with many natural and material resources, but they have low economic strength, weak economic governance, little value-adding transformation capacity, and are not engaged in specialisation, nor have they capitalised on their uniqueness (UN Habitat, 2020). However, there are some good models, such as Teuton in Morocco, that have focused on creating a competitive position based on the strength of their tangible assets and advantages, e.g., cultural, historical, and religious pilgrimage destinations.

African secondary cities fall behind metropolitan regions in virtually all SDG development indicators (UN Habitat, 2020). Most are not connected to global networks that propel urban investment (see Chapter 2). Little direct foreign investment (FDI) finds its way into private capital markets, works programs, and secondary cities' investment. As a result, many are cut off from access to funds, information and goods, new infrastructure, and development opportunities.

African economies have remained broadly protective, and governments have failed to develop strategic infrastructure and foster competition nationally and internationally between cities. As a result, they are often inefficient, uncompetitive, and weak in trade negotiations.

Cities Alliance's *Future Cities Africa* report (Cities Alliance, 2016b) argues that the robustness of a city's economy and economic development is dependent on five key factors:

- Productivity of the city's human capital.
- Diversity of the local economy, including the informal sector.
- Supportive institutional and governance environment.
- Influence of national and regional factors on the local economy.
- Impacts of local economy outputs.

Human capital refers to the knowledge, skills, competencies, and other features relevant to support local economic functions and development. Human capital development in African secondary cities is weak – especially in the legal, financial, built environment, professional and knowledge services. There is also a lack of financial-management capabilities and data that are specific to a given city. Personnel, social services and health workers in secondary cities tend to have poorer qualifications and professional educations. The weakness in these human capital assets and capabilities has long-term impacts on developing secondary city economies across the continent (UN Habitat, 2020).

In Uganda, however, the strategic policy is to develop specialised secondary cities driven by planned economies. These include Hoima (oil) (Shell, 1999), Nakasongola (industrial), Fort Portal (tourism), Moroto (mining) and Jinja (industrial). A key objective to support job creation in Uganda's secondary cities is to collaborate in a regional approach to development attained by boosting growth-oriented small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), the growth of knowledge industries, and locational advantages in secondary cities. Uganda's emphasis on balanced urbanisation and investment in secondary cities is not without problems. There is still insufficient attention to capacity building and to building awareness about how secondary cities can adopt and translate policies that drive local economic development (Randolph et al., 2019).

Uganda also needs policies and programs to develop and strengthen local networks that connect government and business to support private sector development. A 'community college' (Mann, 2017, p. 21) model form of partnership between the education, local government and business sectors could significantly benefit the development of Uganda's secondary cities (Cities Alliance, 2012). The pivotal issues include strengthening coordination between national and local stakeholders to formulate and implement job creation/economic policies and plans for secondary cities and forge local, multi-stakeholder coalitions to support SMEs and job creation (Sladoje et al., 2019).

In Ethiopia, knowledge gaps (lack of requisite/empirical data on how ICs can contribute to economic development) in intermediate cities (secondary cities) hinder rural and regional development. These cities are viewed as catalysts for rural transformation, but with poor socio-economic data, weak governance systems, lack of decision-making autonomy and limited financing, it is not easy to plan for the strategic infrastructure required (see Chapter 8, on Ethiopia). Ethiopia's secondary cities face a development gap due to a lack of coordinated policies to address and meet the needs and the shortcomings of local government capacities and lack of infrastructure.

Rwanda's urbanisation strategy focuses on promoting secondary city economic growth and development beyond the capital, Kigali. Rwanda has identified six secondary cities to support in order to stimulate their growth and development. The policy objectives for the strategy include the following:

- Make their future more predictable, given specific regional challenges, current necessities, and structural transformation needs (Rwanda Governance Board, 2016).
- Enhance institutional and capacity building in leadership.
- Orient economic development in niche sectors specific to the six niche regions.

Musanze is the fourth largest town in Rwanda. It is a tourism destination and a base for visiting the nearby gorilla colonies. It is envisaged as an 'ambassador city' designed to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) and foreign visitors to increase export earnings to the country and the northern province district.

Morocco has recently announced a strategy that identifies the role of intermediate cities in the post-COVID-19 recovery under the National Strategy of Intermediate [secondary] Cities in articulation with the Sustainable Development Goals (Mebtoul, 2020). Intermediate cities in Morocco are considered key in creating economic growth engines, creativity, innovation, and attraction outside the metropolitan regions. They constitute important strategic links that contribute to the structuring of the national urban framework.

3.1.4 Urban Governance

Both public and private institutional performance of secondary cities are crucial for local and regional development and efficient public services delivery. The quality of governance in public institutions – their effectiveness and efficiency – can be a catalyst to facilitate and enhance economic development – or to impede it. Institutions encompass both government structures and governance processes, including regulatory frameworks. They also embody leadership. Institutions play critical roles in the economy and society and in addressing environmental issues. They can have positive and negative effects on factors ranging from economic performance to quality of life.

Governance and institutional deficiencies permeate African secondary city management, creating gaps in urban governance capacity and sound urbanisation policies. Typically, these lack a combination of firm legal foundations, institutional capabilities, administrative procedures, and financial instruments, resulting in dysfunctional governance. This is caused, in many cases, by the lack of clarity in the separation of powers and responsibilities between levels of government and the lack of autonomy given to local governments. Inherent institutional weaknesses are central to determining urban governance effectiveness, reflected at metropolitan and lesser city government levels (UN Habitat, 2020). The parallel structure of chieftaincy adds another level of governance that makes decision-making difficult, especially concerning land, resulting in clashes between civil and customary laws and land-use practices.

In Kenya, devolved governance was incorporated into its constitution, but it has not proved easy to implement. In the pre-devolution era, the unwillingness to share political and fiscal power with regional and municipal governments was a reason given for the failure in Kenya's national governance and administration structures (Otiso, 2005). A decade after devolution, the central government is still dictating terms, especially on grants and other fiscal transfers, economic development, and infrastructure projects. Despite recent local government reforms, the devolution process has been slow (Nassiuma et al., 2015) and is frustrated by the lack of institutional capacity at the local-government secondary-city level.

Mozambique faces governance challenges in fragmented urban institutions, lack of capacity and ineffective administrations (Cities Alliance, 2016). By contrast, South Africa's planning system is possibly the most comprehensively structured in Africa. However, the South African government has not recognised the notion of 'secondary cities' as encompassing a unique set of cities requiring a distinct governance approach to their potential for driving the country's development (South African Cities Network, 2012). In many South African secondary city municipalities, the poor state of management is evidence that a well-articulated institutional governance structure based on the national constitution is no guarantee for efficient and effective local governance. The mismanagement of finances, inadequate service delivery and corruption in metropolitan and secondary cities have had detrimental effects on developing the country's national system of cities (Siddle & Koelble, 2016).

Although the good intentions of many governments are to devolve administrative and fiscal functions and to clarify responsibilities for implementing services and capital works programs in African metropolitan and secondary cities, few cities have reached the functional level of governance that existed under colonial rule. Substantial international development assistance has been given over many decades to improve regional urban management and governance. Although some progress has been made, it has not been sufficient for secondary cities to catch up with or get ahead of what is needed to manage rapid urbanisation and foster sustainable economic development.

National policies and programs to reform and revise constitutional and other provisions for the devolution of powers and responsibilities to local government, especially recognising the role of secondary cities is crucial to enhancing national economic performance and sustainable development. Without this recognition, secondary cities will not compete with other regions of the world for trade, investment, and jobs. There is currently a tendency towards re-centralisation of government in Africa, which has become more prevalent with COVID-19. The challenge in post-COVID-19 recovery is getting decentralization of governance back onto the policy agenda. The need for advocacy policies from all industry sectors and the community will be crucial for this to occur.

3.1.5 Finance

Due to their smaller populations, secondary cities are constrained by higher transaction costs, and they can't take advantage of economies of scale and match the agglomeration advantages of metropolitan regions. Secondary cities' revenue and capital needs far exceed local governments' capacity to deliver critical infrastructure and social services, even in the best-run cities (Sy, 2016). This lack of capacity undermines their competitiveness and limits the potential for market growth. Financial challenges faced by African secondary cities include reduced fiscal transfers, poor access to capital, and lower returns on investment than for metropolitan regions. Greater decentralization and devolution of administrative, fiscal and services delivery has improved productivity, performance and governance in secondary cities in some countries, but progress has slowed and, in some cases, has been reversed due to the COVID-19 pandemic. As noted in the OECD report, *The territorial impact of COVID-19: Managing the crisis across levels of government* (OECD, 2020, p. 29):

> "In countries where the level of decentralisation is high, the impact on subnational government expenditure will be higher, particularly in spending areas most affected by the crisis (i.e., health, social protection, education, utility services, economic development, etc.). This is also true for revenue. This is confirmed by the OECD-CoR survey, which shows that subnational governments in medium and highly decentralised countries are more likely to anticipate experiencing higher losses in revenue as a result of the COVID-19 crisis than in more centralised countries."

Municipal finance policy reforms are essential and urgent. Financial management and local revenue collection challenges to support the development of secondary cities and improving service delivery and are discussed in detail in Chapter 6. Other policy reforms are required in the areas discussed in the following sections.

Greater decentralization and devolution of administrative, fiscal and services delivery has improved productivity, performance and governance in secondary cities in some countries, but progress has slowed and, in some cases, has been reversed due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

3.1.5.1 Social Contract to Pay for Urban Services

African cities' local governments generally are poor at collecting property taxes and other charges. There is still a heavy reliance on central government grants and transfers to fund infrastructure, maintenance, and local government services. In secondary cities, more than half the budget outlays are spent on wages and salaries. Studies show that secondary cities collect less tax per capita than large cities. Kampala collects US$6 per capita in Uganda compared to less than US$4 per capita in secondary cities (Hommann & Lall, 2019).The wealthy and diaspora property owners pay an inequitable share of taxes for the services they use or the resources they consume. Improved revenue collection remains a systemic problem for secondary cities. In many African countries, the unwillingness of central and local governments to do anything about it has been one of the most outstanding public sector financial management failures since independence.

Not only do the rich and powerful in municipalities and secondary cities avoid paying taxes, but the informal sector workforce also pays little central and local government tax towards the cost of providing and maintaining infrastructure and urban services. Approximately 70% of non-agricultural employment in Africa is in the informal sector (Jackson, 2016), which generates over 42% of sub-Saharan Africa's gross national income (Verick, 2006). This is much higher in cities (Etim & Daramola, 2020, p. 134), especially in secondary cities, which tend to have higher informal-sector employment levels.

The informal sector is central to the economy of secondary cities. However, informal-sector employment activities are mostly unregulated, uncontrolled, and occur in unsafe working environments (Cities Alliance, 2021; Masakorala & Dayawansa, 2015). Many small businesses engaged in the sector are significant contributors to waste and groundwater pollution, consume unmetered water, and illegally access electricity. Central and local governments have a strong reluctance to collect local taxes and revenues from the informal sector, despite compelling evidence that the informal sector should, and would be willing to, pay taxes for better services (Joshi et al., 2014). Current collection mechanisms are inefficient, given the low amounts per individual collection and the high costs involved for each transaction, and the mechanisms are subject to abuse and corruption. Informal taxation systems exist in the most impoverished residential communities in African cities, with vigilante groups imposing informal taxes to provide essential urban services and protection. There is an obligation also in many informal-sector poor communities to pay tithes to local mosques, churches and traditional religious leaders.

Policy and regulatory reforms are needed to indirectly capture local revenue from formal and informal employment sectors to pay for improved public utilities and services. South Africa and Tanzania have introduced policies for local governments to outsource tax revenue collection in secondary cities (Haas & Manwaring, 2016, p. 14). However, central governments should also allow local governments to capture revenue via community services charges through services such as banking, mobile phone, electricity, gas, or water bills. This practice has been used elsewhere, for example, in Sri Lanka.

Local government financial management must ensure greater community engagement in budget policy and responsibility for paying for urban services. This is a contentious but necessary area of policy reform, if secondary cities are to adequately fund the public services their economies need, not only to exist but significantly to grow and develop and to offset some of the costs of informal settlements and create a more equitable revenue platform.

> *The wealthy and diaspora property owners pay an inequitable share of taxes for the services they use or the resources they consume. Improved revenue collection remains a systemic problem for secondary cities.*

3.1.5.2 Foreign Direct Investments

Foreign direct investment is central to government policy to support the development of African cities and countries. Private FDI firms discriminate on the terms and conditions and locations for their investments. Metropolitan regions receive the majority of urban sector FDI (see Chapter 5). Most goes to transportation corridors, agriculture, energy, and telecommunications. Africa's secondary cities generally only feature as part of FDI if they are close to primary cities or close to national highways, rail, and port networks (UN Habitat, 2018). For example, since its founding, Thika, a secondary satellite city to the north of Nairobi, has benefitted from its proximity to Nairobi.

Governments have been slow to recognise that secondary cities only attract FDI when enabling environments are in place to create a competitive advantage from the location to resources, materials, agglomeration, integrated logistics and transport systems and industry clustering. To build these enabling environments, specialist infrastructure, skills, technology, education, research and development facilities must be available, produced, and provided to international standards. Increasingly, quality of life factors, such as good quality housing, education and health services, are also a necessary part of the mix. Central and local governments need to identify new ideas and policies to create more specialised and competitive enabling environments to attract FDI to secondary cities and explore ways to tap the informal sector's unrealised human capital potential (Cities Alliance, 2018a; Masakorala & Dayawansa, 2015).

3.1.6 Entrepreneurship

There is no shortage of entrepreneurship in African secondary cities or amongst the diaspora associated with them. Strong support for local entrepreneurship is crucial to overcome underutilised human capital challenges. Fostering entrepreneurship can encourage business development and develop innovative solutions to building or restoring infrastructure and services and rebuilding dysfunctional institutions. It is crucial for improving the socio-economic conditions that prevail in most secondary cities.

A relatively unexplored area of finance and investment support is associated with youth entrepreneurs. A study of youth entrepreneurs in 10 African countries (Gough & Langevang, 2017) found that many young people have begun investing in local entrepreneurial enterprises – from software to designer garments.

The study found that the level of youth entrepreneurship based on the opportunity was 87%. The primary intentions were to create jobs for themselves and others, create personal wealth, earn more money, and become bosses. Many of the youth entrepreneurs had tertiary qualifications, were well-travelled, optimistic, technologically savvy, and previously employed. Friends and family had played a crucial role in the formation of the entrepreneurs. Across the 10 countries, the challenges were found to be similar, with the most significant being access to finance – indicating a need for commercial banks to review their lending policies. The study recommended that governments take a more active role in policies and initiatives that give greater access to finance, reduce administrative burdens, improve tax regimes, and encourage the private and educational sectors to develop entrepreneurship. In addition, technology and telecommunications networks should be expanded to provide better access to business support and training and improved access to electricity supply and other essential services (Chiloane & Botha, 2019).

A vital policy lesson from this study is that secondary city governments need to work with central governments to develop low-cost start-up premises, access to shared-use facilities, and provide small amounts of venture start-up capital. Such policy reforms will be necessary to create new entrepreneurs and businesses in secondary cities post-COVID-19.

3.1.7 Infrastructure

A report by the African Development Bank (AfDB), *An Integrated Approach to Infrastructure Provision in Africa* (African Development Bank, 2013) provides a quantitative account of infrastructure challenges in large and secondary cities, rural hinterlands, and 'deep rural' Africa. World Bank Indicators show that Africa's urban infrastructure is lagging significantly behind other low-income countries. The most significant gap is in the energy sector: ICT services are inadequate, except in countries like Rwanda. Road densities, access to potable water and sanitation services are comparable to some lower-income Asian economies. The capital costs of infrastructure provision by density (US$ per capita) for different delivery technologies for water, sanitation, power, roads and ICT are significantly lower in large cities compared to secondary and smaller cities (African Development Bank, 2013, p. 62). Economies of scale and demand are the primary factors for the differences.

Overall, infrastructure capital costs are lower in high-density large cities. The unit costs of infrastructure are significantly higher in secondary cities and even higher for 'rural hinterland' and 'deep rural areas. However, sustainable technology solutions can reduce capital and operating costs, improve latrines and community

septic tank sanitation, and introduce local area solar energy networks, waste management, and recycling. The AfDB has called for a strategic vision for the infrastructure agenda to introduce greater technology to reduce infrastructure construction and life cycle costs (African Development Bank, 2013, p. 62). New but not necessarily advanced technologies adapted for local use are needed to develop smart infrastructure for secondary cities. This step is crucial to lowering infrastructure transaction and lifecycle costs in secondary cities to enable them to become more competitive and overcome the agglomeration and economies-of-scale advantages enjoyed by metropolitan regions.

Access to transportation and communication networks; energy grids; sewerage and waste disposal systems; health, social and educational facilities; and economic infrastructure are essential to make secondary cities an attractive place to work and live. The absence or low level of infrastructure investment is a barrier to the development of secondary cities (Roberts & Lindfield, 2020). Infrastructure is not restricted to (hard) physical assets; it also includes the soft infrastructure, including governance and social and fiscal capital. The quality of infrastructure affects competitiveness, investment attractiveness and visitor flows (UN-Habitat, 2020).

Asset management and maintenance is also a significant problem for secondary cities. Poorly run and maintained infrastructure and physical assets add to operational and external costs of business and government. Most African secondary-city local governments underspend substantially on or have inadequate funds to maintain infrastructure assets. Few local governments budget for the financial, human and material resources needed to manage infrastructure assets over their lifespan (Hanif et al., 2021). Elected representatives have a propensity to focus on 'new and shiny' projects that win votes. Neglected infrastructure leads to asset inefficiencies, reduced returns and higher replacement costs. New infrastructure is often built without an asset management framework that supports reliable, inclusive, and sustainable essential services and maintenance (Hanif et al., 2021, p. 67). This can be extremely costly to the ongoing operation of the infrastructure and budgets in secondary cities, as noted in a comprehensive United Nations manual on *Managing Infrastructure Assets for Sustainable Development* (Hanif et al., 2021):

> "Underinvestment in infrastructure maintenance is estimated to cost some developing countries up to 2 per cent growth in GDP. Under-maintained infrastructure assets are more likely to fail, disrupting essential services like transport, water and sanitation or solid waste management. Such vulnerabilities become particularly evident — and the consequences even worse — in times of crises that put a strain on these assets" (p. 67).

3.1.8 Connectivity

Connectivity is "the state or quality of being connective or connected" (Merriam-Webster, 2018). The term can be applied widely to systems and how the various elements or components interact. Connectivity has both physical (Mariyappan et al., 2005, p. 66) and metaphysical (Laszlo and Abraham, 2010) attributes. These attributes can be measured in terms of flows and exchanges of information, knowledge, goods and services between hubs and nodes that make up national and regional systems of cities involving infrastructure and enabling environment networks. Physical connectivity, such as roads and telecommunications, is relatively easy to document and measure across networks. Metaphysical connectivity, e.g., knowledge and information sharing between cities and firms, and social capital is much more challenging to identify and measure. Countries such Morocco and Tunisia have started focusing on improving inter-city connectivity, but in general, African cities, businesses, and institutions are poorly connected, both physically and metaphysically.

PHOTO 3.3
State of roads to ports: Severe road erosion, the Democratic Republic of the Congo

© Source: The Maritime Executive.

Factors that affect connectivity and development within systems of cities include:

- The physical nature and ease of access to infrastructure networks that support the flow or exchange of information, material, or spatial movement of many types of goods and services.
- Economic, governance, ideological, social, legal, and other non-physical types of rules, regulations, technologies, and modalities that provide access to public and private goods and services within cities and other locations.
- Freedom of movement, immigration, ideas, and speech.
- General levels of literacy, education, skills and language, etc., that give equitable access to knowledge and learning.
- The quality, scope, scale, density, flexibility, and capacity of infrastructure and networks to deliver services and respond to change.
- Opening of local economies to competition, change, foreign investment, and international exchanges, and foreigners.
- Shared community values, beliefs, tolerances, welcomeness, and attitudes of belonging to country, place, and society.

Africa's secondary cities are generally poorly connected physically by national highways, rail, air services and ICT networks. The transcontinental routes between north and south and between east and west Africa, planned for more than a century, have never been completed. Shipping and air connections between countries, except northern and southern Africa, are limited. Pipe and transmission line infrastructure are also crucial to enhanced connectivity of energy and water systems (UN Habitat, 2020). Connectivity and access to health, education, financial and transport services are critical to well-functioning and liveable cities. Secondary cities, especially inland, have poor access to many of these services. One of the few areas where secondary cites are better off than metropolitan cites, however, is in connectivity to open space.

China has recognised poor continental connectivity as the major hindrance to Africa's development. Building Africa's infrastructure has become a priority investment for China, which is becoming the most significant single financier for infrastructure in Africa. The Chinese-funded infrastructure projects' realisation is expected to improve Africa's lack of internal trade significantly (Du Plessis, 2016). These infrastructure investments are linked to metropolitan regions such as Dar es Salaam, Nairobi, Kampala, and Lagos, connecting those cities with secondary cities, towns, and rural areas into a development corridor along the roads under construction.

The importance of collaborative networks between secondary cities and the role of national and regional governments in supporting their development is an important area of urban systems policy development (Roberts & Lindfield, 2020). The development of a networked system of secondary cities helps such cities improve supply-chain efficiency and production systems (Roberts, 2019, p. 106). It also ignites opportunities for resilient economic growth with multiple endogenous trade benefits, local economic development, and market opportunities. It can nurture secondary city collaboration, synergies, and innovation to reduce scale and transportation costs of goods and services. Spatially dispersed but integrated, networked national and regional cities will lead to efficiencies that will buttress efforts to address climate change and environmental, economic and security concerns.

Several African counties have recognised the importance of and have developed policies for enhancing connectivity and logistics within their national systems of cities. Rwanda's 2020 Vision aims to make Rwanda a very efficient place to do business. Four of its six secondary cities, Nyagatare, Rubavu, Muhanga and Rusizi, have strategies focused on enhancing connectivity as potential means of promoting export-oriented development industries. Uganda's secondary cities are envisaged as centres for job creation through the growth of SMEs and by boosting incentives to encourage local content (Sladoje et al., 2019).

Soft connectivity policies are also becoming increasingly important to Africa's cross-border secondary cities, which function as twin towns and cities (Soi & Nugent, 2017). When the populations of peri-urban settlement areas are added to these towns and cities, many develop into large urban agglomerations, especially on the Uganda/Kenya and Ghana/Togo borders. Connectivity at border secondary cities and towns (which often operate as single-entity bi-frontier trading cities under different governance systems) could significantly improve with bi-lateral national and local government agreements. Such an economic trade agreement works well between Singapore, Bintan-Batam (Indonesia) and Johor Baru (Malaysia) to the mutual benefit of all and is a model that African countries and cross-border secondary cities and towns could adopt.

Connectivity and access to health, education, financial and transport services are critical to well-functioning and liveable cities. Secondary cities, especially inland, have poor access to many of these services.

3.1.9 Human Capital Development

Localities with a large pool of well-developed and diversified human capital, i.e., knowledge and skills, competencies and qualities relevant to economic development attract FDI. Secondary cities, with their comparatively smaller economies, resources and skills bases and less capacitated local governments, are especially weak in their depth of human capital, especially professional services (UN Habitat, 2020). They face significant challenges in acess to education, knowedge and skills (Rwanda Governance Board, 2016). To become more productive, African secondary cities must improve the performance, quality, efficiency and effective use of their limited human capital.

Census and survey data on employment, skills, and education levels in secondary cities in regional areas is poor in most African countries. There is a lack of reliable information on labour markets, employment, and the economic multiplier effects of an investment in local economies; GDP or gross regional income for secondary cities is seldom available. Labour force planning, education and training are factors in the economic development of secondary city economies and should be aligned with their growth and development needs. The capacity and quality of education and training staff, facilities, and support infrastructure are weak. Many African students in secondary cities suffer from a poor learning environment, with few books and without access to computer and internet facilities to aid learning and develop skills in the use of emerging technologies.

An increasing number of university and technical colleges are being developed in secondary cities; however, attracting skilled instructors and good teachers is challenging. Many vacancies in schools, higher education and government centres are partially filled with untrained instructors. Consequently, secondary cities in many poorer African countries cannot build a high level of knowledge capital to raise the overall skills base. Many migrants to secondary cities have only basic literacy skills, which make formal learning difficult. Consequently, skills development and transfer occur primarily through tacit knowledge and learning on the job.

The provision of more technical college courses is critical to developing a skilled labour pool to construct larger local capital works projects, which are more often than not currently awarded to national firms. However, higher-order professional skills, e.g., engineering, health, finance, science, and technology, are lacking in many secondary cities and are a significant impediment to building the skills and competencies needed to attract, develop, and manage cities. These higher-order professions are critical to social and human development planning and are missing in local government, business and institutions in many secondary cities.

PHOTO 3.4
Many African students suffer from a poor learning environment

© Source: Reuters Khamis (2016).

The mismatch between qualifications and job responsibilities in secondary cities and regional offices of line agencies and the rapid changing of positions across agencies result in a loss of corporate knowledge in the public sector. Many officers employed in line agencies and secondary city departments are appointed to positions when they do not have the necessary skills or qualifications to do the job correctly. The permanency of employment conditions in the public sector makes it difficult to dismiss incompetent staff. Human resource management reforms of secondary city local government have also proved very difficult. In many instances, there are not enough skilled people outside of metropolitan regions, where working conditions are far from ideal, to fill vacancies.

Policies are needed to lift the level of skilled staff and human capital development in secondary cities. Some secondary cities have recognized the importance of this. Two of Rwanda's econdary cities, Rubavu and Musanze (designated to become major tourism destinations), are developing skills to support the economy's capacity to strengthen human capacity to support targeted growth industries and local government (World Bank, 2017, p. 3). A study of secondary cities in Ethiopia, Mozambique, Uganda and Ghana found that only a fraction of managerial, technical and support staff were qualified to undertake their jobs: more than 60% did not have the required qualifications; and secondary city staff often were poorly paid compared to their private-sector counterparts. Unpredictable payment, freezing of salaries, and the cutting of staff, establishment costs, and operational budgets are common and are not conducive to a stable labour force, employment security, and the human resource development required to manage these cities (Cities Alliance 2018b; Masakorala & Dayawansa, 2015).

One effective way secondary cities can make up for the shortfall of human capital is to mobilise the diaspora's knowledge and resources. The diaspora has greater access to capital, technology, finance, knowledge, experience and expertise. It is a valuable source of relatively untapped specialised human capital that can be used to fill skills and knowledge gaps in secondary city local governments, institutions and businesses. The advantage of diaspora skills and knowledge is that it can be translated and transferred through peer learning into the local language and cultural context at a minimal cost. Kakuma, a secondary city refugee camp in northwest Kenya with over 186,000 people, successfully uses this approach to develop micro-enterprise and technology skills among refugees. Local governments could work with diaspora groups to tap advanced knowledge, experience and expertise to rebuild and create new jobs for secondary city economies, particularly during post-COVID-19 recovery efforts.

3.2 Social Planning, Poverty Alleviation and Community Development

Poverty alleviation has been a principal focus of the SDGs and international development assistance agencies. At the same time, poverty in Africa has decreased significantly over the past three decades. It remains a significant challenge in cities, however, and is becoming more pronounced in secondary cities where job opportunities are fewer than in metropolitan regions. Unfortunately, COVID-19 has returned many people in African cities to below the poverty line, which calls for a renewed focus on social development. Local governments will need to develop policies and strategies to foster new types of employment, restore wealth, and improve education and health services access. A range of policy initiatives has been designed to address urban poverty in secondary cities (Kessides, 2005, p. 116; Cities Alliance, 2012; Bertrand & Giraut, 1999, p. 477).

Secondary cities are often transitory staging points (Cassiman, 2007, p. 13) for migrants seeking to move to large metropolitan regions and overseas destinations. Many basic skills and knowledge are gained by migrant workers in secondary cities (Kessides, 2005, p. 116), enabling them to find essential employment and learn new skills to capitalize on if they choose to move elsewhere. Improvement to spatial and social planning in secondary cities and rural towns offers the potential for urban employment opportunities (Muchemwa & Ngwerume, 2013), which will help retain skills in secondary cities to support the development of their economies.

Central to addressing urban poverty problems in African secondary cities is a better understanding by local governments and communities of the vulnerability and risk factors facing people living in slums and informal settlements. Greater emphasis on capacity building of local institutions and organizations is also essential. Local governments can be mobilized effectively to support poverty reduction (Johnson & Rogaly, 1997; Kanbur & Squire, 2011); however, policies

and programs need to be coordinated and targeted at job creation and providing seed capital for micro and small-scale enterprises. Some secondary cities have been very successful in targeting poverty reduction, often with international assistance.

There is evidence that the deprivation in cities and the emerging urban public health problems related to institutional failures perpetuate social exclusion and inequalities between the urban poor and the urban non-poor. There is an unusually large inter-country variation in the reported concern with crime and disorder. Surprisingly, firms in capital/metropolitan regions do not claim to suffer this problem more than do those in secondary cities (Kessides, 2005, p. 116).

> *Secondary cities are often transitory staging points for migrants seeking to move to large metropolitan regions and overseas destinations.*

3.3 Land Administration and Management

The AfDB places the onus for land management problems of African cities, including secondary cities, on formal land institutions and the related legal and regulatory frameworks. Land management in many African countries is a delicate balance of indigenous land rights embedded in customary law and colonial legal and administrative frameworks. The levels of conflicting cultural and legal interpretation of rights vary from country to country. While customary law may function seamlessly in rural areas, conflicts become apparent in secondary cities that are transitioning to or have adopted Western law. Another problematic area of land management is the preference by government administrations for centralised procedures. This process results in high transaction costs arising from the complex and time-consuming requirements for land registration and ineffective land-use policies and city planning systems (African Development Bank, 2013). The situation encourages the rise of informal settlements that bypass prescribed systems.

Most cities lack realistic master and spatial development plans. Where plans do exist, challenges often arise with their interpretation and implementation. Many secondary cities do not have modern plans that provide for anticipated growth areas. As a result, they are not in a position nor are they equipped to manage urbanisation. Many plans are disconnected from the reality of local conditions, especially the capacity to fund infrastructure and community services and to manage illegal settlements. Numerous attempts at land administration in Ghana, Nigeria, Ethiopia and Angola have been slow to reform land conversion and registration processes. Court systems can be extremely slow in resolving ownership disputes. Such disputes are increasingly common with the development of regional secondary cities such as Mekelle in Ethiopia (Photo 3.5) and clustered secondary cities on the periphery of metropolitan regions such as Accra and Lagos.

South Africa has constitutionally driven comprehensive planning and land management systems. However, the growth of primary and secondary cities severely tests the system's ability to cope with urbanisation and land management pressures. In Ghana, the secondary twin-cities of Sekondi-Takoradi face significant land management issues, but do not have adequate mechanisms and resources to manage them. These pressures are driven by economic migration from an expanding oil and gas industry, insufficient rental property supply, rising middle-class incomes, demand for estate housing and land speculation, some of it by the diaspora. Land disputes are widespread. For example, according to a news story from the town of Adigrat in the Tigray region of Ethiopia, "Amhara officials say the disputed lands, equal to about a quarter of Tigray, were taken during the nearly 30 years that the TPLF dominated central government before Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed came to power in 2018" (Aljazeera, 2021, n.p.).

Mozambique has an ineffective land administration and management system with limited local capacity for planning and implementation. Secondary cities like Beira, Nampula and Chimoio cannot provide sufficient land. As a result, 80% of the population live in unplanned informal settlement areas (Jachnow et al., 2017).

PHOTO 3.5
Mekelle, Tigray region: Disputed lands make planning for development difficult

Land administration and management is a significant problem for African secondary cities. Title registration, land management and land conversion responsibilities are multi-layered and range from centralised to decentralised systems. Customary land systems and laws often overlay these systems. For example, in the Ashanti region of Ghana, the King has a land registry that operates parallel to the Registry Office. Parallel systems also operate within government agencies and local governments on issuing licenses, leases and land-use rights, leading to duplication, overlapping and inaccurate boundary and area descriptions. Few land registries can register long-term leases or property covenants on titles. Property and tax maps are inconsistent in defining property boundaries and structures, valuations are outdated and property ownership and tax records are often not correctly recorded. Residents of informal settlements have no title or security of tenure.

These land administration and management problems facing metropolitan and secondary city local governments in Africa are systemic. They have a profound impact on the ability of city governments to manage land, determine ownership and collect taxes. Unless secondary cities can address these challenges through better policies, laws, and regulations, the impacts will be just as significant as those experienced in metropolitan regions. Land management policy reform for cities is one of the most pressing issues facing urbanisation in Africa. Poor land management affects the efficiency of land and property markets, security of tenure, development rights, and the enforcement of environmental laws and regulations.

3.4 Environmental Management

Generally, environmental conditions in secondary cities are better than those of primary cities. They tend to have lower emissions and lower soil, surface, and groundwater pollution problems, and they generate less waste per capita. Factors contributing to this are the lower urban-development levels, populations and traffic densities, and lower fuel, energy and water consumption of secondary cities. However, secondary cities rely more on unclean energy sources, such as wood and charcoal fuels and kerosene (UN Habitat, 2020). When secondary cities develop on the outskirts of metropolitan regions, new residential and industrial developments lead to increasing pollution levels from households, vehicles and factories that negatively impact the natural environment and the surrounding agricultural areas. As urban areas expand, pollution of airsheds, water catchments, rivers and coastlines also increase (Dodman et al., 2017). Excessive drawdown of groundwater to meet the growing demands of clustered secondary cities surrounding Lagos, for example, has led to water shortages and increased salinisation of aquifers close to the coast.

