THE PRODUCTION OF MARGINALITY

PARADOXES OF URBAN PLANNING AND HOUSING POLICIES IN CALI, COLOMBIA

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This thesis is the result of my own work and includes nothing which is the outcome of work done in collaboration except as declared in the Preface and specified in the text. It is not substantially the same as any that I have submitted or is being concurrently submitted for a degree or diploma or other qualification at the University of Cambridge or any other University or similar institution except as declared in the Preface and specified in the text. I further state that no substantial part of my dissertation has already been submitted, or is being concurrently submitted for any such degree, diploma or other qualification at the University of Cambridge or any other University or similar institution except as declared in the Preface and specified in the text. It does not exceed the prescribed word limit of 80,000 words.

SUMMARY

Despite massive investments and the deployment of a wide gamut of policies during the last 70 years, urban marginality persists in most Latin American cities. Although this condition has been strongly associated with informal settlements, the premise underpinning this research is that marginality can be produced by the state through the construction of large-scale social housing complexes grounded in urban planning and housing policies focused on imposing a physical-spatial order.

Drawing upon a cross-case analysis in two contrasting areas of Cali, Colombia, this dissertation reveals that the government's approach to tackle marginality through 'development' and 'modernisation' has failed to address the two main drivers of marginality: 1) the enormous inequalities of a heterogeneous society underpinned by a capitalistic accumulation system; and, 2) the historical causes of such disparities grounded in colonialism, and perceived today through conditions such as the coloniality of power.

Although marginality is correlated with, but not entirely determined by, the economic and power structures, there are other factors that can be changed or influenced by public policy in order to reduce its effects. In this sense, urban marginality is understood in this dissertation as a multidimensional phenomenon whereby underprivileged communities deal, on a daily basis, with the constraints of ethno-racial segregation, informality, hyperunemployment and violence, in a context of limited participation in decision making.

The analysis of the case studies, carried out through the lens of what I term the five inherent characteristics of marginality ultimately shows that, as a counter-intuitive outcome of urban planning, beneficiaries of the government-led free housing programme developed in Cali are more severely affected by marginality than people living in the informal peripheries of District 18.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

BRT	Bus Rapid Transit
CBD	Central Business District
CCT	Conditional Cash Transfer
CIAM	International Congress of Modern Architecture
CIDSE	Centro de Investigaciones y Documentación Socioeconómica (Socio-economic Research and Documentation Centre)
CISALVA	Instituto de Investigación y Desarrollo en Prevención de la Violencia y Promoción de la Convivencia Social (Institute for Research and Development of Prevention of Violence and the Promotion of Social Coexistence)
CONPES	Consejo Nacional de Política Económica y Social (National Council for Economic and Social Policy)
CVC	Corporación Autónoma Regional del Valle del Cauca (Regional Autonomous Corporation of Valle del Cauca)
DAGMA	Departamento Administrativo de Gestión del Medio Ambiente (Administrative Department of Environmental Management)
DANE	Departamento Nacional de Estadística (National Department of Statistics)
DAPM	Departamento Administrativo de Planeación Municipal (Administrative Department of Municipal Planning)
DESAL	Centro para el Desarrollo Económico y Social de América Latina (Centre for Economic and Social Development in Latin America)
ECLAC	Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean
EECV	Encuesta de Empleo y Calidad de Vida (Employment and Quality of Life Survey)
EMCALI	Empresas Municipales de Cali (Public Utility Company)
GIS	Geographic Information System
ICT	Instituto de Crédito Territorial (Territorial Credit Institute)
ILO	International Labour Office
JAC	Juntas de Acción Comunal (Community Action Boards)
JAL	Junta Administradora Local (Local Administrative Board)
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
MVCT	Ministerio de Vivienda, Ciudad y Territorio (Ministry of Housing, City and Territory)
PDM	Plan Municipal de Desarrollo (Municipal Development Plan)

POT	Plan de Ordenamiento Territorial (Comprehensive Territorial Plan)
SDG	Sustainable Development Goals
SISBEN	Sistema de Identificación de Potenciales Beneficiarios de Programas Sociales (System of Identification of Potential Beneficiaries of Social Programmes)
TIO	Territorios de Inclusión y Oportunidades (Territories for Inclusion and Opportunities)
TIP	Tratamiento Integral de Pandillas (Comprehensive Treatment of Gangs)
TPA	Town Planning Associates
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UPAC	Unidad de Poder Adquisitivo Constante (Constant Purchasing Power Unit)
VIP	Vivienda de Interés Prioritario (Housing of Priority Interest)
VIS	Vivienda de Interés Social (Housing of Social Interest)

INTRODUCTION

URBAN MARGINALITY IN TIMES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH



Someone once asked me what my greatest fear of living in Cali was, and I said: ‘my fear is to raise my son here and even worse, in the [*Aguablanca*] District’.

(Social leader displaced from the Pacific coast and beneficiary of the ‘100% subsidised housing’ programme).

The process of rapid urbanisation that began in the 1930s throughout Latin America, and intensified from the 1950s onwards, took place within a context of development and economic growth which contrasted with increasingly visible urban poverty. This situation gave rise to particular forms of land occupation in cities where, within the space of a few years, deprivation, social exclusion and the escalation of informal settlements became major problems. In the mid-1960s this phenomenon came to be known as *marginality*.

In the 1960s and 1970s, the concept of marginality became the focus of attention not only for Latin American scholars and policy makers but also for academics and consultants working at universities and for multilateral agencies in Europe and the US. However, at the end of the 1970s, academics started to question the suitability of the term as a description of underprivileged communities. One of the main critics of the concept, Janice Perlman (1976), argued that the urban poor were not ‘marginals’ but were integrated into the system in an asymmetrical way.

In the 1980s, *marginality* was presented as a 'forgotten theory' (Bassols, 1990), or a concept that was gradually replaced by notions such as 'new poverty' (González de la Rocha et al., 2004) or 'informality' (Connolly, 1990; Saraví, 1996). However, recent literature examining *new forms of marginality* suggests quite the opposite. As will be discussed later, new approaches in Latin America assert that marginality continues to exist, no longer as a phenomenon associated with industrial capitalism, but rather as a complex set of conditions associated with an era framed by neoliberal practices of deregulation, land speculation and free trade. Within this framework, current scholarship on marginality explores questions such as the deterioration of wage labour, retrenchment of the welfare state, protracted unemployment and social fragmentation (Auyero, 1999; Sassen, 2002; Wacquant, 1996, 1999, 2008), persistence of colonial domination patterns in city making (Hernández, 2017) and exacerbation of different forms of violence in deprived areas (Auyero & Berti, 2013; Auyero & Burbano de Lara, 2012; Perlman, 2005, 2006).

While I agree with Teresa Caldeira's (2009) criticism, questioning the revival and appropriation of the notion of marginality by Western authors elaborating on ideas that, according to her, were introduced by Latin Americans between the 1960s and 1970s, I concur with the claim made by contemporary scholars that marginality has not disappeared but has instead taken multiple forms. Thus, by resorting to a cross-case analysis of two areas in Cali, Colombia -*Llano Verde*, a recently built government-led free social housing development in District 15, and a group of five informal settlements in District 18- this study seeks to reveal how urban planning and housing policies contribute to the production of urban marginality as a counter-intuitive result of government city plans and actions.

What differentiates the present study from previous investigations on marginality is that it brings urban design back into a debate that for half a century has been dominated by sociology, economics, anthropology and history. To do so, I combine socio-spatial analysis, critical examination of policies and ethnographic methods as an attempt to bridge the gap that commonly separates urban theory, planning policies and government actions. In addition to contributing to current scholarship on urban studies and planning in Colombia, this analysis has potential to inform and influence future public policies geared towards improving the quality of life of the urban poor.

This research is motivated by a fundamental concern, rooted in my role as an architect and urban planner, that raising a child in a social housing neighbourhood should not be an experience defined by fear as it is for the Afro-descendant leader cited in the epigraph. I believe that Colombian cities have conditions that could provide a good quality of life for all. However, solutions to counteract marginality involve rejecting the deep-rooted idea that 'development', conceived merely as the construction of massive social housing complexes and basic services infrastructure, is the best way to tackle this phenomenon.

Two extremes. Prosperity and marginality in Cali

Located in the fertile valley of the Cauca River, and near the largest port on the Colombian Pacific coast, Cali is the main centre for commerce and services in the southwest of the country. Since the 1930s this city, like other South American capitals, has experienced significant economic growth combined with accelerated urbanisation to the point that today 98.5 per cent of the 2,420,000 inhabitants of Cali live in the urban area (Alcaldía de Cali, 2016, p. 9).[1] Despite its privileged location and a prosperous economy, currently around 290,000 households, corresponding to 40 per cent of the total, live in precarious housing (Alcaldía de Cali, 2017a, pp. 6–7).

Looking beyond the physical-spatial dimension, other features of marginality (those of a structural nature and less visible to the naked eye) continue to afflict underprivileged communities on a daily basis. For instance, as will be shown in Chapters 1 and 2, the distribution of the poor within the territory reveals that the socio-economic segregation, that ruled urban development during the colonial era, persists in current practices of city making (Aprile-Gniset, 1992; Vásquez, 2001; Vivas, 2013). Indeed, political elites that have managed to stay in power have tacitly perpetuated traditional forms of urban planning and development that have contributed to the prevention of social mixing.

At this point, it is worth mentioning that in Cali social divisions go beyond social markers, such as class or income, since race and ethnic origin have played a central

[1] The remaining 1.5 per cent are people who have set their homes in informal settlements located just outside the city growth boundary and residents of small rural villages called *centros poblados*.

role in the city splitting. Although skin colour is commonly embedded -or even treated interchangeably- within the notion of class, darker-skinned people seem to occupy the lower rungs of the social ladder. Recent studies reveal that Afro-descendant communities in Cali, the city with the largest Afro-descendant population in Colombia and the second largest in Latin America after Salvador de Bahia in Brazil, are poorer and live in harsher conditions than deprived families from White and Mestizo groups (Viáfara, Urrea, Vivas, Correa & Rodríguez, 2016). These findings demonstrate that in a city where little is said about the existence of racial discrimination in social and political circles, markers of disadvantage such as race and ethnicity exacerbate the marginal conditions of the poor.

As I explain later, relatively few studies in Colombia correlate causal factors of marginality such as those mentioned above, with government-led social housing,[2] since most theories associate this phenomenon with informal settlements. Nevertheless, my claim in this dissertation is that urban planning and housing policies that focused on imposing a physical-spatial order have, in fact, become major drivers of urban marginality. In this context, the two guiding questions underpinning this thesis are: how does urban marginality manifest itself in both government-led social housing complexes and informal settlements? And, how do institutional decisions regarding urban planning and housing policies contribute to the production of marginality in both formal and informal environments?

For carrying out the analysis, I suggest in Chapter 2 a definition of *urban marginality* that encompasses both physical-spatial and socio-economic dimensions. This definition integrates what I call the *five inherent characteristics of urban marginality*, which become the framework for answering the questions raised above. Addressing not one but five characteristics of this phenomenon is a major challenge for a doctoral research project with limited scope and time. Nevertheless, my argument that marginality is a multidimensional phenomenon, which must be approached in a comprehensive manner, compels me to consider multiple angles in parallel. In this regard, this work must be seen as the conclusion of an initial stage of an ongoing process.

[2] Among these studies the work of Paola Jirón (2012) in Chile on the shortcomings of social housing programmes stands out. These programmes followed a top-down approach and were developed in order to relocate households living in informal settlements.

Past and present theories

The origin of the concept of marginality in the Latin American context dates back to the mid-1960s when the psycho-social approach to the 'marginal man', introduced by Robert E. Park (1928) and developed by his student Everett Stonequist (1937), was transformed to explain a broader phenomenon: *social marginality* (Bennholdt-Thomsen, 1981, p. 1507). Early studies in the region used this notion interchangeably to refer to poor settlements located on the outskirts and to the living conditions of people inhabiting substandard dwellings (Lloyd, 1976, p. 13; Quijano, 1966, p. 8).[3] In the following years, two schools of thought framed the marginality debate in Latin America. One was the *developmentalist/integrationist approach* underpinned by Modernisation Theory and development models pioneered by North American social scientists. The other was the *Marxist approach* that addressed marginality from a historical-structural perspective.

Anchored in development and integration premises, the Centre for Economic and Social Development in Latin America (DESAL) defined 'the marginals' as social groups lacking integration who were 'affected by poverty in its wider connotation' (Giusti, 1968; Vekemans & Venegas, 1966, p. 219). For DESAL, lack of *passive* or *receptive* participation, but also lack of *active* or *contributory* participation, were the main factors that inhibit the incorporation of the marginals at all levels (Giusti, 1968, p. 54). This standpoint was complemented by theories developed by Gino Germani (1973, p. 65) who defined marginality as 'the lack of participation of individuals and groups in those spheres in which, according to determined criteria, they might be expected to participate'. According to this line of thinking, 'popular promotion',[4] modernisation and development should be implemented in order to achieve the social integration of 'the marginals'.

At that time, urban planning became a technocratic tool at the service of economic growth, used to develop new infrastructure to support the production of

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[3] While the first Latin American theories on marginality did not explicitly mention race or ethnicity, two components present in the works of the Chicago school, previous texts of authors such as O'Gorman (2006) [1958], Fanon (1963) and Quijano (1965) become central sources in investigations of the link between race/ethnicity and marginality.