Onsite sanitation is the main form of human waste disposal in most African cities. World Bank studies show that between 10% and 15% of the population have access to a sewer network in most primary and secondary cities, but few have sewerage treatment plants beyond primary stage treatment. About 80% of the population depend on onsite facilities such as septic tanks and pit latrines (Morella et al., 2008). In the Mozambique secondary cities of Tele and Nampula, over 50% of the urban population lack toilets, leading to regular disease outbreaks. Basic sanitation and potable water remain one of the most pressing challenges for all cities. Low-level technology and local area network wastewater, sanitation and solid waste collection systems offer the quickest solution to improving secondary cities' environmental and public health standards.

Larger secondary cities located on river and lake systems such as the Niger, the Nile and the Central African lakes are a growing source of pollutants, including wastewater and solid waste along waterways (White et al., 2017). This pollution has a cumulative effect, as downstream towns and cities must deal with increased pollution levels, including plastics, other flotsam wastes and reduced water quality, all of which add to treatment, environmental and health costs in cities in the lower catchments. Sustainable Development Goal 6 calls for access to water and sanitation for all. The problem in localizing the SDGs at the secondary city level, however, is that towns and cities located along river and lake systems are highly parochial and have different priorities on the goals they support. There is a need for increased collaboration between cities so that water quality along river and lake systems can be addressed comprehensively to achieve SDG 6 and its targets.

PHOTO 3.6
The growing waste problem in Kisumu, Lake Victoria

© Source: CUSSH 2018.

Climate change is one of the most significant challenges of our time. Cities contribute an estimated 75% of greenhouse gas emissions, with urban transport and buildings among the most significant contributing factors to climate change. Populations living in coastal and drier regional secondary cities will be hit hard by climate change impacts, and their ability to adapt will be difficult. African governments, cities and municipalities have limited scope for influencing the current global warming rate (Cartwright, 2015). Actions that can positively contribute, however, are changes in unsustainable land-use practices, reafforestation and localised adaptation measures, including water catchment management, use of alternative fuels for cooking, and local-area network solar systems.

Little research has been done on climate change impacts on secondary cities, as some have pointed out. "Resilience efforts in capital cities are the most dominant in the literature, but far less emphasises is given to the needs of secondary cities and towns, which is necessary for a deeper understanding of the role played by inter-municipal and inter-metropolitan collaborations" (Kareem et al., 2020, p.1). Strategies and measures to support global warming mitigation and the SDGs are essential, but governments and cities should pay attention to adaptation measures to address climate change impacts – especially on vital infrastructure.

There is an urgent need for improved environmental awareness and education from the primary to tertiary education levels on sustainable development and climate change. Polices are also needed which incorporate indigenous African knowledge on the natural environment. Africa cities can learn from and replicate Asia's clean industries and many other 'innovations' – including those based in traditional knowledge, which are more likely to find acceptance in small rural towns (Erbach & Gaudet, 1998).

3.5 Social Issues

The need to reduce absolute poverty levels and high birth rates, and improve life expectancy rates, public health, education, and living standards has accelerated trade and consumption-driven urbanisation and secondary-city development since the 1990s. Secondary cities are often the first step in migration from rural areas and small towns to larger cities. Growing populations and migration has led to trade-commerce-consumer driven urbanisation, resulting in increased pull-migration towards secondary cities across all African states, as rural migrants search for jobs and a better quality of life. Ibadan in Nigeria provides an example of a secondary city that, in the mid-twentieth century, had many small-scale enterprises which generated limited but widely distributed income across the city and hinterland. This resulted in increased demand for inexpensive, locally produced consumer goods. Local small-scale commercial and manufacturing enterprises responded to the increased demand by importing, at reduced costs, the materials necessary for local production. This led to the rapid expansion of business and population growth for the city (Erbach & Gaudet, 1998, p. 78).

Africa's secondary cities suffer from poor social infrastructure and community services. The absence of social facilities creates physical and mental health issues, can lead to crime and violence and a loss of inclusiveness. There is a general lack of policies to protect vulnerable people like refugees, resulting in unfavourable living and working conditions for these groups (UN Habitat, 2020). In addition, cities that have poor physical and social infrastructure also struggle to attract investment.

Inadequate housing is a problem facing all African cities. The demand for housing and accommodation in secondary cities can be great, especially where significant development pressures are being experienced. The twin secondary cities of Sekondi-Takoradi in Ghana, for example, are experiencing significant social and housing mobility problems (Yankson et al., 2017). A study by Yankson et al. (2017) focused on the dynamics of physical and social transformations, mobility, and livelihoods around migration to Sekondi-Takoradi, residential mobility within the twin cities, the normal mobility of residents, and how these interactions form networks of residents' livelihood strategies. The effect of a rapid transition in the cities' housing markets increased the risk of tenure insecurity, rapidly rising rents, with minimal improvement in housing stock quality. The quality of accommodation, access to urban services and public transport are significant issues affecting housing in secondary cities, for which policy responses have been inadequate at all levels of government.

Poverty in secondary African cities is often associated with high levels of crime and violence. Regional secondary cities and towns, especially those on or near international borders and ports, are particularly susceptible to criminal activities, especially drugs, arms, contraband, and people smuggling. Border towns and cities in East Africa are

zones of significant risk, as they provide opportunities for quick money-making ventures and deals that tend to attract a range of criminals. Border security and policing in regional and border secondary cities has become increasingly complex, with law enforcement lacking the facilities, equipment, technologies and skilled workforce to fight crime. In different countries across many parts of the Sahel, secondary cities and towns have become unsafe because governments can no longer enforce the rule of law. This situation has a significant adverse impact on security and personal safety, as well as on economies, communities, and social well-being of this enormous region. It is forcing many people to migrate vast distances across the continent in search of a safer place to live and work.

Poverty, crime, insecurity, and lack of social infrastructure facilities and services are products of governance failure. These issues are exacerbated by poor communications, education and health services, as well as by politics, tribalism, and corruption. These factors impede the delivery of social and community services needed to improve the well-being of rural and urban populations. Countries such as Rwanda and Kenya are taking steps to address these issues, but progress is slow. In some of Africa's secondary cities, in the absence of the policies necessary to support secondary city social and cultural development, citizens are taking the initiative and evolving their own distinct and often organic coping strategies outside the shadows of their metropolises.

Studies of Kisumu in Kenya (DCP Kenya, 2019), Kankan in Guinea, and Korhogo and Bouaké in Côte d'Ivoire illustrate different approaches of how the people of these small cities have reacted and moved on to confront nationally and locally unfavourable political, financial, social and cultural infrastructural situations (Ammann & Sanogo, 2017). In Kisumu, the city's frustrated youth, in the face of an indifferent municipal cultural cluster that was not addressing their basic cultural infrastructure needs, took matters into their own hands to explore outlets for their potential involvement in the cultural industry, with some success (Unseld, 2017).

> *Growing populations and migration has led to trade-commerce-consumer driven urbanisation, resulting in increased pull-migration towards secondary cities across all African states, as rural migrants search for jobs and a better quality of life.*

In Kaduna, Nigeria, where funding for cultural activities is minimal, youth have taken the initiative to create independent films with their smartphones (Africanews, 2019). Opportunities exist for mature volunteers to add weight and support to youth culture through mentoring and corporate social responsibility networks.

Government agency programs to support social development in secondary cities and regional towns fall short of meeting population needs. International agencies and NGOs have had to fill many of the gaps. Few attempts have been made at resource sharing and collaboration between regional secondary cities and towns, such as leveraging resources and building a critical mass of resources, infrastructure, and human capital to support social services delivery, despite very strong policy recommendations made in reports such as, *Assessing the Institutional Environment of Local Governments in Africa* (Cities Alliance & UCLGA, 2013).

Secondary cities and towns should consider using a regional-cluster collaborative approach to policy development and implementation to create the social infrastructure and services required to support social development. The challenge with this approach to collaboration between regional and local governments is a new governance model that requires trust and a willingness to pool resources. It is the antithesis of the current system – where regional local governments compete for the minimal resources available. Collaborative governance at a secondary and regional cities level is crucial to improved social and community services delivery, supporting social development,

and achieving the SDGs. There is, therefore, a clear need for education and learning about collaborative urban-governance models in African secondary cities, as they currently are unable to independently create the critical mass of infrastructure, services and capacity required to deliver even essential social support services to address poverty and other social problems.

3.6 Conclusions

Africa's secondary cities support the livelihood of more than 750 million people living in rural areas. Most are centres of trade and commerce, and government services. Except for natural resources extraction industries such as oil and petroleum, industrialisation has not played a significant role in driving the development of secondary cities. South Africa and northern African countries are the countries with substantial and growing manufacturing industries located in their secondary cities. The key driver of employment and economic development in secondary cities is the growth of services – especially government, health, education and transport (see discussion in Chapter 2).

Colonialism laid the foundations for development and urbanisation, following similar patterns to Asia, South America and Europe at the beginning of their respective industrial revolutions. African countries have sought to industrialise and take advantage of cheaper labour, tax incentives and proximity to European markets, but they are not industrialising as rapidly as Asia, and industrialisation is not occurring in secondary cities. They are, however, urbanising at a faster rate (see Chapter 5).

Large African metropolitan regions will likely continue to attract a more significant proportion of migrants from rural and smaller regional towns and cities and a significant proportion of investment. Many secondary cities will grow rapidly, as rural inhabitants are pulled by economic opportunity and pushed by civil unrest and climate change. There is likely to be spinoff flows from metropolitan to secondary cities and hinterlands in trade and remittances (Adepoju et al., 2007, p. 308). But the rapid urbanisation in secondary cities will also give rise to many of the problems experienced by large metropolitan regions.

Although the library on secondary cities in Africa is small, it is growing. The first studies conducted in the 1970s and 1980s focused on these cities as extensions of the agriculture sector. Initially, the primary function of these cities was to act as secondary logistics and production hubs to support products and materials to larger cities and overseas markets. Interest in the development of secondary cities waned in the early 1990s, except for some UN-Habitat studies. In the mid- 2000s, however, international agencies and researchers demonstrated a renewed interest in the development of secondary cities.

The literature shows that challenges facing the development of secondary cities are also growing. The issues of weak urban governance, the need for improved planning and urban management, basic infrastructure, and environmental, education and social development have been covered in this chapter.

Secondary, intermediate, and middle-sized cities are not yet part of the vocabulary of urban policy development in Africa. A few countries, including Rwanda, Ghana and Morocco, have developed policies to support the development of these cities under national urbanisation strategies. However, in South Africa, where there is a relatively well-developed system of secondary cities, bringing them into the focus of debate and discussion is still a challenge.

Secondary cities play a significant role in the development of national economies. They are still a neglected area of research and policy development, especially in improving governance, logistics, infrastructure, and job creation and attracting investment. Most secondary cities lag well behind the development of larger metropolitan regions. Catching up will be a significant challenge and will require a substantial shift in policies to avoid the situation where one or two cities dominate an entire nation's economy.

Setting new strategic directions for the development of secondary cities requires a much deeper understanding of what is happening socially, economically and environmentally to their development. Only through a deeper understanding of their role in the development of national urban systems can appropriate frameworks and strategies be created that will allow secondary cities to realize their potential.

REFERENCES

Adepoju, A., Naerssen, T.v., & Zoomers, A., eds. (2007). *International Migration and National Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: Viewpoints and Policy Initiatives in the Countries of Origin.* BRILL, Leiden, Boston.

African Development Bank. (2013). *An Integrated Approach to Infrastructure Provision in Africa,* Statistics Department, Africa Infrastructure Knowledge Program. AfDB Chief Economist Complex.

Africanews. (2019). Nigerian teens make sci-fi films with smartphones. www.africanews.com

Aljazeera. (2021). Land dispute drives new exodus in Ethiopia's Tigray. *Aljazeera* (31 March 2021). https://www.aljazeera.com/gallery/2021/3/31/land-dispute-drives-new-exodus-in-ethiopias-tigray

Ammann, C., & Sanogo, A. (2017). *Secondary Cities – The Urban Middle Ground.* Basel Papers on Political Transformations, No 11/12. Institute of Social Anthropology, University of Basel.

Bertrand, M. and Giraut, F. (1999). Les Villes secondaires d'Afrique noire, 1970-97, bibliographie analytique et commentée. *African Business, 69*(03): 477-477.

Cartwright, A. (2015). Better Growth, Better Cities: Rethinking and Redirecting Urbanisation in Africa. Working paper. Washington. London, World Resources Institute. Overseas Development Institute.

Cassiman, A. (2007). *An Anthropology of Secondary Cities in Africa: A (Comparative) Regional Analysis.* KU Leuven – University, Leuven, Belgium http://soc.kuleuven.be/web/files/7/38/Secondarycities_synopsis.pdf

Chiloane, G.E., & Botha, T.A. (2019). Factors influencing urban youth entrepreneurship development in sub-Saharan Africa *Problems and Perspectives in Management, 13* (4-1), 230-239.

Cillers, J., Consthulzen, M., Kwasi, S., Alexander, K., Pooe, T.K., Yeboua, K & Moyer, J.D. (2020). Impact of COVID -19 in Africa A scenario analysis to 2030. Institute for Security Studies, Frederick S. Pardee Center for international Futures, Gordon Institute of Business Science, University of Pretoria.

Cities Alliance & UCLGA. (2013). Assessing the Institutional Environment of Local Governments in Africa. Brussels The Cities Alliance and United Cities and Local Governments of Africa.

Cities Alliance. (2012). Improving Service Delivery in Uganda's Secondary Cities. Retrieved 26 May from https://www.citiesalliance.org/sites/default/files/CA-inAction-TSUPU.pdf

Cities Alliance. (2016a). Future Proofing Cities. Uganda-Secondary Cities. Arup. https://www.citiesalliance.org/resources/publications/policy-brief-report/future-proofing-cities-uganda

Cities Alliance. (2016b). *Future Cities Africa.* Feasibility Study. https://www.citiesalliance.org/resources/publications/cities-alliance-knowledge/future-cities-africa-outputs

Cities Alliance. (2018a). Cities as Engines of Growth: Unlocking Urban Productivity and Job Creation. https://www.citiesalliance.org/resources/publications/documents/cities-engines-growth

Cities Alliance. (2018b). The Capacity Crisis in Africa's Cities. https://www.citiesalliance.org/resources/publications/documents/capacity-crisis-africa%E2%80%99s-cities

Cities Alliance. (2021).The Cost of Informality, Winners and Losers in the Urban Economy. https://www.citiesalliance.org/sites/default/files/BN_CostofInformality_WEB.pdf

DCP Kenya. (2019). Development Corridors in Kenya: A Scoping Study. UNEP-WCMC, Cambridge, UK.

Dodman, D., Leck, H., Rusca, M. & Colenbrander, S. (2017). African Urbanisation and Urbanism: Implications for risk accumulation and reduction. *International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction, 26*: 7-15.

Du Plessis, R. (2016). China's African Infrastructure Projects: A Tool in Reshaping Global Norms. *Policy Insights 35*. South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA).

Ellahham, N. (2014). Towards Creating New Sustainable Cities in Egypt- Critical Perspective for Planning New Cities. World SB 14 Barcelona. Pdf.

Erbach, J., Gaudet, P.J. (1998). *Urbanisation Issues and Development in Sub-Saharan Africa.* Prepared for the Office of Sustainable Development. Bureau for Africa. United States Agency for International Development. Washington, DC.

Etim, E., & Daramola, O. (2020). The Informal Sector and Economic Growth of South Africa and Nigeria: A Comparative Systematic Review. *Journal of Open Innovation: Technology, Market, and Complexity, 6*(4): 134.

Gough, K. V., & Langevang, T., eds. (2017). *Young Entrepreneurs in Sub-Saharan Africa.* Oxford, Routledge.

Haas, A. R. N., & P. Manwaring (2016). *Private vs. public collection in enhancing local tax revenues.* London, International Growth Centre, London School of Economic: 14.

Hanif, N., Lombardo, C., Platz, D., Chan, C., Machano, J. & Balakrishman, D. P. S., eds. (2021). *Managing Infrastructure Assets for Sustainable Development: A Handbook for Local and National Governments.* United Nations, New York.

Hommann, K., & Lall, S. V. (2019). *Which Way to Liveable and Productive Cities? A Road Map for Sub-Saharan Africa.* International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Washington, DC.

Jachnow, A., Keunen, E., Lunetta, C., Mazzolini, A., & Brilhante, O. (2017). *Urbanisation in Mozambique Assessing Actors, Processes, and Impacts of Urban Growth*. Institute for Housing and Urban Development Studies of Erasmus University Rotterdam. Publisher: Cities Alliance, Brussels. https://www.citiesalliance.org/sites/default/files/Urbanisation%20in%20Mozambique.pdf

Jackson, T. (2016). Why the voice of Africa's informal economy should be heard. *Conversation*. January 21.

JICA Research Institute. (2013). *Development Challenges in Africa Towards 2050*. JICA. www.jica.go.jp

John, L. (2012). Secondary cities in South Africa: The Start of a Conversation. *South African Cities Network, Cape Town.* http://led.co.za/sites/led.co.za/files/cabinet/orgname-raw/document/2012/cities_backg_report_2012.pdf

Johnson, S., & Rogaly, B. (1997) *Microfinance and Poverty Reduction*. Oxfam and Action Aid, London. https://doi.org/10.3362/9780855988005

Joshi, A., Prichard, W. & Heady, C. (2014). "Taxing the Informal Economy: The Current State of Knowledge and Agendas for Future Research." The Journal of Development Studies 50(10): 1325-1347. https://doi.org/10.1080/00220388.2014.940910

Kanbur, R., & Squire, L. (2011). The Evolution of Thinking About Poverty: Exploring the Interactions [Internet]. Working Paper 127697. IDEAS. Cornell University Department of Applied Economics and Management; Available from: https://ideas.repec.org/p/ags/cudawp/127697.html

Kareem, B., Lwasa, S., Tugume, D., Mukwaya, P., Walubwa, J., Owuor, S., Kasaija, P., Sseviiri, H., Nsangi, G. & Byarugaba, D. (2020). Pathways for resilience to climate change in African cities. *Environmental Research Letters* 15(7): 073002. https://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1748-9326/ab7951/pdf

Kenawy, A. (2017), Encouragement of settlement and population attraction in the new towns – Egypt. *International Journal of Architecture and Urban Development* 7(No. 3, Summer): 17–24.

https://ijaud.srbiau.ac.ir/article_11520_9d3a09478e3c220c63a60815a5f5b99a.pdf

DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.36339.27689 pdf

Kessides, C. (2005). The Urban Transition in Sub-Saharan Africa: Implications for Economic Growth and Poverty Reduction. *Africa Region Working Paper Series No. 97*. World Bank, Washington, D.C.. http://www.worldbank.org/afr/wps/wp97.pdf

Laszlo, E., & Abraham, R. H. (2010). *The Connectivity Hypothesis: Foundations of an Integral Science of Quantum, Cosmos, Life, and Consciousness.* State University of New York Press. https://books.google.com.au/books?id=oHmyFAhaTMgC

Lwasa, S. (2012). Planning innovation for better urban communities in sub-Saharan Africa: The education challenge and potential responses. *Town and Regional Planning,* 60, 38-48.

Mann, E. (2017). Connecting community colleges with employers: A toolkit for building successful partnerships. Washington. D.C, Browns Centre on Education policy, Brookings: 21.

Mariyappan, J., Bhardwaj, N., Coninck, H. de & van der Linden, N. (2005). A Guide to Bundling Small-scale CDM Projects. A report prepared for the EU Synergy CDM Pool Project. https://inis.iaea.org/search/search.aspx?orig_q=RN:36104475

Masakorala, P. P., & Dayawansa, N. D.K. (2015). Spatio-temporal Analysis of Urbanisation, Urban Growth and Urban Sprawl Since 1976-2011 in Kandy City and Surrounding Area using GIS and Remote Sensing. *Bhúmi, The Planning Research Journal,* 4(2): 26–44. DOI: http://doi.org/10.4038/bhumi.v4i2.8

Matos, M. C., Ramos, T. B., & Costa, L. P. (2009). Planned and unplanned towns in former Portuguese colonies in Sub-Saharan Africa: an analysis of Silveira's *Iconografia*. *African Perspectives*, 1-10.

Monica, F. (2020). TaxiBrousse, Going small – the role of secondary cities in Africa. www.taxibrousse.it February 2020 a progetti per cooperazione internazionale.

Morella, E., Foster, V., and Banerjee, S. G. (2008). Climbing the Ladder: The State of Sanitation in SubSaharan Africa. Background Paper 13. World Bank, Washington, D.C.

Moriconi-Ebrard, F., Heinrigs. P, & Tremoloeres, M., eds. (2020). *Africa's Urbanisation Dynamics. Africapolis, Mapping a New Urban Geography 2020,* OECD, Sahel and West Africa Club: Paris.

Muawwad, M. A. S., & Hassan, I. (1999). New urban communities in Egypt (Policies & Useful Lessons). *Zagazig University, Egypt.*

Muchemwa, C. M., & Ngwerume, E. (2013). The Urban Crisis in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Threat to Human Security and Sustainable Development. *International Journal of Security and Development, 2(1),* 1-7. https://doi.org/http://dx.doi.org/10.5334/sta.ap

Nassiuma, B., Kilelo, H., & Moses, B. (2015). Devolution and Public Sector Reforms in Kenya: Challenges and Opportunities. *International Journal of Innovative Research & Development, 4*(8).

Njoh, A. (2006). *Planning Power: Town Planning and Social Control in Colonial Africa.* University College Press, London & New York. DOI https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203964866

Nwaka, G. I. (2005). Planning sustainable cities in Africa. In: *Sustainable Development in Africa: A Multifaceted Challenge,* ed. U. OKechukwu & O. G. Afoaku, pp. 119-138. Africa World Press, Trenton, NJ.

Odendaal, N. (2012). Reality check: Planning education in the African urban century. *Cities, 29*(3), 174-182. https://doi.org/http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cities.2011.10.001

OECD Policy Studies Institute. (2020). Ethiopian intermediate cities and their roles for rural development, in *Rural Development Strategy Review of Ethiopia: Reaping the Benefits of Urbanisation.* OECD Development Centre. https://doi.org/10.1787/a325a658-en

OECD. (2020). The territorial impact of COVID-19: Managing the crisis across levels of government. OECD Policy Responses to Coronavirus (COVID-19). https://www.oecd.org/coronavirus/policy-responses/the-territorial-impact-of-covid-19-managing-the-crisis-across-levels-of-government-d3e314e1/

OECD-CoR. (2020). The impact of the COVID-19 crisis on regional and local governments: Main findings from the joint CoR-OECD survey, https://www.oecd.org/regional/multi-level-governance/

Pumain, D., & Moriconi-Ebrard, F. (1997). City size distributions and metropolisation. *GeoJournal, 43* (4): 307-314. DOI: 10.3406/geoas.1997.2063

Onzili, P. (2020). Covid 19 in Africa: socio-economic impact, policy response and opportunities.

https://www.emerald.com/insight/ JEL Classification – G21, G28, I11, I18

Otiso, K. M. (2005). Kenya's secondary cities growth strategy at a crossroads: which way forward? GeoJournal (2005) 62: 117-128 DOI 10.1007/s10708-005-8180-z.

Randolph, G., Sladoje, M. & Dewan, S. (2019). Job creation ecosystems in African secondary cities: A study of Uganda. International Growth Centre. https://www.theigc.org/project/job-creation-ecosystems-in-african-secondary-cities-a-study-of-uganda/

Roberts, B. & Lindfield, M. (2020). Secondary Cities: Challenges and Opportunities, World Bank Presentation, Urban Frontiers, Australia and Urban Infrastructure Services, Australia 29 October 2020.

Roberts, B. (2014). Managing Systems of Secondary Cities. Cities Alliance/UNOPS, Brussels.

Roberts, B. H. (2019). Connecting Systems of Secondary Cities. Cities Alliance/UNOPS, Brussels.

Rondinelli, D. A. (1983). *Secondary cities in developing countries: policies for diffusing urbanisation.* Beverly Hills, Sage Publications.

Rwanda Governance Board. *Development through Good Governance, Foresighting Service Delivery in Secondary Cities.* Impamyamihigo - Rwanda Governance Board (Kigali: 2016). P 6

Shell. (1999). The Shell Report 1999: People, Planet & Profits - an act of commitment. Royal Dutch Shell, The Netherlands. http://www.shell.com/shellreport/.Same

Siddle, A., & Koelble, T. A. (2016). Local Government in South Africa: Can the objectives of the developmental state be achieved through the current model of decentralised governance? Research Report No.7. Swedish International Center for Local Democracy.

Silva, C. N. (2012). Urban planning in Sub-Saharan Africa: A new role in the urban transition. *Cities, 29*(3), 155-157. https://doi.org/http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cities.2012.01.006

Sladoje, M., Khan, L. & Randolph, G. (2019). *Transforming secondary cities for job creation: A study of Uganda.* IGC Policy Brief 43447. International Growth Centre, Uganda. https://www.theigc.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Sladoje-et-al-2019-policy-brief.pdf

Soi, I., & P. Nugent. (2017). Peripheral Urbanism in Africa: Border Towns and Twin Towns in Africa. *Journal of Borderlands Studies.* Lands Studies Volume 32, Issue 4: Special issue: Theorizing town twinning: Towards a global perspective.

South African Cities Network. (2012). Secondary cities in South Africa: The start of a conversation. Background report. March 2012.

South African Government. (2011). National Development Plan, Vision for 2030. Republic of South Africa. National Planning Commission. https://www.gov.za/issues/national-development-plan-2030

Sy, A. (2016). Impediment to Growth. *Finance and Development 53*(2). Pp 26-27. Finance and Development. IMF https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2016/06/sy.htm

Mebtoul, T. (2020). Sustainable Urban Development: Morocco Looks to Intermediate Cities, Morroco. *World News,* (Sep 22, 2020).

UN-Habitat - United Nations Human Settlement Programme. (1991). *The Management of Secondary Cities in Sub−Saharan Africa: Traditional and Modern Institutional Arrangements.* 1991, United Nations Centre for Human Settlements (Habitat): Nairobi. p. 154.

UN-Habitat - United Nations Human Settlement Programme. (2004). Reassessment of Urban Planning and Development Regulations in African Cities. 2004. p. 52.

UN-Habitat - United Nations Human Settlement Programme. (2020). Prepared for UNICEF and UN Habitat. Analysis of Multiple Deprivations in Secondary Cities in Sub-Saharan Africa. Analysis Report EMIT 19061. March 2020.

UN-Habitat - United Nations Human Settlement Programme. (2020). Covid-19 in African Cities Impacts, Responses and Policy Recommendations.

UN-Habitat & IHS-Erasmus University Rotterdam. (2018). *The State of African Cities 2018. The geography of African Investment.* (Wall R.S., Maseland J., Rochell K. and Spaliviero M). United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat). https://unhabitat.org/sites/default/files/download-manager-files/The%20State%20of%20African%20Cities.pdf

UNICEF & UN-Habitat. (2020). Analysis of Multiple Deprivations in Secondary Cities in Sub-Saharan Africa. Nairobi, UNICEF, UN Habitat.

Unseld, F. (2017). Art in Cities off the Map – Perspectives from Kisumu, Kenya, pp. 11-24 in *Secondary Cities –The Urban Middle Ground*, ed. Ammann, C. & Sanogo, A. Basel Papers on Political Transformations, No 11/12. Institute of Social Anthropology, University of Basel. https://edoc.unibas.ch/54960/3/20170503095517_59098ce5b8b57.pdf

Verick, S. (2006). *Don't underestimate the power of Africa's informal sector in a global economy.* Economic and Social Policy Division, United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) And Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)International Labour Organizations.

White, R., Turple, J. & Letley, G. (2017). *Greening Africa's Cities: Enhancing the relationship between urbanisation, environmental assets and ecosystem services.* World Bank, Washington, DC. License: Creative Commons Attribution CCBY 3.0.

World Bank. (2017). *Reshaping Urbanisation In Rwanda.* Note 4: Profiling Secondary Cities in Rwanda—Dynamics and Opportunities Issue. World Bank, Washington, DC. https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/29083/122185-WP-P157637-PUBLIC-Note-4-Rwanda-Urbanisation-12-08-17.pdf?sequence=1

Yankson P. W. K., Gough, K. V., Esson, J. & Amankwaa, E. F. (2017). Spatial and social transformations in a secondary city: the role of mobility in Spatial Sekondi-Takoradi, Ghana, *Geografisk Tidsskrift-Danish Journal of Geography, 117* (2): 82-92. https://doi.org/10.1080/00167223.2017.1343672

4

URBAN POLICY AND DEVELOPMENT

BRIAN H ROBERTS AND
GODFREY O. ANYUMBA

4.1 Introduction

This chapter reviews the role of African secondary city development policies from the pre-colonial to the postcolonial period. The review draws on an extensive range of literature and studies on urbanisation, urban systems, planning and development of African cities (Njoh, 2007; Moriconi-Ebrard, 1997; Nwaka, 2005; Matos et al., 2009). However, the literature on secondary cities' development is not substantial, is geographically uneven and varies in content and detail. Data is generally limited, with few primary research studies available. The chapter covers three themes:

- The historical context of urbanisation and secondary cities development.
- Colonialism and other influences on urban and secondary cities development.
- National policy responses to urbanisation and secondary city development.

4.2 Historical Context of Urbanisation

Africa has a long history of urbanisation and city development over more than four millennia. During this time, conditions in Africa have given rise to numerous empires, kingdoms, societies, colonies, cities, and trading partnerships. The following discusses the historical path of urbanisation in Africa and the various factors that have shaped urban development patterns and secondary city growth across the continent.

4.2.1 Early History

Urbanisation and development of towns and cities began over four millennia ago with the development of the Egyptian, Greek and Roman civilisations' settlement of northern Africa. Parallel to this was the development of indigenous urbanisation, with a long history of urban settlement and culture dating back nearly three millennia (Anderson & Rathbone, 2000; Hull, 1976).

Northern Africa was one of the first regions to experience urbanisation, with the Nile Valley being home to some of the world's oldest continually inhabited cities. Secondary cities formed an essential part of the Egyptian hierarchy of cities engaged in the production, logistics and integrated supply-chain systems required to support a growing population under rulers of successive dynasties.

The Romans were the colonialists who developed towns and cities across northern Africa. Most of these communities were small, like Cyrene, Leptis Magna and Sabratha in present-day Libya, but some like Alexandria (Egypt), Carthage (Tunisia), and Volubilis (Morocco) grew to several hundred thousand. Several of these were secondary cities, serving as capitals of Roman provinces. Over 120 urban settlements of varying size were built across northern Africa, with settlements and supply chains often extending far inland. These towns and port cities formed a vital part of the supply-chain network of food, cash crops, and mineral resources that service the empire. "Everywhere, the Romans built on the same general pattern, leaving behind the familiar elements of Roman urban planning and civic life that characterise the archaeological sites that remain today. Roman towns typically had many grand public buildings, including a Capitol, Basilica, Amphitheatre and Public Baths, a triumphal arch and Forum (central square), with wide streets laid out on a grid. Water was brought into town via elaborately built aqueducts, and the towns were usually surrounded by a defensive wall with grand entrance gates and sentry posts along their length" (African World Heritage, 2018).

The Romans laid down the foundations of a pattern of urban settlement and development, which was to be replicated in the colonial period at began in the fifteenth century until the present day. The fall of the Roman Empire in the fifth century resulted in the end of the earliest phase of Africa's urbanisation and development.

The spread of Islam across northern Africa, the Sahel, and eastern Africa in the seventh century profoundly impacted cities' development and urban form. Islam led to the rapid growth of many coastal and inland trading cities. Many of these were administered as traditional kingdoms. Islam did not impose a specific type of governance and administrative system upon the northern part of the continent, but operated in parallel with traditional tribal governance structures. Islam strongly influenced ideas, policies, customs and practices, particularly in city design and architecture, education, public health and civil codes of behaviour. The increased level of trade between cities that developed under Islam led to a significant expansion and development of inland cities and towns along caravan and river routes. Many larger centres, such as Sokoto, Nigeria, began taking on secondary city characteristics, as the ports and market centres of inland river and productive regions engaged in artisan activities and industries involved in the processing of agriculture and natural resource products.

FIGURE 4.1 | Central African itinerary from Sokoto to Timbuktu, old map with Timbuktu insert plan



Source: Shutterstock stock photo ID: 83126437

Islam became integrated into many aspects of traditional culture, trade, business, and governance practices. Cities often developed separate Islamic or Moorish residential districts or quarters, where most of the residents were traders. Many secondary cities developed a unique architectural form for the house, mosque and market design. Some, such as Malindi in Kenya (DCP Kenya, 2019) and Timbuktu and Djenné-Djeno in Mali, became specialised centres of religion and learning, trading and metals manufacturing. Colonialism and modernisation in later centuries led to a decline of many inland Islamic secondary cities. Islam remains a powerful force in developing

and continuing the functions and operations of cities today. Christianity would have a similar influence on other parts of Africa.

Timbuktu originated as a spiritual centre and then expanded later as a trading centre, as did Kano in Nigeria and many other towns and cities in the region. Others grew from the development of the slave trade and industrialisation. Benin City in Nigeria is famous for its brass work manufacturing, dating back to the thirteenth century and its ivory and wood carvings. The Great Zimbabwe ruins, considered a proto city although a minor development, was once a centre of 18,000 people involved in producing stone works, ivory, ceramics and skins that were traded with Arab traders.

The next phase of urbanisation emerged from incipient indigenous traditional forces in different parts of the continent, starting around the tenth century in western Africa. This was led by the expansion of African empires such as Benin and Oyo in modern-day Nigeria, Mutapa (Zimbabwe), Numidia (Tunisia), Mauretania (Morocco and Algeria), the Aksumite Empire (Ethiopia), and the Kingdoms of Mapungubwe (South Africa), Sine (Senegal), Sennar (Sudan) Great Zimbabwe (Zimbabwe), Kongo (Angola and Congo (DRC) and Ife (Nigeria). City-building was a small but significant part of developing these empires and kingdoms – to oversee local populations and administration, foster trade and economic development, and ensure the realm's defences.

While Africa's historic urban systems were small and dispersed compared to the current day, they were nevertheless established and developed well before the colonial era (Hull, 1976). Alliances between tribal groups, the intellectual exchange between Hausa Reformists and Arab Scholars and pilgrim movements led to further trade and the spreading of common trading language in different regions. A well-established system of customary cities and towns began to develop in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries across North Africa, with high connectivity and interactions between many of them (Figure 4.2).

Much of Africa's early urbanisation occurred along coastlines and rivers, but other inland urban centres such as Kano and Timbuktu also had relatively large populations and were important regional market centres. Many of the connections between these ancient cities continue today, especially along the western African coastal trading corridor. These larger cities were the primary market and transportation hubs of their day, with a well-developed network of trade and feeder routes to secondary (sub-regional) city hubs. A city-state network of trading cities developed during the pre-colonial phases of urbanisation across Africa's northern and eastern coasts. Many of these were the nascence of today's secondary cities and were engaged in small-scale raw materials and agriculture processing and production with significant trade. These early years of urbanisation laid the foundation stones for urban settlement, transport networks, communications and trade.

FIGURE 4.2 | Trade routes, North Africa and the Sahel, twelfth century



Source: Easy Zoom (2021).

4.2.2 Colonial Urban Settlement and Development of Secondary Cities

Colonialism had a significant impact on the settlement and urbanisation of Africa. European colonialism led to the development of territorial protectorates and colonies, ports, roads and railways, regional towns and cities covering most of the African continent. It played a significant role in shaping African secondary city development, especially introducing local government to occupied territories. The different colonial powers resulted in noticeable differences between Anglophone, Francophone, Lusophone, and Arab countries within modern Africa. The subsequent emergence of independent African nation-states perpetuated the urbanisation approaches and planning trends of former colonial characteristics.

Before colonisation, less than 10% of the African population lived in urban settlements; most lived in villages and towns. Colonisation led to more organised local governments, cities, trade, and communications across the region. In the sixteenth century, colonialism brought about significant changes to urban settlement patterns – and urban development began across Africa. The changes were driven by rival European imperial strategies and influenced strongly by governance systems of colonial powers and colonial railway infrastructure. The Industrial Revolution in nineteenth-century Europe led to rapid population growth and a rapidly rising demand for food, materials and natural resources in that region, much of which was sourced from conquered African colonial territories.

Colonial powers needed well-organised administration systems, cities and towns, infrastructure and transport systems in Africa to support industrialisation. They introduced new governance systems and policies. They began developing roads, railways, and other infrastructure, new towns and agricultural settlements in many parts of Africa, exploiting minerals and forests, planting new crops, and developing new industries, taking advantage of cheap labour and proximity to materials. In many cases, colonial and traditional systems related to economic and social development, governance, land administration, law, health, education, and planning ran parallel and continue today. However, conflicts between the two systems have been a significant impediment to some countries' growth and development.

The Berlin Conference of 1884–1885 was Africa's undoing in more ways than one. The European colonial powers superimposed their domains on the African continent irrespective of natural borders and customary land territories (Figure 4.3 Map showing the Berlin Conference partitioning of Africa). Colonial countries with the most significant impact on the continent included Britain, France, Portugal, Belgium, Italy, and Spain. By the late 1950s and 1960s, when many African countries regained their independence, they acquired a legacy of political fragmentation and colonialism that could neither be eliminated nor made to operate satisfactorily.

The arbitrary division of natural and customary boundaries imposed by colonial powers destroyed many historical patterns of trade. The changes to cultural groups and language made it extremely difficult for African nations to engage in the meaningful exchange of information, trade and investment, which were still primarily controlled by external interests. Postcolonial policy and the development of urban systems in Africa are still largely shaped by the legacy of whichever former colonial power ran the country, a situation that has not changed in more than half a century.

Colonial planning systems, therefore, have had a significant influence on the current pattern and rate of urban development in different parts of Africa. The publication *Town Planning and Social Control in Colonial Africa* (Njoh, 2007)provides a multidisciplinary perspective of British and French colonial planning powers in town and country planning in Africa. Those powers significantly influenced colonial administrative and economic strategies, especially in the early

FIGURE 4.3 | Map showing the Berlin Conference partitioning of Africa

twentieth century. The stated goal of colonial town and country planning was: "to accomplish the laudable objectives of ensuring sound architectural standards, protecting public health and promoting the efficiency and effectiveness of the built environment… colonial authorities employed urban planning policies and projects as tools to facilitate the accomplishment of broader goals of colonial enterprises involving self-preservation, cultural assimilation, political domination, social control, territorial conquest and perpetual consolidation of colonial rule" (Njoh, 2007, p.ix).

The legacy of the colonial planning systems in Africa defines the patterns of urban settlement, communications, economic development, class segregation and culture that prevail today. It is responsible for the significant differences and gaps in local and regional economic and social development levels in countries across the region. The following summarises the influence that different colonial planning systems and policies had in shaping the region's urban and economic geography.

4.2.3 British Colonial Urban Settlement and Development

Britain gained most from the Berlin Conference and secured many colonies from Cape Town to Cairo through their control of Egypt, Sudan (Anglo-Egyptian Sudan), Uganda, Kenya (British East Africa), South Africa, Malawi (Nyasaland), Zambia (Northern Rhodesia), Zimbabwe (Southern Rhodesia), Eswatini (Swaziland), Lesotho (Basutoland) and Botswana (Bechuanaland). The British also controlled Nigeria, Ghana (Gold Coast), Sierra Leone, and part of Cameroon. Many of its colonies were in areas with plentiful rainfall, good arable soils and grazing lands, with control over significant rivers, lakes and coastlines. British colonisation of sub-Saharan Africa was founded on the need for food security and the demand for resources, especially animal products, cash crops, and minerals needed for the growing population of the United Kingdom, its economy, and other British colonies. Provincial and municipal systems of local government and towns were established in strategically located ports, agricultural or mining centres.

The British colonial development policies and governance structures led to the establishment of many prosperous secondary cities, such as Kumasi in Ghana, Arusha in Tanzania, Durban, and Mombasa. Many of these cities were well-planned and had sound governance systems and infrastructure. Many expanded significantly after the Great Depression of the 1930s and after the Second World War, when strong policies were in place to support migration and settlement – especially in eastern and southern Africa.

While central colonial governments strongly influenced national economic development planning, at the time, there was still a high level of devolution and delegation given to provincial and municipal governments in some colonies, particularly in Nigeria, Ghana, Kenya, Zimbabwe and South Africa. This helped to foster competition between colonies and cities, with investment in mining, industry and agriculture. It stimulated growth and rural-urban migration to primary and secondary cities, which generated significant jobs growth in agriculture and in the agricultural and forestry processing, construction, mining and manufacturing sectors.

British colonisation of sub-Saharan Africa was founded on the need for food security and the demand for resources, especially animal products, cash crops, and minerals needed for the growing population of the United Kingdom, its economy, and other British colonies.

By the late 1940s, British colonial policy began to focus on industrialisation in its colonies, with countries like North and South Rhodesia (Zambia and Zimbabwe), South Africa, Nigeria and Ghana developing industrial estates. Industrialisation resulted in new towns like Tema, 20 km east of Accra in Ghana, developed in the late 1950s to support a range of heavy industry development and industrialisation. In Lagos, Nigeria, in 1958–1959, the Department of Commerce and Industry created two industrial estates to focus on developing federal industrial establishments (Fourchard, 2011, p. 70). By 1950, Zimbabwe (formerly South Rhodesia) had a relatively well-developed industrial base, with the only integrated iron and steel plant in sub-Saharan Africa. By 1953, it was estimated that manufacturing accounted for 10% of GDP and 8% of Zimbabwe's exports (Ndlela, 1984). Much of Zimbabwe's industrial development was located in Harare and Bulawayo.

At the time of independence, many nations began planning new national capitals to take on a primarily secondary city function as a political capital. Secondary cities like Lilongwe (Malawi), Dodoma (Tanzania) and Abuja (Nigeria) were developed as post-independence new towns. Many of these developments drew on the British new towns and Buchannan transport plans (Buchannan, 1963). The development of Abuja began in 1976, and it has become a primate city of over 3 million people. Other countries such as Ghana and Zambia examined new national capitals and new towns, but did not proceed with their development.

Following independence, many governments throughout the former British colonies largely neglected urbanisation and balanced urban development policies. Many countries had 5-year development plans that were never effected and policies that were, more or less, left on 'autopilot' – with disastrous consequences. Constant coups and long periods of military government led to minimal investment in subnational regions and cities and the undermining of local government, except in South Africa. Only recently have some former colonies begun progressive reforms and taken a fresh look at urbanisation and secondary city development, with countries like Uganda and Ghana leading the way. Case studies on the development of secondary cities in South Africa (Gqeberha, formerly Port Elizabeth), Kenya (Mombasa), and Nigeria (Ibadan) are presented later in this study.

At the time of independence, many nations began planning new national capitals to take on a primarily secondary city function as a political capital.

4.2.4 French Colonial Urban Settlement and Secondary City Development

France and Belgium were the Francophone beneficiaries of the Berlin Conference. France controlled much of western Africa, from Mauritania to Chad (French West Africa), Gabon and the Republic of Congo (French Equatorial Africa). Francophone governance, finance, law, planning and engineering practices influenced African colonies' development and their cities' development. However, the interests of each country were slightly different. French interests in Africa date from 1659, and the establishment of a trade port on the western African coast at St. Louis (Photo 4.1). French interest and participation in western Africa did not increase substantially until later in the nineteenth century, particularly after the Berlin Conference.

French interest in the interior regions focused on gum arabic (acacia gum used as a food preservative), groundnuts (peanuts) and other raw materials to support industrial expansion in France. Cities like Touba in Senegal became important secondary cities for sourcing raw agriculture products and materials and for pilgrimages (see Senegal case study, Chapter 14). The French West Africa colonies (then territories) were administered as a single territory by a governor based in Dakar. The constituent territories of French West Africa were divided into cercles (administrative units).

PHOTO 4.1
View of Saint-Louis, a colonial secondary (intermediate) city, Senegal

Many parts of French West Africa had established towns and small cities, some of which were the ruling centres of kingdoms or places of religious importance and scholarship. By the beginning of the twentieth century, French colonial urban planning principles had crystallised, at least in theory, according to Njoh (2007). The French government began to invest in developing coastal and interior secondary cities to support the development of pastoral lands and mining activities. "In practice, the lack of funds rendered their implementation impossible. Cities in French Sub-Saharan African colonies developed mostly according to the desires of businessmen who were able and willing to make the necessary investments" (Njoh, 2007, p. 20). In the Federation of French Equatorial Africa, which was much less populated than French West Africa, almost all infrastructure investment went into Brazzaville's development to support the forestry sector.

A significant difference between French and other colonial administrations relates to land tenure. French colonial governments were focused on replacing indigenous land tenure systems with French land administration and management systems. It was common for French colonial governments to transplant land-use and related legislation from one colony to another. This resulted in much greater uniformity of planning systems in African towns and cities of French colonies compared to British colonies. In 1949, the French created the central planning agency, le Bureau Central d'Etudes pour les Equipements d'Outre-Mer, to prepare urban plans and become involved in housing and other urban development activities. Urban plans took the form of master plans, many of which were ambitious in their design, but with minimal funding available to support infrastructure development. Those urban development management plans are still used in some former colonies.

Through its international agency, the French government has continued to support primary and secondary cities' planning and management in the postcolonial era. Like those in former British colonial countries, many of the planning practices and laws related to urban planning and development have changed little since the countries gained independence in the 1960s. The failure to adequately maintain planning systems and enforce development control has resulted in laissez-faire patterns of urbanisation in most primary and secondary cities throughout Africa. In this respect, the failure to continue, modify and adapt colonial planning systems is a crucial reason why so many African cities lack facilities, have large informal and poorly managed areas of urban development, and weak transport systems and networks. A case study of the secondary city of Touba-Mbacké, Senegal, is presented later in this study (see Chapter 14).

4.2.5 Belgian Colonial Planning

Belgium, a Francophone and Flemish-speaking country, occupied the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Belgian Congo). Belgium's interest in the colony was primarily the exploitation of rubber, copper and other minerals in the upper Lualaba River basin to support the bankrupted monarch, Leopold II. In the early twentieth century, the Belgian government established a province and territory system as a forerunner to developing areas for colonial settlement related to agriculture, cash cropping and mining. By the mid-1920s, copper and diamond mining were the mainstays of the economy. Some mining companies built regional infrastructure and towns for workers in 1930, from which the migration of rural inhabitants to urban areas began.

To the present day, the development of many secondary cities in the Congo region continues to be driven by a legacy of private Belgian investment in mining regions. Other private foreign actors, such as China and South Africa, are also driving investment in agriculture and forestry in the mineral-rich Democratic Republic of the Congo. Compared to French colonial territory planning and development, the development of the former Belgian Congo was driven more by private profit and interests than by genuine government interest in supporting colonial settlement. As a result, Brazzaville and secondary cities development were poorly planned compared to many other parts of the continent.

4.2.6 Portuguese Colonial Settlement and Secondary City Development

The Portuguese have had a long history of involvement in Africa, dating back five centuries. Portuguese speaking Africa (Lusophone Africa) includes five countries: Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, and São Tomé and Príncipe. Luis Silveira's 1957 essay Ensaio de Iconografia das Cidades Portuguesas do Ultramar – (Essay of Iconography of Portuguese Overseas Towns) indicates that the Portuguese approach to colonisation and urban settlement was to translate colonies into provinces with the same administrative partition and urban development patterns as in Portugal (Silveira, 1975)

Until the early nineteenth century, Portugal's primary interest was in developing coastal cities to support the slave and ivory trades. However, by the 1860s, it had introduced comprehensive programs to develop its colonies' interiors to support farming, urban settlement and gold mining. The selection and development of planned cities were very formal, with approval sought from the Town-Planning Committee for the Overseas Territories in Lisbon. Many of these cities were formally laid out, but took many years to develop. There was also a systematic hierarchical system of urban settlements developing and linking the primate and secondary cities, similar to Spanish practices in Latin America (Hidalgo, 2009).

Until the early nineteenth century, Portugal's primary interest was in developing coastal cities to support the slave and ivory trades. However, by the 1860s, it had introduced comprehensive programs to develop its colonies' interiors to support farming, urban settlement and gold mining.

Unlike other colonial powers, Portugal was not in a strong position to fund the substantial infrastructure investment needed to expand road and rail networks, and its local government was weak. The end of Portugal's 500 years of colonialism in Africa was marked by bitter civil wars in several colonies, which led to the destruction of national urban systems and vital infrastructure and the loss of the human capital necessary to support those nations' ongoing development. These factors have significantly impacted the development of former Portuguese African colonies since independence. Many secondary cities that developed during the colonial era have struggled to manage the influx of impoverished rural migrants.

Nevertheless, central governments have made considerable efforts and further efforts are being made, with international assistance, to develop new planning and governance systems to support their national and regional development.

4.2.7 German Colonial Settlement and Secondary City Development

Germany had three colonies in Africa: Namibia (German Southwest Africa), Tanzania (German East Africa, Tanganyika) and Cameroon. Under German colonisation, commerce and agriculture were high priorities. It was realised early that economic development would depend on reliable transportation, and the colonial government embarked upon an expansive roads and railway building program to open up land for coffee, sisal and other cash crop production in Tanzania. This led to the establishment of a pattern of rural towns and settlements across the country, with the transport systems converging on the primate city of Dar Es Salaam.

German colonisation of Tanzania, however, was not a success. The colony was heavily subsidised, and after the Treaty of Versailles in 1919, it was ceded to the British. British colonialism led to the significant expansion and growth of regional towns and cities to service an expanding agriculture sector. Road and railway systems were expanded, including a link to the 10,228 km trans-African Highway from Alexandria to Cape Town. Part of the plan, which was first proposed in the late nineteenth century, was to establish an inland route through Tanzania to boost colonial trade and development by developing a trade corridor and promoting industrial and agriculture cities between Kenya and South Africa.

German South-West Africa (Namibia) was the only colony where Germans settled in large numbers. However, a reasonable number of German settlers remained in Tanzania and South Africa. German immigrants were drawn to the colony by potential economic riches in diamond and copper mining and farming, but the arid climate and hostilities with indigenous people restricted the development and urban settlement. Britain, and later South Africa, showed little interest in developing the country except for mining. As a result, there is no well-established urban settlement pattern. Windhoek is the largest city in Namibia, with a population of 431,000 in 2020. There are nine small cities with populations less than 60,000, many of whom are now experiencing urbanisation and informal settlements.

4.2.8 Italian and Spanish Colonial Settlements

At the Berlin Conference, Ethiopia was allocated to Italy. Spanish West Africa, comprising the Western Sahara Desert, was allocated to Spain. Neither country took a strong interest in colonising their administered territories, especially Spain, which had lost most of its Latin American colonies during the early nineteenth century. While Ethiopia has a large population, it is landlocked, making it difficult to service from surrounding countries. Ethiopia is one of the least urbanised and industrialised countries in Africa, but several of its secondary cities have grown rapidly (Schmidt & Kedir, 2009, p. 38). A case study on Ethiopia and the secondary city of Dire Dawa (UN-Habitat, 2008, p. 32) is presented later in the book (see Chapter 8).

4.3 Post-Colonial Era: Urban Development Policies and Practices

The postcolonial era in Africa has been one of rapid development, but it has also been associated with turmoil, disruption and political division. There has been a propensity to blame much of this on colonialism's legacy – especially the partitioning of Africa into artificial territories with no respect for indigenous groups or customary boundaries. But the postcolonial era also has a history of lost opportunities caused by competing political, social and economic ideologies and corruption. Since the 1960s, Africa has had more civil wars, coups and periods of military and despot rule than any other regions of the world.

Attempts have been made to modernise and develop solid economic structures, but many have failed to meet expectations, such as the East African Community between Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, which collapsed in 1977. The building of industrial estates at Tema (Ghana), Bulawayo (Zimbabwe) (see Photo 4.2), and Warri (Nigeria) was slow to materialise. The policy of Ujamaa in Tanzania – cooperative economics based on the cooperation of local people in towns and villages to provide the essentials of living, to build and maintain stores, shops, and other businesses and profit from them together – was a failure. Northern African countries have fared much better, with significant manufacturing investment and growing industrialisation in Morocco, Algeria and Egypt.

PHOTO 4.2
Bulawayo, Zimbabwe: An industrial secondary city hub of Africa

Since the end of colonial rule, uncertainty, disruptive changes and corruption have undermined confidence and investment in developing the region's secondary cities. Most Africans long for stability and well-functioning social, economic, and governance systems. Instead, the uncertainty, loss of economic opportunity and insecurity have seen millions of Africans migrate to other regions and parts of the world (Adepoju et al., 2007; IOM, 2008, p. 38). This migration has drained African cities of the intellectual capital, competencies and skills needed to develop subnational regional cities. The enormous loss of human capital in urban management, especially engineering and planning, has been a significant factor in the failure to manage urbanisation in the postcolonial era (Rogerson, 1989). Many secondary cities in Ghana, Kenya, Sierra Leone and Cameroon do not have a qualified planner or engineer.

The colonial era left a legacy of economic and physical systems across Africa that has profoundly shaped urban and regional development (Nwaka, 2005). As indicated earlier, many African countries still have planning laws that are a legacy of colonial legislation. The 1947 UK Town Planning Act, for example, remains a legacy of planning laws and regulations in most former British colonies. French and Portuguese planning codes are embedded similarly in Francophone and Lusophone countries.

With the exceptions of South Africa, Kenya, Morocco and Nigeria, planning for urban and local economic development in Africa remains heavily centralised. Federal government structures have facilitated some competition for development between cities and subnational regions; however, the postcolonial era has generally seen a continued weakening of local government structures, competitiveness, and financial autonomy. This has placed Africa's secondary cities on the periphery in terms of their potential contribution to national development.

Despite their sporadic and poorly managed development, many secondary cities, except those in the Sahel, thrive and develop. They play important administrative roles and add value to mineral, agricultural and forestry production, tourism, satellite and university towns, transportation hubs, and gateway border towns. A few secondary cities have developed as new or expanded growth centres, namely, the new capital cities such as Lilongwe (Malawi), Dodoma City (Tanzania), Yamoussoukro (Côte d'Ivoire) and Abuja (Nigeria) – the latter of which is now the capital city and a metropolis.

For the most part, policies designed to encourage secondary city growth poles generally have not been adopted by African countries, primarily because governments do not have the resources to develop these; however, Kenya is planning a large technology growth pole – Konza Technopolis – and Egypt is planning more than 20 new cities, as discussed below (Al-Youm, 2018). The future development of new secondary cities in Africa will predominantly result from expanding fast-growing middle-sized cities and towns – especially around Lake Victoria in eastern Africa, the Nile Valley and the Nile Delta. Significant growth in secondary cities is also expected in western Africa along the Atlantic Coast and around the Mediterranean Sea's port cities.

As indicated earlier, many African countries still have planning laws that are a legacy of colonial legislation. The 1947 UK Town Planning Act, for example, remains a legacy of planning laws and regulations in most former British colonies.

4.4 National Urban Development Policies

4.4.1 National Urban Policy

As discussed in chapter 3, African secondary cities' development has been hampered by national urban policies that focus primarily on the development of metropolitan regions and primate cities (Kriticos, 2019). Only a few African cities have updated spatial or land-use plans or enforced the provisions of these. Most plans are unrealistic in terms of the financial and human resources needed for implementation. Many secondary cities do not have qualified planners, engineers or building inspectors. Secondary cities lack essential services such as energy, water, roads and communications networks, and their installation is at a much slower rate than the growth of urbanisation (Monica, 2020).

It has been pointed out in Chapter 3 that the urban development bias for primate cities runs throughout Africa. Nairobi's domination within Kenya's system of cities has had very negative consequences for secondary city development (Otiso, 2005). South Africa's National Development Plan of 2011 noted that a principal focus of urban development was towards the country's largest cities – in contrast to the stagnation of small rural towns (South African Government, 2011). Kigali, Rwanda's capital, accounts for 50% of the country's urban population and has received the most investment in urban development; however, this will change with the recent decentralisation plans. Similar concerns are expressed about the over-concentration of urban development in Accra and Kumasi in Ghana (Yankson et al., 2017) and Kampala City in Uganda (Sladoje et al., 2019).

Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) research found that for African primary and secondary cities to realise their potential as 'engines of growth', they must address policy issues related to:

- The evolution of political and institutional platforms to enable cities to support equitable growth.
- Effective partnerships between locally elected officials and their constituencies.
- Adequate technical skills and organisational capacity to manage urban development systems effectively and efficiently.
- Getting the basics right to support growth.
- Management of the impacts of climate change.
- Integrating systems of cities through the cluster of cities and trade corridors (JICA Research Institute, 2013).

4.4.2 Implementation of National Urban Policies

For a long time after independence, many African governments viewed rural development and industrialisation – not urbanisation – as the pathway to national development. However, most African governments now recognise that cities are central to creating future jobs and industries. City development management must be supported more strongly by national and reformed local governments to fulfil this role. National urbanisation policies and plans, incorporating roles and responsibilities for secondary city development, are an excellent way to support a more robust, dynamic, vibrant national system of cities. Without these, African countries are likely to face significant challenges in managing urbanisation, and primacy levels are likely to increase. Ensuring an appropriate balance of power and responsibility between government levels (Cartwright, 2019) in developing and implementing national strategies and policies to manage urbanisation and urban development is a lesson learned from the management of urbanisation in other regions of the world.

Less than 20 African countries have or are developing national urbanisation policies, strategies, or plans, despite their critical role in properly managing urbanisation and development resulting from migration and the co-dependencies between cities and countries (Cartwright, 2019). Policies designed to slow down migration and urbanisation and create jobs in rural communities have failed. Urbanisation is an integral part of Africa's development – just as it has been for all other regions of the world.

Unlike many African countries that have done little to implement national urban policy reform since independence, South Africa has one of the most comprehensive national urbanisation policies in Africa, which was developed in the wake of Apartheid. Its policies for secondary cities are embedded in the urbanisation policies of the 1996 Constitution. Although the policies have tended to work well, they are not, however, without their problems (Marais & Cloete, 2017).

4.4.2.1 Weak Institutional Enabling Environments

City Alliance's *Assessing the Institutional Environment of Local Governments in Africa* (Cities Alliance & UCLGA, 2018) argues that for African cities to be effective implementers of urban development policies, they must operate within a robust legal framework with explicit, unambiguously stated roles within the national urbanisation policy, with mandates and subsidiary responsibilities. In 2013 and 2015, two surveys were conducted of the institutional environment for city action of over 50 African cities. The criteria used to assess whether the institutional environment is favourable to cities and subnational governments included:

- Constitutional and legislative frameworks.
- Local governance; financial transfers from central to local governments; local authority own resources; capacity building for local governments; transparency in the operation and management of local governments; citizen participation.
- Local government performance; the existence or lack of a national strategy for urban management.

Table 4.1 shows the summarised results of the study for the three periods, 2012, 2015 and 2018. Just a few countries had a favourable institutional environment and policies for urban development. Many countries required significant institutional environment improvements, and 26 out of the 50 countries achieved minimal improvement. Secondary cities often perform poorer in environmental and urban policy implementation than do metropolitan regions.

TABLE 4.1 | National institutional environment for cities

Colour Classification	Number of African countries		
	2012	2015	2018
Green Countries with the most favourable environments for the action of cities and local authorities in accordance with standards adopted.	3 out of 49	4 out of 50	4 out of 50
Yellow Countries whose environment is relatively favourable to the action of cities and local authorities but where improvements are needed.	4 out of 49	9 out of 50	12 out of 50
Orange Countries that require significant reform efforts to move towards an environment that is favourable to cities and local authorities.	25 out of 49	17 out of 50	13 out of 50
Red Countries whose environment is generally unfavourable to the action of cities to local authorities.	17 out of 49	17 out of 50	13 out of 50

Source: Cities Alliance & UCLG Africa (2018).

4.4.3 Decentralisation

A report on the pre-2010 Devolution Constitution indicated that development policies and approaches had not helped Kenya's development of its secondary cities – due to flawed rural development and centralist government policies favouring city primacy (Otiso, 2005). After a decade of regional devolution, Nairobi's primacy has not been dented.

A UN-Habitat study (UN-Habitat, 2008) of national urbanisation policies noted that the Ethiopian government understood and accepted arguments for a more decentralised national urbanisation policy. Ethiopia approved a policy framework in 2005, and Ethiopia's intermediate (secondary) cities now appear to be in a better position to foster and leverage the country's rural transformation (see Chapter 8, on Ethiopia).

Rwanda's national policy, linked to Rwanda's Vision 2020, recognises urbanisation as a 'positive tool' for development. The policy is for the country to exit from being a low-income country, with urbanisation as its driver for economic growth. The Rwanda National Urbanisation Policy recognises the importance of secondary cities (Republic of Rwanda, 2015).

The Nigerian government initiated the National Urban Development Policies in the 1990s. However, in 2012 the federal government reported:

> "Successive governments in Nigeria have shown little concern for solving urban problems… even though Nigeria adopted a robust Urban Development Policy and enacted a comprehensive Urban and Regional Planning Act, both in 1992, there has been generally little achievement to show in terms of their implementation. Today, the general apathy towards urban planning persists in the country" (the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 2012, p.4; UN Habitat, 2014).

The general failure of Nigeria's national urbanisation policy and the federal government's lack of active involvement has created significant regional development imbalances (Okeke, 2014). However, the planning and building of Abuja, Nigeria's new federal capital, illustrates that Nigeria's cities could be different if there were commitment. There is no reference to secondary cities in Nigeria's urban development policies.

The UN-Habitat (2014) study of Morocco, Ethiopia, South Africa, Rwanda, Ghana, Nigeria, Uganda, Kenya, Malawi, Zambia, Mozambique, Angola and Mali presents a mixed picture of different types of policies that may be considered as national urbanisation policies. However, most African countries do not have explicit national urbanisation policy policies focused on secondary and medium-sized cities. The problem within national urbanisation policies and plans is the lack of a systems approach to cities' development and management.

A more integrated approach is required to national urban policy, planning and development, incorporating the need for secondary cities to play a more decisive role as intermediaries in enhancing connectivity, resources, information, data and knowledge sharing between cities, and identifying opportunities for efficiency gains, value-adding, reducing logistics and energy costs within national systems of cities.

The problem within national urbanisation policies and plans is the lack of a systems approach to cities' development and management.

Decentralisation and devolution policies embraced so enthusiastically in the 1990s have not worked, and central governments are taking back more control – especially over budgets, grants and transfers. The control by national governments on local governments remain strong. This situation has worsened as the result of the COVID-19 pandemic. The Cities Alliance (2016) study of secondary cities in Ethiopia, Ghana, Uganda and Mozambique highlighted the problems with decentralisation policies and central government control of devolution processes: the devolution of powers not commensurate with the implementation abilities of secondary cities, government determination of secondary city budgets, fragmented institutions and powers, and partial political authority.

4.5 Secondary Cities Urban Development Policies

Several countries in Africa have introduced incentives and policies specifically for secondary and intermediate cities. Rwanda (Government of Rwanda and GGGI, 2015), Kenya (Otiso, 2005), Morocco (Mebtoul, 2020), Egypt (Nisreen, 2014), Uganda (Cities Alliance, 2016), Ethiopia (OECD (2020) and Senegal (GGGI, 2018) are leaders, in this relatively recent policy direction. However, the development and management of secondary cities are not priority urban agenda matters for most African countries.

Some countries have used research and advanced technology applications involving geographic information system (GIS) and scenario testing to develop policies, guidelines and development plans for secondary cities. The use of technology in planning secondary cities and towns in Africa is an innovative new planning step. Rwanda not only has a well-considered future through its Vision 2020 (Republic of Rwanda, 2000) and Vision 2050 (Republic of Rwanda, 2015) has become a leader in this field by applying land and information technology to plan and develop six niche secondary cities through a National Roadmap for Green Secondary Cities (Government of Rwanda and GGGI, 2015; Ntirenganya, 2016) (See Box 4.1 and Figure 4.4, for a brief summary).

BOX 4.1 | Rwanda Networked Cities

Rwanda suffered devastation as the result of genocide and civil war in the early 1990s. The Rwanda Vision 2020 (Government of Rwanda, 2000), launched in 2000, set out an ambitious medium-term goal of transforming the country from an agrarian to a knowledge-based economy. Vision 2020 provides a roadmap for Rwanda which supports urbanisation, promotes regional economic integration and cooperation, actively encourages science and technology, education and ICT skills, and addresses the fact that the country is landlocked. Rwanda has developed several progressive initiatives, such as flagship programs to support private-sector development in the skills, employability and entrepreneurship program (SEEP). It has prioritised ICT as an enabler of its socio-economic development through the five-year (2013-17) national strategy on ICT development, called 'Smart Rwanda'. It has also taken the lead in Africa in a broadband network. These initiatives are moving the country towards Vision 2020, and they strongly relate to improved connectivity between cities.

Rwanda is embarking on an ambitious task of developing a network of six green secondary cities. Two key priorities are integrated development planning and management and secondary cities' development as growth poles. Another priority is the focus on green urbanisation and innovation (Figure 4.4 Priority areas for economic transition - Rwanda). In May 2016, the Government of Rwanda, in partnership with the Global Green Growth Institute (GGGI), launched the National Roadmap for Green Secondary Cities Development in Rwanda (GGGI, 2016). The roadmap supports Rwanda's Green Growth and Climate Resilient Strategy and serves as an implementation tool for its economic development and poverty reduction strategy (EDPRS2). A vital element of the green cities agenda is the focus on connectivity around five priority economic transformation areas for rapid growth.

LANDSAT have developed a spatially explicit logistics regression model for Kampala to test city growth scenarios with alternative policy options on future urban-sprawl patterns and quality of life (Vermeiren et al., 2012). In South Africa, studies have presented substantial policy arguments that secondary cities can play a unique role as catalysts for developing their rural hinterlands, alleviating primary city demographic pressure, and more (South African Cities Network, 2012). The study aimed to increase South Africa's understanding of its secondary cities' roles in and contributions to the national space economy

The most proactive national policy to counter the primacy of its cities is Egypt's New Urban Communities Programme (Ellahham, 2014). Some 24 planned new cities are at various stages of construction. Many challenges have arisen concerning Egypt's approach to building these new secondary cities, however (Salem, 2017).

FIGURE 4.4 | Priority areas for economic transition - Rwanda



Source: Jeong (2014)

Uganda's case for secondary cities presents a less clear policy intent. In 2016, Cities Alliance and Arup indicated that Uganda's Vision 2040 had identified "five regional and five strategic cities which are intended to attract investment away from the capital, providing general services to a large catchment area (regional) or a functional speciality for national economic development (strategic)" (Cities Alliance, 2016, p.12). The document refers to Uganda's secondary cities as "municipalities within current government administrative structures". Regional cities are referred to as "urban centres that provide general services to a large catchment area". Strategic cities have a functional speciality for national economic importance, including oil, industry, tourism, and mining. The document indicates some inconsistency, as the capital Kampala is included among the five regional cities when it is, in fact, a primate city.