[4] DESAL proposed this strategy as a mechanism for achieving urban integration but also the incorporation of 'marginal groups' into the national community and into global society (Vekemans & Venegas, 1966, pp. 221–222).

goods and services and to foster foreign capital investment, not as a means to improve social infrastructure and habitat quality in growing cities (Irazábal, 2009, p. 45). Indeed, in the name of planning, modernisation and development some governments favoured a 'handout' approach coupled with massive slum eradication programmes as solutions to tackle marginality.[5]

Opponents of the developmentalist/integrationist approach argued that theories explaining marginality as the consequence of 'lack of integration' and 'underdevelopment' ignored the structural character of this phenomenon. Thus, resorting to *Marxist theory* a group of scholars challenging previous theories focused on demonstrating the role of industrialisation, dependent capitalism and the accumulation model in the emergence and exacerbation of marginality. According to one of its leading figures, Aníbal Quijano (1966), marginality arose not from a lack of integration but as the result of inconsistency in the process by which the situation of a marginal group was structured *vis-à-vis* the global context.

Later, from an economic perspective, Quijano (1967) examined the relationship between dependent capitalism, urbanisation and marginality, and developed the notions of 'marginalised labour force' and 'marginal pole' of the economy (Quijano, 1971), approaching some Marxist principles embodied in the book *Capital* from a different perspective. For this author, the expansion of industrial production in the Latin American context no longer depended on the availability of labour force -the industrial reserve army alluded to by Marx- but on the accessibility to technological innovation. Therefore, unlike Europe and the US, Latin America's available workforce constituted not a *reserve* but rather a *labour force transitorily or permanently excluded* from the labour market (Quijano, 2014, p. 158). This approach gives us a first understanding of the particularities of the Latin American Marxist discourse regarding marginality, which explained this phenomenon not as a result of underdevelopment but from a wider context that encompassed the marginal insertion of regional economies in the production process (Nun, 1971; Nun, Murmis & Marín, 1969), and the role of monopolies in exercising the control of the modern sector in dependent industrialisation (1973, p. 22). I want to highlight here that Latin American scholars

[5] Some authors argue that these actions had the intention to contain the uncontrolled expansion of peripheral settlements perceived at that time as favourable spaces for the advancement of communism in the region (Posner, 2008; Ribeiro, 1971).

such as Quijano did not simply appropriate Marxist theory but used it also in order to deploy an assessment of the particular conditions in Latin America, unveiling the limitations of Marxism to address the realities of an area of the world that Marx (and Engels) did not address fully.

Also grounded in Marxist theory but from a different perspective, social scientists from the Centro Brasileiro de Análise e Planejamento (CEBRAP) asserted that marginality in Latin America was a phenomenon inherent to the accumulation process (Cardoso, 1971; Kowarick, 1974; Singer, 1973).[6] For this group, autonomous or national capitalism would not prevent the accumulation of capital favouring a minority, due to the persistence of colonial patterns of domination, as well as to the inevitable creation of monopolistic markets to become competitive at the global level (Kowarick, 1974, 1978; Singer, 1973).

According to Kowarick (1974, p. 80), the persistence of 'traditional' forms of production generated a labour market in Latin America that was not typically capitalist but, far from being a deadweight in the accumulation process, became part of it. He was referring to the 'small autonomous activities' or 'subsistence economies' that in the 1970s would be known by the name of *informal sector*.[7]As I will discuss later, during the following years the accumulation of capital in a few hands not only aggravated social and economic inequities as predicted by CEBRAP. It also underpinned the consolidation of a neoliberal economic system that combined the liberalisation of markets, free trade and the deterioration of wage labour with the retrenchment of the welfare state, which became the causal factors of new forms of marginality (Auyero, 1999; Sassen, 2002; Wacquant, 1999, 2001).

This intense debate about marginality among theorists of both currents -Developmentalists and Marxist- to which the economic analysis of CEBRAP was added, was challenged in the mid-1970s by Janice Perlman (1976) in her book *The Myth of Marginality*. Drawing on empirical research in Rio de Janeiro, this author

[6] By resorting to the case of Brazil, Kowarick (1978, 1979) demonstrated that strategies implemented in Latin America to promote economic growth produced adverse effects such as exclusion and pauperisation of the working classes.

[7] This notion was coined by Hart (1973) in a study on Ghana in 1971 and adopted by the ILO in 1972 in reference to the case of Kenya. Despite criticisms raised by authors such as Leys (1975) and Bromley (1978), this notion was rapidly incorporated into both academic and political discourses in the Latin American context.

concluded that people living in the *Favela* 'are not economically and politically marginal, but are exploited and repressed; that they are not socially and culturally marginal, but are stigmatised and excluded from a closed social system' (Perlman, 1976, p. 195). Her findings, coupled with previous criticisms (Mangin, 1967; Morse, 1965), demonstrated that theories on marginality raised in the 1960s and 1970s tended to blame the poor, justifying radical interventions for removing informal settlements.

Despite the fact that the notion of marginality almost disappeared from academic and political circles in the early 1980s, scholars not only from Latin America but also from Europe and the US are now revisiting it. While decoupling the analysis of marginality from the so-called global South, a number of theorists are contributing to an understanding of how current socio-economic trends and political regimes stimulate the emergence and persistence of this phenomenon in advanced economies. For instance, Löic Wacquant (1996) refers to *advanced marginality* to explain forms of marginality that 'are not behind us and [are] progressively resorbed, whether by "free market" expansion [...] or through the arm of the welfare state' (Wacquant, 1996, p. 123).[8] This author recognises as ideal-typical features of this phenomenon the fragmentation and precariousness of wage-labour, disconnection between macro-economic trends and neighbourhood conditions, territorial fixation and stigmatisation, dissolution of 'place', loss of informal collective support and symbolic/social fragmentation (Wacquant, 1996, pp. 124–128). His empirical investigation of Black ghettos in the US and the *banlieue* in France helps to elucidate how *dualisation* and *polarisation* in cities induce different forms of marginality (Wacquant, 2007, 2008, 2016).

From the angle of uneven development, Mehretu, Pigozzi & Sommers (2000) developed a *typology of marginality* that also proves relevant for this study. This typology encompassed two primary variants (contingent and systemic) and two derivative variants (collateral and leveraged), of which two have proved especially useful (systemic and collateral marginality). On the one hand, *systemic marginality* 'results from disadvantages which people and communities experience in a socially constructed system of inequitable relations' where one group exerts control over others

[8] In her article *Marginality again?* Caldeira (2009, p. 849) draws attention to the similarity between Wacquant's arguments on advanced marginality and the theories of Quijano and Nun on the emergence of marginality in the dependent industrialisation process in Latin America.

based on markers of disadvantage (Mehretu et al., 2000, p. 91). On the other hand, *collateral marginality* exists when people or communities are marginalised due to their geographic proximity to marginal groups, which could be considered as 'marginality by contagion' (Mehretu et al., 2000, p. 93).

In the Latin American context, scholars such as Auyero (1999), Auyero & Burbano de Lara (2012), Auyero & Jensen (2015), Perlman (2005, 2006) and Hernández (2017) have drawn on marginality as a valid concept in describing current issues afflicting the urban poor. Unlike previous authors, this group of scholars has integrated theories exploring structural factors in the 1960s and 1970s with the new social, economic and political circumstances of the region. For instance, Auyero (1999, p. 48) claims that the structural character of the 'marginal mass' identified in the 1970s had produced effects that reinforce the deterioration of income and employment conditions in subsequent years. According to him, in addition to the 'industrial marginality' of the 1970s, a new marginality is being experienced, 'one related to the functioning of the globalised post-Fordist economy, the dynamics of the "early and non-modern tertiarization" [...] and the resolute adoption by the state of neoliberal adjustment policies' (Auyero, 1999, p. 49).

By applying ethnographic methods, Auyero observed similarities between living conditions in informal settlements in Argentina and those of ghettos in countries with advanced economies (Auyero, 1999, p. 64). This approach enables him to develop a framework of analysis that, in this study, shines a light on the features of the new marginality and the factors that contribute to its persistence. In particular, the work of Auyero & Burbano de Lara (2012) draws attention to the lack of awareness of policymakers regarding the real needs of the poor in producing policies for social inclusion focused on the improvement of income such as the Conditional Cash Transfers (CCT). As will be discussed later, poor people's problems go beyond the need for a proper income and other factors reinforcing marginal conditions, such as violence, infrastructural deprivation or environmental hazards,[9] are not addressed or are ignored by officials and legislators (Auyero & Burbano de Lara, 2012).

[9] In a previous study Auyero & Swistun (2008, p. 361) pointed that in recent works examining marginality in the Latin American context the environmental factors are not mentioned. Hence, they introduce this aspect as an additional variable that must be considered in further research.

Also examining new forms of marginality in Latin America, Janice Perlman resumed her analysis carried out in the *favelas* 30 years earlier and concluded that 'we are observing [...] the transformation from "the myth of marginality" to "the reality of marginality"' (Perlman, 2005, p. 37). Supported by empirical evidence, she asserts that instead of declining, 'the marginalisation of the urban poor has deepened' due to the increase, among other things, of drug-related violence, unemployment, stigmatisation and failure of education as a mechanism for improving opportunities (Perlman, 2006, p. 154).

Finally, while exploring the role of uneven relations of power from a historical perspective, Felipe Hernández (2017, p. ix) asserts that marginality is not a 20th century phenomenon because 'it has been ubiquitous since the foundation of Latin American cities in the sixteenth century'. He draws on notions such as *internal colonialism*[10] and *coloniality*[11] to explain how White elites have managed to preserve a hierarchical system based on racial designation (Hernández, 2017, p. xxi). Thus, for this author, racial exclusion and injustices against Latin American Indigenous and African slaves, underpinned by the Laws of Indies, fostered an 'urbanism of marginality' that persists in contemporary cities (Hernández, 2017, p. xviii).

In sum, the debate of the 1960s and 1970s makes it clear that political elites and multilateral agencies promoting development, planning and economic growth as the means to tackle marginality did not achieve social transformation but deepened the marginal conditions of the urban poor. However, the role of urban planning in the aggravation of marginality has barely been explored in the scholarship, albeit theories addressing the sociological, economic and historical background of this phenomenon have widely exposed the spatial dimension of marginality. In recent decades, we have witnessed how new forms of marginality related to issues such as socio-spatial relegation, racial discrimination, urban violence and unequal distribution of basic services, wealth and power have emerged in both advanced and less advanced economies. In this regard, the critical analysis of urban planning and housing policies proposed in this dissertation becomes a fundamental entry point for understanding

[10] Term coined by González Casanova (1965) and revisited by de-colonial thinkers such as Quijano (2000a) and Mignolo (2007).
[11] This notion, coined by Quijano in the early 1990s, will be discussed in Chapter 2.

the factors that produce and perpetuate marginality in contemporary Colombian cities and also the groundwork for the formulation of more holistic policies.

Methodological approach

This study is underpinned by theoretical, historical and empirical analysis and draws on a *mixed research approach* that combines a range of quantitative and qualitative data and relies on the *case study method*. The method was selected because it allows the research to transcend the study of isolated variables through the combination of multiple sources of evidence (Yin, 2012, p. 4), facilitating a greater comprehension of the subjective aspects involved in urban research (D. Bromley, 1986, p. 23).

Grounded in a multi-scale approach, this research addresses the questions posed through a comparative analysis of two contrasting cases in Cali. The first is *Llano Verde*, a recently built free housing neighbourhood located in District 15, fully planned and financed by the Colombian government in 2013 as part of the '100% subsidised housing' programme. The second case is a group of settlements located on the fringes of the city in District 15, which have been gradually built through informal practices since the mid-1980s. Data obtained from both case studies becomes the groundwork for the *cross-case synthesis* presented in Chapters 2, 3 and 4.

With regard to qualitative methods, during a 12-month fieldwork period I conducted in-depth semi-structured interviews, observations, undertook a survey, and developed mapping activities (see a detailed account of research methods in Appendix A). Interviews were carried out with 70 people from four groups of interest defined during the exploratory phase: community members, national and municipal officials, academics from local universities and Carvajal Foundation staff (see the 16 sets of guiding questions in Appendix B).

Likewise, I used participant and non-participant observation as a way of exploring local dynamics and everyday life practices. In addition to observations in the field, I participated in meetings promoted by the municipality regarding participatory planning. These meetings provided a better understanding of how interactions among city officials and local leaders work, and how citizen participation is managed in Cali.

It was precisely in these official spaces for participation that I conducted a survey aimed at gathering the views of community leaders about official channels of participation and their effectiveness at district level (see the questionnaire in Appendix C).

Finally, I have drawn on mapping as a method to disclose the spatial dimension of marginality in order to create new cartography that contributes to understanding, interpreting and explaining the two territories explored from multiple angles. It became an effective way to bridge the existing gap in spatial knowledge, frequent in informal settlements, which also resulted in being especially useful in unveiling the features of marginality in the case of *Llano Verde*. The maps developed for this thesis include social, economic and spatial variables gathered from both primary and secondary sources, which show aspects such as the production of socio-spatial segregation, the existence of 'invisible borders' created by gangs and criminal organisations for territorial control or precise limits of informal settlements that have not been mapped before. Maps are, then, the resource that integrate spatial issues beyond the physical configuration of districts and neighbourhoods, combining data sets that enable more nuanced interpretations of the causes and perpetuation of marginality in different areas of Cali.