Ethiopia has a vision for developing intermediate (secondary) cities, which offer rural Ethiopia urban market centres for provision and trade of goods and services, employment opportunities, destinations for rural migrants, and financial flows through local and international remittances of land prices adjacent to towns (see Chapter 8, on Ethiopia). Ethiopia's intermediate cities provide the scope for facilitating rural-urban transformations through the functions identified above. The cities serve as market centres for agricultural goods and encourage value-adding to rural food and crop production, but the linkages need to be strengthened. Intermediate cities provide possibilities for strong employment creation (OECD Library, 2020).

4.6 A legacy of Lost Urban Policy Opportunity

Africa's secondary cities support substantial numbers of people living in rural and regional areas. Trade, commerce, and government services have historically been the primary drivers of economic development, high migration and natural population growth. Except for natural resources extraction industries, such as oil and petroleum, industrialisation has not played a significant role in driving Africa's secondary city development. South Africa and some northern African countries are the only states with substantial and growing manufacturing industries located in their secondary cities. The critical driver of employment and economic development in secondary cities is the growth of services – especially government, health, education and transport (see discussion in Chapter 3).

Colonialism laid the foundations of urbanisation and economic development in Africa, following similar patterns in Asia, South America and Europe at the beginning of their respective industrial revolutions. However, neglect of urban planning and policy, on the whole, has brought about the loss of significant opportunities for secondary cities to play a stronger role in the development of African nations. Some African countries have sought to industrialise and take advantage of cheaper labour, tax incentives, and proximity to European markets, but they are not industrialising as rapidly as Asia, and industrialisation is not occurring in secondary cities.

Large primate cities in Africa will continue to attract more skilled migrants from regional towns and cities and proportionate investment capital. Many secondary cities will grow rapidly, and they likely will benefit from spinoff flow from hinterland trade (Adepoju et al., 2007). But the rapid urbanisation in secondary cities will also give rise to the scale of problems experienced by large metropolitan cities. Catching up will be a significant challenge and will require a substantial shift in policies to avoid situations where one or two cities dominate an entire nation's economy.

Secondary /intermediary cities are not on most national urbanisation or regional economic development policy agendas in African countries. Urban policy development is still largely conducted in metropolitan regions because these have a political voice and because the magnitude of environmental and social problems they face is severe. The most recent United Nations World Cities Report made 17 references to metropolitan areas compared with 4 for secondary cities (UN-Habitat. (2020). The New Urban Agenda mentions 'metropolitan' 10 times, with no mention of secondary cities and a single mention of intermediate cities (UN-Habitat, 2016). The imbalance of focus on large metropolitan regions needs to be rectified, especially in African countries where the severity of urbanisation problems in secondary cities is growing rapidly. With secondary cities of 300,000 to 1 million people predicted to experience very high growth shares, the need for a policy agenda for them is important.

For secondary cities in Africa to realise their development potential, a new policy agenda and strategic directions in national and regional planning, as well as economic development policies are needed. This need calls for a deeper understanding of what is happening physically, socially, economically and environmentally in the development of secondary cities and why they are not performing well (Cohen, 2019). Only through such an understanding can appropriate urban frameworks and strategies be developed and implemented to enable secondary cities to play a much stronger role in developing both national economies and the regions in which they are located.

Colonialism laid the foundations of urbanisation and economic development in Africa, following similar patterns in Asia, South America and Europe at the beginning of their respective industrial revolutions.

REFERENCES

Adepoju, A., T. v. Naerssen & A. Zoomers, eds. (2007). *International Migration and National Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: Viewpoints and Policy Initiatives in the Countries of Origin*. Leiden, Boston, BRILL.

African World Heritage. (2018). "Frontiers of the Roman Empire," African World Heritage, Nairobi, Kenya. https://www.africanworldheritagesites.org/cultural-places/frontiers-of-the-roman-empire.html

Al-Youm, A.-M. (2018). Egypt plans 20 new cities to accommodate 30 million people. *Egypt Independent Cairo*. September 10, 2018.

Anderson, D. & Rathbone, R., eds. (2000). *Africa's Urban Past*. Heinemann, Portsmouth, NH; James Currey, Oxford.

Buchannan, C. (1963). *Traffic in Towns*. Ministry of Transport, London (UK).

Cartwright, A. (2019). *The Potential of National Urban Policies in Africa*. Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI) www.ispionline.it

Cities Alliance & UCLGA. (2018). *Assessing the Institutional Environment of Local Governments in Africa*. Cities Alliance and United Cities and Local Governments of Africa, Brussels.

Cities Alliance. (2016). *Future Proofing Cities*. Uganda-Secondary Cities. Arup.

Cohen, A., (2019) Why Africa's economic future lies in its smaller cities. World Economic Forum

https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/05/putting-africa-s-secondary-cities-first/

DCP Kenya. (2019). Development Corridors in Kenya: A Scoping Study. https://developmentcorridors.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/Development-Corridors-in-Kenya_Scoping-Report-2019.pdf

Ellahham, N. (2014). Towards Creating New Sustainable Cities in Egypt- Critical Perspective for Planning New Cities. *World Sustainable Building 2014 Conference (World SB 14) Barcelona, October 28/30th, 2014*. http://wsb14barcelona.org/programme/pdf_poster/P-191.pdf

Fourchard, L. (2011). Lagos. pp. 66-82 in: *Power and Powerlessness: Capital Cities in Africa*, ed. S. Bekker & G. Therbor . HSRC Press. http://www.hsrcpress.ac.za/product.php?freedownload=1&productid=2284 :70

Global Green Growth Institute (GGGI), 2018, Scaling up Green Secondary Cities in Senegal, Annual Report.

Government of Rwanda and GGGI. (2015). National Roadmap for Green Secondary City Development. Kigali https://gggi.org/site/assets/uploads/2017/12/National-Roadmap-for-Green-Secondary-City-Development.pdf

Hidalgo, H. H. (2009). Assentamentos rurais e assentamentos. *Virtruvious, 105*(07): 1-15. http://vitruvius.com.br/revistas/read/arquitextos/09.105/78/pt

Hull, R. W. (1976). *African Cities and Towns before the European Conquest*. W. W. Norton, New York.

IOM (2008). Managing labour mobility in the evolving global economy. IOM world migration report series. London, Hammersmith Press. 4: 38.

Jeong, O. (2014). Develop Rwandan Secondary Cities as Model Green Cities with Green Economic Opportunities. Global Green Growth Institute. Retrieved June 28 from https://www.theigc.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/Panel-7-Jeong-0.pdf

JICA Research Institute (2013) *Development Challenges in Africa Towards 2050*. Japan International Cooperation Agency-JICA. www.jica.go.jp https://www.jica.go.jp/jica-ri/publication/booksandreports/development_challenges_in_africa_towards_2050.html

Kaberuka, D (2000). Rwanda Vision 2020. Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, Kigali https://www.greengrowthknowledge.org/sites/default/files/downloads/policy-database/RWANDA%29%20Rwanda%20Vision%202020.pdf

Kriticos, S. (2019). The costs of urban giants in sub-Saharan Africa. Cities that Work https://www.theigc.org/blog/the-costs-of-urban-giants-in-sub-saharan-africa/ 2021.

Marais, L. & Cloete, J. (2017). The role of secondary cities in managing urbanisation in South Africa. *Development Southern Africa 34*(2): 182-195.

Matos, M. C., T. B. Ramos & L. P. Costa (2009). "Planned and unplanned towns in former Portuguese colonies in Sub-Saharan Africa: an analysis of Silveira's Iconografia." African Perspectives: 1-10

Sladoje, M., Randolph, G. & Khan, L. (2019). Transforming secondary urban areas for job creation: A Study of Uganda. Final Report submitted to International Growth Centre, Uganda C-43447-UGA-1 August 2019.

Mebtoul, T., (2020) Sustainable Urban Development: Morocco Looks to Intermediate Cities, Morocco World News, Sep 22, 2020.

Monica, F. (2020). TaxiBrousse, Going small – the role of secondary cities in Africa. www.taxibrousse.it February 2020 a progetti per cooperazione internazionale.

Moriconi-Ebrard, F. (1997). Cities and secondary cities of the Third World: Cities side of Africa. *Cities Parallel* 22: 38-56.

Ndlela, D. B. (1984). Sectoral Analysis of Zimbabwe Economic Development with Implications for Foreign Trade and Foreign Exchange. *Zimbabwe Journal of Economics: Textile and Clothing Industry In Sub-Saharan Africa, 1*(1). http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/03796/19zimbabwe.pdf

Nisreen (2014), Towards Creating New Sustainable Cities in Egypt- Critical Perspective for Planning New Cities. World SB, 14 Barcelona. pdf.

Ntirenganya, E., (2016). New report recommends niche for secondary cities. The New Times. 8 September 2016. https://www.newtimes.co.rw/section/read/203344

Njoh, A. (2007). *Planning Power: Town Planning and Social Control in Colonial Africa.* University College Press, London. https://books.google.com.au/books?id=5fJ-k8BtH3QC&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_ge_summary_r&hl=pt-PT#v=onepage&q&f=false

Nwaka, G. I. (2005). Planning Sustainable Cities in Africa. pp. 119-138 in: *Sustainable development in Africa: a multifaceted challenge.* ed. U. OKechukwu and O. G. Afoaku. Africa World Press, Asmara.

OECD Library. (2020). Ethiopian intermediate cities and their roles for rural development. *Rural Development Strategy Review of Ethiopia: Reaping the Benefits of Urbanisation*. Oecd-library.org/sites/3458.

Okeke, I. N. (2014). Towards a Growth Path in Africa: A Study of National Urban Policy Responses to Urbanisations. South Africa Cities Network.

Otiso, K. M. (2005). Kenya's secondary cities growth strategy at a crossroads: which way forward? *GeoJournal 62*: 117-128. DOI 10.1007/s10708-005-8180-z.

Republic of Rwanda, Department of Infrastructure. (2015). National Urbanisation Policy. pdf

Republic of Rwanda, (2015). Rwanda Vision 2050. Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, Kigali https://www.nirda.gov.rw/uploads/tx_dce/Vision_English_Version_2050_-31_Dec_2020.pdf

Rogerson, C. M. (1989). Managing the Decolonizing City in Southern Africa. *South African Geographical Journal, 71*(3): 201-208. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03736245.1989.9713536.

Salem, O E. & essam Monir, M. (2017). Policies, Strategies, and Mechanisms of New Cities in Egypt. *ARChive, 1, (1*). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3056685

Schmidt, E. & Kedir, M. (2009). Urbanisation and Spatial Connectivity in Ethiopia: Urban Growth Analysis Using GIS. Addis Abba, Ethiopia, Development Strategy and Governance Division, International Food Policy Research Institute: 38.

Silveira, L. (1957). Junta de Investigações do Ultramar. Ensaio de iconografia das cidades portuguesas do ultramar / por Luis Silveira Ministerio do Ultramar, Junta de Investigacoes do Ultramar Lisboa 1957.

South African Cities Network. (2012). Secondary cities in South Africa: The start of a conversation. Background report. March 2012.

South African Government. (2011). National Development Plan, Vision for 2030. Republic of South Africa, National Planning Commission. https://www.gov.za/issues/national-development-plan-2030

UN-Habitat - United Nations Human Settlement Programme. (2008). Dire Dawa Urban Profile. Nairobi, United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-HABITAT): 32.

UN Habitat. (2014). *The Evolution of National Urban Policies, A Global Overview.* United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat) and Cities Alliance, Nairobi. https://unhabitat.org/the-evolution-of-national-urban-policies

UN-Habitat - United Nations Human Settlement Programme. (2016). "HABITAT III New Urban Agenda." In, 23. United Nations Centre for Human Settlements, Nairobi.

UN-Habitat - United Nations Human Settlement Programme. (2020). "World Cities Report 2020: The Value of Sustainable Urbanisation." In, 418. United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat), Nairobi.

Vermeiren, K., Van Rompaey, A., Loopmans, M., Serwajja, E. & Mukwaya, P. (2012). Urban growth of Kampala, Uganda: pattern analysis and scenario development. *Landscape and urban planning:* 106: 199-206.

Yankson, P.W.K. Gough, K. V., Esson, J. & Amankwaa, E. F. (2017) Spatial and social transformations in a secondary city: the role of mobility in Spatial Sekondi-Takoradi, Ghana, *Geografisk Tidsskrift-Danish Journal of Geography 2017. 117*(2): 82-92. https://doi.org/10.1080/00167223.2017.1343672

© Pexels

5

POPULATION, DEMOGRAPHY, MIGRATION

BRIAN H ROBERTS,
LUC CHRISTIAENSEN,
GODFREY O ANYUMBA

Africa has been urbanising fast over the past few decades, and much of the world's urbanisation over the coming decades will happen in Africa and Asia. They are the last continents with below 50% urbanisation. Africa's rapid urbanisation comes along with high overall population growth (the highest in the world). Sixty (60%) of the continent's population is under the age of 25. The United Nations estimated, in 2015, 226 million young people aged 15-24 lived in Africa, representing 20% of the continent's population and one-fifth of the world's youth population.

This chapter reviews the drivers of Africa's secondary cities development, including trends and demography within the broader context of Africa's rapid urbanisation. It focuses on migration patterns to large, medium, and small urban areas, internally displaced persons, and the economic impacts of migration using a case study of Kakuma, Kenya. The impact of forced migration involving refugees and internally displaced people significantly impacts the development of secondary cities, especially in those located close to international borders. The final section of the chapter presents a series of policy agendas for improved population management related to migration and urbanisation concerning secondary cities.

PHOTO 5.1
Africa's growing urban population

5.1 Urban Population Growth and Trends

Africa's cities are youthful, with more than 66% of urban dwellers below the age of 30 (UN DESA, 2015. Many cities have become large and are growing rapidly, especially the megacities of Lagos in Nigeria and Kinshasa in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Estimates for Kinshasa's population growth predict the city will grow from 17 million in 2021 to 35 million by 2050. The population of many of the secondary cities is also rising rapidly due to economic and forced migration, as well as internal population growth and reclassification. The effect of rapid urbanisation has resulted in many changes to urban landscapes. Existing cities have grown, and many new urban centres have emerged through urban natural population growth, migration, and the merger and absorption of rural villages into existing urban agglomerations or their reclassification as new urban centres. This has resulted in diverse spatial settlement patterns, further affected by environmental characteristics such as terrain, soils, climate, and land use (Prieto Curiel, 2020). Together they determine the rate of urban growth and the size and form of built-up areas.

The widely differing forces of urban expansion and the political and administrative reasons to distinguish 'urban' from 'rural' have made it so that a common globally accepted definition of 'urban' does not exist (OECD/SWAC, 2020a; Dijkstra et al., 2018). This has complicated spatial demographic comparisons between countries.[1] Two widely used data sources for analysing urbanisation patterns across countries in Africa are the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA) project, *World Urbanisation Prospects* (UN DESA, 2018), and Africapolis, a project of the OECD-supported Sahel and West Africa Club (OECD/SWAC, 2020a).[2]

The United Nations uses definitions of 'urban' as applied by national statistical offices relying on census and administrative boundaries.[3] It also uses various methods to interpolate data over time to estimate urban population and city size when census data is unavailable. These urbanisation data have the advantage of being officially recognized. On the downside, they are not strictly comparable across countries and only provide a breakdown of urban data by city with populations above 300,000.

Africapolis uses GIS to identify spatial concentrations of greater than 10,000 people with a continuously built environment of less than 200 m between buildings.[4] This recognizes patterns of connectivity and distance that operate as urban agglomerations[5] It also enables a breakdown by city size of below 300,000 people.

This section reviews the evolution of the distribution of Africa's urban population by city size and prospects for the future, drawing on the UN DESA urbanisation data and Africapolis. In this chapter, secondary cities with population agglomerations of between 100,000 to 1 million are used for analysis. A few secondary cities in Africa, such as Mombasa (Kenya) and Gqeberha (formerly Port Elizabeth, in South Africa), are larger than 1 million and essentially function as secondary cities.

The effect of rapid urbanisation has resulted in many changes to urban landscapes.

5.1.1 Urban Agglomerations

According to the UN World Urbanisation Prospects (UN DESA, 2018), Africa's urban population is projected to pass the 50% threshold in 2035 (Figure 5.1). Africapolis data suggests that Africa may already be more than 50% urbanised (OECD/SWAC, 2020a). Based on data from 50 African countries, the population of urban areas in 2015 was 567 million, compared to 491.53 million estimated by the UN DESA (2018). The difference is explained by the way urban areas are defined. However, regardless of how urban agglomerations are defined, by 2050, Africa's cities are predicted to be home to an additional 900 million people.

FIGURE 5.1 | Urban and rural population sub-Saharan Africa 1950-2050 (estimated)



Source: UN DESA (2018).

Looking at the distribution of the urban population across cities, known as the urban hierarchy, the proportion of urban people living in large, and megacities (>5 million inhabitants), was 14.7% in 2020 (UN DESA, 2020; Figure 5.2). When taking 1 million as the threshold, a little bit more than one-third of the urban population (36.7%) is living in cities of 1 million inhabitants or above.

FIGURE 5.2 | Distribution of African urban population by city size, 2020 (UN DESA, 2020)



Source: UN DESA (2020)

Africapolis has similarly identified 74 urban agglomerations of built-up urban areas within Africa, with more than 1 million inhabitants, housing 40% of its estimated urban population in 2015. About one-third of these 74 urban agglomerations of more than 1 million are in three countries alone: Nigeria (12), Egypt (7), and Kenya (5). The small variations in the percentage of population shown for city size between UN DESA (2018) and Africapolis are explained by data collection and coverage methods. UN DESA uses administrative boundaries, Africapolis uses urban footprint.

FIGURE 5.3 | Distribution of African urban population by city size, 2015 (Africapolis)



Source: Africapolis Database, OECD/SWAC (2020a).

There are six supra-agglomerations in different parts of the continent (Figure 5.4). Some agglomerations are well-established metropolises and primate cities. Others are fast-growing, dispersed polycentric, and economically, and spatially clustered integrated urban-centric concentrations of smaller towns and cities, which have developed around expanding secondary city provincial capital cities. Kisumu, Kenya, (population 380,000) is the centre of a large polycentric agglomeration of smaller cities and towns, with a metropolitan region population of over 3 million people, covering an area of approximately 2,500 km^2 with a population density of 1,200 ppkm^2.[6] This population is within a radius of 28 km or a little over 45 minutes of Kisumu city centre commuting time.

As Africapolis notes: "One of the main drivers of urban growth in Africa is the expansion of built-up areas, leading to absorption and merging with urban agglomerations and smaller settlements. Environmental characteristics, such as relief and land-use, impact urban forms and the size of built-up areas" (OECD/SWAC, 2020b). This urban agglomeration pattern of clustered urban development in Africa is not dissimilar to the concept of 'agripolis', first identified in Asia during the late 1970s (Friedmann & Douglass, 1978). It highlights the importance of reclassification (or in situ urbanisation) as a driver of urban growth, in addition to natural population growth and migration.

Of the total urban agglomerations identified by Africapolis in Africa, over 630 (about 8%) are secondary cities between 100,000 and 1 million inhabitants. Together, they house 28% of the urban population. The urban population share of secondary cities varies significantly between countries, from less than 10% in countries like Burundi and Mauritania to more than 60% in countries like Gabon, Gambia, and Eswatini. The urban population share is around one-third in Tanzania, Senegal and Tunisia, and one-sixth in Ghana, Côte d'Ivoire and Mali. Overall, Africapolis classifies a more significant percentage of Africa's population as 'urban' and a greater share of its urban population in larger urban centres.

FIGURE 5-4 | Urban agglomerations in Africa



Source: Africapolis (2018).

5.1.2 Urban Expansion

Annualized population growth rates for African cities calculated from UN DESA data have remained high, at over 3.7% since 1990, but rates continue to fall. The growth rate of urban areas varies significantly between regions and city size (Table 5.1). At more than 4.5%, eastern, middle, and western Africa cities have the highest expected average annual population growth rates. Southern and northern Africa population growth rates for cities are much lower, reflecting the already high levels of urbanisation within the countries in these two regions.

TABLE 5.1 | Average annual change (%) in population by city size of Africa (1990–2020) UN DESA

City size	Africa	Central	Eastern	Northern	Southern	Western
<0.3	4.0	4.4	6.8	2.6	1.8	6.0
300,000 to 500,000	3.2	3.6	3.4	1.5	4.6	3.7
500,000 to 1 million	3.2	4.7	3.3	2.3	2.5	3.2
1 to 5 million	3.3	4.6	3.8	1.7	2.7	1.3
5 to 10 million	3.7	4.6	4.0	1.8	3.8	3.1
>10 million	3.4	2.1		2.5		3.7
† Average annual growth rate (%)	3.7	4.5	4.5	2.3	2.5	4.3

Source: UN DESA (2020) Derived Population in Cities Classified by Size Class of Urban Settlement, Region, Subregion, Country, and Area, 1950-2035 (thousands) † AAGR estimates derived from the historical population for cities reaching population threshold level in 2020.

Population growth rates using UN DESA data show that cities in Africa with between 5 and 10 million inhabitants are growing at an average of 3.7%, but there are significant variations between regions. Smaller cities in central and western Africa are growing fast, at 4% or more. Recent studies confirm that some of the biggest increases in urban population occur in small- and medium-sized urban agglomerations in mid-latitudinal Africa (Guneralp et al., 2017). Secondary cities between 300,000 and 1 million are growing slower, at 3.2%. However, smaller secondary cities, regional cities, and towns in eastern, southern, and western Africa with low urbanisation levels also have high population growth rates. The rates of population growth by city size vary between countries within regions. There is significant variation in the growth of cities within countries.

Africapolis data shows even higher growth rates for African cities (4.8% on average) (Table 5.2). Cities in the 0.1 – 0.3 million band are, on average, again growing fastest (at 4.5%), but compared with the results from UN DESA, the patterns differ across sub-region. The Africapolis numbers further point to fast growth of secondary cities and towns in East Africa. As indicated earlier, UN DESA population data does not necessarily capture spill-over urban populations outside administrative boundaries of cities, which are functionally part of the urban agglomeration (OECD/SWAC, 2020a). This explains the lower (and different) growth rates compared to Africapolis.

TABLE 5.2 | Average annual change (%) in population by city size of Africa (1990-2020) AFRICAPOLIS*

Africa	Africa	Central	Eastern	Northern	Southern	Western
10,000 to 50,000	3.5	5.2	2.9	1.2	4.3	3.4
50,000 to 100,000	4.1	3.6	4.1	2.6	3.5	3.8
100,000 to 300,000	4.5	5.2	7.4	5.1	3.3	3.5
300,000 to 500,000	4.1	3.0	4.9	1.7	5.1	3.5
500,000 to 1 million	4.0	3.1	8.1	6.1	5.9	2.2
5 to 10 million	4.3	3.6	5.2	3.3	2.6	5.4
10 million-plus				2.4		
AA % Change	4.6	5.0	6.5	3.8	4.0	4.5

Source: Africapolis (2020) * Estimates derived from Africapolis was adjusted to align with UN DESA country region classification

Finally, neither UN DESA nor Africapolis capture day and night population data. With increasing levels of daily commuting from peri-urban areas into cities, more reliable estimates of the day and night-time population are required to plan for infrastructure and urban services.

5.1.3 Projections

Current rates of population growth for cities in Africa are falling, but the patterns differ depending on the rates of urbanisation and migration. Figure 5.5 shows Africapolis urban agglomeration spatial projection to 2030. The projection shows significant urban population growth occurring in corridors, especially in western, eastern, and northern Africa. Significant shifts and changes in cities' spatial patterns and structures across the regions are expected over the next few decades (OECD/SWAC, 2020a). A report from UNICEF and UN-Habitat (2020, p. 19) notes:

> "Urban growth projections show that secondary cities in SSA will continue to grow in terms of population and urban area. Intense growth is expected in East Africa, especially around Lake Victoria towards Nairobi, central Uganda, Rwanda, and the northern United Republic of Tanzania" (Figure 5.5).

"Accelerated urbanisation is also expected in West Africa on urban areas along the Atlantic coast, stretching from Port Harcourt in Nigeria through Porto Norvo (Benin), Lomé (Togo), and Accra to Abidjan (Ivory Coast). Secondary cities along this western coastal stretch from Dakar (Senegal) to Conakry (Guinea) are expected to grow into primary cities, increasing from less than 1 million to 5 million between 1990 and 2030" (UNICEF and UN-Habitat, 2020, p. 19).

Urbanisation is expected to accelerate in East Africa around the Great Lakes Region. Population growth rates remain high, especially in Uganda (Government of Uganda-NPC, 2020). Population growth rates are around 3%, and almost half (47.9% of Uganda's population) is below 15 years.

"In southern Africa, the fastest-growing towns are in Angola, Zambia, and Mozambique. South Africa's cities are experiencing growth but not as much as the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa" (UNICEF and UN-Habitat, 2020, p. 19).

FIGURE 5.5 | Urban agglomeration spatial projection to 2030



Source: Africapolis (2018).

In northern Africa, the population is concentrated generally within 50 km of the coastline in Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia, and along the Nile Valley. Migration to coastal areas is expected to continue as climate change affects many fertile inland areas, causing them to receive less rainfall and experience higher temperatures (Meddi & Eslamian, 2021).

5.2 Demography of Secondary Cities

The UN Urbanisation Prospects (UN DESA, 2018) and UNFPA (2021) reporting provide good macro-information on national demographic change for Africa. However, systematic demographic information on African secondary cities is generally poor or survey data is produced at an aggregate level (Henderson et al., 2019). Most countries produce subnational statistical reports based on census and household survey data on demographic change. This comprises reports prepared by statistical offices on subnational regions. Occasionally, metropolitan regions and secondary city reports are produced. There are some good studies on metropolitan regions in Ghana and a few in-depth demographic investigations of secondary cities, such as the one produced for Tamale (Ghana Statistical Service-GSS, 2014).[7]

5.2.1 Country, Primate, and Secondary City Population Pyramids

Population pyramids provide insights into future changes in the demographic structure of countries and cities. The changes in age-cohorts can have implications on future land use, social and economic and development demands for public goods and services. A pyramid with a very narrow base of under 15-year-olds may signal a long-term decline and an ageing population. This will have consequences for long-term planning needs and infrastructure and social services operational costs at both national and local levels. The following shows differences in population cohort pyramids at country, primate, and secondary cities levels within Africa and two countries: Kenya and Egypt.

National Population Pyramid

Overall, Africa's population is young. The median age of the population is 19.7 years, compared to a global median of 29.6. Niger, at 14.9, has the youngest population cohort globally; Tunisia is the oldest at 32.7 (Figure 5.6). The population pyramids show some small variations of the age and sex of a population due to migration and health factors.

FIGURE 5.6 | Population pyramid Africa, Niger, and Tunisia



Source: UN DESA 2020.

There are significant differences in the population cohort structure between rural and urban areas within countries. These are illustrated clearly in the population pyramids for urban and rural areas in Kenya, where the national median age is 20.1 years (Figure 5.7). Kenya's rural area population pyramid depicts a wide base in the level of the population aged below 15 years, arising from high fertility rates. The population pyramid for urban areas indicates that most of the population is concentrated between ages 20 and 34 among both sexes. Individuals in this cohort are all working age, many migrants from rural areas, and towns and cities from within the country (Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, 2020).

FIGURE 5.7 | Kenya, population pyramid (2020)



Source: Kenya National Bureau of Statistics 2019 Kenya Population and Housing Census Reports (2019, p. 12); Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (2020).

Primate City Pyramid

The Cairo, Egypt, population pyramid is typical of older African primate cities (Figure 5.8). First, the Cairo pyramid varies significantly from the national one in the working-age groups, which migrants boost. The population cohort for 0–14-year-olds is lower, compared to the national population. There is a gender distortion in the balanced population of the working age. Women are more represented than men in the 20–29 age group. However, there is not a high level of engagement of migrant women in the workplace. They tend to migrate for marriage reasons, be less educated, and take care of children and do domestic work. In other African primate cities, women's participation in the workforce is higher.

FIGURE 5.8 | Population pyramid for Cairo, Egypt



Source: Weebly, Creative Commons 2017

Egypt is 43% urbanised. Birth rates are high, at 3.3 births per woman. The urban population will continue to rise and bring about even greater demand for land and housing development and housing – especially in Cairo. To reduce pressure on Cairo, Egypt's New Cities Programme aims to build over 35 satellite towns that are, essentially, secondary cities away from areas of population concentration (Barrada, 2004; Kenawy, 2017).

Secondary City Population Pyramid

Data that would enable a more detailed analysis of the structure and dynamics of the population of the secondary cities in most African countries is difficult to secure. Even when available, it is often difficult to obtain. Many large secondary cities have significant spill overs of the population into the surrounding (peri-urban) area of mainly rural local government. These extended urban areas remain classified as rural in census records. Many migrants live in peri-urban areas and depend on the secondary city for employment and other basic needs.

Some African countries such as Morocco, Kenya, Ghana and South Africa have good census data to map and analyse the demographics of secondary cities. Others have census data that could be utilized effectively, if available, in digital format to provide better information on the cohort structure and change in secondary city populations, including migrant mix. This information would enable better social development plans to be prepared and services provided for secondary cities (Christiaensen & Lozano-Gracia, 2021).

Figure 5.9 shows the population pyramid for the secondary cities of Grahamstown (now Makhanda) and Nelson Mandela Bay Metro Municipality, Eastern Cape South Africa [Gqeberha] (Roddy, 2012). Grahamstown shows a typical pyramid profile of a small struggling secondary city in Africa. Grahamstown has a population of 70,000. It is a university town, renowned art and cultural centre, and a regional market centre. The cohort of the under 15-years age group, especially 0–4 years, is small. This may be an outcome of the HIV/AIDS pandemic, consistent with the low number of females in the 30–34 age group. This reflects the significant decline in the fertility rate in South Africa between 1988 and 2000 of almost 50%. There are comparatively large numbers of 20–24-year-olds -who are at Rhodes University. This is not uncommon in smaller secondary cities with a university or boarding high schools (as observed in Cape Coast in Ghana). The most significant factor is a very rapid tapering off to the 26–49 age cohorts. This is due to the working-age population migrating to other parts of South Africa, including former students searching for employment after completing their studies.

Nelson Mandela Bay Metro Municipality (NMBM, 2020) shows the differences that often occur in the pyramid profile for a large secondary city. This municipality is attracting many migrants from rural-urban and intra-urban migration in search of employment (see the case study in Chapter 13). The population profile of 0–14-year-olds follows the national cohort, while the working-age (16–39-year-olds) population is larger than the national average, due to migration. The graph also shows that Nelson Mandela Bay Metro Municipality secondary cities are a significant attraction for retirees (aged 70 years and over) — especially women and widows. This is the case with secondary coastal cities in South Africa and northern Africa.

FIGURE 5.9 | Pyramid of secondary city: Grahamstown (now Makhanda), Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality



Source: Statistics South Africa (2012)

5.2.2 Demographic Profiles of African Countries, Primate Cities, and Secondary Cities

Table 5.3 shows a range of indicators that provide a demographic profile of African countries, primate, and secondary cities.

TABLE 5.3 | Demographic profile of African countries, primate cities, and secondary cities

	Countries	Primate Cities	Secondary Cities
Eastern Africa	Kenya (Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, 2020)	Nairobi (2019)	Mombasa (2019)
Population	47,564,296	4,397,073	866,820
Annual population growth rate (2015–2020) (%)	+2.3	+3.96	+3.47
Total Fertility Rate – live birth per woman	3.5 children	2.7 children	3.2 children
Urban population (%)	27.3	NA	NA
Population density people per km^2	82	6,247	5,495
Life Expectancy (years)	66.4	57	
Infant Mortality (infant deaths/ 1,000 live births)	30.6	95.0	

	Countries	Primate Cities	Secondary Cities
Southern Africa	South Africa	Cape Town	Gqeberha (formerly Port Elizabeth)
Population	59,308,690	3,433,441	967,677
Annual population growth rate (2015-2020) (%)	1.28	1.68	0.98
Total Fertility Rate – live birth per woman	2.4	2.8	2.3
Urban population (%)	66.3	NA	NA
Population density per km^2	48	1,700	
Life Expectancy (years)	63.78	64.0	56.4
Infant Mortality (infant deaths/ 1,000 live births)	23.6 per		
Central Africa	Angola	Luanda	N'dalatando
Population	32,866,272	2,776,168	383,100
Annual population growth rate (2015-2020) (%)	3.27	3.63	
Total Fertility Rate – live birth per woman	5.6	7.5	
Urban population (%)	66.1	NA	NA
Population density per km^2	26	4,400	
Life Expectancy (years)	62.3	61	
Infant Mortality (infant deaths/1,000 live births)	53.4	Worse in poorer communities	Worse in poorer communities
Western Africa	Nigeria	Lagos	Kano
Population	206,139,589	14,368,000	4,103,000
Annual population growth rate (2015-2020) (%)	2.58	3.3	2.6
Total Fertility Rate – live birth per woman	5.4	5.3	6.8
Urban population (%)	51.2	NA	NA
Population density per km^2	215	6,872	550.8
Life Expectancy (years)	55.8	54.5	52
Infant Mortality (infant deaths/1,000 live births)	54.7	74.2	20.5
Northern Africa	Algeria	Algiers	Boumerdas
Population	43,851,044	2,768,000	786,499
Annual population growth rate (2015-2020) (%)	1.85	1.48	
Total Fertility Rate – live birth per woman	2.89	2.9	5.6
Urban population (%)	72.6	NA	NA
Population density per km^2	18		592
Life Expectancy (years)	77.5		
Infant Mortality (infant deaths/1,000 live births)	18.4		

Sources: Various United Nations data sets and national statistics office data.