In this sense, in addition to revealing the spatial distribution of raw data that have never been geo-referenced in existing cartographies of Cali, I take advantage of mapping as a tool for making visible certain situations that should be addressed with urgency in discussions about the future of the city. I refer, for instance, to maps that disclose the concentration of victims of the armed conflict in informal settlements, the imbalances of privileged and underprivileged areas in the provision of basic services or the continuous occupation of at-risk areas by both formal and informal agents. I strongly believe that this mapping exercise opens up valuable opportunities for future interdisciplinary research to combine geographic information systems with spatial analysis linked to existing methods used in other disciplinary areas, such as sociology, geography and economics.

Structure of the dissertation

As mentioned above, this research addresses marginality through the lens of urban planning as a way of articulating the socio-economic dimension, widely discussed in theories, with the physical-spatial dimension which has traditionally been the main focus of planning and housing policies. In order to accomplish the purpose of revealing how planning and housing policies produce, and often intensify, marginality, this thesis is divided into five chapters. Chapter 1 elaborates on the relationship between theories of marginality -and the subsequent scholarship on informality- and urban planning and housing policies, displaying some representative examples of its implementation in both Latin America and Colombia. Grounded in the historical account of policies, this chapter also includes an exploration of the role of international agencies' guidelines in policy frameworks. It summarises the outcomes of the projects implemented as well as the current challenges involved in improving living conditions for the urban poor. Moreover, this chapter addresses some relevant aspects of the history of urban planning in Cali, stressing the main role that landowners have had in the city making and their influence in shaping the land market in a way that has pushed the underprivileged to the city outskirts, not only to informal settlements but also to poor-quality social housing complexes. This section ends with the introduction of the case studies, drawing on socio-spatial and historic analysis of the districts and the specific areas that make up the cases.

Chapter 2 begins with a definition of the notion of *urban marginality* as a means of introducing the case studies analysis. By approaching one by one the *five inherent characteristics of urban marginality* in each case, this chapter reveals how marginality manifests itself in both formal and informal environments, addressing the first question of this dissertation and enabling the contrast of living conditions in both formal and informal environments. The first section explores how *ethno-racial segregation* has become one of the main challenges of poor ethnic minorities in Cali. The second part analyses *informality* through the lens of housing and includes day-to-day aspects such as local economies and informal means of transport. The third section looks at the phenomenon defined by Javier Auyero (1999, p. 49) as *hyperunemployment*, emphasising the role of race, location within the city, connectivity and stigmatisation in local employment/unemployment dynamics. The fourth part elaborates on visible and invisible forms of *urban violence* and its possible

causal factors, exploring how the imposition of spatial order through urban planning can contribute to the formation of violence. The chapter ends with the analysis of the fifth characteristic named *limited participation,* defined here as a cross-sectional component of urban marginality. This section explains how the system for the allocation of financial resources in order to support community initiatives operates, as well as how the failures in participatory planning and budgeting can lead to the production of marginality. It also summarises successful forms of participation that have emerged spontaneously in informal settlements, grounded on principles such as mutual trust, solidarity and joint work.

Following the same sequence of the inherent characteristics of urban marginality developed in Chapter 2, Chapter 3 addresses the second question posed in this research regarding the role of public policies in the production of marginality. Although this chapter focuses on the analysis of the case studies, it also explores the influence of national guidelines in local decision-making, as a critique of the prominent role still played by the national government in a country where the constitutional framework promotes decentralisation and local leadership.

Finally, Chapter 4 concludes the analysis by setting out the factors influencing the production and persistence of urban marginality in both formal and informal environments. Based on the findings in the two case studies, the chapter closes with a number of conclusions and final remarks that attempt to provide new insights for future research, policies, plans and projects aimed at counteracting the effects of urban marginality.

1. ADDRESSING MARGINALITY.
THEORIES, POLICIES AND PRACTICES IN CITY MAKING

After the 1930s, when the rapid urbanisation of Latin American capitals began, neither hyperbolic 1920s' urbanism nor the modern plans implemented between the 1930s and the 1950s were effective in containing marginality. In fact, despite the development of successive plans and massive investments in social housing for more than seven decades, poor peripheries continue to grow. By addressing three scales - regional (Latin America), national (Colombia) and municipal (Cali)- this chapter sheds light on how the emphasis on development, economic growth and planning has become a main driver of both the production and the perpetuation of marginality.

The first section presents the prevailing approaches to urban planning in Latin America during the first half of the 20th century and the gradual loss of prominence of this field in the marginality debate in subsequent decades. This section also examines how the notion of *informality* introduced into urban scholarship in the late 1970s influenced social housing policies at regional level. The second part, dedicated to the case of Colombia, addresses urban planning and housing policies from a historical perspective, drawing attention to the main economic and political milestones that have determined the orientation of the projects implemented. In addition, points of convergence between international and Colombian guidelines regarding the development of social housing are explored. The third section delves into the case of Cali, presenting a historical account of urban plans, their outcomes and the current challenges faced by the city in terms of housing for the poor. Finally, the chapter concludes with some clues about the strengths and weaknesses of policies and programmes put into place in the three contexts analysed.

1.1 Urbanisation, marginality and urban planning in Latin America

Urban plans implemented in Latin America's main capitals throughout the first half of the 20th century ratified the pre-eminence of Western paradigms as universal models in city-making. Since the 1920s concerns such as demographic transformations, rapid urban growth and the aspiration of being modern, prompted some Latin American governments to commission European advisors to develop large-scale projects but also to establish the first urban planning offices in the region (Almandoz, 2006).[12] This stage of Latin American planning history, described by Almandoz (2006, p. 87) as *inter-war colonialism*, demonstrates that ruling elites remained captivated by 'the old world's cultural and academic prestige'.

Throughout the 1930s and 1940s, the academic and aesthetic approach of urbanism shifted increasingly towards a rational-functional approach disseminated worldwide by the Modern Movement. Again, consultants from Europe and North America were in charge of designing modern master plans under the theoretical premises of the International Congress of Modern Architecture (CIAM), with the aim of ordering the existing city and projecting its future growth.[13] However, neither the first proposals following the aesthetic paradigms of urbanism, nor the second ones underpinned by functional principles, prevented the development of socio-spatial segregation and the rapid expansion of the informal city during the second half of the century. In fact, modern plans promoted by ruling elites resulted in the imposition of increased barriers to the urban poor in overcoming their disadvantaged situation. As Diane Davis suggests,

> Although the modernist planning movement saw itself as a force for positive change, [...] its aims remained largely unfulfilled. Much of this is due to the ways that modernist land-use priorities and building preferences displaced socially-marginal populations from city centres to disadvantaged, peripheral locations, thus establishing a spatial separation between the formal and informal city (Davis, 2014, p. 379).

[12] At that time, French figures such as Jean-Claude Nicholas Forestier, León Jaussely, Donat-Alfred Agache, the German Werner Hegemann and the Austrian Karl Brunner were commissioned to create and/or support town planning offices in the capital cities of Argentina, Cuba, Brazil, Chile and Colombia.

[13] Since the late 1930s and until the 1950s, outstanding urban planners such as Le Corbusier, Paul Lester Wiener and Josep Lluis Sert designed pilot plans for cities such as Buenos Aires, Rio de Janeiro, Bogotá, Cali and Medellín, among others.

From this perspective, modernist plans contributed to perpetuating conditions of exclusion that already existed in cities and anticipated the neoliberal itineration towards the end of the 20th century. The resulting socio-spatial separation became a visible demonstration that the functionalist planning of the CIAM, while yielding mixed results in other regions of the world, was not particularly successful in Latin America. Modern plans were, therefore, ineffective tools to counteract the dominant trend of segregated growth in a context of uncontrolled urbanisation.[14] Subsequently, urban planning theories and modern master plans lost momentum in the urban debate and were gradually eclipsed by the developmentalist discourse that emerged in Latin America after World War II under the influence of foreign nations, mainly the United States (US).

At that time, the so-called 'Third World' countries became the target of multiple missions backed by the nascent international agencies[15] aimed at fostering development and economic growth. As this approach gained support and popularity among Latin American governments since the mid-1950s, in addition to delineating regional economic policy it had a significant role in shaping the way in which planning would be conceived in the following years. CIAM master plans were then replaced by regional development plans and strategic planning based on the postulates no longer produced by architects but by economists devoted to development theories (Vainer, 2014, p. 51). Based on models such as Perroux's growth poles (1955) or Rostow's stages of economic growth (1960), technocratic planning was deployed in Latin America as a mechanism to promote economic prosperity, leaving aside more complex matters such as the redistribution of wealth and power widely discussed by Latin American Marxists.

This approach to planning gained momentum with the *Alliance for Progress*, an initiative of economic and social aid launched in 1961 by President John F. Kennedy. Although the Alliance ostensibly focused on development and economic growth as the main strategies to improve urban living conditions and promote agrarian

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[14] Except in the case of Brasilia, where Modern Movement principles became the conceptual basis for developing the city, a range of master plans designed for Latin American cities between 1940 and 1950 were partially implemented while others proved unfeasible or were considered obsolete when they were delivered to local planning offices.

[15] The World Bank (formerly The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development) was founded in 1944 and in 1948 the United Nations founded the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLAC). In 1959, the Inter-American Development Bank was established in Washington.

development, a number of authors claimed that its true purpose was to prevent the spread of communism in Latin America, which gained ground with the success of the Cuban revolution in 1959 (Darnton, 2012, p. 58; Elhawary, 2010, p. 390; Latham, 1998, p. 200). That aim was implicit in the speech that President Kennedy made presenting the Alliance to members of the US Congress and Latin American ambassadors,

> We propose to complete the revolution of the Americas, to build a hemisphere where all men can hope for a suitable standard of living, and all can live out their lives in dignity and in freedom. To achieve this goal political freedom must accompany material progress. Our Alliance for Progress is an alliance of free governments, and it must work to eliminate tyranny from a hemisphere in which it has no rightful place (Kennedy, 1961).

This programme, which lasted until 1970, entailed massive US investments directed at the construction of social housing in countries such as Chile, Argentina, Brazil, Venezuela and Colombia aimed at reducing the cumulative deficit. Thus, underpinned by the principles of developmentalist theories, the construction of large low-income housing complexes was consolidated as one of the main strategies to tackle urban marginality. However, neighbourhoods built under the umbrella of the Alliance for Progress, intended to produce a spatial order in which *the home* was considered 'an agent of cultural transformation' (Benmergui, 2009, p. 306), produced diverse and controversial results.[16]

As Quijano (1966, p. 62) asserted, marginality should not be tackled solely from its spatial dimension, that is as a matter of deficit, since this phenomenon was multidimensional and grounded in existing power structures. Therefore, solutions to counteract marginality should be based not on expanding the supply of housing and urban infrastructures but on the transformation of the power structures embedded in urban society (Quijano, 1966, p. 62).[17] Nevertheless, as long as the developmentalist approach gained ground in academic and political spheres, typical interventions to

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[16] For instance, Benmergui (2009) explains how informality and marginality rapidly emerged in housing complexes built with the support of the Alliance in Buenos Aires and Rio de Janeiro. In contrast, Ciudad Kennedy in Bogotá, built with the intermediation of the ICT, which used this project to test different typologies of social housing, is currently well-serviced and well-integrated within the urban fabric.

[17] Quijano (1966, p. 62), in fact, compares strategies to counteract *urban marginality* through the expansion of infrastructures with the attitude of Latin American governments towards *rural marginality* while governments encouraged an agrarian reform focused on the increment of productivity rather than on the radical transformation of power structures affecting the countryside.

address urban marginality in the subsequent years continued to focus on slum eradication and the construction of large social housing complexes in the urban outskirts.

In the mid-1970s, when the use of the concept of marginality begun to decline in both academic and political circles, the nascent notion of *informality* was extensively used to describe economic activities outside the formal labour market (informal sector) and, later, other extra-legal activities such as transport and housing. It was at this time that spontaneous settlements appeared in the literature on informality and the British architect John Turner became one of the most influential scholars writing on the topic. For more than a decade, his theories became an important source for urban planning and housing policy in countries facing peripheral uncontrolled growth. Since the late 1960s Turner had suggested that trying to solve the housing problem 'with the aid of policemen, bulldozers, and modern construction techniques [was] the direct consequence of interpreting the problem in terms of a quantitative deficit of modern standard dwellings' (Turner, 1967, p. 120).

For Turner (1967, p. 121), low-income housing complexes promoted by governments were not only 'costly, stultifying, rigid and depressing' but, most importantly, unaffordable for the poorest households. Thus, his main argument was that spontaneous settlement dwellers should be understood, supported and guided (Turner, 1967, p. 121). As Turner & Fichter (1972) hinted, housing in informal settlements could be built directly by users (as was already happening), given the constraints of public funds. In this regard, the argument of these authors was that people should be free to use their resources to build their own homes, an approach that had already proved effective.

In the mid-1970s, disagreements over the best solutions for improving the deprived living conditions of the urban poor were the demonstration that marginality continued to be a major and unresolved problem. Within this context the UN promoted the first World Conference *Habitat I*, held in Vancouver in 1976. At this meeting , the shift 'from the "provider" to the "enabler" paradigm' (Hernández & Kellett, 2012, p. 11) introduced new strategies to ensure access to affordable housing. Influenced by Turner's approach, the conclusion of this conference was that large public housing programmes were not meeting the needs of the poorest households and also that

resources allocated were insufficient to solve the problem (UN-Habitat, 1976). As a result, the discourse moved beyond the construction of new housing complexes to look at alternatives, such as self-help housing, sites and services and settlement upgrading, as valid solutions.[18] In subsequent years these initiatives were implemented across Latin America with the technical blessing of the United Nations and many of them with the financial support of the World Bank.

In the 1980s, also grounded in ILOs' perspective of informality, the Peruvian economist Hernando De Soto caught the interest of international agencies and Latin American governments looking for low-cost housing solutions. De Soto's recommendations in terms of housing encompassed legalisation and regularisation of informal settlements by implementing large-scale titling processes. His central argument, raised in his book *The Mystery of Capital* (De Soto, 2000), is underpinned by the idea that property rights are an effective manner of transforming informal dwellings into assets. Thus, legalised properties could be transformed by poor owners into capital to secure a loan or as an upfront fee for an investment. During the following years, supporters and opponents of De Soto's arguments mushroomed in the literature. For instance, regarding his proposals about formalising the informal settlements via property rights, Field (2005) asserted that the land titling programme in Peru increased family investments in housing improvements. Other authors such as Fernandes (2011), Payne (1989) and Sanyal (1996), on the contrary, demonstrated that informal settlers invested in their homes not only when they had titles but also when they gained a sense of security linked to formal access to public services or when the government reduces its attempts of eviction.[19]

In the years that followed, production of social housing in Latin America was transformed by the arrival of the neoliberal wave, which challenged the 'rigidity' of city plans and promoted 'market oriented' and 'market friendly' planning (Vainer, 2014, p. 51). This new approach placed cities at the service of the real estate market and social housing became an attractive business for developers. In fact, from the mid-1980s to the present, in most Latin American countries the responsibility for building social

[18] Under the scheme of self-help housing, people receive financial support to build or finish their home. In the sites and services system, beneficiaries receive a plot of land with public services and access roads and they are in charge of building the house according to their financial capability.

[19] Other counterarguments to De Soto's approach can be found in Gilbert (2002), Pradilla (1988) and Giraldo (1987).

housing was transferred from the public to the private sector. Under this scheme, governments allocate low-income households with funds which can be invested by beneficiaries in projects offered in the real estate market. This approach, known as *on-demand subsidies*, continues to run today, and does so in parallel with the aforementioned strategies of upgrading informal settlements and granting property titles.

Despite the increase in affordable housing supply, the marginal conditions in which millions of people were living not only in Latin America but also in other countries at the end of the 20th century continued to be a global concern. Reaffirming the commitments agreed in Vancouver, the World Conference *Habitat II* held in Istanbul in 1996 launched a global action plan aimed at 'ensuring adequate shelter for all' (UN-Habitat, 1996, p. 7). This plan was supported by three pillars: cities as the engines of global growth, a stronger role for local authorities, and recognition of the power of community in urban affairs participation (UN-Habitat, 1996).

In 1999 the *Cities Alliance* was created through a partnership among multilateral agencies along with its action plan called *Cities Without Slums,* both aimed at promoting sustainable development in cities around the world (Cities Alliance, 1999). In 2000 the United Nations promulgated the *Millennium Development Goals* (MDG) with special emphasis on reducing poverty and improving the quality of life of communities living in substandard housing (United Nations, 2000). In 2015 the United Nations adopted the *2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development* through which the global *Sustainable Development Goals* (SDG) were set. This Agenda calls upon all nations to strive for an end to poverty, the reduction of inequality, the improvement of cities as inclusive places and to take actions to tackle climate change (United Nations, 2015). Finally, during the World Conference *Habitat III* held in Quito in 2016, the United Nations presented an evaluation of the outcomes of the agendas launched since 1976 and concluded the following,

> Since the United Nations Conferences on Human Settlements in Vancouver in 1976 and in Istanbul in 1996, and the adoption of the Millennium Development Goals in 2000, we have seen improvements in the quality of life of millions of urban inhabitants, including slum and informal-settlement dwellers. However, the persistence of multiple forms of poverty, growing inequalities and environmental degradation remain among the major obstacles to sustainable development

worldwide, with social and economic exclusion and spatial segregation often an irrefutable reality in cities and human settlements (UN-Habitat, 2016, p. 2).

This statement demonstrates that limitations of planning and social housing policies for ensuring housing for the poorest social segments persist despite substantial investments and initiatives implemented during the last 70 years. A recent analysis of the situation in Latin American countries shows an increase in the number of people living in informal settlements. According to UN-Habitat (2012b, p. 127), between 1990 and 2012 the number of people living in this kind of dwelling rose from 104.8m to 113.4m which means that 24 per cent of the total population in Latin America lives in substandard housing (Graph 1).

Graph 1 People living in informal settlements in Latin America (1990 and 2012)

Source: Graph by the author based on data from UN-Habitat (2012b, p. 127).

This situation becomes more problematic given that UN-Habitat & CAF (2014, p. 173) have recently suggested that Latin American policies, regulations and public expenditure 'sometimes tend to exacerbate inequalities rather than mitigate them'. In fact, up-to-date statistics show that Latin America is the most unequal continent in the world (World Economic Forum, 2016) where one-quarter of the population lives in poverty, in other words 124m people (UN-Habitat, 2012a, p. 39). This conclusion demonstrates that for more than half a century urban planning and housing policies intended to promote spatial order have failed in addressing critical issues in poor urban areas.

On the one hand, considered outside the planning apparatus, the *informal city* has been largely neglected by public programmes and actions, which is compounded with the fact that alternatives created by people to improve their living conditions are not treated as valid or valuable. This attitude ensures that the solution to support informal settlers remains the conventional: planning, slum clearance and social housing. On the other hand, the *planned city*, where the construction of large social housing complexes has become the answer to social problems, segregates and discriminates through the preservation of power structures that maintain control over both land and capital.

There is no prior learning about the failure of this approach; the *development schemes* imposed since the 1950s continue to be reproduced, leading again and again to similar results: production and even aggravation of the marginal living conditions of the poor. As will be discussed in the next sections, devoted to the cases of Colombia and Cali, policies implemented at the national and local levels have paralleled the developmentalist approach prevailing in most Latin American countries, leading also to limited and questionable outcomes.

1.2 Urban planning and housing policies in Colombia

Colombia, a country with a population of almost 50 million (DANE, 2018a), has experienced rapid urbanisation rates since the 1930s. Reflecting the Latin American trend, the urban population grew from 30.9 per cent in 1938 to 76.7 per cent in 2017 (DANE, 1993, 2018a). The urbanisation process, accompanied by high rates of poverty, led underprivileged families to occupy, extra-legally, public and private land on the outskirts of major cities, acting under what Abramo (2012, p. 36) called 'the logic of necessity'. Such settlements became the physical-spatial representation of urban marginality and have fuelled the formulation of successive planning and housing policies over a century.

The first housing policy in Colombia dates back to 1918 when the government established the minimal conditions needed to ensure a healthier urban environment in poor neighbourhoods, and determined the obligation for municipalities to allocate part of their budget for the construction of suitable housing for working-class families

(Ceballos, 2008; Saldarriaga, 1995). In the following decades, President López Pumarejo, inspired by Roosevelt's New Deal policy, moved from *laissez-faire* economics, towards an interventionist model (Ceballos, 2008, p. 33) and created the *Instituto de Crédito Territorial* (ICT) in 1939, which became the most important agency for promoting, financing and building social housing for the next five decades.

In the 1940s, the ideal of modern planning became visible through the rapid diffusion of the premises of the CIAM disseminated by a group of graduates of the Faculty of Architecture of the *Universidad Nacional de Colombia*. The principles of the Modern Movement favouring functional planning were embodied in the Law 88 of 1947 which established, for the first time, the obligation of municipalities to develop a regulatory plan. Although capital cities like Bogotá, Medellín and Cali hired leading figures such as Le Corbusier, Paul Lester Wiener and Joseph Lluis Sert to design their master plans, they were never fully implemented. The inapplicability of these plans had to do mainly with the fact that both planners and public servants in charge of urban planning offices privileged a physical-spatial approach while ignoring the social and economic realities in which plans should operate.

At the end of the 1940s, the national political arena was dominated by bipartisan violence between conservatives and liberals, worsened in 1948 by the assassination of the liberal opposition leader and presidential candidate Jorge Eliécer Gaitán. This phase, known as *La Violencia*, led to an upsurge in the exodus of large numbers of poor peasants who arrived in the cities, aggravating the urbanisation pressure. Thus, through what Aprile-Gniset (1992, pp. 122–125) calls 'popular urban colonisation', peasants who colonised rural wastelands in the first decades of the 20th century became urban settlers when they were forced to abandon their lands. Despite the construction of infrastructure and large-scale housing projects carried out throughout the 1950s, government strategies failed to contain the irregular occupation of urban peripheries derived from the massive arrival of poor rural migrants.

Facing the aggravation of uncontrolled urban growth in the early 1960s, President Alberto Lleras Camargo (1958-1962), who was aligned with the developmentalist discourse, strengthened the construction of social housing as main solution. It was at that time that the *Alliance for Progress* was launched in Colombia with the aim of supporting the implementation of housing programmes led by the ICT. In 1961, the same year that the Alliance became an official US programme in Latin

America, President Kennedy and his wife visited Bogotá in order to inaugurate one of the most ambitious social housing projects of the time, a neighbourhood of 12,000 homes called *Ciudad Techo*, which name was changed after the assassination of the president of the United States in 1963 to *Ciudad Kennedy*.

Left (1): Aerial view, *Techo Neighbourhood* in Bogotá. Middle (2): Blueprint of the project. Right (3): Presidents Lleras Camargo and Kennedy, during the opening ceremony in 1961. Sources: (1) Sáenz (2016) Photo: Felipe Cardona; (2) Goossens & Gómez (2015, p. 131) Image: Archivo Inurbe; (3) Valverde (2013).

During the same year of the launch of the Alliance in Colombia, the *Central Nacional Provivienda* (CENAPROV) was officially established as an organisation led by a group of people self-identifing as 'the roofless'. At the beginning, this organisation convened by the Communist Party openly promoted solutions for the poorest households based on extra-legal occupation of vacant land (Naranjo, 2014, p. 104).

Left (1): Struggles between *Policarpa* neighbourhood inhabitants and the police during eviction attempts in 1966. Right (2): CENAPROV X National Assembly. Sources: Zapata (2011, p. 14), CENAPROV (2018).

Neighbourhoods that appeared under the influence of CENAPROV had an internal organisational structure for decision-making with sub-commissions responsible for both monitoring the territory and promoting educational, cultural and sports activities (Naranjo, 2014, p. 107). Considering the precarious conditions in

which settlements were established, this community-based organisation was instrumental in guaranteeing the preservation of areas for public spaces and local facilities ensuring the construction of neighbourhoods that some years later were legalised by the city authorities. As an officially recognised organisation since the 1960s, CENAPROV posed questions for the capitalist forms of housing production by demonstrating that self-managed projects were possible.[20]

The fact that housing was seen by popular organisations as a *process* and not as a *product* (as assumed by the government and private builders), enabled communities to deploy their own participation strategies in order to gradually improve both their homes and the surrounding areas, including economic activities for income generation. Alas, in the following years as this thesis reveals, lessons learned from bottom-up housing projects were not incorporated into public policies. Conversely, the vision of *housing as a product*, grounded in the idea that massive production would ensure the coverage of the quantitative deficit, was strengthened. As a matter of fact, following the recommendations of the Canadian advisor Lauchlin Currie,[21] the government issued special measures since the early 1970s in order to stimulate housing construction, hereinafter considered as an *economic engine*.

From two opposing perspectives (both politically and operationally), experiences such as the attainment of serviced land in state-led housing or the meaning of citizen participation in community-based initiatives, were not part of a broad reflection to improve urban planning and housing policies. Low-income housing policies continued to be characterised by the strengthening of savings and housing corporations, consolidated at the end of the 1980s with the flourishing of neoliberalism which, as discussed later, had a direct impact on housing markets.

The housing shortage, combined with informal settlements growth, pervasive poverty and social segregation, common in many Latin American cities at the end of the 1980s, were aggravated in Colombia by the exacerbation of the long-standing armed conflict and the drug trafficking boom. At the end of the 20th century, violence

[20] Until today, this institution has promoted the construction of low-income housing for more than half million people in Colombia (CENAPROV, 2018).

[21] Currie was the coordinator of the first World Bank mission in Latin America held in Colombia in 1949. A few years later, he moved to Bogotá and became a consultant for the government on issues related to urban and economic development.

in rural areas resulting from both events provoked a new wave of forced migration of poor peasants who had no other choice but to reach the cities and swell poverty belts (Figure 1).

Figure 1 Geography of forced displacement in Colombia



Source: Sarmiento (2004, p. 87). Figure modified by the author without altering data.

According to the *Unidad para las Víctimas* (2019)[22] in Colombia, between January 1985 and December 2018, around 7,500,000 people were forcibly displaced from their places of origin. As stated by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Colombia 'had the world's largest internally displaced population at the end of 2015' (2016, p. 30), a phenomenon in which Afro-descendants and Indigenous people were the most affected communities.