The indicators show several demographic differences between primate and secondary cities. In general, secondary cities tend to have urban population growth rates closer to the national average. Fertility rates tend to be higher than in primate cities, but migration rates are usually lower.

5.2.3 Gender Regional Differences in African Cities

Male birth rates in Africa are slightly higher than female birth rates (1.038:1), but on average, women live longer. The United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2019) estimates put the population of males at 679,230,901 and females at 679,196,279. Large primate cities tend to have a larger male cohort, particularly in the 20–45 age group. Countries with lower urbanisation tend to have fewer females living in cities than in rural areas; however, this varies substantially within Africa.

Overall, men are more engaged in the urban labour market than women and under better conditions. Men tend to be more employed than women; they work more hours and have significantly higher wages. Furthermore, across countries, male migrants are more likely to work than are male residents; although there is no systematic difference in the employment rates of female urban migrants and female residents (Christiaensen & Lozano-Garcia, 2021).

Most women are not highly skilled, and their jobs are mostly informal, low-paid, and part-time. This gender divide becomes wider in organizational management structures with low levels of female representation. Nevertheless, some companies actively seek female employees to improve the gender balance among their staff (University Rotterdam, 2018). Across Africa, gender inequality differs widely, with the gender employment participation gap also differing widely. However, the gap between male and female employment participation in cities tends to be lower.

Most women are not highly skilled, and their jobs are mostly informal, low-paid, and part-time. This gender divide becomes wider in organizational management structures with low levels of female representation.

5.2.4 Household Structure and Size

The median household size in Africa is around 4.4 persons per household. Djibouti has the highest at 9.33, and Mauritius the lowest at 3.42. Household size continues to fall. In Kenya, the average household size fell from 5.3 persons per household in 1969 to 4.0 in 2014 (Statista, 2021). More than half of Africa's population lives in extended household structures. Average household size between urban and rural areas varies between countries. In South Africa, the average household size for urban areas is 4.75, compared to 6.09 in rural areas, with subnational variations ranging from 4.98 for Gauteng (Johannesburg) to 6.14 for Natal (Global Data Lab, 2020). In Algeria, the urban household size is 5.6 persons, compared to 5.86 in the rural areas. There is only a small variation between poor and non-poor households for urban and rural areas country. The household structure also varies. In South Africa, 40% of urban households are 2–3 persons, compared to 31.3% in rural areas. Six-person households are, respectively, 11.3% for urban and 20.6% for rural areas (Statista Data Base, 2021).

In more highly urbanised countries, with large secondary cities, household sizes can exceed the national average. In Nigeria, the national average urban household size is approximately 5.2. For secondary cities in the north of Nigeria, some such as Kaduna, have more than 6.3 persons. Cultural factors, migration rates, and wealth are significant factors that shape the regional differences in the size and composition of secondary city household structures. Countries or subnational regions are experiencing significant rates of urban-rural migration; secondary cities have a larger household size and dependency ratio than large cities. The housing construction rate tends to be slower in secondary cities because of higher construction costs and difficulties accessing finance. This partly explains the generally more inferior quality of housing in secondary cities compared to metropolitan regions (UNICEF & UN-Habitat, 2020; Gollin et al., 2021).

> *The median household size in Africa is around 4.4 persons per household. Djibouti has the highest at 9.33, and Mauritius the lowest at 3.42. Household size continues to fall.*

5.2.5 Education

Education remains a significant challenge for all African countries. In Mali, more than 51.5% of 6–8-year-olds do not go to school and are not literate (UNICEF & UN-Habitat, 2020). Despite doing well, less than 40% of girls in the same age cohort do not attend school, with attendance rates for girls in urban areas at only 62% — and falling. A study by UN-Habitat on Analysis of Multiple Deprivations in Secondary Cities in Sub-Saharan Africa found that these cities are more deprived of education facilities, teaching, and access to technology than are primate cities. The future of employment is anchored in good quality education services. Many secondary cities, such as Cape Coast in Ghana, are important education centres that contribute significantly to the local economy. However, most secondary cities lack high-quality technical colleges or university campuses — a significant disadvantage in developing the human capital needed to grow local economies. The need to improve the development of education facilities, quality of education, and years of school attendance — especially for females — is crucial to improving the economic prospects, health, and welfare of people living in secondary cities.

The difficulty in attracting and retaining good teachers and trainers at secondary city schools and technical colleges is a challenge facing most African secondary cities. Most schools do not have sufficient qualified teachers and instructors. National expenditure on education remains low and lower per capita in secondary cities and rural areas. Overcoming skilled teacher shortages is critical to the development of secondary cities and regional areas. "About 6.3 million primary school teachers are needed: 2.4 million to fill new teaching posts to accommodate all children and 3.9 million to replace the teachers expected to leave the profession. At the secondary level, the region must recruit 10.8 million teachers by 2030, including 7.1 million for new teaching positions and 3.7 million to replace those who have left" (UNESCO, 2016, p. 2).

More E-education services are crucial to closing the gap on equitable access to education, skills development and learning opportunities between metropolitan regions, secondary cities, and rural areas. Currently, only 14% of households have access to the internet, and around 92% of learners in sub-Saharan Africa do not have access to a computer at home (UNESCO, 2020). Improving basic education standards remains one of the highest priorities for Africa in addressing poverty, economic development opportunities, and improving health and quality of life in secondary cities, rural and regional areas. E-education offers significant opportunities for secondary African cities, but needs substantial investment through national and international development programs across the continent.

5.2.6 Public Health (including mental health)

Secondary cities are undergoing significant transformations which impact the physical and mental health of residents. Health conditions across most secondary cities need significant improvement. Not much is known about secondary cities from an epidemiological perspective. Little data is available about the mental health and well-being of residents of secondary cities. However, many secondary cities in the Sahel have large numbers of refugees suffering trauma from the effects of conflict.

PHOTO 5.2
Public health education to prevent HIV/AIDS i
Education Outreach Centre in Angola

© Source: Wiki land.

Africa has an estimated 60% of the world's population living with HIV and accounts for 90% of all malaria infections. Significant efforts have been made to reduce and eliminate urban malaria and other water-borne diseases; however, contamination of coastal waterway areas is of increasing public health concern, with the continued dumping of waste and effluent into waterways. Secondary cities' water and sanitation indicators indicate that basic sanitation and public health services are significantly below metropolitan regions (see Chapter 2, State of African Secondary Cities).

The creation of healthier secondary cities is a significant challenge for African countries. Essential health services such as hospitals, clinics, and day surgery facilities are inadequate, as is the professional level of staffing, equipment, and technologies needed to run them. Many provide regional base-hospital and medical services for large rural and smaller towns where no medical emergency services are available. Organizations like Mission Aviation Fellowship provide essential services to secondary cities in countries like Tanzania. However, many secondary cities do not

have all-season usable runways. Emergency air services are also expensive and not affordable to people in remoter parts of Africa. Most African countries have a meagre budget allocation for public health, and in some cases, this is not entirely spent. Neither do they have the capacity nor funds to improve public health services, particularly in regional rural areas. Secondary cities can play a more strategic role in providing improved public health services. However, this calls for a build-up of capacity and capability in E-health services, and the training of paramedical staff who can handle routine health services and educational needs for the local population. It also calls for a greater focus on public health and sanitation programs, particularly targeting the education of the poor and illiterate.

> *Essential health services such as hospitals, clinics, and day surgery facilities are inadequate, as is the professional level of staffing, equipment, and technologies needed to run them.*

5.2.7 Crime

Crime in cities in many African countries is a significant problem. Data records on crime are poor, and most crimes go unreported. Most crimes relate to theft, drug abuse, and violence. A study of Nigeria suggests that crime rates are highest in the primate cities of Abuja and Lagos and are significantly lower in states with smaller urban centres (Bulwark Intelligence, 2016). This situation holds across African cities (Gollin et al., 2021, Table 6). Crime is becoming a significant issue in secondary cities in border locations, associated with the movement of contraband goods and drugs. Many of these cities have high male unemployment rates, with idle youth becoming involved in gang-related criminal activities. Policing in many of these cities is ineffective, with police often engaged in rent-seeking from criminal activities. There is a need for action in addressing growing criminal activities in secondary border cities. Encouraging more free trade agreements between countries within regions, would remove many rent-seeking opportunities in the movement of contraband goods.

5.3 Secondary Cities and Migration

Africa has historically experienced high levels of inter-regional cross-border and internal migration. Migrants fall into different groups ranging from rural-urban, urban-rural, urban-urban, economic, and refugee. Poverty is seen conventionally as the principal driver of migration in Africa, especially in rural-urban migration, but this is subject to debate (Flahaux & Hein De Haas, 2016; Gollin et al., 2021). It seems that Migrants move in search of opportunities, and sometimes safety, but also in search of better public services and amenities.

The presence of large numbers of economic migrants in northern Africa seeking to get to Europe has raised the focus on migration in Africa. However, African migrants aged over 15 years residing in OECD countries were estimated at 12.5 million in 2015/16, representing only 10.4% of the 121 million migrants in this age cohort residing in OECD countries (OECD, 2019). The majority of African migration occurs within and between African countries. To put things in perspective, in 2017, about 36 million of those living in Africa were living somewhere other than their place of birth. The highest level of migrants leaving the continent is from North Africa.

Despite a growing depth of knowledge on international migration, studies on the causes and patterns of internal migration within Africa are poor compared to other developing countries (Christiaensen et al., 2021). Existing data sources provide a limited picture of migration trends in Africa. Only about half of African countries have prepared a national migration profile report (Hovy et al., 2020). Research on the socio-demographic spatial pattern and characteristics of migration in secondary cities is limited. Secondary cities appear to have high levels of migration and migrants. However, the way migrants are assimilated into the local communities, the workforce, and where they live, and the socio-economic problems they face are not well documented.

The following provides a short overview of migration trends and spatial patterns in Africa. More specifically, it focuses on secondary cities and explores three important questions:

1. What factors contribute to the migration component of urban growth in African secondary cities?
2. What are the patterns and stages of migration from rural to town, town to city, city to metro process, i.e., where do migrants go in countries and how long do they stay in places?
3. What are the socio-demographic features of the flows and settlement patterns of migrants in secondary cities?

In responding to these questions, some overall trends, and drivers of migration in African countries are presented based on recent research (OECD/SWAC, 2020a).

> *The majority of African migration occurs within and between African countries. To put things in perspective, in 2017, about 36 million of those living in Africa were living somewhere other than their country of birth. The highest level of migrants leaving the continent is from North Africa.*

5.3.1 Patterns and Trends in African Urban Migration

Migration takes many forms. Most migrants are economic migrants who take the opportunity to leave where they were born in search of a better life (or better public services and amenities). Others are refugees, forced to leave where they live — by civil war and unrest, political persecution, religious, ethnic, cultural differences, and climate change. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), there are 6.6 million of these refugees in Africa (UNHCR, 2014), mostly living in border zones in impoverished camps and cities in Uganda, Sudan, Ethiopia, and more. In the case of Kakuma in Tukana Region, Kenya, some people have been living there for almost 30 years.

5.3.2 International and Regional Migration

Figure 5.10 shows the relative size of migrant population flows between African countries and international destinations. In 2017 there were 26.6 million international migrants within and outside of Africa (UN DESA, 2019). This compares to 15.1 million in 2000. By far, the most intensive flow is from North Africa to outside Africa, mainly to Europe. However, the magnitude of flows in the west and east of Africa are significant. Currently, international migrants comprise just 2% of Africans, compared with 3.5% of the world's total population (International Organization for Migration-IOM, 2020).

Over 79% of all international migrants residing in Africa were born in Africa (Hovy et al., 2020). The number of economic migrants by region for 2017 is shown in Figure 5.12. 'Economic migrants' can be defined as people leaving their home countries primarily in search of employment.[8] Table 5.4 shows the origin of the top 10 countries of origin for economic migrants.

The dynamics of migrant movements are not fully understood, but a study of eight southern African countries of 629 secondary urban areas (towns and cities between 5000 - 100,000) showed that population growth rates across eight sub-Saharan African countries for 2000–2015 were 2.44% (Zimmer et al., 2020). However, small urban areas were also shown to have "experienced higher growth rates when distant from primary cities, had variable rainfall patterns and a greater amount of surrounding agricultural land to provide resources for a growing population" (Zimmer et al., 2020, p. 2514). These findings are important for understanding intra rural-urban dynamics, distance, and the contribution of local food systems to urban population growth rates in southern Africa. Recent evidence from Tanzania underscores the importance of distance in determining migrants' choice of destination (town or city), with the deterring effect of distance significant and more extensive for the uneducated and the poor. With towns more nearby to where the rural poor live, they also are a natural destination for many rural migrants, especially for the first move. (De Weerdt et al., 2021).

TABLE 5.4 | Africa's economic migrants: Top 10 countries of origin (2017)

Country of Origin	Number of Migrants in 2017	Population	Level of Freedom	Per Capita Income	Corruption Perceptions Index Score*	Human Development Ranking
Ethiopia		87,000,000	Not Free	5370	34	174
Nigeria	17,487	170,000,000	Partly Free	$1,280	28	152
Guinea	12,158	11,000,000	Partly Free	$430	27	183
Cote d'Ivoire	11,966	21,000,000	Partly Free	$1,090	34	171
Morocco	9,558	33,000,000	Partly Free	$2,970	37	123
Gambia	7,711	1,800,000	Not Free	$500	26	173
Mali	6,953	16,000,000	Partly Free	$610	32	175
Algeria	6,444	37,000,000	Not Free	$4,470	34	83
Sudan	5,852	33,000,000	Not Free	$1,310	14	165
Senegal	5,786	13,000,000	Free	$1,070	45	162

Source: UNHCR - Refugee Statistics (2020) UNHCR data.

FIGURE 5.10 | International and interregional migration patterns in Africa



This chart demonstrates the relative size of estimated flows between African regions and from Africa to the rest of the world in 2017. The circles's segments represent the origins of migrants and their destinations using an arrow shape. The size of estimated flow is indicated by the width of the link per region and can be read using the tick marks (in millions) on the outside of the circle.

Source: Bouchet et al. (2018).

5.3.3 Internal Migration in Africa

The internal level of the migration rate and migrants to cities for African countries is difficult to estimate. Some countries collect census information that captures the previous places of residence from census data, allowing for migration tracking. However, censuses are often conducted at irregular intervals in many countries, making consistent cross-national estimates difficult (Bell & Charles-Edwards, 2013).

During the 1980s, studies showed that an excess of births over deaths among urban residents accounted for 62% of urban growth in developing countries, leaving rural-to-urban migration and reclassification accounting for the remaining 38% (Lerch, 2017). Unfortunately, little data is available to estimate the splits between internal and international migrants residing in urban and rural destinations. Table 5.5 shows the typology of migration and forced displacement of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and international migration.

TABLE 5.5 | Typology of migration and forced displacement of internal and international migration

	Internal (millions)	International (millions)
Migrants (economic or voluntary)	740–763	Migrants 240
Forced	Climate-driven IDPs: 20 million	(Climate-driven or mixed flows)
	FCV-driven IDPs: 41	Refugees: 26

Source: World Bank (2019).

The Botswana National Migration Survey of 1978–1979 showed that 36% of all people surveyed in the four largest towns were rural-urban migrants; it also showed that 6% had been urban-rural migrants (Case, 1982). Overall, the contribution of internal migrants, as a proportion of total urban population growth, is declining — especially in countries with high urbanisation rates, despite natural growth rates in urban areas being lower than in rural areas (Menashe-Oren & Bocquier, 2021).

More than 30% of Africa's urban residents are estimated to be internal migrants who have left their original place or region of birth. Overall, migrants tend to be more frequent in big cities; they tend to come more from other urban areas in secondary cities, whereas they are slightly more rural and stay for shorter periods in towns (Christiaensen & Lozano-Gracia, 2021).[9] Estimates, however, vary significantly between countries, depending on the level and rates of urbanisation. For example, Djibouti is 78% urbanised. In Djibouti City, where 62% of the country's population resides, less than 5% of the city's population are internal migrants and 10% international (Macrotrends, 2021). Uganda is only 25% urbanised, but an estimated 45% of the urban population are internal migrants.

The proportion of migrants living in urban areas will be higher when international migration and adjustments are incorporated into the estimates. The composition of migrants (internal, external, refugee, and transient) in African cities requires more research and better modelling to understand the needs of migrants.[10] In some countries, total migrants (rural-to-urban migration, net international migration) and other classifications, accounted for more than half of the urban growth in Rwanda (79%) and Namibia (59%).

West Africa has the highest concentration of international migrants — with the most significant proportion in urban areas. There is a long history of migration along the West Coast of Africa, e.g., between Ghana and Nigeria and between the Sahel and coastal countries (e.g., Mali, Burkina Faso and Côte d'Ivoire). The lack of reliable research into the makeup of the migrant structure and mix in Africa makes it diffident to determine the needs — especially for planning and provision of socio-economic infrastructure and services (Christiaensen & Lozano-Gracia, 2021).

More than 30% of Africa's urban residents are estimated to be internal migrants who have left their original place or region of birth.

5.3.4 Demographic Differences Between Migrant Groups

5.3.4.1 Economic Migrants

Economic migrants choose to emigrate from one region to another, including crossing international borders, seeking an improved standard of living, because the conditions or job opportunities in the migrant's region are insufficient, or those at the destination are particularly attractive. About 25% of migrants in sub-Saharan Africa are international economic migrants.

Comparing the population pyramids of the general population of Uganda with the migrant stock (Figure 5.11) reveals that the latter is more evenly distributed across different age groups (International Organization for Migration-IOM, 2020). The pyramid shows a very different structure to the overall population of non-migrants. There is little difference between gender in younger age cohorts. The 0–4-year age group has a significantly lower percentage cohort than the total population. The proportion of the population in the +50-age cohort is significantly larger, explained by family migration, often by parents. Differences in the pyramid structure between small, secondary, and large cities are not well researched; however, large cities tend to have a larger cohort of aged migrants. Migrant income, education, and wealth levels are generally higher in migrants living in large cities, and where children are in a better financial position to assist parents and family migration.

FIGURE 5.11 | Population pyramid comparing national and migrant stock for Uganda



Source: This data was derived from UN DESA (2018).

Recent research comparing urban migrants with urban residents by city size across six African countries shows that the average age of migrants in small towns and small and large cities is 5 to 6 years younger than the resident population (Figure 5.12a).[11] Wide average age gaps (>6 years) for rural-urban migrants to secondary (small cities) may be partially explained by student migration.

Dependency ratios are also lower for migrants than residents, as shown in Figure 5.12b. The gap is more significant for urban-urban migrants than for rural-urban ones (who tend to have higher fertility) (Menashe-Oren & Stecklov, 2017). With fewer children or elderly to take care of, migrants are more likely to work more hours and enjoy higher welfare levels (income, expenditures) per adult equivalent, even if their hourly or monthly wages are lower (Jedwab et al., 2019). This is only part of the story. Migrant welfare (except for rural-urban migrants) still tends to be higher, even after controlling for household dependency status. This holds, especially for the town and small city migrants.

Migrants are more educated than residents, with the difference declining by city size and turning negative for rural-urban city migrants, as shown in Figure 5.12c (Christiaensen & Lozano-Gracia, 2021). Overall, educational attainment of the urban labour force increases by city size, with big-city dwellers (migrants and residents alike) more educated than those in large towns and small cities, who are, in turn, more educated than those in small towns. In Uganda, it was found that 80% of internal migrants were literate (MGSoG, 2017). There appears to be a strong correlation between literacy and propensity to migrate, due to increased perceived capacity to thrive in the new environment, especially if moving to urban areas. These rates appear higher in urban-urban migration, given the poor level of education of rural-urban migrants.

A final trend is that the majority (56%) of internal migrants reported that they were working, while 39% were not working (International Organization for Migration-IOM, 2013). Being younger, with lower dependency ratios and higher education, migrants to towns and small cities reinforce the labour force in towns and secondary cities, even more so when coming from other urban areas. These advantages are smaller for rural migrants to big cities (even turning negative for education) and more consistent with the popular perception of migrants joining the lower ladders of the big city labour force (which may still be more advantageous than their opportunities in their villages of origin).

> *Recent research comparing urban migrants with urban residents by city size across six African countries shows that the average age of migrants in small towns and small and large cities is 5 to 6 years younger than the resident population*

Agriculture remains a non-negligible proportion of urban employment in sub-Saharan Africa, especially in towns and small cities and for urban residents (Figure 5.12d). About one in four non-migrant residents is still employed in agriculture in small towns (<20,000 inhabitants) and about one in seven in large towns and small cities combined (20,000–1,000,000 inhabitants). Continuingly high employment in agriculture in Africa's urban centres (also compared to other countries at a similar level of development) has been highlighted before. It underscores Africa's lack of industrialisation (Henderson & Kriticos, 2018) and the centrality of urban-rural linkages for secondary towns and cities (Cattaneo et al., 2021). Small town migrants, however, are on average 11% less likely to be employed in agriculture than are small-town residents, with the difference declining as urban centres grow, to virtually disappearing in large cities, where agricultural employment is much less frequent to begin with (only a few percentage points of overall employment). Urban-urban migrants are even less likely to be employed in agriculture, compared to residents, than are rural-urban migrants.

FIGURE 5.12 | Differences between migrants and natives in urban areas



Source: Christiaensen and Lozano-Gracia (2021)[12]

5.3.4.2 Refugee Migrants

Refugees are displaced people, mostly from conflict zones or following climate change and/or natural disasters. The World Bank has predicted up to 86 million internal climate migrants in sub-Saharan Africa by 2050 (Clement et al., 2021). Those people have little choice but to leave – to avoid death, violence, or starvation. In 2019, Africa was estimated to be hosting 7.3 million refugees (including asylum seekers) or 25% of the global refugee population (28.7 million) (Cattaneo et al., 2021). Many refugees are located along 15 migration corridors (UNCTAD, 2018). Table 5.6 shows the number of refugees hosted by regions in Africa. Over half of all refugees in Africa were hosted by three countries.

TABLE 5.6 | Refugees by African regions

African Region	Estimated Refugees (2019)
Eastern Africa	3.8 million
Middle Africa	1.4 million
Northern Africa	1.4 million
Western Africa	383,000
Southern Africa	288,000

Source: International Organization for Migration-IOM (2020).

Between 2000 and 2019, the increase in the refugee population on the African continent (97%) significantly outpaced that of the global refugee population (74%), with the number of refugees hosted more than doubling in eastern, middle, northern, and southern Africa. As a share of all international migrants in 2019, refugees were particularly numerous in eastern Africa (48%), northern Africa (46%), and middle Africa (38%). Overall, 1 in every 4 international migrants in Africa is a refugee, compared to 1 in every 10 international migrants globally.

The situation regarding African refugees is serious (Adepoju, 2019). African countries host over 5.1 million refugees, about 40% of them coming from South Sudan (Table 5.7). In addition, there are over 9.8 million internally displaced persons.

TABLE 5.7 | Number of host country and origin country of refugees

Countries	Host Country Number of Refugees	Countries	Origin Country of Refugees	Countries	IDPs UNHCR
Uganda	1,396,773	South Sudan	2,189,141	Somalia	2,967,500
Sudan	1,058,771	Somalia	814,551	Ethiopia	2,733,628
Ethiopia	770,755	Sudan	787,755	Sudan	2,552,174
Democratic Republic of the Congo	525,528	Eritrea	521,949	South Sudan	1,600,254
Chad	472,108	Burundi	373,036	Burundi	21,863
Kenya	443,336	Rwanda	245,806		
Cameroon	414,852	Ethiopia	151,336		
South Sudan	302,132				
Total	5,093,470		9,875,419		

Source: UNHCR Data (2021).

The primary propellant of forced and voluntary migration is triggered by a range of factors, including homegrown conflicts, national or regional underdevelopment, poor political governance, economic and social deprivation, environmental crises, and human rights abuses. Most African forced and voluntary migrants relocate to neighbouring countries in search of security and improved livelihoods. Overall, refugee movements are mainly confined to the continent. Nevertheless, African refugees find themselves in ongoing, highly fluid situations. The number of refugees in Africa, their composition, their challenges, and the limited success of searching for a permanent solution requires sustained efforts by governments and the international community (Verwimp & Maystadt, 2015).

5.3.5 African Towns and Secondary Cities: A Growing Catalyst for Migration

Africans are migrating in increasing numbers to urban areas, nationally and internationally. Most migrate voluntarily in search of a better and safer life. Contrary to popular belief, most rural-urban migrants do not migrate directly to large metropolitan and secondary cities. Instead, the process is transitional, starting with migration to the nearest regional town or small city and then moving to larger cities after gaining urban life skills and experience (Ingelaere et al., 2017). Most secondary city migrants are a combination of rural-urban and town-urban-urban migrants. International and interregional migrants generally migrate between large primate and secondary cities. Many refugee facilities, such as camps and processing centres, tend to be located close to international borders in regional towns that have grown to become secondary cities, as people search for greater economic opportunities (see Box 5.1).

Many push-pull factors are responsible for migration to cities in Africa (Christiaensen & Lozano-Gracia, 2021). Poverty is often cited as the major factor in migration. However, "the idea that African migration is driven essentially by poverty ignores evidence that demographic and economic transitions and development … are generally associated with increasing rather than decreasing levels of mobility and migration and that the relationship between development and migration is fundamentally non-linear" (Flahaux & De Haas, 2016).

Several factors start the migration process at the rural level. A study in Tanzania found, overall, "the need for money for the fare, a network at the destination to get set up, the ability to function in a cash economy and the professional skills needed to obtain meaningful employment" are the most frequently mentioned reasons why people migrate from rural areas to the nearest town or city (Ingelaere et al., 2017, p. 17). In addition, secondary towns offer off-farm employment opportunities nearby, facilitating rural livelihood diversification, which has long been an important vehicle driving urban-rural migration. "Secondary towns emerge as the more feasible urban destinations, as they are both physically and culturally more accessible" (Ingelaere et al., 2017, p. 21). Where migration is peaceful and not forced, physical proximity to home is an insurance policy — if the move does not work out, a migrant can always return home.

Family circumstances often provide the rationale for migration to the nearest town or cities. However, unless forced, few migrants suddenly leave the security of family, land, and relationships without preparation. There are critical factors that migrants consider before migrating. Of critical importance are pre-existing migration networks, which determine migration's choice, act, and destination. In addition, there is a natural and well-established support system that aids migration for most migrants, especially in moving to larger cities and for international migration. When it comes to gender, women are more likely than men to migrate to smaller towns. Marriage or domestic employment opportunities, often with family or relatives, provide a secure environment for the transition to urban life. Men looking for non-seasonal or more permanent work tend to migrate to larger urban settlements and secondary cities with better prospects of gaining employment, knowledge, and skills-building access.

Migration generally occurs within a finite age-related window of opportunity. This is most often before people start families and take on associated responsibilities. Small regional towns are generally the first space rural-urban migrants move to and experience urban life (De Weerdt et al., 2021). Later, as the migration trajectory unfolds, some make a progressive transition to a larger city or secondary city and often to a primate city. This applies particularly to migrants who were born in regions distant from primate cities and metropolitan areas.

When it comes to gender, women are more likely than men to migrate to smaller towns. Marriage or domestic employment opportunities, often with family or relatives, provide a secure environment for the transition to urban life.

BOX 5.1 | Case Study: Kakuma, North-west Kenya

CHALLENGES OF MIGRANTS AND REFUGEES IN SECONDARY CITIES

The Kakuma refugee camp in Kenya is one of the largest in Africa, with a population of over 186,000. Many recent arrivals, especially in the Kalobeyei new settlement areas, are still living in tent housing. Housing in the older camp communities is more permanent, constructed of timber, mudbrick, block, and mainly corrugated iron roofs. Water supply, sanitation, and waste management are inadequate. Ongoing tensions between the refugees and the local community have resulted in occasional conflict, partly because host communities perceive that the refugees often have better access to services. Compared to the rural population, the Kakuma camp has better health facilities, more children in full-time education, and better access to basic and financial services. The camp is an integral part of the regional economy and a part of the livelihood options available.

The Kakuma Camp has attracted considerable attention from refugee stakeholders, with a great range of issues covered. For example, The Norwegian Refugee Council (Norwegian Refugee Council, 2018) notes that Kenya's restrictive refugee movement laws prevent relocation to parts of the country where they can plan a more direct role in becoming more self-sufficient. The creation of livelihood opportunities contributes to offsetting the reliance on humanitarian assistance and limits refugees' ability to add to the local host community economy. It renders refugees with a sense of hopelessness and leaves them open to corrupt exploitation. It also leads to mental health disorders that may continue when they are either repatriated or after they are settled in a safe country.

The economic impacts of Kakuma are best seen at night. Night-time lights indicate that refugee inflows increase economic activity in areas within 10 km of the camp centre (Alix-Garcia et al., 2017). Household consumption within the same distance is 25% higher than in rural areas further away. Refugees have had a positive effect: increased availability of new employment and rising prices in agricultural and livestock markets have benefited local producers. Education and inclusion have improved the integration of the refugees into the local community (Bellino & Dryden-Peterson, 2018), and have better equipped youth refugees if they migrate back home or elsewhere. In 2010, online courses in basic medical training were introduced. The goal of the online course was to focus on relevant health issues around Kakuma. Other courses have been developed with top-level universities, such as Princeton in the United States (Princeton University, 2019).

Kenya's Kakuma-Kalobeyei experience shows how support to regional secondary cities and towns can help support large numbers of dependent refugees and build a more robust economy. The refugees in Kakuma have created more than 2,500 local businesses, adding at least $56 million per year to Kakuma's economy (Rummery, 2019). The management policies at this secondary city by the international community and government have been positive. However, more can be done to boost the development of the economy and social adjustment, if many stakeholders in the community are better coordinated. The key to the hope and prosperity of this region is improved education, connectivity, and collaboration between refugees and the local Turkana community and refugees and their connection to diaspora and regional business networks. Similar observations and dynamics have been recorded observed in other refugee housing.

PHOTO 5.3
Kakuma Refugee Camp North-west Kenya

Migration to secondary cities is often seen as a play-off between the social connectedness close to where migrants were born or grew up and the realization of self-development and economic opportunities. Secondary cities often provide opportunities to gain higher skills and access to capital to develop micro-scale enterprises. However, often when family migration occurs, the opportunities to move on to a larger urban centre become more restricted because of the need to support the larger family; and uncertainty around establishing necessary networks before more significant economic opportunities are realized.

5.4 Policy Consideration to Address Migrant Issues

Secondary cities are popular destinations for internal migrants, internally displaced persons, and refugees, given their proximity to international borders. However, local secondary city governments are less equipped to manage the impact of population growth, especially those with large refugee populations. Several research publications (Iazzolino, 2018, p. 50) suggest that secondary cities have a greater capacity to absorb migrants and meet their expectations of more affordable living costs than capital cities. If capacitated, those cities could form important components of comprehensive migration management strategies. However, this will require a better understanding of city-specific drivers and dynamics of rural to urban migration and the particular draw of secondary cities and the challenges faced by these cities compared to rural areas, capital cities, and international destinations.

Two reports — a report on rural to urban migration related to secondary cities in Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda (Iazzolino, 2018) and the Cities Alliance Joint Work Programme on Cities and Migration (Cities Alliance, 2019, p. 46) — recommended policies to address migrant issues and associated problems in secondary cities. Those recommendations have Africa-wide relevance and need to be embraced by governments and official development assistance (ODA) and incorporated into national and subnational assistance programs to support migrants living in African secondary cities. Recommendations adapted from those reports are suggested as follows:

- Supporting migrants and migration programs for secondary cities can significantly accelerate poverty reduction, reduce inequalities, and alleviate the desire to migrate to primary cities. The management implication is that governments should not impose cross-national or internal barriers to migration, as has occurred in many post-independent African countries.
- Networking and collaboration between migrants in secondary towns and cities would build social capital and networking between migrant groups, increase national productivity and prosperity, and reduce the pressure of rural-urban migration on the development of large metropolitan regions and significantly reduce poverty levels and disparities in regional development.
- Reliable data on the number of IDPs in Africa does not exist. Improved collection of data on IDPs would significantly help governments resettle some of these people in secondary cities where cultural and social assimilation may be beneficial.
- Local administrations request greater involvement in national-level discussions and more accurate data on the number of residents in order to better inform national fiscal transfers and aid allocation decisions. From a management viewpoint, the systems of data collection must be revisited and recalibrated to a more frequent reflection of localized sets of data, rather than the agglomeration of data that is the norm in virtually all African countries.
- Before targeting specific populations, support programs should begin by supporting secondary cities' financial and institutional capacity to plan and develop. If divisions between migrants and residents are distinct, targeting displaced populations and the most impoverished migrants in urban areas through income-generating schemes and ensuring the protection of vulnerable individuals, such as women and informal workers, should be undertaken. This also adds to the social stability of secondary cities and the mental well-being of migrants.
- Developing 'communities of interest' with diaspora groups provides financial and well-being support and connections with families and cultural groups.

5.4.1 National Population Plans

The call for African countries to adopt population policies dates back over three decades. For decades, many African governments had an anti-urban attitude, with population policies designed to stem migration to cities. Most African governments now recognize that cities are the primary drivers of economic activity, employment, and where most people will live. However, in formulating national urban strategies and development plans, inadequate consideration is given to the importance of developing national spatial population plans which align closely with the above. National population policies play an essential role in how nations manage population growth and provide social and community infrastructure to support the needs of rapidly growing urban populations.