It is in this turbulent political and social context that market-oriented housing regulations shifted the role of government from promoter and executor to enabler

[22] Article 3 of Law 1448 of 2011 defined victims in Colombia as "those persons who individually or collectively have suffered damage due to events that have occurred since the 1st of January of 1985, as a consequence of violations of International Humanitarian Law or serious and manifest violations to international Human Rights standards occurred *within the context of the internal armed conflict*". [Italics in original]. Author's translation from original in Spanish.

(MVCT, 2014, p. 40). With the liquidation of the ICT in 1991, the private sector was strengthened as social housing supplier and the vision of *housing as a product*, which had guided policies since the mid-1960s was coupled with the idea of *housing as a business* since the 1990s and until now. Although state-funded programmes under this approach have contributed to expanding low-cost housing supply and reducing the numbers of people living in substandard homes, more concerning problems such as income inequality have worsened (Graph 2).

Graph 2 Households in informal settlements and Gini coefficient in Colombia



Source: Graph by the author based on data from UN-Habitat, Global Urban Observatory (2012), cited by UN-Habitat & CAF (2014, p. 108).

In this context, President Juan Manuel Santos launched in 2012 a new programme named *Vivienda 100% subsidiada* (100% subsidised housing) intended to help the poorest households -mainly forced migrants- to become homeowners. In order to implement this initiative, which ran from 2012 to 2018, the government hired the biggest construction firms in the country to build 200,000 free homes in capital cities.[23] The strong (and open) emphasis of the free housing programme in promoting the revitalisation of the construction sector in order to foster development and economic growth, demonstrated the secondary role that social development had in this

[23] Projects ranged from rows of one- or two-storey houses to apartment blocks with an average area of 47m^2 per home. The maximum cost per house is around US$19,370, meaning US$412/m^2. By way of comparison, according to real estate advertisements, a house located in the historical centre of Cartagena costs up to US$3,500/m^2, in a high-income neighbourhood in Bogotá, US$3000/m^2 and in the suburbs of Cali about US$2,000/m^2. Estimated exchange rate: US$1=COP$2,823.

programme.[24] Repeating earlier mistakes, new homes were being built mainly on the outskirts of the cities, away from areas of potential employment and with poor supporting infrastructure. In fact, financial resources for activities aiming at improving coexistence, job training and income generation opportunities in the new neighbourhoods were scarce or non-existent. Meanwhile, issues such as violence, drug sales and consumption, stigmatisation and proliferation of gangs have been encountered in several neighbourhoods across the country.[25]

Regarding the political dimension of the programme, it is worth mentioning that the inauguration of the neighbourhoods across the country was delegated to the presidential candidate Germán Vargas Lleras, who was appointed Minister of Housing during the first term of Santos (2011-2014) and Vice-President during his second term (2014-2018).

Top left (1): Santos and Vargas Lleras laying the foundation stone of the '100% subsidised housing' programme in 2013 in El Salado, Bolívar. Top right (2) Vargas Lleras opening the second phase of the '100% subsidised housing' programme in Bolívar. Sources: (1) MVDT (2013b), (3) MVCT (2016)

Overall, in terms of social housing and poor households support, the '100% subsidised housing' was the flagship programme of the Santos government despite the criticisms of the quality of the projects[26] and their possible use as a political platform for Vargas Lleras's presidential campaign in 2018. Although it has been one of the most ambitious initiatives in relation to housing for extremely poor families in the last decades, studies evaluating the outcomes of this programme are still scarce.

[24] The focus of the Santos' government on promoting economic growth through the free housing programme is clear in the president's launch speech broadcast nationwide in 2012. Speech transcript can be found in http://wsp.presidencia.gov.co/Prensa/2012/Abril/Paginas/20120423_05.aspx Accessed: 9/02/2016.

[25] See Sliwa & Wiig (2016), http://www.elespectador.com/noticias/nacional/crecen-alertas-casos-de-extorsion-conjuntos-de-vivienda-articulo-611438 Accessed: 9/02/2016; https://www.elheraldo.co/local/convivencia-lo-que-mas-cuesta-en-las-casas-gratis-189593 Accessed: 19/01/2016.

[26] See for instance Gilbert (2014).

As will be discussed later, in the analysis of *Llano Verde*, the characteristics of the projects as well as the social issues that rapidly emerged in the free housing neighbourhoods reflect a new failure of national policies applied to the letter in local contexts, with the intention of 'accommodating' a community in a space rather than supporting them to co-create solutions to improve their marginal living conditions. At the national level, the government continue to use planning as a tool for promoting spatial order and economic growth, maintaining a *top-down approach* that prevents the emergence of alternatives for city-making. Beyond 'insurgent practices' -a concept borrowed from Holston (2008)- that challenge the current planning apparatus, bottom-up initiatives in urban development in Colombia are virtually non-existent. At the local level, the municipality not only adopts national guidelines without assuming a critical position but also uses its power to perpetuate socio-spatial divisions under an urban development pattern grounded in hierarchical relationships in which citizen participation has no place. In the case of Cali, as discussed below, urban planning has been a mechanism favouring a few for decades, contributing to the production of new forms of marginality in a complex context of forced migration, economic crisis and internal violence.

1.3 The case of Cali: many plans, limited achievements

In Cali, ruling elites have maintained their control over land for decades and landowners have always expected to reach the highest speculative value of their properties (Aprile-Gniset, 1992, p. 699). Their positions in the government enabled them to achieved that goal.[27] This speculative approach, which would rapidly generate scarcity of urbanised land for low-income housing, also fulfilled the underlying purpose of maintaining the segregationist urban pattern inherited from the colonial era (Aprile-Gniset, 1992, p. 703). As a result, informal settlements gradually emerged, occupying public and private land, mainly in at-risk and environmentally fragile areas of the urban fringes. Extra-legal land occupation became the popular way of recovering public land known as *ejidos*, many of which were illegally taken by large landowners over time.[28] The rapid and uncontrolled urban expansion generated concern among the

[27] In addition to maintaining their political power, traditional families in Cali managed to preserve land ownership over time through strategic marriages between heirs (Espinosa, 2009, p. 57).

[28] During the foundation of Cali in 1536 the Spanish crown designated some communal lands around the city -called *ejidos*- for recreational purposes and to feed the cattle. However, after the colonial period, the

ruling elites over the future of the city. Thus, since the early 1940s, and following in the steps of other Latin American capitals, the government and some powerful families supported the development of a succession of urban plans led by international consultants.

In 1943, the municipality signed a contract with the Austrian urbanist Karl Brunner for the development of the *Cali Regulatory Plan*, known as the *Future City Plan*. However, within a short time the technical incapacity of the municipality to develop a plan of this magnitude, added to the lack of resources and the slow progress of the work developed by Brunner, indicated the shortcomings of the process (Aprile-Gniset, 1992, p. 729; Espinosa, 2009, p. 67). Consequently, in 1947 the contract was settled by mutual agreement and Brunner delivered a series of drawings containing the designs for the *Avenida de las Americas* (a project to connect the railway station and the city centre), and the *Regulatory and Expansion Plan of Cali* (Figure 2).[29]

Figure 2 Regulatory and Expansion Plan for Cali. Karl Brunner, 1947



Source: Espinosa (2009, p. 75).

This ideal of modernity was reinforced with the arrival of the Modern Movement in Cali when the New York firm Town Planning Associates (TPA), led by Paul Lester

communal character of these lands began to be lost. Disputes over alleged ownership of *ejidos* by private individuals as well as by informal settlers, who claimed that these lands were left for those who need them most, remain unresolved.

[29] Brunner's plans were lost in the Planning Office after being delivered. However, in 2009 the researcher Leon Darío Espinosa found a photograph of the Regulatory and Expansion Plan in the personal collection of the architect Jaime Coronel in Cali.

Wiener and Joseph Lluis Sert, was commissioned to fulfil the mandate of Law 88 of 1947, which compelled cities to develop a regulatory plan. In 1949 these architects signed a contract with the municipality to carry out the 'Pilot Plan for Cali' (Figure 3).

Figure 3 Pilot Plan for Cali. TPA, 1950



Source: Espinosa (2009, p. 125).

While Brunner's ideas seemed obsolete at that time, and the agreement with TPA represented Cali's entry into modern urbanism, the documentation delivered describing the long-term plan did not meet the local expectations, and its implementation was limited to the following of some general guidelines. As Aprile-Gniset hinted,

> The CIAM master plan designed in New York came too late and both Wiener and Sert fully ignored the social dynamic, which would render it obsolete before its delivery. From Manhattan, you cannot see *Siloé* (Aprile-Gniset, 1992, p. 727).[30]

In a similar vein, Espinosa (2009, p. 151) argued that the TPA's plan lacked legal tools for its implementation and, therefore, it was impossible to transform the land ownership structures as well as to generate the resources to make the plan feasible. For these reasons, 'groups interested in these kind of decisions, the landowners, had nothing to worry about' (Espinosa, 2009, p. 151). In the event, in the 1950s, two

[30] Author's translation from original in Spanish. *Siloé* is one of the first informal settlements that appeared in the early 1930s in the western hills of the city.

avenues connecting the city centre with the south side were built, incorporating thousands of hectares of *hacienda*s into the urban land market. According to Aprile-Gniset (1992, p. 730) 'in five years the roads for three decades of land speculation were built [producing] an urbanism of landowners in distress'. These road projects demonstrate that the few recommendations of Brunner and TPA useful for the expansionist purposes of the ruling elites were partially implemented, while the schemes that went against their economic interests were shelved.

With the TPA master plan discarded, during the years with the major influx of internal migrants the Municipal Planning Office was directly in charge of developing zoning and land-use regulations that were decisive in accelerating the urbanisation of agricultural land under a segregationist and speculative approach. Although after the 1940s Cali attracted people from neighbouring municipalities seeking job opportunities in the industry and services sectors, since the early 1980s it was the economic boom generated by drug trafficking which stimulated the second wave of internal migration.

However, in the following decades, the exacerbation of the nationwide conflict accelerated the arrival of forcibly displaced people seeking refuge in the city, in a context of economic crisis. According to the *Unidad para las Víctimas* (2019), between January 1985 and December 2018, around 170,000 displaced people arrived in Cali. In times of aggravated conflict in rural areas, the city became the prime destination for poor Afro-descendant migrants from the Pacific coast and for other Mestizo, Indigenous and Afro-descendant groups from surrounding municipalities located in the south western Andes.

The rapid population growth derived from the massive arrival of poor peasants, combined with the speculative urbanisation of poor-quality lands in the city outskirts, resulted in a reconfiguration of the urban form in the following years. The city for middle- and high-income families continued to grow along the linear north-south axis, while low-income neighbourhoods were built, legally and extra-legally, in the western hills and in the areas prone to flooding on the east side, between the boundary of the peri-centre and the edge of the Cauca river.[31]

[31] In the mid-1950s an entity was created with the advice of the former director of the Tennessee Valley Authority, David Lilienthal, and the financial support of the World Bank. This institution, named the CVC

This well-established segregationist development pattern has gradually resulted in the consolidation of four differentiated cities at the end of the 20th century (Figure 4).[32]

Figure 4 Socio-economic strata and socio-spatial divisions in Cali



Source: Maps by the author based on data from the DAPM (2017).

i) ***Western hills***, in which informal settlements have predominated throughout the 20th century and where gated housing complexes for middle- and high-income families have been emerging in small spots, putting pressure on the land occupied by poorer settlers (Districts 1, 18 and 20).

(initially as the acronym of Cauca, Valle, Caldas and nowadays as the acronym of the Regional Autonomous Corporation of Valle del Cauca) was responsible for the building of a dam, irrigation canals for agriculture and the draining of flooded lands in order to recover thousands of hectares in the eastern fringes of Cali, as part of a project named *Aguablanca*.

[32] For administrative reasons Cali has been divided into 22 districts. All the buildings have been classified into six socio-economic strata -from stratum 1 (low-low) to stratum 6 (high)- with the purpose of establishing differential rates for the payment for public utilities. Although the general idea is commendable, socio-economic stratification has become a marker of social class (C. Uribe, 2008).

ii) ***North-south axis***, where high profile business and services share space with residential areas for people in a middle-high and high-income bracket (Districts 2, 17, 19 and 22).

iii) ***Central area***, which includes the Central Business District (CBD) located in District 3. This, like many CBDs in Latin America, has experienced a systematic decline in urban quality coupled with loss of population. This zone also includes the peri-centre attached to the historic area (Districts 9 and 10) and the neighbourhoods that emerged during the industrialisation process after the 1930s (Districts 4, 5, 8, 11 and 12).

iv) ***East side***, where the population is predominantly poor despite the fact that in this area social housing neighbourhoods, built by private developers under an on-demand subsidies scheme, predominate. There, the socio-economic strata decline with distance from the city centre. While the inhabitants of Districts 6, 7 and 16 are in better social and economic conditions, people in the sector known as *Aguablanca District* (Districts 13, 14, 15 and 21) face major challenges in terms of poverty, education, employment, violence and ethno-racial segregation. This area was planned for the development of low-cost housing and currently has the highest concentration of Afro-descendants in the city.