Tunisia is the first country in Africa to implement a national population policy (Clarke, 1969; Dérer, 2019). It is one of the most progressive Arab-speaking countries in terms of women's rights. Countries should prepare national population policies and align with national development and urbanisation strategies to align social needs with economic and governance systems. National population policies need to be guided by clearly defined objectives. The African Development Bank Guide on Policy on Population Strategies for Implementation (African Development Bank, 2000) includes some useful principles to guide national population policy. These include the following:

- Population is a cross-cutting issue in planning for urban and regional development. Population forecasting and demographic factors must be incorporated into social, agriculture and infrastructure projects, given the magnitude and multi-faceted nature of population and urbanisation problems facing African countries.

- The relationships between population growth and economic growth and subsequent impact on poverty and sustainable development, are critical to implementing any population policy. High-level officials need to be informed on these issues through specific training and other related programs.
- Economic empowerment of women is a prerequisite to successfully implementing maternal and child health and reproductive health programs. Family planning services and maternal and child health have desirable effects at an urban and rural level as part of an integrated economic empowerment and production incentive package. Family planning is key to ensuring that women and couples, in general, do effectively control their desired family size and can reconcile their occupations with family or maternal obligations.
- Adolescent sexuality and services adapted to the specific needs of the youth must be given full consideration in population policy. In Africa, 15-19-year-olds account for a large and growing segment of the population, and among school-going girls, unwanted pregnancies constitute a significant cause of school dropout. The prevalence of sexually transmitted diseases and HIV/AIDS is also high among the youth. Yet cultural barriers and biases among families and health workers often limit their access to reproductive health facilities.
- Partnerships between key institutions can enhance the skills mix on a range of population-related issues and cost-sharing. This is especially important given new and emerging issues such as the increase in female-headed households, the result of civil wars and men's economic migration, HIV/AIDS, and the refugee situation. All of these have affected family structures and the age pyramid, but they have also worsened the overall quality of life of the populations.
- National population policies need to consider gender, religious, social differences, and other forms of discrimination and how the needs of these groups can be accommodated.

5.4.2 Secondary City Population Planning

At the subnational level, there is a need for secondary cities to prepare population forecasts and projections to clearly define the future planning needs of development, community services, and population growth. More detailed demographic information about spatial changes in demography and socioeconomics is required to develop projections on population growth. Studies also need to be conducted of rural hinterland population demographics to identify the propensity to migrate, providing estimated migration flows by size and age within 5-year timeframes. Local governments should establish university research and monitoring programs on secondary city populations' health, well-being, and gender-related needs as part of localizing Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) programs. Such programs could be undertaken in collaboration with surrounding local governments, with central government support, to study and monitor a range of population-health-environmentally linked factors, particularly disease control, treatment, and management. Other initiatives related to city population planning include the following:

- Support for policies and programs for inclusiveness and conflict resolution initiatives to prevent the eruptions of violence in some places, which has become regular, particularly during elections and other major public events in contested cities, and to reduce tension between migrant and indigenous sectors of the population.
- Programs for community engagement so that the key concerns expressed by the community can inform policy priorities, including employment, social services, and security, to prevent irregular migration and to ensure that secondary cities can meet the expectations of the existing population and migrants and can absorb new migrants.
- Preparation of population projections, demographic change, and policy plans to identify future needs of the community and social services.
- Support for the development of self-organizing communities of interest groups to supplement government delivery of social services and local infrastructure.
- Development of migrant/refugee support services through community associations (including local chambers of commerce) and advocacy groups to assist migrants/refugees to readjust, overcome trauma and settle into their new community.

In secondary cities with large numbers of refugees, ensure regular dialogue between refugee and resident community representatives to address conflict, mutual responsibility, and collaboration on developing and maintaining the urban and peri-urban environment.

5.4.3 Engaging with the Diaspora

The diaspora is the most underutilized pool of social capital in Africa. The remittance flow to sub-Saharan Africa in 2019 was estimated at US$48 billion. But it is not just money that is remitted to African countries. Goods, notably used clothing, machinery, and equipment, are shipped and sold through family and other networks in local markets. Many small-scale exports through diaspora networks into international markets are traditional products and foods, for which there is a limited expatriate market. The formation of local diaspora associations is helpful in the development of networks for the transfer of skills, technology, access to markets where locally produced goods can use indigenous design to create hybrid products for sale in international markets.

Some African cities have recognized the importance of the diaspora to fill skills gaps in gaining access to new technologies and expertise that can help build new jobs and industries, especially within cities and regions. Nigeria and Uganda have developed national diaspora policies to encourage their diaspora to participate more fully in national and regional development. Diaspora services departments have been established that deal with diaspora matters, including facilitating the diaspora's contribution to society, economy, technology, and social development. These initiatives need to be taken further to develop local secondary city local chapters/organizations of diaspora communities, which would provide a city hub for learning, access to knowledge, technologies, marketing networks, and finance to support local economic and social development — including the provision of health care and business development services.

The formation of local diaspora associations is helpful in the development of networks for the transfer of skills, technology, access to markets where locally produced goods can use indigenous design to create hybrid products for sale in international markets.

5.5 Need for Migration and Demographic Research on Secondary Cities

African secondary city populations are amongst the poorest but fastest-growing in the developing world. Many lack basic infrastructure, education, and healthcare facilities, have very poor-quality housing, low levels of well-being and income, and higher infant mortality and refugee migrant populations than large metropolitan regions. They are, however, vibrant places with a rich mix of multicultural, language, and artistic expression. They are home to more than 180 million people.

The dynamics of Africa's urban population and cities are continually and rapidly changing. African cities are young, as are their populations. They are absorbing a growing number of economic migrants and refugees. Nevertheless, the number of in-depth research studies on the dynamics of population change and the demography of secondary cities is sparse. Secondary cities are an important intermediary step in the urban migration transition process, which sees many internal migrants move later to larger cities, nationally and internationally. The population pyramid of both primate and secondary cities shows that young migrants are attracted to those cities to search for better economic opportunities and quality of life. Cities in conflict zones, especially in the Sahel and North Africa, are receiving disproportionately more refugees.

African countries suffer from poor subnational data and statistics on spatial patterns and changes in urban population and demography. More significant efforts and resources must be made available to improve research on population dynamics and demography of African cities — especially secondary cities. The current lack of information on population makes the future planning of urban areas extremely difficult. Improved data and information to support city government, business, social services development, delivery, and physical and social infrastructure will aid better city management and support for social and economic development. Effective use could be made of national identity cards data to monitor population changes through address and other data-capture means.

This chapter concludes with a plea to national governments and international development assistance agencies to boost expenditure — to develop and adequately resource national statistics offices, population research centres, and universities to improve the research and policy outputs on urban population and demographic studies. Additional international resources are also needed to provide better information on inter-regional migration within Africa.

REFERENCES

Adepoju, A. (2019). Migrants and Refugees in Africa. Published online: https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.723 African Development Bank. (2000). Policy on population and strategies for implementation, African Development Bank, p. 42. https://www.afdb.org/en/documents/document/policy-on-population-and-strategies-for-implementation-11344

Alix-Garcia, J., Walker, S., Bartlett, A., Onder, H. & Sanghi, A. (2017). Do refugee camps help or hurt hosts? The case of Kakuma, Kenya. *Journal of Development Economics 130*:66-83. https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/29341

Barrada, A. (2004). The Egyptian New Cities Program; A critical review. https://scholar.cu.edu.eg/?q=barrada/files/iran-document-final.pdf.

Bell, M., & Charles-Edwards, E. (2013). Cross-national comparisons of internal migration: An update on global patterns and trends. Population Division Technical Paper No. 2013/1. United Nations, New York.

Bellino, Michelle J, & Dryden-Peterson, S. (2018). Inclusion and Exclusion within a Policy of National Integration: Refugee Education in Kenya's Kakuma Refugee Camp. *British Journal of Sociology of Education, 40* (2): 222-238.

Bouchet, M., Liu, S., Parilla, J. & Kabbani, N. (2018). Global Metro Monitor. Brookings Institute. Washington, D.C. https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/Brookings-Metro_Global-Metro-Monitor-2018.pdf#page=14

Bulwark Intelligence. (2016). Crime Reports in Nigeria. Retrieved January 20, 2019, from http://bulwarkintelligence.com/reports/crime/find-out-which-state-has-the-highest-crime-in-nigeria-after-factoring-the-state-population/

Case, J. (1982). Migration flows, sizes, and directions. Pp. 92–148 in *Migration in Botswana: Patterns, Causes and Consequences, Vol. 2.* Botswana Central Statistics Office, Gaborone.

Cattaneo, A., Nelson, A. & McMenomy, T. (2021). Global mapping of urban–rural catchment areas reveals unequal access to services. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 118*(2), e2011990118. doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2011990118 https://www.pnas.org/content/pnas/118/2/e2011990118.full.pdf

Cattaneo, A., Adukia, A., Brown, D.L., Christiaensen, L., Evans, D. K., Haakenstad, A., McMenomy, T., Partridge, M., Vaz, S. & Weiss, D.J. (2021). Economic and social development along the urban-rural continuum: new opportunities to inform policy. Mimeographed. https://doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-9756

Christiaensen L., & Lozano-Gracia, N., eds. (2021). *Migrants, Markets, and Mayors – Rising Above the Employment Challenge in Africa's Secondary Cities.* World Bank Group, Washington D.C.

Christiaensen, L., Gonzalez, A. & Robalino, D. (2021). Migration and Jobs: Issues for the 21st Century. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 8867: World Bank Group, Washington, D.C.

Cities Alliance. (2019). How Secondary Cities Can Manage Migration to Promote Growth: A Discussion. Lessons from Ethiopia, Kenya, Tunisia, and Uganda. Joint Work Programme (JWP) on Cities and Migration. p. 46. https://www.citiesalliance.org/sites/default/files/2019-10/Migration_PeerLearningEvent_Report_Reduced2.pdf

Clarke, J. I. (1969). Population Policies and Dynamics in Tunisia. *The Journal of Developing Areas, 4*(1); 45-58. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/4189645

Clement, V., Rigaud, K. K., de Sherbinin, A., Jones, B., Adamo, S., Schewe, J., Sadiq, N. & Shabahat, E. (2021). Groundswell Part 2: Acting on Internal Climate Migration. World Bank, Washington, DC. https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/36248

De Weerdt, J., Christiaensen, L., & Kanbur, R. (2021). When Distance Drives Destination, Towns Can Stimulate Development. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper. Retrieved from Bonn: http://ftp.iza.org/dp14157.pdf

Dérer, P. (2019). The first population policies implemented in Africa: the case of Tunisia, *MAHB Millennium Alliance for Humanity, and the Biosphere* (October 8, 2019). thttps://mahb.stanford.edu/blog/first-population-policies-implemented-africa-case-tunisia/

Dijkstra, L., Florczyk, A., Freire, S., Kemper, T. & Pesaresi, M. (2018). Applying the Degree of Urbanisation to the Globe: A New Harmonised Definition Reveals a Different Picture of Global Urbanisation. *16th Conference of IAOS, 19-21 September 2018. OECD Headquarters, Paris, France.*

Dijkstra, L., Poelman, H., & Veneri, P. (2019). The EU-OECD Definition of a Functional Urban Area. Retrieved from Paris: https://www.oecd.org/cfe/regionaldevelopment/THE%20EU-OECD%20DEFINITION%20OF%20A%20FUNCTIONAL%20URBAN%20AREA.pdf.

Flahaux, M.-L. & De Haas, H. (2016). African migration: trends, patterns, drivers. *Comparative Migration Studies, 4*(1). https://doi.org/10.1186/s40878-015-0015-6

Friedmann, J., & Douglass, M. (1978). Agropolitan development: Towards a new Strategy for Regional Planning in Asia. Pp. 163-192 in: *Growth Pole Strategy and Regional Development Policy*. F.-C. Lo & K. Salih. Pergamon, London. https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-08-021984-4.50014-9

Ghana Statistical Service–GSS. (2014). "District Analytical Report: Tamale Metropolis." In: Accra, Ghana: Ghana Statistical Service.

Global Data Lab. (2020). Database Developing World. https://globaldatalab.org/ddw/

Gollin, D., Kirchberger, M. & Lagakos, D. (2021). Do urban wage premia reflect lower amenities? Evidence from Africa. *Journal of Urban Economics 121*: 103301.

Government of Ghana. (2015). Ghana National Spatial Development Framework (2015-2035). Accra, Government of Ghana. 1: 435.

Government of Uganda-NPC. (2020) Population Growth in Uganda: Challenges and Opportunities, National Population Council, Government of Uganda, http://npcsec.go.ug/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Population-Issues-Paper-2021.pdf

Guneralp, B., Lwasa, S., Masundire, H., Parnell, S. & Seto, K. C. (2017). Urbanisation in Africa: challenges and opportunities for conservation. *Environmental Research Letters 13*: 1-8.

Henderson, J. V. & Kriticos, S. (2018). The development of the African system of cities. *Annual Review of Economics*, 10:287-314. https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev-economics-080217-053207

Henderson, J. V., Liu, V., Peng, C. & Storeygard, A. (2019). *Demographic and Health Outcomes by Degree of Urbanisation: Perspective of a New Classification of Urban Areas.* London School of Economics, London.

Hovy, B., Laczko, F. & N'Guettia Kouassi, R. (2020). African Migration: An Overview of Key Trends. In: *Africa Migration Report: Challenging the Narrative*. International Organization for Migration, Addis Ababa.

Iazzolino, G. (2018). *The Lure of the City: Synthesis report on rural to urban migration in Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda.* SOAS University of London and Rift Valley Institute, Nairobi and London. https://blogs.soas.ac.uk/ref-hornresearch/files/2020/02/Lure-of-the-City.pdf

Ingelaere, B., Christiaensen, L., de Weerdt, J. & Kanbur, R. (2017). Why Secondary Towns Can Be Important for Poverty Reduction: A Migrant's Perspective. (September 13, 2017). World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 8193. World Bank, Washington, DC. Available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3036710

IOM-International Organization for Migration–IOM (2013). Migration in Uganda – A Rapid Country Profile. International Organization for Migration, Kampala. Retrieved June 2021 from http://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/mp_uganda_25feb2015_web.pdf

International Organization for Migration–IOM. (2020). *Africa Migration Report: Challenging the Narrative.* International Organization for Migration, Addis Ababa2. https://publications.iom.int/books/africa-migration-report-challenging-narrative

Jedwab, R., Pereira, D. & Roberts, M. 2019. Cities of Workers, Children, or Seniors? Age Structure and Economic Growth in a Global Cross-Section of Cities. Policy Research Working Paper; No. 9040. World Bank, Washington, DC. https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/32585 License: CC BY 3.0 IGO.

Kenawy, A. (2017), Encouragement of settlement and population attracting in the new towns – Egypt. *International Journal of Architecture and Urban Development 7* (No. 3, Summer): 17–24. https://ijaud.srbiau.ac.ir/article_11520_9d3a09478e3c220c63a60815a5f5b99a.pdf

Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (2020) 2019 Kenya Population and Housing Census Reports https://housingfinanceafrica.org/app/uploads/VOLUME-III-KPHC-2019.pdf

Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (2019). 2019 Kenya Population and Housing Census. Volume III: Distribution of Population by Age and Sex. Pg. 12. December 2019. https://housingfinanceafrica.org/app/uploads/VOLUME-III-KPHC-2019.pdf

Lerch, M. (2017). *International Migration and City Growth*. New York, United Nations.

Macrotrends (2021). Djibouti Immigration Statistics 1960-2022. https://www.macrotrends.net/countries/DJI/djibouti/immigration-statistics>

Meddi, M., & Eslamian, S. (2021). Uncertainties in rainfall and water resources in Maghreb Countries under climate change. In: *African Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation*. ed. Leal Filho, W., Oguge, N., Ayal, D., Adeleke, L. & da Silva, I. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-45106-6_114

Menashe-Oren, A. & Stecklov, G. (2017). Population Age Structure and Sex Composition in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Rural-Urban Perspective . *IFAD Research Series 17*(November 14, 2017). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3284565

Menashe-Oren, Ashira, and Philippe, Bocquier. 2021. The Role of Internal Migration in Urbanisation in Contemporary Low and Middle-Income Countries. Population and Development Review. Forthcoming.

MGSoG. (2017). Uganda Migration Profile: Study on Migration Routes in the East and Horn of Africa. Retrieved from Maastricht.

Moriconi-Ebrard, F., Heinrigs, P. & Trémolières, M., eds. (2020). *Africa's Urbanisation Dynamics 2020*, Africapolis, Mapping a New Urban Geography. Paris: OECD, Sahel and West Africa Club, 2020. https://www.oecd.org/development/africa-s-urbanisation-dynamics-2020-b6bccb81-en.htm

NMBM. (2020). "Nelson Mandela Bay Metro EC: Profile and Analysis District Development Model." Nelson Mandela Bay Metropolitan Municipality, Nelson Mandela Bay: 34.

Norwegian Refugee Council, (2018) Supporting Kakuma's Refugees the Importance of Freedom of Movement https://hrp.law.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/Movement-Briefing-NRC-IHRC-1.pdf

OECD. (2019). "Are the characteristics and scope of African migration outside of the continent changing?" In *Migration Data Brief 8*. OECD, Paris.

OECD/SWAC. (2020a). Africa's Urbanisation Dynamics 2020: Africapolis, Mapping a New Urban Geography. Ed. Moriconi-Ebrard. F, Heinrigs. P & Trémolières, M.,. West African Studies, OECD, Sahel and West Africa Club, OECD Publishing, Paris. https://doi.org/10.1787/b6bccb81-en

OECD/SWAC. (2020b). Top 50 agglomerations in Africa. Africopolis, web page. https://africapolis.org/en/research/top-50-largest-agglomerations

Philipp Heinrigs, (2020) « Africapolis: understanding the dynamics of urbanisation in Africa », Field Actions Science Reports, Special Issue 22 | 2020, 18-23.

Prieto Curiel, R. (2020). "Urban Agglomeration Network." Retrieved 30 October 2020, from https://africapolis.org/research/urban_agglomeration_network.

Princeton University, (2019). From Campus to Camp and Back. https://ammodi.com/2019/10/22/from-campus-to-camp-and-back/

Roddy, F. (2012). Population Census 2011, Makana Municipality Age Sex Data

Rummery, A. (2019). Why including refugees makes economic sense. Press Release (04 April 2019). UNHCR, Geneva.

Statista. (2021). Average household size in Africa as of 2021, by country. https://www.statista.com/statistics/1228286/average-household-size-in-africa-by-country/

Statista Data base. (2021). https://www.statista.com/statistics/1114300/distribution-of-households-in-urban--and-rural-south-africa-by-household-size/

Statistics South Africa. (2012). https://esa.un.org/miggmgprofiles/indicators/files/Uganda.pdf

UNCTAD-United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. (2018). Economic Development in Africa Report 2018: Migration for Structural Transformation.

UN DESA. (2015a). Trends In International Migrant Stock: The 2015 Revision Migrant Stock in Uganda by Age Group. https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/data/estimates2/docs/MigrationStockDocumentation_2015.pdf

UN DESA-United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs. (2015b). Youth population trends and sustainable development. Population Facts No. 2015/1. New York, United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs POPFACTS 1 (May 2015). https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/publications/pdf/popfacts/PopFacts_2015-1.pdf

UN DESA-United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. (2018) *World Urbanisation Prospects: The 2018 Revision*, UN DESA , Population Division. Online Edition.https://population.un.org/wup/

UN DESA-United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. (2019). *International Migration 2019*. Report ST/ESA/SER.A/438. UN DESA, Population Division, New York. https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/publications/migrationreport/docs/InternationalMigration2019_Report.pdf

UN DESA-United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. (2020). Derived Population in Cities.

UNESCO-United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. (2016). The world needs almost 69 million new teachers to reach the 2030 Education Goals. UIS Fact Sheet October 2016, No. 39. UNESCO Institute for Statistics. https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000246124?4=null&queryId=4e851c-cc-c70d-432d-98df-e823962551b7

UNESCO-United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. (2020). A snapshot of educational challenges and opportunities for recovery in Africa. Retrieved from Geneva: https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000377513/PDF/377513eng.pdf.multi

UNFPA-United Nations Population Fund. (2021). Dashboard. https://www.unfpa.org/data

UNHCR-Refugee Statistics. (2020). United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. https://www.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics/

UNHCR-Refugee Statistics. (2021). Data 2021. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. https://www.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics/

UNHCR-United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. (2014). "World Refugee Day: Global Forced Displacement Tops 50 Million for First Time in Post-World War II Era." no. 20 (June 2014). http://www.unhcr.org/53a155bc6.html

UNICEF & UN-Habitat. 2020. *Analysis of Multiple Deprivations in Secondary Cities in Sub-Saharan Africa.* UNICEF & UN-Habitat-United Nations Human Settlement Programme, Nairobi. https://www.unicef.org/esa/media/5561/file/Analysis%20of%20Multiple%20Deprivations%20in%20Secondary%20Cities%20-%20Analysis%20Report.pdf

University Rotterdam. (2018). "The State of African Cities 2018: The geography of African investment." (Wall R.S., Maseland J., Rochell K. and Spaliviero M). United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN Habitat).

UNSOM Somalia. (2017).

Verwimp, Philip; & Maystadt, Jean-Francois. 2015. Forced Displacement and Refugees in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Economic Inquiry. Policy Research Working Paper; No. 7517. World Bank, Washington, DC. © World Bank. https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/23481 License: CC BY 3.0 IGO."

World Bank. (2019). Leveraging Economic Migration for Development: A Briefing for the World Bank Board. Retrieved from Washington, D.C.

Zimmer, A., Guido, Z., Tuholske, C., Pakalniskis, A., Lopus, S., Caylor, K., & Evans, T. (2020). Dynamics of population growth in secondary cities across southern Africa. *Landscape Ecology,* 35(11): 2501-2516. doi:10.1007/s10980-020-01086-6.

ENDNOTES

(1) These problems are exacerbated by differences in the countries' geographic regions used by data collection agencies. The blurry boundaries between what is rural and what is urban has also led scholars to go beyond the rural-urban dichotomy and to consider the rural-urban continuum and study urban catchment areas differentiated by city size instead (Cattaneo et al., 2021).

(2) Unless otherwise indicated: 'Africapolis' generally refers to the database at https://africapolis.org/en; while 'UN DESA' and 'UN World Urbanisation Prospects' generally refer to data available at https://population.un.org/wup/. For more information on both of these sources, see also OECD/SWAC (2020) and UN DESA (2018).

(3) Census organisations use more than 25 definitions of 'urban' in Africa countries.

(4) The OECD uses yet another definition for 'urban' centres, consisting of contiguous grid cells with a density of at least 50,000 persons or 1,500 inhabitants per km^2 (see Dijkstra et at., 2019).

(5) These patterns are most intense in the more fertile parts of the continent.

(6) Over 150 cities in the Africapolis data base (https://africapolis.org/en) show very significant increases in population between 1990 and 2015. This is due to the classification of the emergence of polycentric secondary city-type clusters of urban settlements showing agropolis-type network structures that have high levels of dependency on urban employment.

(7) Ghana Statistical Service (GSS) is a notable exception.

(8) Oxford Dictionaries (2015) "Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary" p. economic migrant. Archived from the original on 2015-09-14.

(9) In the 6 African countries studied by these authors, the migrant share of the urban population varied largely between 30% and 40%, with the share's highest big cities (>1 million in habitants) (39%), followed by secondary cities (100,000–1,000,000 inhabitants) (31%) and towns (25-27%).

(10) Christiaensen and Lozano-Gracia (2021) make a useful step in this direction.

(11) Note that the age gap for rural-urban and urban-urban migrants compared to residents has been calculated for three countries, while age gap for all migrants concerns six countries, explaining why the latter does not necessarily lie in between the former, as in the other panels in the figure.

(12) The terms 'rural-urban' and 'urban-urban' denote migrants from rural to urban areas and intra-urban migrants. The age gap is the difference in the average age of internal and international migrants relative to the local population. Dependency ratios are a percentage measure of non-working-age household members to working-age household members (working-age population = 15–64-year-olds). The education gap is the difference between the years of education of migrants relative to the resident population. The non-agricultural share gap is the difference (percentage points) between the share of migrants in cities employed in the non-agricultural sector compared to the share of the resident population working in the nonagricultural sector. For migrants, differences are based on six African countries; the migrant category (rural-urban; urbanurban) is based on three countries. Differences are presented each time by city category.

6

FUNDING AND FINANCING SECONDARY CITIES

ASTRID R.N. HAAS

6.1 Introduction

Secondary cities will continue to account for over 40% of sub-Saharan Africa's urban population between now and 2030 (OECD, 2020). Global evidence from 51 countries between 1980 and 2004 shows that for a given level of urban population growth, secondary cities are overall better at driving poverty reduction (Christiaensen & Todo, 2014). In African this seems to hold true as well: empirical evidence from Tanzania shows that secondary cities are in fact better at driving poverty reduction quicker than primary cities (Christiaensen et al., 2017). There are several reasons for this, including the fact that secondary cities are located closer to rural populations and thus can more easily support the transition from agricultural to non-agricultural work. Furthermore, secondary cities also provide important markets for agricultural goods.

On a continental level, secondary cities have a central role in enhancing trade and in operationalising the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA). Data from the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) shows that AfCFTA is meant to increase trade by 50%–69% and boost African GDP by US$44 billion (UNECA, 2020). This provides a major opportunity for small and medium-sized cities, particularly those located in border areas. For example, a study from 18 western African cities has shown that those cities within a 50-km radius of border regions are experiencing some of the fastest economic growth, with some of the most dynamic markets (UNECA, 2020). This can have large, important effects on welfare for informal traders, who are mostly women, and currently contribute an estimated 20%–75% of intra-regional trade (UNECA, 2020).

In terms of spurring local economic development through firm investments, secondary cities still have a major advantage in the fact that there is comparatively more land available there than in primary cities. As such, they have opportunities to attract firms, such those operating in the manufacturing space, which have land as a core factor of production. This in turn can provide opportunities for employment within the city and its surrounding areas. To attract these types of firms, having land available is necessary, but not sufficient. There is a need for governments to invest in infrastructure to improve connectivity and services both within the cities themselves, as well as to surrounding markets. Furthermore, investments are also needed to improve the liveability for people moving to cities (UNICEF, 2020).



PHOTO 6.1
Hargeisa, Somalia - The challenge of gaining access to international finance

Unlocking these opportunities of economic productivity across African cities will therefore require significant financing; the current infrastructure gap in Africa is estimated to be US$130–170 billion annually and growing (AfDB, 2018). The gap may be even wider when considerations are made for investments in climate-smart infrastructure. At the same time, there is also growing evidence that the overall longer term pay-offs, in terms of both GDP and job growth, can be substantial (CUT, 2021). Therefore, for African secondary cities, which are set to undertake most of their urbanisation in the coming decades, ensuring that infrastructure investment can happen in advance of settlement is key to unlocking the urban dividend. It is also important to avoid the financial, political and social costs of retrofitting as much as possible. However, to achieve the commitments of the 2021 United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP26), some retrofitting cannot be avoided. A central question for city governments with limited resources is how to balance the need to invest in new infrastructure with retrofitting already existing infrastructure. This challenge may be even more substantial for many secondary cities that have not experienced investment for many decades, and so both their retrofitting and new investment needs are significant.

The challenges in terms of raising such substantial financing in the coming years are significant for African cities overall, but particularly significant when considering the current capacities of secondary cities. The slowness of decentralisation is common across the continent, resulting in local governments taking on increasing responsibilities for infrastructure and service provision, without commensurate expansion in their fiscal space. As such, the fiscal viability of local governments is declining and there is a growing dependence on intergovernmental fiscal transfers. This dependence is problematic: prior to the COVID-19 pandemic and the associated economic crisis, these transfers already were generally not consistent and commensurate to the needs of cities. As a result of the ongoing economic crisis, national government finances have been even further constrained. It is estimated, for example that in Uganda, in 2020, the economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic was the equivalent of 4.5% of Uganda's GDP (Owori, 2021). This has a consequent effect on how much revenue is available to transfer to local governments. As such, the investment needs for secondary cities are large and growing as urbanisation rapidly progresses, yet the funding and financing opportunities are becoming further constrained.

For example, policymakers in Hargeisa, located in the Woqooyi Galbeed region and capital city of self-declared Somaliland, understand the urgency and necessity of collecting property tax, as discussed below. This is due to the highly decentralised nature of their political system, which means that the city is responsible for delivering most services and infrastructure investments. Furthermore, although Somaliland has been a self-declared autonomous region since 1991, it is not internationally recognised as a country. This means that neither the country nor the city can benefit from substantial flows of financial aid. Thus, the city has had to rely on its own revenues.

The challenges in terms of raising such substantial financing in the coming years are significant for African cities overall, but particularly significant when considering the current capacities of secondary cities.

A stable flow of municipal finances is key to ensuring the overall longer-term sustainability for secondary cities and in particular their infrastructure and public services. As such, this chapter explores, using case studies from across Africa, potential ways that secondary cities can consider expanding their financing and funding bases. In this context, it is important to highlight that 'financing' refers to the monies that need to be raised to cover the overall capital investments in infrastructure, whilst 'funding' refers to how the infrastructure will ultimately be paid for, such as through taxes, user fees, or external development assistance.

This chapter begins with a focus on funding, starting with intergovernmental fiscal transfers, as these are the most important source of funding for most secondary cities. It will then go on to focus on the need for secondary cities to grow their own-source revenue and, in this context, the opportunities that exist through more local administrative reforms, as well as more substantial policy reforms. In these contexts, the case studies used will highlight how reforms can be further strengthened by investments in technology and digitisation, emphasising, however, that technology is not a panacea in itself. Following funding, the next section will focus on improving cities' access to finance through a two-pronged approach of improving cities' creditworthiness, coupled with expanding their access to capital markets, with a particular focus on the role of subnational intermediaries. It will also look at the untapped potential of remittance flows and areas that governments can focus on to tap into these to help finance investments. The final section will highlight what development partners can do to support the agenda on financing and funding secondary city development, using a case study of the African Development Bank, and other institutions' current efforts in this area.

6.2 Secondary City Funding

The primary area that secondary cities need to focus on is to improve their funding, which will also improve cities' access to financing. As the subsection highlights, to date, for most secondary cities, funding is composed of intergovernmental fiscal transfers from higher levels of government. However, these flows are not sufficient and often are challenging in terms of their regularity and timing for the budget process. Therefore, reducing dependence on intergovernmental fiscal transfers through increasing own-source revenues will be important. Two ways this can be done, which are highlighted in the next part of this section, is through administrative and policy reforms. Both these types of reforms can be supported by investments in soft infrastructure through digitisation and other technological innovations. Key in increasing own-source revenues will be in tax reforms, particularly around property taxation, as well as other forms of land value capture.

(...) for most secondary cities, funding is composed of intergovernmental fiscal transfers from higher levels of government. However, these flows are not sufficient and often are challenging in terms of their regularity and timing for the budget process.

6.2.1 Intergovernmental fiscal Transfers

Intergovernmental fiscal transfers, which are the transfers made by higher tiers of government to cities, are a necessary component of all cities' budgets. These transfers can help cover the differences between expenditures and revenues that can result in a city's low revenue base. Furthermore, these transfers can also support smoothing national horizontal fiscal imbalances between cities (Bird & Valliancourt, 1998). Given the size of the transfers with respect to many secondary cities' budgets, they also have an important role to play with respect to credit market development, as the revenue from these transfers may be used to back loans or general-obligation bonds (Freire & Petersen, 2004). However, across many countries in Africa, the budget data is not always immediately available and, where it is, transfer payments may not be detailed. This lack of transparency in intergovernmental transfers is compounded by the fact that they may not happen regularly and may be off the normal budget cycle altogether. This not only creates difficulties in terms of determining the full scope of a secondary city budget, but it can create challenges for the cities themselves in the budget planning process.

A city's over-dependency on intergovernmental fiscal transfers can have a destabilising effect on its budget. This is particularly the case when, as noted, transfers are irregular in terms of their timing, as well as their size and scope. Yet for many secondary cities across Africa, even within those countries that have ostensibly decentralised many of their revenue-raising functions, the largest share of city budgets is comprised of these transfers. A pertinent example in this respect is Uganda. In 2020, Uganda officially gazetted 10 new cities. Looking at the data of these cities, which can be seen in Table 6.1 (from Babale, 2021), own-source revenue as a contribution to their overall budgets is extremely low. In fact, across Uganda, the average for all local governments is about 4% of total budget, although it is a bit higher for urban municipalities, where it can make up to 27% of the budget (Ofungi, 2020). In 2017, the Government of Uganda reformed the fiscal transfers by collating all the different unconditional portions of these transfers into a single grant called the 'Discretionary Development Equalisation Grant'.

TABLE 6.1 | Funding status of 10 newly gazetted cities in Uganda UGX Bn (US$ millions)

FY 2020/21	Arua	Fort Portal	Gulu	Hoima	Jinja	Lira	Masaka	Mbale	Mbarara	Soroti	Total
Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfers (UGX Bn)	23.28	18.63	55.71	40.57	26.54	23.59	37.06	39.12	36.90	15.30	316.70
US$ (millions)	6.358	5.088	15.212	11.078	7.248	6.443	10.120	10.683	10.076	4.177	86.483
Own-Source Revenue (UGX Bn)	3.005	2.940	4.746	1.856	7.411	3.404	2.921	3.365	4.863	2.010	36.520
US$ (millions)	0.821	0.803	1.296	0.507	2.024	0.929	0.798	0.919	1.328	0.549	9.973
TOTAL (UGX Bn)	26.289	21.573	60.454	42.423	33.953	26.997	39.979	42.488	41.760	17.305	353.221
US$ (millions)	7.179	5.891	16.508	11.585	9.272	7.372	10.917	11.602	11.404	4.726	96.456

Source: Babale (2021).

Given the importance of intergovernmental fiscal transfers for secondary cities, an important set of reforms is to support national governments to stabilise the flow of these types of transfers to secondary cities. This will assist cities greatly in their budget planning and execution. Furthermore, particularly given that secondary cities are still relatively small, their needs are rapidly expanding; ensuring that there are ways that these transfers are fairly distributed between cities will be important. This can be done through a formulaic approach, such as is used in South Africa (Farvacque-Vitkovic & Kopanyi, 2014), which ensures that all cities receive their fair share of transfers, with respect to their current and future needs (see Box 6.1 for an outline of South Africa's formulaic approach).

At the same time, as will be discussed in subsequent subsections, ensuring that secondary cities expand their own-source revenue base is key. Although in the immediate term, intergovernmental fiscal transfers are going to remain an important source of revenue for secondary cities, particularly for those cities located in more centralised governmental systems, in all cases these transfers are likely to be too small to meet the infrastructure investment and service needs for rapidly growing cities. Lessening secondary cities' dependency on these transfers has other benefits too. It can increase their autonomy in decision making, as well as improve local accountability with respect to their own constituents. Furthermore, as noted, these transfers are not likely not to be stable within and across budget cycles. This is particularly pertinent during periods of economic downturns, like the one associated with the COVID-19 pandemic, when overall national government revenues fall. As such, improving the own-source revenue base can improve the sustainability in terms of overall budgeting.

BOX 6.1 | South Africa's intergovernmental fiscal transfers

The basis of South Africa's formulaic approach to intergovernmental fiscal transfers is laid out in its Constitution. This makes the provisions for the fact that the equitable division nationally raised resources, between its 9 provinces and 257 municipalities, must be determined on an annual basis. It also outlines the provisions upon which the division of resources needs to happen, including:

- National interest.
- Debt provisions.
- Maintaining national flexibility to respond to emergencies.
- Resource allocation for basic and developmental needs based on the powers and functions of the respective sphere of government.
- Fiscal capacity and efficiency of the respective sphere of government.
- Reducing horizontal economic disparities.
- Promoting sustainability and predictability.
- To enact the transfers each year a Division of Revenue Act is passed, which considers the consultations with the Financial and Fiscal Commission.

Source: South Africa Treasury (2016).

6.2.2 Own-source Revenue Generation

In addition to increasing the budget available for infrastructure investment, strengthening secondary city funding is central to unlocking financing. As noted, a key component of this is ensuring that secondary cities can expand their own-source revenues. Two levers to do this are:

Administrative reforms: These sets of reforms focus on enhancing the efficiency and effectiveness of revenue generation. A major advantage of administrative reforms is that they are usually largely in the cities' own control and can lead to substantial initial increases in revenue. A drawback to administrative reforms, however, is that increasing revenue generation from these reforms is finite once administrative efficiency has been achieved. However, for most secondary cities, achieving this is still very far off and as such, implementing administrative reforms still has substantial potential.

Policy reforms: These sets of reforms include changes to laws, policies and regulations around revenue generation. Compared to administrative reforms, policy reforms can result in much more substantial increase in revenue. This is especially the case when the reforms undertaken focus on expanding the authorising environment for secondary cities to raise own-source revenue. This includes, for example, changes to tax rates and bases or the types of user fees that cities can collect. However, policy reforms can take much longer to implement, since they often require legislative support for any changes to happen.

The following subsections will use case studies from different secondary cities across Africa to highlight both the opportunities and challenges with different reform programmes in areas of administration and policy. They will also highlight how both administrative and policy changes can be supported by investments in digitisation and technology. However, any of these investments will only be as useful as the underpinning institutional and administrative structures they are meant to support.

6.2.2.1 Administrative Reforms

Outsourcing Tax Collection

As highlighted, administrative reform has substantial potential to improve revenues, particularly in cities where existing revenue sources are still underperforming. Such reforms may be easier to implement, as investing in improvements in administrative structures is something that is usually in the control of the city government itself to initiate and carry through. As such, these reforms are usually also quicker to implement, and can thus show results in a relatively short period of time.

There are different ways administrative reforms can be implemented, and increasingly, the focus is on improved digitisation through technological reforms. The benefits and drawbacks of this aspect of reform will be covered in the next subsection. Another area is to increase the capacity of tax collectors, which ample evidence shows can improve revenues (Besley & Persson, 2009). Especially where tax collection is still carried out manually, which is often the case in secondary cities, there is an overall constraint, given the number of tax collectors, on how many taxpayers can be visited at any given point for the issuance of bills and collection of payments.

One way to increase the capacity of tax collectors is to engage local leaders in supporting governments with tax collection (Knebelmann et al., 2020). Evidence from Kananga, a city in the south-central part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the country's fourth largest city, shows that this type of partnership can work to increase local tax revenues (Begeron et al., 2021). In the case of Kananga, the city started implementing property taxes in 2016 (the potential of property taxes will be separately examined in the subsequent sections). Before the new tax was launched, city chiefs already had an important role with respect to the management of properties, often mediating in disputes and acting as intermediaries between the government and city residents. To increase revenues from property tax collection, a city-wide experiment was conducted in 2018. As part of this experiment, the city's 45,162 properties were randomly assigned to either have a government tax collector or a city chief visit them for tax collection. All other administrative and policy aspects of the property tax collection were kept the same across both samples.

The results showed that those properties visited by city chiefs had 52% higher compliance with their property tax payments, generating an additional 43% of revenues. Furthermore, contrary to concerns by the government that there may be increased mismanagement if tax collection was outsourced, there was little evidence of this. Perhaps one of the most interesting findings from this experiment was the fact that the local city chiefs and the government tax collectors visited the same amount of properties on average and, as such, this was not the driving factor behind the revenue increase. Rather it was primarily because city chiefs knew their constituents better and were therefore able to better target those individuals who were more likely to pay their property taxes.

The results showed that those properties visited by city chiefs had 52% higher compliance with their property tax payments, generating an additional 43% of revenues.

This example shows two important factors about administrative reforms. Firstly, by undertaking reforms that are merely targeted at improving the efficiency and effectiveness of generating funding, major improvements can be made to generating revenues. Secondly, ensuring that administrative reforms are localised and respond to the requirements of a specific area, in this example, are more likely to be successful than merely adopting strategies from elsewhere without understanding how they can be localised successfully. In the case of Kananga, the propensity of an individual to pay was an unobservable factor and therefore not something that government tax collectors could discern easily.

Technological Innovation for Administrative Reform

In supporting administrative reforms for improving municipal finance, investing in soft infrastructure, in the form of technology, is increasingly seen as one of the major areas to improve efficiencies in revenue generation. There are different aspects of revenue administration that can be digitised. This includes creating databases of information, which in turn can improve coordination, as the same information can be accessed and used by various tiers of government. Having information digitised can also improve transparency, giving taxpayers a clearer overview of what they are required to pay, as well as tracking the inflows of their tax payments. In terms of revenue collection, digitisation can also be used to improve the ease of compliance for payers of taxes or user fees. Examples include automated billing or cashless payments, such as through means of mobile payments. The COVID-19 pandemic highlighted another benefit of digitisation, namely improving the resilience of tax collection as systems that were digitised could continue in the face of lockdowns. In places like Rwanda, where several tax collection and payment processes have been digitised, there was a much smaller loss of revenues than would have occurred if tax collections still occurred manually (Haas et al., 2021). As such, investments in technology are often taken as a measure of modernisation and therefore improved efficiency of municipal finance systems.

Some secondary cities, like Kisumu, Kenya, have embarked on digitisation as a central tenant of their municipal finance reform processes. Kisumu, which has a population of 1.2 million, with approximately 50% of those living in urban areas, had a FY18/19 budget of about US$72 million, which is approximately equivalent to US$60 per capita (Fleck, 2021). The 2010 Kenyan Constitution increased devolution and has enabled cities like Kisumu to increase their abilities to raise own-source revenues. However, to date, Kisumu has struggled to meet the revenue potential, with their budget still composed of 78% of national transfers. As such, the city government decided to embark on reforms centred primarily around improving tax administration through digitisation. One of the reforms, for example, focused around improving collection of unstructured revenue streams, such as market fees, which are small amounts paid daily and at the source. To do this, the city procured 100 point-of-sale devices at a cost of US$500 each. These were distributed to fee collectors to improve collection and payments. In addition to the point-of-sale devices, the city also introduced a system where market fees could be paid via mobile payments.

Kisumu has not yet seen the anticipated revenue increases from the market fees, given the capital investments in digital technology. One reason was that 300 point-of-sale devices were required, but the city could not afford that many at the time. As such, nearly two-thirds of market fees continued to be collected manually. Perhaps more important was that this technology was superimposed on an institutional system that already had challenges. For example, there were no systems for audits and verification, which were also needed to ensure that the correct information was being input into the devices.

The COVID-19 pandemic highlighted another benefit of digitisation, namely improving the resilience of tax collection as systems that were digitised could continue in the face of lockdowns.

The case of Kisumu highlights that there are several factors to consider when investing in and implementing any technological solutions. Most importantly, technology is not a panacea to institutional challenges and therefore should not be superimposed on systems that are already not working. Rather, technology should be considered as one input into more comprehensive reform processes. Furthermore, in adopting digitisation, the systems selected should not simply mimic the manual processes that were in place the first place. Rather overall reforms in terms of efficiency measures should be considered, which in turn can then be supported by digital processes.

A further major consideration when it comes to implementing technological reforms in secondary cities, is the question of human resource and financial capacity. It is critical that any chosen system both mirrors and considers the prevailing capacity constraints. In Mzuzu, Malawi, for example, the digitisation of the property tax systems, which involved automation of the registration, billing and payment processes, used simple and open-source software that is also flexible enough to be easily amended to respond to future required changes (Delbridge et al., 2021b). In understanding the capacity needs of the key actors across the municipal finance chain, which include both those who are implementing the system as well as users of the system, ensuring sufficient, testing, training and communication through the technology roll-out phase is key to its success.

Reforms in Tanzanian secondary cities provide further examples of how technological innovation can be used to support administrative reforms to improve local government tax collection (Figure 6.1). Using a geographical information system (GIS) application, several secondary cities have established systems linked to revenue enhancement and urban development management for property identification, verification, taxation and spatial development governance. Twenty-three cities have had official development assistance (ODA) in introducing GIS systems, many of which are linked to taxation and financial management systems databases. The project is an important step forward for Tanzania to improve secondary cities' information and financial management systems. However, important lessons have been gained from the process, which include the needs to (i) examine and integrate the entire business process of urban councils; (ii) create an appropriate data structure that could support a functional set of city business processes; and (iii) improve the granularity of data, connectivity and interoperability between GIS and other functional areas of the council, including asset management and valuation. As the project report highlights:

> "…the use of open-source software will enable every user of spatial data to have similar sets of data and to add data accordingly, and thus facilitate the process of populating the GIS databases." (Namangaya, 2018, p. 571)

There are also other lessons be gained from the case study of these projects:

> "… it is evident that despite the indication of ownership of GIS system and mainstreaming of the same in the respective councils shown by the fact that the councils funded GIS operations from internal revenues, the systems remained as a departmental affair, mainly limited to departments dealing with lands administration/planning and revenue mobilization. Moreover, the data system of internal revenue sections and those on by the departments dealing with land matters (buildings and plots) were not linked, leading to revenue leakages and untapped revenue sources. There were also serious gaps in the data with many houses left out and inaccurate valuation data" (Namangaya, 2018, p. 564).

FIGURE 6.1 | Projects institutionalizing GIS for revenue mobilization for secondary cities in Tanzania

Despite these challenges, the application of technology has proved successful in Tanzania. A study of Arusha shows that yearly revenue collection increased by 14.5% between 2013 and 2016 (McClusky et. al, 2018).

There are still many challenges for local governments in introducing technologies to improve revenue enhancement, information and data management. This area needs continued assistance until local governments have the capacity and funds to maintain and upgrade technologies for improved revenue and budget management.

6.2.2.2 Policy Reforms

Property Tax Reform

As noted, policy reforms, which affect laws, policy and regulations, can have an even more substantial impact on generating own-source revenues, compared with solely focusing on administrative reforms. In this context, one area that many cities and local governments are exploring is how to implement or better generate property taxes, as shown in the previous example of Kananga. This revenue source is one of the most underexploited taxes across the continent. An indication of its potential is reflected in the fact that property taxes currently account for approximately 2% of GDP in OECD countries, but still only about 0.5% of GDP across sub-Saharan Africa, with this percentage being substantially smaller for most secondary cities (Franszen & McCluskey, 2017). Leveraging property tax in African cities, particularly for funding local infrastructure investments, has great potential (UNICEF, 2020). If designed and administered well, property taxes can allow city authorities to capture value created by rapid urbanisation and reinvest this into the city's infrastructure and services in a virtuous cycle.

There are several features of property tax that make it an extremely desirable tax, particularly for rapidly growing secondary cities to consider. Some of its notable features include:

- It is fairer compared to other forms of taxes as, if implemented well, it captures publicly created value. For example, with rapid urbanisation there is increasing demand for property, which in turn increases its value. In addition, property values also rise when public infrastructure investments are made in their proximity. In all these instances, value is publicly, rather than privately, created and therefore it is fair that this value is captured by governments to be reinvested for the public.
- Depending on the property tax system, it is a relatively more equitable tax than other taxes, as those who own properties tend to be richer.
- As a tax it is relatively easier to administer than other taxes, given that properties have a fixed base and many of the characteristics required for valuation are observable.
- Given that it is a tax that can demonstrate a direct connection between the tax paid and the local infrastructure and services provided, it is a tax that can help strengthen the social contract between government and citizens.

For this potential from property tax to be realised, however, many cities require not only administrative but also policy-related reforms. The actual ability for cities to administer and collect property tax depends very much on the legislative and institutional environment they are operating in. As such, different types of reforms, with respect to property tax, will be more or less feasible, given this context. One set of policy reforms that should be considered irrespective of the institutional environment is how to assess the value of the properties that the tax is based on.

For any taxing authority, deciding on the most appropriate assessment model may be constrained by what is specifically defined in legislation. However, even within what is prescribed, there may be opportunities for reform, as well as the possibility to determine whether considering a change in legislation is worth it. The variety of options when it comes to assessment models exists on a spectrum, reflecting increasing complexity in terms of their implementation, but also revenue potential. As is evident from Figure 6.2 (Collier et al., 2018), different models have important trade-offs to consider: on the one end of the spectrum, there are purely area-based systems. These are arguably the simplest forms of valuation to administer and require the least amount of data, as they only need the area of the property to be taxed. At the other end of the spectrum, there are highly complex capital value-based systems. These have the benefit of being buoyant in terms of the fact that they change with increases in property values, and are, in general, more equitable than more area-based systems. Furthermore, if administered well, a value-based system is likely to generate more revenue for the taxing authority relative to the area-based system, as it captures more of the full revenue potential of the property tax.

A value-based system requires higher capacity to administer much more sophisticated data. Therefore, in lower-income contexts, even where legislation may provide for using a value-based system, taxing authorities may still decide on implementing a simpler area-based system. This is particularly likely given prevailing capacity constraints, especially in administration, as well as the fact that property markets, and therefore data pertaining to these, may be under-developed. As has been the experience in many systems, starting simple can have important benefits: it can help broaden the tax base by bringing more properties into the tax net, sensitise increasing numbers of taxpayers to paying the tax and, importantly, as a result, generate much-needed revenue. These simpler systems can then be built on and further developed over time. This is the case in most jurisdictions currently using an area-based assessment; in fact, hardly any use solely the area to value property. Rather, most area-based systems already incorporate adjustment factors to incrementally move toward capturing more of the property value. In doing so, systems whilst becoming more complex to administer, become more equitable at the same time.

FIGURE 6.2 | Assessment models for property tax systems

More accurate

Type of assessment	Accuracy	Data requirements on transactions	Data requirements on land contents/ characteristics	Estimation capacity required	Transparency
Capital Market Value	High - though requires regular reassessments	Significant (on assets transactions)	High for greater accuracy	Significant	Can be low
Rental Value	High (where rental values are available and rent controls are not applied)	Significant (on assets transactions)	High for greater accuracy	Significant	Can be low
Points/Proxy	Medium (depending on calibration to market values and number of proxies included)	None needed - though helps in accuracy	Depends on number of proxies	Medium	Relatively hight
Area-based	Low	None	Very limited	Limited	High
Construction cost	Low	High - on supply side transactions	High	High	Relatively high

Greater simplicity

Source: Collier et al. (2018).

An interesting example in this context is the city of Hargeisa, the capital of Somaliland. Whilst it is a primary city, its revenue base is small, akin to many of the smaller secondary cities across Africa. Interestingly, however, unlike many secondary cities, the largest component of its total revenues are own-source revenues. In 2016, the total revenue for the city was about US$8.2 million, with 80% being attributed to own-source revenue collection (Delbridge et al., 2021b). One of the largest components of its own-source revenue is its property tax, and reforms to its area-based system have increased the city's property tax revenue by four-fold since 2008. The foundation of Hargeisa's property tax system is based on the calculation of the taxable property's area. When the property tax was introduced, this was a relatively straightforward calculation, as most buildings were constructed in similar styles. In particular, the majority were only one-storey and had one of three areas: 12 by 12 m, 24 by 18 m, or 6 by 9 m. They were usually located closer to the centre of the city as shown in Figure 6.3 (Tempra et al., 2007).

FIGURE 6.3 | First steps to strategic urban planning



Source: Tempra et al., 2007.

As the city started to grow and attract large investments, however, the buildings themselves became more complex and less standardised. The system has therefore been updated to be able to consider building height. For multi-storey buildings, a percentage of the ground floor value is calculated for each subsequent floor at a decreasing rate. For example, a second floor is taxed at 80% of the ground-floor rate, 70% for the third floor and so on (Haas, 2018).

Perhaps the main benefit of such an area-based system is that it is relatively easy for the city to administer, as calculating the area of buildings, particularly with standardised ones, is quite straightforward. This can be further aided by using GIS technology. This was first done in Hargeisa in 2004/2005, and it expanded the property tax register by over 270% — from about 15,850 properties to 59,000 properties. The subsequent GIS mapping exercise undertaken in 2017 expanded the register by approximately 30,000 further properties (Delbridge et al., 2021a). An area-based system is also relatively transparent and thus is easy to communicate to a taxpayer.

There are also several challenges with the system. One major drawback for city officials is the fact that the only way that the property tax revenue for the city can currently expand is if new structures are built. Furthermore, this expansion can only happen once the valuation roll is be updated, and it took 12 years for the last update to happen. Yet, the fact that the roll expanded by nearly 30,000 properties highlights the fact that construction in Hargeisa is indeed booming, and there would be merit in trying to capture these new structures as soon as they are built. Furthermore, the current valuation rolls are compiled by generating the relevant GIS data. For both the 2005 and the more recent valuation exercises, the generation of the roll was funded by the United Nations Human Settlement Programme (UN-Habitat). Like many secondary cities, however, Hargeisa only receives limited development partner funds and support, although in the case of Hargeisa, this is due to the unrecognised status of Somaliland. Therefore, finding ways to supplement the roll, when development partner funds are not readily available, is also important, given how rapidly the city is growing.

A second significant issue with the primarily area-based system is that it is not fully buoyant, as it does not capture any of the increases in the value of properties. As noted, for fast-growing cities like Hargeisa, this increase in value is both because of growing demand as well as the increasing complexity of structures being built. It is important to highlight, that if the system does not consider the complexity and quality of a structure, it is likely to be regressive. This is because, for example, a modern shopping mall would be taxed at the same rate as a simple house, if the two had the same floor area. Yet the shopping mall is likely to have far higher value.

Technological Innovation for Policy Reform

Further property tax reforms that better capture the overall value of buildings can have significant impacts on revenue. A secondary city that has piloted innovative reforms in this area is Mzuzu, Malawi's third largest city. The city had a population of about 221,272 people in 2018, and like Hargeisa, intergovernmental fiscal transfers made up less than 20% of Mzuzu's total US$3.3 million budget for FY 2019/20 (Delbridge et al., 2021b). As in Hargeisa, the principal source of own-source revenue for Mzuzu is property rates, which are charged on the value of land plus improvements, as well as ground rents. The potential of property tax is much higher than what is currently being collected, however, as the tax base is significantly constrained by the fact that 60%–70% of Mzuzu's urban population live in informal settlements and therefore were left out of the tax base.

In 2013, the city of Mzuzu, with support from the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) revenue mobilisation programme, decided to undertake significant reforms to its property tax system. Prior to these reforms, the valuation roll was only updated once every 20 years, on average, and as such missed out an estimated 75% of properties. In addition to the properties missing from the roll, those which featured on it were significantly undervalued. The reform process not only undertook the automation of the entire property tax process, including registration, billing and payments, it further helped Mzuzu implement a points-based property tax system, as the first city to do so in Malawi. This simplified value-based system uses the area of a property and then adjusts this for easily observable characteristics to be able to calculate an estimated market value, by which the property can be assessed (Grieco et al., 2019). This is then weighted by certain points, which add to the value based on positive features of the property, such as having a strong outer perimeter fence or high-quality roofing or deduct from the value when there are negative features, such as no access to running water. Although the system considers aspects that capture value when it comes to property, it is much simpler to administer and understand than a full market-based system. Through these reforms, Mzuzu managed to increase its revenue seven-fold from US$68,000 in 2013 to US$478,000 in 2018 (Delbridge et al., 2021b).

The case of Mzuzu shows that policy reforms, particularly in a pilot phase, can sometimes more easily be carried out in secondary cities where the political economy may be more conducive to testing innovative reforms. However, this example of Mzuzu also offers a word of caution. Although the reform was implemented in Mzuzu, it was then legally challenged, as the Local Government Act of Malawi stipulates that all property valuations in Malawi needs to be undertaken by certified valuers from the Surveyors Institute of Malawi (Delbridge et al., 2021b). This highlights that policy reforms may be more difficult than administrative reforms, due to the overall institutional framework changes that must take place.

The potential of property tax is much higher than what is currently being collected, however, as the tax base is significantly constrained by the fact that 60%–70% of Mzuzu's urban population live in informal settlements and therefore were left out of the tax base.

6.2.2.3 Land Value Capture

One of the most important assets for all cities is the land that they are located on. This land can provide a key resource for financing and funding a city's development. In fact, for some cities, land can make up 90% of their total asset base (Freire & Kopanyi, 2018). Through the urbanisation process, it is the increasing scarcity of land as people and businesses begin to locate on it, coupled with public investments made on the land to improve productivity and liveability, that drives up its value. As such, it is important for secondary cities, particularly those that are still at the relative outset of their urbanisation process, to have in place mechanisms that can capture the value of land and then use the revenues from this to reinvest into the cities.

Many African secondary cities are asset rich and revenue poor. Land values have increased substantially in metropolitan regions and secondary cities. In some secondary cities, such as Cape Coast in Ghana, land values of US$200,000 per hectare are not uncommon, with prices rising over 50% per annum. Property taxes are as low as 0.01% of the land value. Across Africa, little attempt is made at value capture from rising land prices, nor is there legislation or political willingness to introduce it to collect property taxes and other land taxes at market prices. Few secondary cities have cadastres and valuation rolls, and for those that do, the property values are not based on current market values or adjusted regularly for rises in land value. In some cities, personal and property wealth levels in terms of property assets are commensurate with some middle-income countries.

There are several policy tools that can be considered when looking at land value tax, a summary of which is provided in Table 6 (Haas & Kriticos, 2019). However, a major challenge in considering how to implement these tools is the underlying complexity of tenure systems, coupled with an opacity in land administration, which means that many cities in Africa, have not yet successfully implemented land value capture instruments. Yet these should be considered, particularly for secondary cities, where a major opportunity stems from the fact that most of their city growth, and therefore increases in values of land, is yet to happen.

TABLE 6.2 | Land value capture instruments and characteristics

Instrument	Type of Charge	For What	Who Pays	When (usually)	Examples
Land Value Increment Tax	Tax	Increased value because of public action (e.g., zoning)	Landowners (for reinvestment into public benefit)	Either on a fixed-frequency basis (e.g., yearly) or at the time of transfer	Taiwan
Betterment Levy	Tax or Fee	Increased value because of public investment (e.g., construction of a road)	Land or property owners in a pre-specified area of influence based on the gains they have accrued	After completion of project within a bounded period	Bogota, Colombia
Development Impact Fee	Fee (Monetary)	Cover the cost of additional infrastructure and services because of a development	Developer	One-time, upfront charge	Hong Kong
Exaction	Fee (Non-Monetary)	In-kind contribution linked to the cost of additional infrastructure and services because of a development	Developer	One-time, upfront contribution	Medellin, Colombia

Source: Haas & Kriticos 2019

One way for these cities to capture the value of land, is through proper planning of urban expansion. Changing or adopting new land-use management plans, and the resultant impact on land values, can provide a major source of revenue for a city. In those cities where land is publicly owned, the sale or lease of land for city growth is perhaps the most straightforward way to finance urban infrastructure. The major difference between selling versus leasing is that land sales, whilst providing an immediate source of revenue, will only result in a one-off cash inflow for cities. As the city then no longer owns the land, its sale then prevents it from benefiting from any potential increase in its value in the future. Through land leasing, the city can retain overall ownership of the land and then charge rent or a fee for user rights and, as such, a regular cash inflow. This, however, is coupled with the potential administrative costs of managing the leased land and the collection of any fees. In many cities, a combination of selling and leasing is used, and a detailed capital investment plan can help a city determine and prioritise which land assets it should sell to finance its development priorities.

Another way to capture the value of land is through rezoning and then leasing the land for urban use. For example, agricultural lands on the periphery of current urban areas, which are likely to be absorbed as part of future city growth, can be re-zoned to urban land uses. This will, in general, automatically increase its value. Given that the power of re-zoning lies with the government, this is a clear example of publicly created value where the value should be captured and reinvested for the public accordingly. This was the type of model that has to date been successfully used in China to finance a large part of its infrastructure investments, including in its secondary cities, during its rapid urbanisation process (Dercon et al., 2019).

Irrespective of whether the city decides to sell or lease its land, it is extremely important that it plans for its urban expansion. One of the major challenges facing many of the primary cities in Africa to date, is that settlement has happened before investments in infrastructure. As such, cities are having to grapple with the financial costs of retrofitting, which evidence from Latin America has shown can be up to three times more expensive, coupled with the political and social costs of moving people from their land (Fernandes, 2011). Therefore, planning for density by ensuring that there is sufficient space left for public infrastructure, can be key to generating further productivity, liveability and therefore revenues for cities.

One way for these cities to capture the value of land, is through proper planning of urban expansion. Changing or adopting new land-use management plans, and the resultant impact on land values, can provide a major source of revenue for a city.

The New York University's Marron Institute is partnering with four secondary cities in Ethiopia, namely Adama, Bahir Dar, Hawassa and Mekelle, to undertake this planning for urban expansion (Lamson-Hall, 2020). This requires forecasting up to 30 years of potential population growth, which given current sources of data can be done relatively easily, and then using this to estimate how much land will be required for development. Once this is done, the cities work on securing the land in the future right of way for the urban expansion areas, with a particular focus on the arterial roads. Depending on the land tenure system, this can be done through direct expropriation for the public benefit or by paying the required compensation to landowners to guarantee that there no construction takes place in those areas in the future. In some cases, physical barriers, such as trees, are erected to demarcate the areas that should be kept free from construction. In the case of these four Ethiopian cities, 570 km of roads had been constructed by 2018, providing settlement space for around 140,000 new settlers and generating approximately 26,000 jobs (NYU Marron Institute, 2020). The total cost of this urban expansion programme across the four cities is estimated to be about US$35 million over 5 years, the equivalent to about 50% of those cities' construction budgets.

This method of planning for urban expansion has benefits beyond ensuring the space is maintained for future investments in infrastructure. It can help direct the direction of settlement as it shapes community and business expectations for future infrastructure investment. In Bahir Dar, for example, an industry zone, providing employment for surrounding populations was developed, given the investor expectations of future infrastructure. Overall, cities have seen an increase in formal settlement as new arrivals to the cities are able to purchase leases around the urban fringes. Furthermore, in Hawassa, about 7,000 informal settlers were resettled with formal leases in this way too (NYU Marron Institute, 2020).

Perhaps more importantly, investments like this, coupled with public investments in infrastructure, will increase the land values, which if managed well, can generate revenues for the city to invest in the future infrastructure. Another way to do this is for the cities to sell or lease the blocks of land surrounding the arterial roads. Specifically, as the grids around the arterial roads develop, and as the public infrastructure investments happen, this can increase the land values for the city. To date, in the case of the Ethiopian cities, it is estimated that approximately US$77 million of leases have been sold across the four cities (NYU Marron Institute, 2020). This money can then be reinvested to service the land, as well as provide for further infrastructure in the expansion areas. In fact, from land value and revenue projection models that were developed for these four cities, considering all the associated costs of implementing the urban expansion programme, including the compensation for land, costs of infrastructure and costs of developing arterial grids, the expectation was that all four cities would still have a revenue surplus in the future.

6.2.2.4 Subnational Value Added Tax

A value-added tax (VAT) is a tax that is levied at all stages of production, with an inbuilt compliance incentive, as suppliers across a value chain need to ensure payments of their counterparts to ensure they can claim input credits. It has become an overall popular tax for developing countries, particularly as an efficient revenue-generation mechanism. In general, VAT is a national tax, and the revenues may then be distributed to a state or municipal level. There are only a few countries, mostly with federal systems, where VAT is levied as a subnational tax. This is due to, amongst other challenges, concerns about the administrative feasibility and overall efficiency of levying such a tax at a subnational level.

One of the countries that levies VAT at a subnational level is India, which through reforms between 2003 and 2008 decided to replace its subnational sales tax with subnational VAT. The aim of this reform was to help spur revenue growth at a state level (Sen, 2015). By 2005, 27 out of the 29 states decided to implement this subnational VAT and research shows that in 18 of those states there was an up to 8% increase in overall revenue efficiency, i.e., comparing the difference between the net cost of administering the tax versus the net benefit in terms of revenues generated. By 2008, revenues from VAT made up approximately 64.4% of own-source revenues in those states (Sen, 2015).

There were three main reasons that it was possible in the Indian context to levy tax at a subnational level:

- India has a federal government structure and as such states have much more autonomy to set the relevant revenue laws at a subnational level.
- Prior to implementing subnational VAT, the sales tax was already a state tax, whereas in many countries, this is in fact a national tax. Therefore, in effect, the adoption of VAT was merely replacing a more inefficient tax.
- Even though the states were responsible for administering the subnational tax, the central government still set the model legislation which the states had to follow. This included three tiers of rates, a 12.5% standard rate, a 4% reduced rate for items of necessities, as well as a 1% rate for gold, silver and precious stones. States were permitted to issue rates above these thresholds, which some subsequently did in 2010, but not below it to induce a quasi-trade war across state boundaries.

Like India, Ethiopia is also a federal country where the collection and administration rights of VAT is at a state level, although the responsibility for the actual collection is divided between central and state tax administrators (Yesegat & Krever, 2018). The revenues from VAT, which are a substantial source of tax revenue for the government, are divided in a unique manner, however: the state government gets to keep any revenue collected from unincorporated firms, and the central government keeps the revenues from those that are incorporated. Furthermore, the allocation of VAT by state is based on the registration of the location of the firm. As such, the final allocation of VAT revenues, rather than being based on consumption of the final goods and services, is dependent on the registration status and geographic location of the firms. This bifurcated system has the implication that effectively buyer-states are being cross-subsidised by consumer-states.

In general, the public financial management literature is clear that levying VAT at a subnational level is highly inefficient. Rather it advocates for the central administration of VAT and then the distribution of the revenues to a subnational level. As the cases of India and Ethiopia show, in some federal systems, VAT is managed at a state level. Although, at least in India, these reforms seem to have borne some of the intended increases in subnational revenue efficiency, it is unlikely that this is a feasible major revenue source for many secondary cities in Africa. Furthermore, it is worth noting that the revenue efficiency increases were recorded in India's most economically prosperous states, and those which had lower economic development and thus less capacity to implement this to start with did not derive the same benefits from these reforms (Sen, 2015).

6.3 Improving Access To Finance

There are major constraints on African cities' access to capital markets for financing the upfront capital costs of infrastructure investments. These challenges, which are both of a legislative and administrative nature, exist for primary cities and are even more pronounced for secondary cities. In some places, decentralisation is far enough advanced that cities can, according to legislation, borrow from capital markets. One of these places is Tunisia, which is described in the chapter on Gabés. Following the 2010/11 Jasmine Revolution in Tunisia, which resulted in a new constitution in 2014, the institutional structures saw a major shift in decentralisation. One of the main outcomes of this was to provide cities and municipalities with stronger political and administrative status, as well as the enhanced fiscal autonomy to both generate own-source revenues and to access finance.

In the context of this increased devolution of fiscal powers, the Mayor of Bizerte, Tunisia's sixth largest city, decided, in 2020, to undertake a full credit rating to determine the current financial strength of the city and, importantly, where the city should focus its municipal finance reform efforts. Perhaps more than the rating, the detailed recommendations of the main challenges within the fiscal and overall planning systems of the city were the most useful outcome of this exercise (PBR Rating, 2020). As a result of this, the Bizerte's Director of Finance, under the auspices of the mayor, is developing a municipal finance action plan that outlines detailed areas and sequencing in which the city wants to improve its fiscal health.