According to official statistics on poverty and vulnerability from the *Sistema de Identificación de Potenciales Beneficiarios de Programas Sociales* (SISBEN),[33] in Cali 1,233,190 people (51 per cent of the total population) are vulnerable and 45,165 people (12.1 per cent) live in extreme poverty. As shown in Figure 5, districts that make up *Aguablanca* in the eastern fringe, an area planned, formally built, with a regular urban fabric, property titles and infrastructure, concentrate the higher percentage of poor households.[34] This characteristic of the eastern side of Cali highlights the fact that vulnerability and extreme poverty is not only a feature of informal settlements while uneven development patterns embedded in the apparatus of planning has produced marginal living conditions in fully-planned urban areas.

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[33] Through a scoring system that ranges between 0 and 100 points, the survey SISBEN classifies households according to their socio-economic conditions, enabling public investment to more easily target poor and vulnerable populations (Departamento Nacional de Planeación, 2019). This survey asked households about housing quality (materials and access to public utilities and basic services), access to health services, education, economic activity and family income.

[34] Detailed statistics from the SISBEN survey and other topics presented in the following sections are available in Appendix D.

Figure 5 Concentration of vulnerable and extremely poor households



Source: Maps and estimates by the author based on SISBEN Survey (2017).
*Percentages calculated on the basis of the total number of households in SISBEN database.

At the turn of the 21st century, the concentration of poverty and urban violence in the city outskirts, coupled with the economic crash, collided with the failure of successive administrations to respond effectively to issues such as social inequality, segregation, protracted unemployment and informality (Otero, 2012, pp. 51–53). As a consequence, socio-economic problems, more effectively tackled by other cities such as Bogotá and Medellín, were still critical in Cali. As shown in Table 1, while in the 1980s and 1990s Medellín was dealing with a deep social crisis, after 2000 Cali seems to be the city with greater challenges: the highest unemployment, informality and homicide rates.

Table 1 Socio-economic statistics in Cali, Bogotá and Medellín (1985-2015)

	1985			1995			2005			2015		
	Cali	Bogota	Medellin	Cali	Bogota	Medellin	Cali	Bogota	Medellin	Cali	Bogota	Medellin
Gini Coefficient[a]	0,50	0,48	0,53	0,51**	0,55**	0,58**	0,54	0,56	0,52	0,48	0,50	0,49
Unemployment rate[b]	13,7%	11,5%	15,1%	10,8%	7,6%	11,9%	11,4%	11,3%	10,9%	10,4%	8,3%	9,2%
Informality[c]	57,5%**	53,0%**	50,2%**	59,0%	50,0%	54,0%	61,7%	52,9%	54,6%	48,0%	42,2%	41,4%
Homicide rate[d]	86	33	122	109	60	199	65	23	36	60	17	20

■ Worst indicator in each variable.

*Data only available for 1984. **Data only available for 1994.
Sources: DANE, INMLCF, Policía Nacional, Vicepresidencia de la República de Colombia (2009), Santamaría (1999) and Henao et al. (1999).[35]

As urban conflicts continued to grow, the shortage of social housing derived from internal migration was strengthened in the government discourse as the solution for tackling the marginal conditions of vulnerable households.[36] Nevertheless, during the years of greater influx of poor displaced people (1995-2010), municipal efforts to provide low-income housing were not as effective as expected. Few projects were accessible to the poorest households and poor-quality social housing and extra-legal occupation of public and private land continued to intensify.[37]

Paradoxically, under such circumstances, the city plan posed ambiguous solutions. On the one hand, it included as main goals the reduction of social segregation and the prevalence of compact development and, on the other, it reserved the best and safer areas for middle- and high-income households from facilitating urban expansion. In parallel, public actions to prevent legal and extra-legal occupation of at-risk areas were minimal, if not speculative or detrimental. As mentioned earlier,

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[35] (a) 1985: Muñoz (1990, p. 90); 1994: Santamaría (1999). 2005, 2010, 2015: DANE (2017d). (b) 1985, 1995: DANE (2001); 2005: DANE (2005a); 2015: DANE (2017c) (c) 1984: Henao et al. (1999). 1995: DANE (2001); 2005: DANE (2005a); 2015: DANE (2017b). (d) Rate per 100,000 inhabitants. 1985: Escobedo (2013, p. 18). 1995 and 2005: Observatorio del Programa Presidencial de Derechos Humanos y DIH (2009, p. 250); 2015: INMLCF (2016).

[36] The draft of the *Housing and Habitat Plan 'PLANeVITA' 2015-2027* established a quantitative shortfall of 90,179 homes, while the qualitative deficit was estimated at 24,607 homes (Alcaldía de Cali, 2015, p. 46).

[37] Figures from the Secretariat of Social Housing show that 3 per cent of the urban area is occupied by informal settlements (38,400 households) and almost 22 per cent (252,109 households) corresponds to 'precarious neighbourhoods', defined as legally developed neighbourhoods with low-quality housing and deficiencies in public spaces, roads and facilities for basic services (Municipal Agreement 411 of 2017).

the eastern districts are prone to floods, and the western hills have unstable soils that increase the landslide risk. Urban planning in Cali has put the population of the *Aguablanca* District at permanent risk when development of social housing was allowed in areas that could be seriously affected by the overflow of the Cauca River if the dyke fails (Map 1). This situation resulted from the fact that the city grew towards the buffer zone that was drained in the 1960s by the construction of the dyke. The top of the dyke was gradually occupied and at the turn of the 21st century nearly 9,000 households were living there. If the structure of the levee fails the *Aguablanca* District would be flooded, affecting around 900,000 people (Alcaldía de Cali, 2014a, p. 99).

Map 1 Flood risk in Cali



Source: Maps by the author based on the POT (2014).

In this regard, the formal development of these areas via on-demand subsidies has resulted in an exclusionary urbanism produced by government decisions that have pushed low-income families to the worst areas. The underlying motivation of this decision is the rise of the land value of flooding zones through infrastructure financed by the state and subsequent changes in land-use regulations that have favoured both landowners and private developers, while deepening the causal factors of marginality.

In the case of the western hills, the situation is different but still worrying. Besides natural geological conditions, human activities such as deforestation, occupation of the banks of the water sources, earthmoving and prohibited wastewater discharges into the ground have increased the landslide risk in the upper part (Map 2).

Map 2 Landslide risk in Cali



Source: Maps by the author based on the POT (2014).

Unlike the formal neighbourhoods in the east, where the occupation of at-risk, private land for speculative purposes was facilitated by the government, the linkage between the seizure of at-risk areas and land speculation in the slopes is more obscure. The fact that ownership in the hills has been unclear for decades, because some areas are *ejidos*, has propitiated land grabbing and uncontrolled occupation of public lots by developers as well as by individuals seeking free urban land to build a home, who claim that idle lands (*ejidos*) were left for the roofless.

In both cases, the irregular way in which the occupation of the territory was performed by developers and disadvantaged communities demonstrates that in Cali *poverty and risk are tied to each other* and that the segregationist pattern that has ruled urban planning since the colonial era continues to relegate the poorest social segments to the worse areas. In this context, what emerges from the history of urban

development in Cali, highly influenced by national policies (and politics), is that planning and social housing programmes have not only been contradictory and ineffective but they have also become the main drivers of marginality. The lack of political will to intervene in the land market, which favours private landowners, has prompted the location of social housing in the fringes of the city, disconnected from work nodes and basic urban services. Besides, the housing deficit approach that has ruled policies has produced the steady reduction of areas to the minimum standards, lowering the spatial quality of both neighbourhoods and homes. In areas developed under this model, informal means to adapt the homes or the public spaces to the needs of users have rapidly emerged, reducing the already low quality of housing and public areas.

On the other hand, resources for neighbourhood upgrading programmes, in addition to being insufficient, are not reaching the most critical sectors due to policies that forbid the municipality investing public funds in informal settlements. The absence of strategies for overcoming this rule indicates that it is very likely that policies grounded in the production of a spatial order through the construction of massive low-quality social housing complexes in remote areas will continue to be the main alternative for providing a dwelling solution to the poor in Cali. As shall be discussed in the next chapters addressing the case studies, this type of housing (peripheral, disconnected and planned to serve a homogeneously poor population) is contributing not only to produce the marginal conditions of the poor but also to aggravate them.

1.4 Introduction to the case studies

The two case studies selected for the analysis, mentioned in the introduction of the thesis, represent two extremes in physical-spatial and geographical terms. The first is the free housing complex *Llano Verde* built in 2013 in the eastern edge of the city in District 15. The second case is a group of five settlements (*Palmas I, Pampas del Mirador, Arboleda, Brisas de las Palmas and Alto Polvorines*) located in the slopes of District 18 (Figure 6).

Figure 6 Location of the case studies

Source: Figure by the author.

Llano Verde was selected because it was the only project developed under the umbrella of the '100% subsidised housing' programme in Cali. This means that the entire neighbourhood was built in order to meet a national guideline issued to mitigate the effects of a sustained armed conflict. Seeking to protect the victims, the Constitutional Court compelled the government to ensure proper housing for forced migrants arriving in capital cities and free housing was presented by the Santos administration as the best alternative.

Paradoxically, the Peace Accords with the FARC signed in 2016 by President Santos do not include specific actions for city-based victims or a critical analysis of the free housing experience, disregarding the possible effects of the arrival of ex-combatants in urban areas. As such, this thesis critically examines housing policies for victims of the armed conflict -particularly the '100% subsidised housing programme' with the aim of establishing a framework of reference for possible new urban housing demands derived from the peace process.

The *informal settlements*, on the other hand, were gradually built by their residents over more than four decades on the western fringe of the city. Largely neglected by the government, the community of these settlements has resorted to 'insurgent practices' (Holston, 2008) to ensure the provision of basic services. This area was selected because it satisfied three criteria: i) the settlements were built in a peripheral location through extra-legal practices without any government support; ii) this zone is the only informal housing area in the city that has a population census,[38] meaning that detailed data is available; iii) a strong community organisation has made this area accessible, walkable and relatively safe compared to other sectors of Cali.

Despite obvious differences related to the origin (formal or informal) and the level of development in terms of infrastructure, these cases have similarities with respect to their socio-economic and physical-spatial conditions: the population living there are mainly internal migrants who have dealt with poverty in the long run, both sectors are characterised for their poor-urban quality and both are widely considered marginal areas of Cali. However, as will be discussed in Chapter 2, these cases have also profound differences in terms of internal relations, coexistence, ways in which community issues are addressed and of course spatial and functional features which are the most easily traceable.

1.4.1 Llano Verde in District 15

Located in a flat zone on the southeast border of Cali, District 15 is part of the area called *Aguablanca District*. The emergence of the first four neighbourhoods -*El Retiro, Laureano Gómez, Comuneros I* and *Mojica*- dates back to the early 1970s when poor people, mainly Afro-descendants from the Pacific coast, began the extra-legal occupation of flood-risk areas without any access to public utility networks (Alcaldía de Cali, 2016b, p. 38). However, it is unlikely that the communities alone would have developed such a regular urban fabric (as shown in Map 3) without the support of external agents, including landowners who wanted to push the city's expansion to the east. Following the gradual occupation of this area, a process of normalisation was promoted by the City Council for ensuring the provision of public utilities and accessibility via paved roads.

[38] The Carvajal Foundation, which has a strong presence in the area, carried out a census in 2007 and data has been updated over the following years.

Map 3 Formal neighbourhoods and informal settlements District 15

City growth boundary
Case study boundary
Rivers/streams
Protected areas
Public spaces

Grey scale: formal neighbourhoods. Pink scale: informal settlements.

Informal settlements: 1. Las Gorditas, 2. El Retiro, 3. Retiro/Laureano Gómez, 4. Laureano Gómez, 5. Colonia Nariñense, 6. Brisas del Caracol, 7. La Antena, 8. MD, 9. Brisas de las Palmas, 10. El Encanto, 11. Haiti, 12. Brisas de Comuneros, 13. África, 14. El Valladito, 15. La Lomita.

Source: Map by the author based on fieldwork data and mapping activities with the community and the Metropolitan Police.

While the risk of flooding still exists but at a lower level, as mentioned earlier, actions to prevent flooding in the east were one of the first and largest real estate operations for the 'creation' of developable land in Cali. Backed by the municipality, which ignored the recommendations of the Master Plans of Brunner, Wiener and Sert, the owners of agricultural land were allowed to initiate a rapid urbanisation process. Projects went from the offer of sites and services for self-help housing, to the development of social housing complexes financed with government subsidies based on the 'minimum standards' regulations.

After the mid-1980s, three neighbourhoods -*El Vallado, Ciudad Córdoba* and *Morichal*- were built with higher standards (and of course higher prices) with the

endorsement of the municipality to expand the supply of social housing. Despite the high level of consolidation of this district, planned development was combined with the gradual emergence of 15 informal settlements in the north-eastern edge. Some of the settlements emerged during the first wave of invasions in the 1970s but were not legalised because they occupied public spaces. The rest of these settlements were the result of the arrival of poor communities, mostly Afro-descendants from the Pacific fleeing from the armed conflict since the 1990s and onwards (most of them located in the poorest settlements outside the city growth boundary).

It was in one of the last pieces of private land in District 15 where the national government built the neighbourhood *Llano Verde* to settle 4,321 households, representing around 20,000 people. Of those, 3,523 households were beneficiaries of the free-housing programme -most of them (98 per cent) victims of the armed conflict displaced from their territories- and 798 were recipients of a project named *Plan Jarillón* promoted by both national and municipal governments to relocate families living above the dyke that protects the city from overflows of the Cauca River.[39]

Aerial view of Llano Verde.
Source: https://www.findeter.gov.co/ninos/documentos.php?id=200730&colorder=fecha&order=ASC Accessed: 20/10/2016.

[39] Despite multiple interventions such as the relocation of families in neighbourhoods such as *Potrero Grande* and *Llano Verde*, the occupation of the dyke mainly by poor migrants from the Pacific coast has been a recurring problem. In recent decades, thousands of families have been relocated but once they are vacated, the dyke is occupied again. Currently the government is working to secure the dyke and to maintain it clear.

Planned as a social housing complex by a private construction firm, *Llano Verde* was sold in its entirety to the national government for the '100% subsidised housing' programme and to the municipality for the *Plan Jarillón*. This neighbourhood was made up of identical two-storey homes with an area of 47m², distributed mainly in 140-meter-long and 20-meter-wide rows.

Photos by the author (2017).

Although *Llano Verde* complies with the required areas for parks and communal facilities, as we will see in Chapter 3, it cannot be said that the urban quality of the neighbourhood or the engagement of its community in the maintenance of common spaces are good. The urban and architectural typology (based on minimum standards), the place where it was developed (the last corner of the *Aguablanca District*) and the lack of participation of beneficiaries in the development of the project, condemned this neighbourhood to failure even before it was built. *Llano Verde* indeed, followed exactly the same parameters of other social housing neighbourhoods developed in *Aguablanca* such as *Protrero Grande*, a government-led complex built in a corner of District 21, which at present is the most violent area of the city.[40]

The government decision to build the free housing complex in District 15 which, as we shall see in the next section, accommodates the most vulnerable population of Cali, concentrates Afro-descendant communities, and has the highest percentage of jobless and the highest homicide rates in the city. This was the first decision that ratified the role of urban planning in the production of marginal areas. As is further discussed in this thesis, the beneficiaries of the free housing have been marked as 'dangerous' and accused by their neighbours of being a 'burden on society' two years

[40] I will come back to this case in the next chapter.

before the homes were built and delivered. Previous struggles accentuated beneficiaries' relegation both spatially and socially when they moved into *Llano Verde* which quickly turned into an isolated space at the local scale, in a District already isolated at the urban scale.

1.4.2 Informal settlements of District 18

This district appeared in the 1930s with the construction of three middle-income neighbourhoods in the flat area near to the *Calle Quinta* Avenue -*Meléndez, Buenos Aires* and *Caldas*- and the emergence of one informal settlement in the foothills -*Los Chorros*- that triggered the expansion of spontaneous housing to the slopes. After the 1960s, the flat area was fully consolidated with formal neighbourhoods but also with the construction of the installations of the Third Brigade of the Army, intended to be a military reserve in the outskirts, which was surrounded by new neighbourhoods when the city grew to the south. Since its establishment, this regional-scale facility has been the centre of a great deal of disruption due to the fact that it was considered a military objective for the guerrilla groups, which attacked it with minor explosives several times.

In spite of the existence of this military base, poor families arriving in Cali mainly from the Andean region, some of them fleeing from the armed conflict, continued to occupy public and private land, producing an irregular urban fabric up into the hills. Thus in this district, 16 formal neighbourhoods share spaces with 20 informal settlements that have completely covered the slopes, even overstepping the western urban growth boundary (Map 4). These settlements occupy lands of the national and municipal governments, private owners and *ejidos* but there are no maps with sufficient topographic precision to make it possible to establish the areas and limits of each property. In fact, as mentioned earlier, the lack of clarity over the ownership of the *ejidos* has become one of the biggest disputes over land in Cali for centuries (Pacheco, 1980). Since the technical tools to resolve these conflicts exist, it seems intentional that the boundaries of these properties have not yet been determined since, apparently, several of those pieces of land were deeded to private owners and transferred through inheritances.

Map 4 Neighbourhoods and informal settlements in District 18



Grey scale: formal neighbourhoods. Pink scale: informal settlements.

Informal settlements: 1. Pampas del Mirador, 2. Palmas I, 3. Brisas de las Palmas, 4. La Arboleda, 5. Alto Polvorines, 6. Alto Meléndez, 7. Alto Jordán, 8. Palmas II, 9. El Árbol, 10. La Piscina, 11. Choclona, 12. Camino del Minero, 13. Tanque III, 14. Alto Nápoles, 15. Bosques, 16. Tamayo, 17. Alto de los Chorros, 18. La Cruz, 19. La Esperanza.

Source: Map by the author based on fieldwork data and mapping activities with the community and the Metropolitan Police.

The settlements selected for this study are located in the upper part of the hills surrounded by the natural reserve of the Melendez River in the southwest end of the district (numbers 1 to 4 and part of number 5 in Map 4). Although one of the characteristics of informal settlements is the lack of official figures, data from the

census carried out by the Carvajal Foundation in 2011 show that in the five areas selected live nearly 5,500 people, grouped in 1,350 households.



Aerial view of the five settlements selected.
Source: Carvajal Foundation (2011).

Unlike the occupation of land and its subsequent legalisation for the development of social housing in District 15, in the informal settlements of District 18 land has been mainly acquired and occupied in three ways: 1) buying a lot from a 'pirate developer' who has invaded and parcelled on his own, 2) inheriting a family member's home, or 3) seizing a small piece of land directly, building a shack in the following 24 hours and resisting eviction attempts. As an example of this dynamic, one of the inhabitants of District 18 remembered how one night she was invited by a friend to seize 'idle lands' on the slopes of the district:

> My friend told me: 'If you want to come with us we are going to do a *minga*[41] to take some lots [...] Don't you want to be the owner of a piece of land in order to stop paying rent?' I said: 'Of course, I want my own home!' In that meeting we were about nine people and at 7:00pm we came here with machetes, shovels and picks. At 10:00pm the place was full. We didn't know where so many people came from. The word spread like a cyclone! (Personal communication, March 30, 2017).

As this testimony shows, guided by need, informal settlers in this area (most of them forced migrants) have reacted to the logic of the state and the market, both of which failed to ensure affordable dwelling in a convenient location.

Photos by the author (2017).

Because of their informal origin, these settlements are considered 'outside the planning apparatus' which means that their inhabitants cannot easily access government benefits. Despite this situation, I have found interesting features of these settlements that can be summarised in three points. First, there is a high level of community organisation, which has led to the creation of one Community Action Board (JAC for its name in Spanish)[42] in each settlement that is recognised as an official citizen organisation in Colombia. For people in the settlements, these JACs are not only mechanisms to facilitate the dialogue with the municipality but also bodies that promote projects for improving the natural and built environments, accessing clean water, energy and sewerage, as well as for supporting initiatives to ensure peace and coexistence in the area, including giving support to at-risk youth.

[41] *Minga* is an Indigenous word that refers to community work to achieve a common goal.

[42] The JAC is a non-profit organisation formed by residents of a neighbourhood created in 1959 as a legitimate communication channel between communities and the government.

Second, the existence of an internal stratification and different levels of access to public transport, goods and services related to the location within the settlement have been found. For example, people who live on the main access road (where the BRT feeder bus runs and commercial units proliferate) have brick houses, more consolidated than those located in areas with pedestrian access in the steepest parts. Likewise, although much of the utility networks have been gradually built by the same inhabitants, running water and energy are provided in some sectors by EMCALI, the municipal utility company, as a result of the lobby of social leaders in this company. Also, by virtue of its location near the *Calle Quinta* Avenue, adjacent to wealthy Districts (17 and 22) and close to a BRT trunk route, people living in the most connected areas of the settlements have secured good mobility and access to formal and informal jobs in the commerce and services sector. Women work mainly in domestic service and men in construction, informal transport or gardening. These last two factors have facilitated the generation of income that has allowed residents to gradually improve their homes and surrounding areas.

The third point is that some people that have managed to settle in the slopes do not want to 'go back', that is, to move to a state-led housing complex in the east side of the city where 'the Black people live', even if benefits such as property titles, formally built homes and full access to public services are ensured. When asked about the possibility of being relocated, one of my interviewees living at-risk in the slopes of District 18 said: 'I don't want to leave my home because I don't want to move to a tiny apartment. I don't have much here, but I have quietness and peace; two things that I will not find in those places'.[43] For her, *Aguablanca*, where social housing was available, is a noisy, complicated and violent place.

Indeed, while most of the social housing complexes have been built in the east side of Cali, one cannot assert that the inhabitants of that area enjoy better living conditions than informal settlers of the western hills. As we will see in the next chapter, devoted to the analysis of the five inherent characteristics of urban marginality, this phenomenon has multiple nuances and different impact levels and does not manifest itself in the same way in formal and informal environments.

[43] Personal communication, March 25, 2017.

2. THE FIVE INHERENT CHARACTERISTICS OF URBAN MARGINALITY

In the previous chapter I argued that urban marginality can be produced and reproduced by the state, when the imposition of spatial order through urban planning and social housing becomes the main goal of public intervention. As discussed in the introduction to this dissertation, in the Latin American context, the production of marginality through institutionalised and widely accepted mechanisms (no one can deny that proper housing is an urgent need for the urban poor) is the result of the juxtaposition of multiple factors, two of which are of a structural nature. On the one hand, there is the prevalence of an economic system that fosters the *accumulation process* leading to an asymmetric distribution of wealth (Kowarick, 1974; Perlman, 1976; Singer, 1973), informality (R. Bromley, 1978; Connolly, 1985; H. Muñoz & de Oliveira, 1976), uneven development (Mehretu et al., 2000; Thorp, 1998) and drug-related violence (Auyero, 1999; Perlman, 2005; Wacquant, 2008). This approach is complemented by the premise that post-industrial modernisation -characterised by neoliberal practices of deregulation, free-trade and globalisation- has led to a deterioration of wage labour conditions and protracted unemployment in the poorest segments of society (Auyero, 1999; Sassen, 2002; Wacquant, 1999, 2008).

On the other hand, there are also *power structures* that reproduce patterns of domination (Quijano, 1966) through different forms of what de-colonial thinkers have called coloniality.[44] This notion, which Quijano defined as one of the features of capitalist power, is underpinned by,

[44] The notion of *coloniality* became the epistemic basis of the school of thought known as *de-colonial thinking* led in Latin America since the 1990s by a group of scholars that include Quijano, Mignolo, Dussel, Escobar, Lander, Castro-Gómez and Grosfoguel. This stream distances itself from the theoretical perspective of Anglo-

> [T]he imposition of a racial/ethnic classification of the world's population as the cornerstone of this pattern of power, and operates at every level, area and dimension, both material and subjective, of everyday social existence and at a societal scale (Quijano, 2000a, p. 342).[45]

In Latin America, after the emergence of a new arrangement of domination grounded in the idea of 'race' and the 'racial' social classification of the world's population, '"racist" social relations [have become] the most visible expression of coloniality of power in everyday life during the last 500 years' (Quijano, 2000b, p. 218). In terms of urban planning, the reproduction of colonial patterns of domination has contributed to the perpetuation of social stratification, ethno-racial segregation and the stigmatisation of the urban poor (Hernández, 2015, 2017). Furthermore, practices that restrain the participation of underprivileged communities, derived from coloniality of power, have become the perfect mechanism for maintaining the *status quo* (Lombard, 2012) and decision-making in urban planning continues to be dominated by ruling elites.

Hence, the current economic system, coupled with the persistence of coloniality of power, has encouraged and maintained a specific way of conceiving planning and social housing, which constitutes the breeding ground for the production of marginality. However, it is my contention that marginality is correlated with -though not entirely determined by- the economic and power structures, while there are other factors that can be modified to lessen the effects of this phenomenon. In this vein, *urban marginality* is defined in this dissertation as *a multidimensional phenomenon whereby underprivileged communities deal, on a daily basis, with the constraints of ethno-racial segregation, informality, hyperunemployment and violence, within a context of limited participation in decision making* (Figure 7).

Saxon *postcolonial studies* which has focused on North-European colonialism in Asia and Africa leaving Latin America in a marginal place within the debate, both as an object of study as well as a source of knowledge (Coronil, 2000, p. 53).

[45] Author's translation from original in Spanish.

Figure 7 Definition of urban marginality



Source: Developed by the author.

While the definition, synthesised in the figure above, concedes that this phenomenon is closely linked to the social and economic structures, it also reveals non-structural factors that play a significant role in its persistence. These factors are encompassed by what I term *the five inherent characteristics of urban marginality*, which includes *limited participation* as a *cross-sectional component*. These characteristics of urban marginality are proposed here as the framework for analysis of the case studies, and the basis for answering the research questions raised earlier.

In this regard, the two contrasting realities of the cases serve, on the one hand, to elaborate on the argument that *state-led urban planning* focused on imposing spatial order is not only insufficient to lift poor communities out of poverty, but it has become a main driver of marginality. On the other hand, to demonstrate that informal settlements, while seen as *territories outside the plan*, have been largely excluded from government's actions, leaving the residents the task of developing strategies to cope with marginality on their own, which has strengthened values such as trust and solidarity among neighbours. Thus, analysed through the lens of ethno-racial segregation, informality, hyperunemployment, violence and limited participation, the comparison of the case studies presented in this chapter seeks to reveal the different nuances of marginality in formal and informal environments as well as the pivotal role of planning and housing policies in the production and reproduction of this condition.