Undergoing a credit rating or a shadow credit rating is one way to determine the creditworthiness of a city. In the case of Bizerte, it has led to a concrete action plan to improve the city's rating for the city to be able to borrow on capital markets. To date, only very few cities across Africa, and primarily in South Africa, have been able to borrow from capital markets. As Gorelick (2018) highlights, this is primarily due to the general weak authorising environment in which cities in Africa operate. This impacts the weak or overall lack of policies and legislation that would be needed to govern cities' ability to raise finance and to create the necessary assurances for markets, particularly prospective issuers of bonds, such that transactions can take place. In this context, therefore, it would be too expensive for cities to undertake a credit rating. Perhaps more importantly, in many cases it would be unnecessary given that the reasons for cities' creditworthiness may already be clear. Furthermore, for many secondary cities it would not be possible to determine creditworthiness, as this requires inventories of assets, balance sheets and other financial information that may not be available. There are other, and less expensive means of diagnosing challenges related to municipal fiscal health. Another challenge in undertaking full credit ratings at a stage where a city's municipal fiscal health is clearly in need of reform, is that receiving a sub-standard rating may send wrong signals to financial markets, and this market confidence may be difficult to reverse at later stages.

As noted, in most cases the challenges facing secondary cities' creditworthiness are relatively easy to diagnose, and this can be done without undergoing a full credit rating. Their challenges in this context, tend to fall into three main, yet interlinked, areas, namely:

- Poor municipal fiscal health.
- A high cost of capital due to several risk factors.
- The project requirements are too small to attract market interest.

Although many of these are structural constraints, secondary cities can still work to rectify them by putting in place reforms. These reforms will, in the longer term, further support them in accessing domestic, and perhaps even international, capital markets.

The first major set of reforms, in improving access to finance, are related to funding and increasing own-source revenue, as has been discussed in the previous section. This section will focus on improving cities' creditworthiness through budget reforms, particularly looking at the costs and benefits of moving from cash to accruals accounting systems. It will also look at the increased use of and support to subnational finance intermediaries that can also assist in pooling projects, as well as the untapped potential of remittances.

> *Another challenge in undertaking full credit ratings at a stage where a city's municipal fiscal health is clearly in need of reform, is that receiving a sub-standard rating may send wrong signals to financial markets, and this market confidence may be difficult to reverse at later stages.*

6.3.1 Cash Accounting vs. Accrual Accounting

Over the past decades, many governments, particularly in developing countries, have been looking for ways to increase the efficiency, accountability and transparency of their budgeting process. A lack of transparency into a city government's budget is one of the major obstacles in giving it overall access to financial markets. Considerations in this regard relate to having budgets that clearly distinguish between current and capital expenditures, as well as between revenues and loan receipts. This is particularly pertinent if city governments want to borrow, as it is important to be able to distinguish between borrowing for investments and for financing operational expenditures (Freire & Petersen, 2004).

Central amongst these considerations is the accounting system that a government uses, as this can provide transparency of information and thus signal to the market a city's municipal fiscal health. One area of reform in this regard is to move from a predominantly preferred use of cash-based accounting system to an accrual accounting system, a system already favoured by the private sector (Cavanaugh et al., 2016). The predominant difference between cash and accrual accounting is when an economic transaction is recognised in the final financial accounts. With cash accounting, transactions are only recognised at the point when cash is transacted, whereas with accrual accounting the transaction is recognised as soon as assets and/or liabilities are exchanged. This is important, as assets and/or liabilities can be exchanged before any cash flow occurs and therefore, if it does, their exchange would not immediately be recognised in a cash-based accounting system. At the same time, the economic impact

of this transaction may have already happened at the time of the exchange. In general, cash accounting adds or subtracts to a government's cash balance, whereas accrual accounting adds or subtracts to a government's net worth, measuring the governments quasi-debt liabilities and thus the overall burden of its financial commitments. In terms of financial reporting, accrual accounting results in additional financial reports, such as a statement of financial position, operating statement as well as a statement of cash flows.

A summary of the main advantages and disadvantages of each accounting system can be found in Table 6 (compiled from Cavanaugh et al., 2016, and IFAC, 2002). In general, the main disadvantage of a cash-based accounting system is that it does not provide the full picture of economic events, where these may not align with cash as paid and received. Conversely, therefore, the main advantage of a well-implemented accrual accounting system is that it should improve transparency and accountability in terms of how a government agency performs, i.e., how it executes its budget to fulfil its mandate. Understanding this can improve budgeting practices, especially transparency, and therefore support in improving government resource allocation. Importantly it can also improve accountability with respect to taxpayers.

Therefore, reforms targeted at a move towards accrual-based accounting should be one area for consideration for secondary cities. However, transitioning accounting systems is a major policy and regulatory undertaking. For secondary cities, which usually have inherently weaker accounting systems, considerations should be made from the outset both in terms of the human and financial resource capacity needs, as well as the overall sequencing of the reform process. There are several foundational factors that are critical to a successful transition, including:

- A need for a strong cash-based system to be in place, prior to undertaking the transition to an accrual-based accounting system, particularly as cash management is a central part of an accruals accounting system.
- A strong cash management system, which has a systematic recognition and valuation of all governments assets and liabilities and thus the creation of a complete asset register is a major requirement of this reform process.
- Any reforms to the accounting system need to be part of a broader set of public financial management reforms. It is important that it is not the accounting system that drives the subsequent reforms, but that the accrual system should rather support whatever broader reforms are happening to the budget.
- Sufficient time and sustained political commitment as full transitions to accrual accounting systems is estimated to take anywhere from 6 to over 10 years (Khan & Mayes, 2009).

The predominant difference between cash and accrual accounting is when an economic transaction is recognised in the final financial accounts.

TABLE 6.3 | The main advantages and disadvantages of cash accounting compared to accrual accounting

	Cash Accounting	Accrual Accounting
Advantages	Simplicity in terms of: • Compilation of budgets and reporting. • Understanding by implementers and users of the system. • For legislature to understand how the monies spent compared to what was appropriated for that budget period. • Less subjectivity in terms of when a transaction gets recorded (i.e., it is exactly when cash is transacted is relatively straightforward). • Lower cost as less skill and IT systems required.	• Can lead to better resource allocation as accruals and/or liabilities may be significantly different from cash payments in a reporting period. • Provides a more comprehensive overview of economic activity. • Links revenues and expenses to a government's net asset position. • More comprehensive information around the budget. • Improved monitoring of governments overall liabilities as well as contingent liabilities. • Improved transparency of the total costs of service provision by governments (especially as governments tend to hold large assets/liabilities). • Can be used to better assess city municipal finance performance and thus improve accountability.
Disadvantages	• Limited scope, as only cash transactions are recorded within a particular reporting period. • Ignores all other resource flows except for cash flows. • Limited insights into overall assets and liabilities held by a government. • Subjectivity in determining when transactions are on or off budget and thus when they get recorded.	• Introduces more complexity into government accounting systems. • Complexity can be used to mask information. • Requires a major overhaul in accounting systems including human resource skills and IT systems. • Major financial and human resource costs in setting up and maintaining new systems. • Can take many years for full implementation.

Source: Compiled from Cavanaugh et al. (2016) and IFAC (2002).

Many secondary cities in Africa will still be a long way from meeting many of these pre-requisites for a full transition to an accrual-based accounting system; therefore, this may be a medium to longer term goal. In the shorter term, however, reforms that work towards and adopt elements of accruals-based accounting, such as setting up and updating an asset and liabilities register, will have benefits in improving municipal fiscal health. This phased approach has been used in South Africa, where not all government entities are required to use the same accounting standards and where entities can work on transitioning based on their capacity (Lubbe & Mkubukeli, 2016). Whilst it is important that budgeting systems in secondary cities do evolve towards accrual-based accounting, these reforms can and should evolve over time with commensurate increases in capacity, resources and needs of the city.

6.3.2 Subnational Financial Intermediaries

Aside from their own municipal fiscal health, there are other major challenges when it comes to secondary cities accessing finance from capital markets, which include:

- The overall national institutional and legal framework is not permissive of cities borrowing. This may relate to concerns that many national governments have about the effect of subnational debt on overall national debt exposure and the potential of moral hazard if the national government must step in as the lender of last resort in the event of a city's fiscal indiscipline.
- As noted, even if cities are allowed to borrow, the cost of capital is too high, and their credit ratings are low or non-existent.
- For many secondary cities, particularly the smaller ones, the type of investments they would like to borrow for are too small compared to the market's interest to lend.

To help overcome these challenges, various forms of subnational municipal finance institutions have been established across the continent. These institutions have different mandates and instruments. At one end of the spectrum are subnational development banks, which are public banks with the mandate to provide financing to local and regional governments or private entitles for local infrastructure and service provision. These banks are owned, governed and supported by national governments to execute a public and development-oriented mandate, with most of their portfolio geared on supporting local and city government projects. They also have an independent legal status and financial autonomy. They can either be first-tier banks, where their lending extends directly to the city itself, or a second-tier bank, where they lend to commercial banks, which then on-lend to the city (Farvacque-Vitkovic & Kopanyi, 2014).

Most of these types of subnational development banks operate in francophone Africa, for example the Agence National d'Investissement des Collectivités Territoriales – ANICT (National Agency for Investment in Local Regions) in Mali or the Fonds National d'Investissement Communal – FONIC (National Fund for Local Investment) in Burundi. Both the examples of the ANICT and FONIC have a major role to play in lending to secondary cities and towns in their respective countries.

The FONIC in Burundi has a mandate to support the disbursement of national government grants to municipalities (Niyongabo, 2020). Since 2015, each municipality in Burundi is entitled to 500 million FBU of development project expenditures (≈ US$250,000). This amount is disbursed by the FONIC based on the readiness of the project proposals it receives as well as the absorption capacity of the respective municipal authority requesting the funds. A 2018 guideline issued by the Burundian national government suggests that annually 20% of this grant should go towards the construction of social infrastructures, whilst 80% should go to infrastructure or services that can generate economic income. In addition to being the conduit for the central government funds, the FONIC also acts as a financial intermediary for external finance that is intended to support local urban development. It further provides technical support to the municipalities for project development and execution.

Another model of a subnational financial intermediary that fulfils similar functions are local municipal development funds. One example of such a fund is the Development Fund for Local Authorities (DFLA) in Malawi. This fund was founded in 1993 with the aim to support increased revenue generation by Malawi's local governments (Delbridge et al., 2021b). It was initially run and capitalised, at US$12 million, by the World Bank, half of which was a loan, and the other half was grant funding. In 2017, the management of the DFLA was handed over to the government Malawi, through a dedicated chief executive officer position. Municipalities and other local authorities can apply to the DFLA for commercial loans for projects that have a dedicated revenue stream in the short-term or a longer-term infrastructure loan. These loans come at a favourable rate, attracting a 14.5% interest rate, which is equivalent to that from the Reserve Bank of Malawi, and lower than commercial loans, which can attract rates upwards of 26%. The tenor of these loans is up to 10 years. To apply for a loan, the entire municipal council is involved in the application process and funds are disbursed based on availability. The types of projects that have been financed by the DFLA have ranged from rubbish collection vehicles to funds to update property valuation rolls. Unlike the FONIC, the loans are not disbursed to the municipal council directly, but rather used to pay suppliers. However, the relevant municipal councils are responsible for loan repayment, and the DFLA has seen steady loan recovery since its inception.

BOX 6.2 | New Zealand's Local Government Funding Agency

On 1 December 2011, the Local Government Funding Agency (LGFA) was established in New Zealand, under the Local Government Act (2002). The aim of the LGFA is to provide efficient and diversified financing sources for New Zealand's local governments. The LGFA is incorporated as a limited liability company, where each local government guarantees to indemnify each other. The local governments can borrow centrally from the government, but they also have a choice to also raise loans which are then bundled to local government. The governance structure of the LGFA is formed by 20% ownership of the New Zealand National Government and 80% of the 30 local councils. In addition, there is a LGFA Shareholders Council, with 5–10 members at any point in time and a Board of Directors.

It took several failed attempts throughout the 1980s and 1990s for local governments to come together to form a corporation to borrow funds. Ultimately some of the success factors that led to the LGFA's establishment in 2011 included:

- The global financial crisis coupled with New Zealand's growing infrastructure deficit that brought on the realisation that increased borrowing and diversified funding sources were needed.
- The passing of the Local Government Borrowing Act in 2011 that allowed local governments to legally borrow.
- Successful examples of local government corporations from Nordic countries that could be used as examples and then tailored to New Zealand's local requirements.
- An initial capitalisation from the New Zealand Debt Management office of 500 million NZD.
- An initial credit rating, delivered by both Standard & Poors as well as Fitch's, of AA+, which was equivalent to the national credit rating.

Source: New Zealand Local Government Funding Agency - LGFA (2016) .

These types of subnational financial intermediaries have an important role to play in terms of increasing the creditworthiness of secondary cities by improving their financial capacity. Through the disbursement of smaller and less expensive loans, than what they would access on capital markets, it allows cities to become more familiar with taking on debt and initiates their credit history. In addition, these institutions can act as intermediaries to help them access domestic and international capital markets, whilst providing local currency financing. Where they have technical assistance functions, like the FONIC in Burundi, they can strengthen cities and regions' capacities in terms of generating a project pipeline of bankable projects.

Across Africa, there are, however, only a handful of similar institutions, and where they do exist, their potential remains constrained due to legal, technical and financial barriers. For example, the DFLA has not received any recapitalisation since its inception in 1993, and the interest paid on the loans just covers the administration costs of issuing the loans and running the DFLA itself. The FONIC in Burundi has also encountered capacity challenges which has sometimes hindered the timely release of funds to municipalities. Another innovative model, as described in Box 6.2 in the case of New Zealand, is where local governments form a corporation to raise debt on collectively better terms than if they raised debt individually (LGFA, 2021). All these forms of financial intermediaries play an important role to reduce risk, provide competition, and foster subnational sovereign and national lending. This would be particularly significant with regards to secondary cities' needs and the fact that many of them will take several years to build their creditworthiness to borrow from capital markets directly. As such, overall support to subnational financial intermediaries should be strengthened across Africa.

6.3.3 Remittances

A feature of secondary cities across Africa is their proximity to rural areas and therefore the ties that city dwellers maintain to their rural origins. In fact, there is an emerging literature that refers to African households as 'trans-locational' based on the economic, social and cultural ties that are maintained by them at different levels (Tostensen, 2004). One area that these ties manifest themselves is in the form of financial flows between those who have migrated to cities and those who remain in rural areas, as well as those who may have migrated to larger primary cities and those in secondary cities.

Although the research of the impact of remittances on secondary cities, particularly in Africa, is scarce, evidence from Latin America and the Caribbean pertaining to international flows of remittances shows that the majority of these go back to secondary cities and towns (Orozco, 2008). This has become an increasingly important source of finance for some households, as trade, globalisation and migration flows have expanded. According to a study looking at remittance flows to eight secondary cities in Latin America and the Caribbean, certain cities with large numbers of international migrants may receive up to as much as 20% of the total remittance flows for that country. The same study shows that most remittances are spent on education, health, housing and insurance. The flow of remittances tends to have an overall consumption smoothing effect as a relatively stable source of income for households. This is also evident by looking at the aggregate data of remittance flows globally, which is evident in the fact that as there are economic downturns, the volume of remittances increases.

One of the few countries where remittances and their impacts have been studied in Africa, is in Ethiopia. In 2010, the World Bank undertook a survey that looked at both international and domestic remittances (World Bank, 2010). This study showed that international remittances were far more prevalent, that only 22% of the adult population in Ethiopia had received domestic remittances, and that the average size of these remittances was eight times lower than international remittances. In a more detailed study of Gondar, a city of about 342,000 people in northern Ethiopia, Zewdu (2014) interviewed 544 households to discern their remittance patterns. Gondar has seen substantial emigration since the 1970s, which also explains that over 80% of the remittances received come from North America and Europe, with the United States accounting for over 60%. The study showed that about one third of households received remittances monthly, usually reflecting their sole source of income. In these cases, remittances were overwhelmingly used to support housing investments, businesses, and education. Other households received remittances primarily on public holidays and other special occasions. Another finding from this study was that remittances are not only sent in case, but increasingly in-kind, in the form of electronics, food, clothing and other forms. These types of in-kind remittances are generally not captured in any official records but are an important source of income for households.

According to a study looking at remittance flows to eight secondary cities in Latin America and the Caribbean, certain cities with large numbers of international migrants may receive up to as much as 20% of the total remittance flows for that country.

Although the studies of Latin American cities, as well as the more detailed studies on Ethiopia, focus largely on international migratory patterns, as noted, for many African secondary cities, the same flows may apply; however, their intra-national migratory patterns may potentially be more significant than they are in Ethiopia. In all cases, however, remittance flows tend to be external to the government budget and, therefore, cannot be channelled in a way to support local infrastructure and service development. For most cities, prevailing institutional structures have

not yet understood how to capitalise on these flows and rather the absorption of these financial flows into the local economy, very much depends on the structure of that economy and the recipients of remittances relationship to it.

To tap into remittances as a source finance, cities must have structures in place that allow for the absorption of the funds, as well as their utilisation in the productive economy. This includes more financial intermediation opportunities for micro funds, the ability to develop and communicate pipelines of investment opportunities that remittances can be directed to, as well as designing local public services, such as education and health care, where remittances can be directed. To ensure that this can be done effectively, there is a strong need for further work on remittance flows in Africa, particularly amongst internal migrants, as we know very little about this to date.

6.3.4 Development Partners

There are several ways that development partners have been supporting secondary cities to date. This includes directly financing city government budgets, the provision of technical assistance to them to help create pipelines of projects, or simply supporting capacity improvements to generate more own-source revenue. This subsection will not provide an exhaustive list of what can be done through development assistance. Rather it will focus on the case study of the African Development Bank (AfDB), the World Bank and the United Nations Capital Development Fund (UNCDF) with examples of their past and present work when it comes to supporting secondary cities.

6.3.4.1 African Development Bank

The AfDB has been engaging with cities across the continent since its founding in 1964. It issued its first Urban Development Policy in 1992, which was followed by an Urban Development Strategy in 2011. In 2022, it is set to publish a Sustainable Urban Development Action Plan, which further builds upon these previous strategies and policies to enhance the scale, efficiency and harmonisation of its operations in the urban sectors.

In addition to its policies and guidelines, the AfDB established an Urban Development Division in 2018 to work directly with cities and municipalities, including secondary cities, and to coordinate the AfDB's investments in them. To further support work and engagements in cities, the AfDB's Urban and Municipal Development Fund (UMDF) was launched in 2019 to provide technical assistance to cities to support infrastructure pipeline development, urban planning, as well as municipal finance and governance. To take the AfDB's interactions with cities forward in a concentrated effort and create impact along the complete investment value chain, the UMDF has created a dedicated cities programme, which expands its cohort by five cities per year. In the first cohort of cities in 2020, two out of the five cities which were selected to join the programme, are secondary cities.

To further support work and engagements in cities, the AfDB's Urban and Municipal Development Fund (UMDF) was launched in 2019 to provide technical assistance to cities to support infrastructure pipeline development, urban planning, as well as municipal finance and governance.

A further important instrument that was approved by the AfDB in 2019, is its Sub-national Finance Guidelines (AfDB, 2019). These Guidelines provide operational and policy guidance for how the AfDB can engage directly with these subnational governments, as well as other non-sovereign entities. Furthermore, the Guidelines also establish and promote the appropriate legal and regulatory frameworks for the optimal functioning of these subnational entities, focusing on sub-sovereign lending, land-financing reform, subnational balance sheet and credit rating, and subnational borrowing. It also enhances its support by engaging at the national level as well. This ability for the AfDB to be able to engage directly at a subnational level improves its responsiveness to cities' needs and, through this, making an increasingly effective contribution to augmenting the supply of subnational finance across the continent. One example is that, upon approval of the Guidelines, a line of credit was approved to Morocco's subnational development bank, the Fonds d'Équipment Communal (FEC) which it is on-lending to cities, including secondary cities, in Morocco.

An analysis of the AfDB's loan portfolio between 2010 and 2020 shows that as a multilateral financial institution, it has already had significant engagements in smaller cities and towns. This has primarily been because of the investments it has made into transportation infrastructure that improves connectivity between and within cities. Over 70% of the AfDB's interventions have been in cities and municipalities with populations of less than 100,000 people. Furthermore, the AfDB has reached 54% of cities in Africa with populations of more than 1 million people.

As noted, this example of the AfDB's work is only one of many other examples that could be drawn upon to show the support that both multilateral, as well as bilateral development partners, could have in supporting the well-managed growth and governance of secondary cities. However, unlike the AfDB for many partners, urban portfolios still largely focus on primary cities and, therefore, developing programmes that respond to the specific needs of secondary cities will be key moving forward.

Over 70% of the AfDB's interventions have been in cities and municipalities with populations of less than 100,000 people. Furthermore, the AfDB has reached 54% of cities in Africa with populations of more than 1 million people.

6.3.4.2 World Bank

The World Bank has been supporting African cities through various technical assistance and programme support. Examples of specific programmes focused on improving the financing and funding of secondary cities specifically include:

Ghana Secondary Cities Support Programme: This programme valued at US$261 million between 2018 and 2024, aims specifically at improving the management of urban services. The programme complements Ghana's overall decentralisation programme and provides grant assistance to enhance funding to qualifying municipal assemblies. The qualification criteria are the same as those set forth in the national government's responsiveness factor grant and district performance assessment tool.

Côte D'Ivoire Infrastructure for Urban Development and Competitiveness of Secondary Cities Project: Although a component of this supports the municipal governments of Bouake and San-Pédro directly, the focus of this project is to enhance private sector finance to cities. It thus aims to improve the business environment in these

two cities, which were selected due to their importance for regional and global trade, to encourage investment, and therefore increase employment opportunities. In addition, the project provides direct assistance to small and medium enterprises.

Uganda Support to Municipal Infrastructure Development Programme (USMID): Like the programme in Ghana, this programme also supports increasing funding to cities. As noted in the subsection on intergovernmental fiscal transfers, in 2017 the Government of Uganda consolidated all unconditional intergovernmental fiscal transfers to secondary cities into a single Discretionary Development Equalisation Grant. The USMID programme finances this transfer for 22 municipalities across Uganda for a period of up to 2023.

Cities Creditworthiness Support Initiative: This is a programme solely dedicated to improving the financial health of cities with the overall aim to improve their creditworthiness and thus unlock investment from private sources. Through this initiative, the World Bank provides comprehensive long-term support through dedicated training academies and implementation programmes. It has already trained over 650 municipal officials across 261 local authorities in 30 countries. An example of the Initiative's support to secondary cities was its work in Tanzania, where work under this initiative resulted in the development of public-private partnership (PPP) pipelines in four local governments, a climate-smart capital investment plan in a further three local governments, as well as detailed municipal finance assessments and own-source revenue reviews.

6.3.4.3 United Nations Agencies

One of the most important United Nations agencies when it comes to enhancing the funding and financing for cities, including secondary cities, is the United Nations Capital Development Fund (UNCDF). This works to offer last-mile finance models to unlock public and private resources, especially from local capital markets. One specific example of a project in Africa that UNCDF is leading, together with Cities Alliance, is the Local Economic Acceleration through Partnerships venture. This programme focuses on promoting local, national, and global dialogues to address investment in rapidly growing cities and to create avenues for PPPs. It currently works in two secondary cities in Ghana, namely Cape Coast and Agona Swedru as well as Mbale and Gulu, in Uganda. In terms of financing for these cities, the programme is specifically looking at providing municipal and county level financial modelling, based on historical financial statements, that can help these cities better undertake their financial planning through cost and revenue projections.

6.4 Conclusion

Infrastructure and service needs for secondary cities across Africa are rapidly growing, yet to date, the funding and financing opportunities have remained constrained. Although this chapter has not comprehensively covered all the opportunities in this area, it has covered some of the most significant ones, which can be summarised as follows:

In the near term, intergovernmental fiscal flows are going to remain a significant portion of secondary city budgets. As such, finding ways to support national governments to stabilise these flows will be key in supporting secondary cities better manage their budget.

At the same time, it is critical that the dependence on these intergovernmental fiscal flows is reduced by looking at ways to increase secondary cities own-source revenue generation. This can be done through administrative and policy reforms, both of which can be supported by technological interventions.

Key in terms of policy reforms is looking at unlocking the potential of property tax and land value capture more broadly.

The financing options for cities in Africa generally, and for secondary cities, remain limited, but are growing. Accessing these depend centrally on cities focusing on improving their municipal fiscal health and through this their creditworthiness.

Secondary cities should focus on improving their financial management, such as by embarking on processes to adopt accrual accounting, as these reforms will help both establish and improve their creditworthiness overall.

Technology can have an important role to play to support reform processes, such as by improving the availability as well as integrating data. However, it should always be used to support overall systemic changes, rather than be a reform process in itself.

Important players in this regard are subnational financial intermediaries, and more can be done to support their work in this area. Furthermore, there are already financial flows to cities, for example remittances, which are not being systematically tapped into yet.

Development institutions, including multilateral development banks, have a very important role to play in this context. The AfDB, World Bank and UNCDF are some of these intuitions, which through their portfolios and technical assistance, have already managed to impact several secondary cities across the continent. Other multilateral and bilateral development partners should also start refocusing their portfolios toward not only primarily engaging with primary cities but looking at secondary cities as well.

The case studies used in this chapter, which have been selected from across all regions of continent, demonstrate the immense potential for secondary cities to unlock the potential of financing and funding, which can be built on moving forward.

REFERENCES

AfDB-African Development Bank. (2018). *African Economic Outlook 2018*. African Development Bank, Abidjan.

AfDB-African Development Bank. (2019). *Guidelines On Subnational Finance*. African Development Bank Group SNSP Department, November 2019. https://www.afdb.org/sites/default/files/2021/02/19/afdb_guidelines_on_subnational_finance.pdf

Babale, A. (2021). *Key Strategies for Financing of New Cities*. Presentation at IGC and Ministry of Local Government Event Unlocking New Cities for Growth in Uganda on 3rd March 2021.

Bird, R. M. & Vaillancourt, F., eds. (1998). *Fiscal Decentralization in Developing Countries*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Begeron, A., Bessone, P., Kabeya, J.K., Tourek, G., and Weigel, J. (2021). Optimal Assignment of Bureaucrats : Evidence from randomly assigned tax collectors in the DRC [Working paper].

Besley, T. & Persson, T. (2009). The origins of state capacity : Property rights, taxation, and politics. *American Economic Review* 99(4), 1218–44.

Cavanaugh, J., Flynn, S. & Moretti, S. (2016). Implementing Accrual Accounting in the Public Sector. IMF, Washington DC.

Christiaensen, L. & Todo, Y. (2014). Poverty Reduction During the Rural–Urban Transformation – The Role of the Missing Middle. *World Development*, 63, 43-58.

Christiaensen, L., De Weerdt, J. & Kanbur, R. (2017). *Secondary towns and poverty reduction in Tanzania*. International Growth Centre, London.

Collier, P., Glaeser, E., Venables, T., Blake, M., and Manwaring, P. (2018). *Land and Property Taxes for Municipal Finance*. International Growth Centre, London.

CUT-Coalition of Urban Transitions. (2021). Financing Africa's Urban Opportunity – The 'Why, What and How' of Financing Africa's Green Cities. Coalition of Urban Transitions, Washington DC.

Delbridge, V., Harman, O., Yusuf, A., Haas, A. & Venables, T. (2021a). *Enhancing the financial position of cities, evidence from Hargeisa*. UNHabitat, Nairobi.

Delbridge, V., Harman, O., Jangia, D., Haas, A. & Venables, T. (2021b). *Enhancing the financial position of cities, evidence from Mzuzu*. UNHabitat, Nairobi.

Dercon, S., Haas, A., Lippolis, N. and Kriticos, S. (2019). *Can Africa learn from the Chinese urbanisation story?* International Growth Centre, London.

Farvacque-Vitkovic, C. & Kopanyi, M., eds. (2014). *Municipal Finances : A Handbook for Local Governments*. World Bank, Washington DC.

Fernandes, E. (2011). *Regularization of Informal Settlements in Latin America*. Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, Boston.

Fleck, L. (2021). Enhancing the financial position of cities, evidence from Kisumu County Government. UNHabitat, Nairobi.

Franzsen, R. & McCluskey, W., eds. (2017). *Property Tax in Africa : Status, Challenges and Prospects*. Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, Boston.

Freire, M. & Kopanyi, M. (2018). *Asset and debt management for cities*. International Growth Centre, London.

Freire, M. & Petersen, J., eds. (2004). Sub-national Capital Markets in Developing Countries – From Theory to Practice. World Bank, Washington DC.

Gorelick, J. (2018). Supporting the future of municipal bonds in sub-Saharan Africa : the centrality of enabling environments and regulatory frameworks. *Environment and Urbanisation* 30(1), 103-122.

Grieco, K., Kamara, A.B., Meriggi, N.F., Michel, J., Prichard, W. and Stewart-Wilson, G. (2019). Simplifying Property Tax Administration in Africa : Piloting a Points-Based Valuation in Freetown, Sierra Leone. Summary Brief 19. International Centre for Tax and Development, Sussex.

Haas, A. (2018). Property taxes: Exploring the untapped potential for the city of Hargeisa. International Growth Centre, London.

Haas, A., Knebelmann, J., & Nyirakamana, C. (2021). *Five tenets for consideration when undertaking property tax reform in Africa.* Policy Brief. African Tax Administration Forum, Pretoria.

Haas, A. & Kriticos, S. (2019). Considerations for land value capture reform in the Greater Amman Municipality. International Growth Centre, London.

Knebelmann, J., Pouliquen, V., & Sarr, B. (2020). *Bringing property owners into the tax net* (Working Paper 102).

IFAC-International Federation of Accountants. (2002). T*ransition to the Accrual Basis of Accounting : Guidance for Government and Government Entities. IFAC Public Sector Committee, New York.*

Khan, A. & Mayes, S. (2009). *Transition to Accrual Accounting.* IMF, Washington DC.

Lamson-Hall, P. (2020). *How they do it in Ethiopia : Making room for urban expansion.* New York University Marron Institute, New York.

Lubbe, I. & Mkubukeli, W. (2016). The impact of using different accounting frameworks in the public sector. University of Cape Town, Cape Town.

McClusky, W. Huang, C.Y., Franszen, R., Doherty, P. and Fish, P. (2018). *Using information and communication technology to enhance local government revenue collection in Tanzania.* ATI Working Paper WP/18/08

Namangaya, A. (2018). "Practices in Institutionalising GIS for Revenue Mobilisation: The Case of Secondary Cities in Tanzania." Current Urban Studies 6, 559-572.

New Zealand Local Government Funding Agency–LGFA. (2021). *About LGFA*, https://www.lgfa.co.nz/about-lgfa

New Zealand Local Government Funding Agency–LGFA. (2016).

Niyongabo, J. M. V. (2020). Funsion du FONIC avec le FMCR : Les incertitudes sur sa valeur ajoutée fusent de partout. In: *Burundi Eco, 11th December 2020.*

NYU Marron Institute. (2020). *Urban Expansion Program Concept Note.* New York University Marron Institute, New York.

OECD-Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. (2020). *Africa's Urbanisation Dynamics 2020.* OECD, Paris.

Ofungi, D. (2020). *Alternative Finance for Local Government.* United Nations Capital Development Fund, Kampala.

Owori, M. (2021). Domestic financial flows in Uganda before and during COVID-19. Development Initiatives, Bristol.

Orozco, M. (2008). Remittances in Latin America and the Caribbean : Their impact on local economies and the response of local governments. Organization of American States, Washington DC.

PBR Rating. (2020). *Compte rendu du project de rapport de notion.* Collectivité Locale Commune de Bizerte Tunisie, Bizerte.

Sen, A. (2015). Essays on sub-national value added tax of India and tax incidence. Georgia State University, Georgia.

Tempra, O., Jacobs, K. & Demissie, B. (2007). *Hargeisa – First Steps Towards Strategic Urban Planning.* UNHabitat, Nairobi.

Tostensen, A. (2004). Rural-urban linkages in sub-Saharan Africa : Contemporary debates and implications for Kenyan urban workers in the 21st century (CMI Working Paper).

South Africa Treasury. (2016). *Explanatory memorandum to the division of revenue*, http://www.treasury.gov.za/documents/national%20budget/2016/review/Annexure%20W1.pdf

UNECA-United Nations Economic Commission for Africa. (2020). State of Urbanisation – Cities : Gateways for Africa's Regional Economic Integration. United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, Addis Ababa.

UNICEF-United Nations Children's Fund. (2020). Analysis of Multiple Deprivations in Secondary Cities in Sub-Saharan Africa. UNICEF, New York.

World Bank. (2010). Survey research examining remittance flows in Ethiopia. World Bank, Washington DC.

Yesegat, W. A. & Krever, R. (2018). *Subnational Value Added Tax in Ethiopia and Implications for States Fiscal Capacity* (ICTD Working Paper 75). International Centre for Tax and Development, Sussex.

Zewdu, G. (2014). The impact of migration and remittances on home communities in Ethiopia. University of Adelaide, Adelaide.

Cities Alliance
Cities Without Slums

Hosted by UNOPS

UN House,
Boulevard du Regent 37
1000 Brussels, Belgium

info@citiesalliance.org
www.citiesalliance.org
/CitiesAlliance

@CitiesAlliance
@CitiesAlliance