2.1 Ethno-racial segregation

Although the term 'race' as a universal category for differentiation was used for the first time in the 1700s, city-splitting practices are as old as cities themselves. According to Nightingale (2012, p. 403), '[a]s Western white segregationists began dividing cities by the new category of race, they both borrowed and reinvented ideas and tools from other genres of city-splitting politics'. Hence, when independence movements defeated colonial domination, the new elites in power managed to maintain segregationist patterns rooted in markers of disadvantage.

In the Latin American context, city splitting by class, ethnicity and race was the strategy that helped both the state and the elites to build a developed-country urban identity at the beginning of the 20th century. At that time, the legacy of the ambition for modernisation was the construction of 'class-exclusive zones for lighter-skinned elites' (Nightingale, 2012, p. 403). That is how, inspired first by the urbanism of Haussmann and then by modernist planning, ruling elites managed to drive out the so-called 'marginal populations' from the urban cores (Sabatini, Cáceres & Cerda, 2001, pp. 24–25).

In the case of Colombia, only after the promulgation of the Political Constitution in 1991, which officially recognised multiculturalism,[46] did the inclusion of the ethno-racial variable gain momentum in urban studies (Barbary, 2004, p. 178). For instance, in 1998, social scientists from the *Universidad del Valle* and the *Institut de Recherche pour le Développement* (IRD) conducted the survey 'Mobility, urbanisation and identities of Afro-Colombian populations' as part of a research project carried out in Cali. This survey made it possible, for the first time, to estimate the volume, racial composition and location of the Afro-descendants in the city and to unveil the close relationship between residential segregation and race (Urrea, Barbary, Bruyneel & Ramírez, 1999).

Grounded in these types of explorations and in view of the increasing interest in base-line data regarding ethnic minorities in Colombia, the National Censuses of 1993 and 2005 included a question on ethnic self-identification that made it possible to

[46] The Political Constitution of Colombia (Asamblea Nacional Constituyente, 1991) established in Article 7 that '[t]he state recognises and protects the ethnic and cultural diversity of the Colombian nation'.

determine the number of people belonging to different ethnic groups.[47] Although the inclusion of the ethnic variable contributed to a higher visibility of minorities, academics and social organisations expressed their concerns about the way in which the National Department of Statistics (DANE) managed the matter (Lozano, 2014, p. 85; C. Rodríguez, Alfonso & Cavelier, 2009).

In the case of Cali, data from the Census of 2005 showed that while 72.79 per cent of the total population said they did not belong to any ethnic group, 26.5 per cent of respondents self-identified as ethnically Afro-descendants or Mulattos (544,763 people) and 0.4 per cent as Indigenous (8,985 people).[48]

Figure 8 Socio-economic strata and Afro-descendant population



Source: Maps by the author based on data from DAPM (stratification map, 2017), and database from 2005 National Census, ethnic self-identification variable (DANE, 2005b).

[47] While in 1993 the question was limited to asking about belonging to an ethnic group and to which one, in 2005 a list of categories was included allowing greater precision. In 1993, only 1.5 per cent of respondents said they belonged to an ethnic group; in 2005 this figure rose to 10.6 per cent.

[48] The other categories registered were *Rom* (0.06 per cent) and the *Raizal* of San Andrés and Providencia islands in the Caribbean (0.05 per cent).

These figures not only placed Cali as the city with the largest Afro-descendant population in Colombia but also corroborated previous findings suggesting the high degree of discrimination against this ethnic group within the city. A general comparison between socio-economic strata and the location of Afro-descendants in Cali, resulting from georeferencing the census database, shows that this population has been segregated to, and retained in, the most deprived areas. As Figure 8 illustrates, the concentration of Afro-descendants increases in tandem with declining social stratum towards the western and eastern edges of the city. 74 per cent of this population is concentrated in poor areas of the eastern fringe, mainly in *Aguablanca* District, while in more privileged areas (medium and high strata), the figure is not higher than 7.5 per cent (Barbary, 2004, p. 182). In the same vein, social scientists from *Universidad del Valle* have found that 28.3 per cent of Afro-descendants are segregated and 26.8 per cent of this population would need to change their place of residence to reach equality in racial distribution across the city (Graph 3).[49]

Graph 3 Segregation, dissimilarity and isolation indices by racial condition



Source: Graph by the author based on Viáfara, Urrea, Vivas, Correa & Rodríguez (2016, p. 99).

In spite of the fact that Afro-descendants are highly concentrated in the east side of the city, Barbary (2004, pp. 188–190) argues that it cannot be said that *Aguablanca*

[49] SI corresponds to global segregation by using traditional Duncan & Duncan indices. SI(w) shows the percentage of people who would need to change their place of residence to achieve equity in residential distribution by racial group. xPx allows calculation of the proportion of each group in the city and the probability that an individual of a particular group shares the spatial unit with another from a different group (Viáfara, Urrea, Vivas, Correa & Rodríguez, 2016, p. 97).

is a racial ghetto because people there are homogeneously poor, and the differentiation of phenotypic traits between Afro-descendant and Mulatto individuals is weak. Conversely, the few Afro-descendant people living in middle and high-income neighbourhoods often confine themselves to specific sectors, resulting in highly segregated spaces.

In District 15, as mentioned in the introduction to the case studies, the neighbourhoods that appeared in the north side in the 1970s were mainly occupied by poor Afro-descendants arriving from the Pacific coast (Map 5). This concentration of Afro-descendant people in the east side unveils the existence of a colonial *racial hierarchy* in the way in which the city grew over time: the poorest areas are directly associated with Afro-descendants.

Map 5 Afro-descendant and Indigenous people in District 15



Sources: Map by the author based on National Census (DANE, 2005b). Data from Llano Verde: Ministry of Housing (2013) and Plan Jarillón (2013).

In this regard, the planning apparatus in Cali, grounded in the principles of coloniality of power, has produced and maintained a sharp socio-spatial separation based on ethno-racial parameters, which have been normalised by the population. More specifically, the east side is generally perceived as the space of the Afro-descendants, a perception shared by the ethnic minorities themselves.

In the case of *Llano Verde*, where ethno-racial segregation should not be a concern since the national government established a ballot system to randomise the location of beneficiaries, I found marked divisions among Afro-descendants/ Indigenous and White/Mestizo groups. By georeferencing the database of beneficiaries and selecting the variable *ethnicity* I discovered that Afro-descendants and Indigenous people were mainly located in the south-eastern side of the neighbourhood (Map 6).

Map 6 Afro-descendants and Indigenous people in Llano Verde

Sources: Map by the author based on database from Ministry of Housing (2013).

Checking the stages of the project, I corroborated that the location of Afro-descendants and Indigenous coincide with the area where the first homes were delivered. Although the intention of the institutions to serve vulnerable groups first was commendable, the effect generated was perverse: Afro-descendant and Indigenous people were confined to a single corner of the neighbourhood. This example reveals how urban planning and state-provided housing aggravate racial segregation in Cali despite the existence of specific policies for preventing racial discrimination.[50]

What happened in *Llano Verde* demonstrates that bureaucratic channels in Cali are leaving aside the underlying factors generating racial segregation while focusing their actions on technical problems in order to solve immediate needs such as delivering housing to accommodate the victims of the conflict. In addition to this lack of coherence between government discourses and actions that produced results such as those presented above, Afro-descendant people in *Llano Verde* frequently experience racial discrimination or are stereotyped by their own neighbours. When inquiring about the existence of racial discrimination, all my interviewees asserted that racism was a bitter reality there. In fact, some Afro-descendant leaders have been victims of discriminatory remarks such as *'¡tenía que ser negro!*, a very common colloquialism that translates into 'he/she had to be Black!'.

Moreover, the most frequent comments I heard about this racial group during interviews with non-Afro-descendant people were: 'Black people are noisy!'; 'They live in extreme poverty, but have money for alcohol and throw parties!'; 'They are poor and live in crowded conditions because their families are huge! They cannot avoid having many children, it's part of their culture'. Even a community mother,[51] during the process of the allocation of children in the public nurseries, said to an official of the Secretariat of Public Health: *'No los quiero negritos. Los negritos son más alborotados'*, or, 'I don't want those *negritos*. *Negritos* are rowdy!'[52] In this context, what is certain in the free housing neighbourhood is that, in addition to having been

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[50] See for instance, Article 9, Municipal Development Plan 2008-2011 (Alcaldía de Cali, 2008b), Article 5, Section 2.3.5 Municipal Development Plan 2012-2015 (Alcaldía de Cali, 2012b), Article 5, Section 1.2.2 Municipal Development Plan 2016-2019 (Alcaldía de Cali, 2016d).

[51] *Community mothers* are people endorsed by the *Instituto Colombiano de Bienestar Familiar* (ICBF) to provide day-care services to children from their own neighbourhoods.

[52] Comment made by an official of the Secretariat of Public Health when I asked her opinion about the existence of racism in *Llano Verde*.

residentially segregated as a consequence of a government directive, people from ethnic minorities are victims of stereotyping and discrimination by their own neighbours, displaced people, as poor as they are.

Although issues such as the concentration of ethnic minorities in specific areas also exist in the case of District 18, the location dynamics in this area are far from being the result of technocratic management as happened in planned neighbourhoods of *Aguablanca*. Ethnic minorities have arrived in the hills spontaneously, encouraged by the existence of both support networks of family and friends and the availability of cheap land (Map 7).

Map 7 Afro-descendants and Indigenous people in District 18



● People who self-identified as Afro-descendants

● People who self-identified as Indigenous

Source: Map by the author based on National Census (DANE, 2005b).

Widely left out of public action, these communities have had the opportunity to decide where to live and, in District 18, they enjoy more favourable conditions (for instance, urban connectivity and less violent environments) than those offered in social housing complexes such as *Llano Verde*. In the settlements that make up the case study, I identified four clusters of Afro-descendants (Map 8). As in District 15, people settled there are mainly from the Pacific coast and most of them came to Cali fleeing from armed conflict.

Map 8 Clusters of Afro-descendants in the informal settlements



Sources: Map by the author based on National Census (DANE, 2005b). Concentration of Afro-descendants: mapping activities with local leaders.

These communities have gradually occupied the little vacant land in the steepest areas and their homes are in more precarious conditions than those who arrived earlier from the Andean region. Discussing the difficult situation in which Afro-descendants live in *Pampas del Mirador*, a social leader told me his hypothesis,

> Please, don't misunderstand this, but on this side of the neighbourhood there are many people from Cauca and Nariño[53] and they persevere; they never stay still. On the other side are the Afros coming from the Pacific coast [...] Right there where there is a lack of progress in the construction of housing [...] Improving the home is not a priority but that is due to their culture, because of their race and ethnicity. (Personal communication, March 23, 2017).

This misconception that people from the Pacific coast are less entrepreneurial than those from the Andean region is very popular in Colombia and is taken for granted. However, the same leader who made the previous comment, referred to the leader of a neighbouring area as one of the most enterprising and hardworking of the entire settlement and, notably, she is Afro-descendant. In the settlements, it is noteworthy that local leaders work together with Afro-descendant communities in order to achieve common goals, something that does not happen in *Llano Verde* where, as we will see later, the leaders of ethnic minorities have been excluded by their peers from participation activities.

This analysis of data (produced for both cases) reveals three core issues. First, the production of marginality through ethno-racial segregation in new housing developments demonstrates that the principles of coloniality of power continue to govern urban planning and housing policies. These principles are so rooted in society that the systemic marginalisation of ethnic minorities is not perceived as a problem but as a reality intrinsic to poverty, ignoring the fact that the origin of this form of discrimination is colonial. However, as we have seen in the case of *Llano Verde*, national guidelines applied by local governments without further questioning have aggravated ethno-racial segregation in communities with similar economic conditions. In this case, it has not been poverty which has kept Black and Indigenous communities segregated but the very government policies designed to assist them.

Second, the place of residence can generate greater degrees of marginality but, when race is added, spatial segregation and socio-economic gaps between vulnerable Afro-descendants or Indigenous and Whites or Mestizos are wider. What the cross-case analysis reveals is that ethnic minorities benefiting from social housing projects not only lose the right to choose where to live according to their convenience, but also

[53] These are the two departments south of Valle del Cauca. Although they also have part of their territory in the Pacific littoral, the interviewee is referring to the people coming from the Andean mountains.

do not have the opportunity to choose the location of their own home within a neighbourhood. Thus, poorly conceived planning policies have not only grouped ethnic-minorities together, further aggravating their degree of marginalisation, but they have prevented them from living in places that are more in line with their needs, employment opportunities and family networks. Although housing in the settlements is more vulnerable in many ways, Afro-descendant communities in District 18 enjoy location advantages that become a central factor for overcoming poverty, a condition that has been denied to beneficiaries of social housing in remote areas such as *Llano Verde*.

Finally, the integration of ethnic minorities through community activities is more difficult when there is a high degree of spatial segregation that further entrenches the separation between Afro-descendants and White or Mestizo groups. An active participation in solving collective problems is more likely when they are seen as a common issue and not as something that concerns particular groups. As happens in *Llano Verde*, the fact that ethnic minorities are highly concentrated ends up isolating them (or they end up isolating themselves) from decision-making to the detriment of their own well-being.

In this context, if as explained above ethno-racial segregation can be produced and reproduced by the government and its planners, the question then arises whether the interest in coping with urban segregation expressed by the local government in recent plans and public policies is more sophistry than fact. Trying to identify clues to this question, I will come back to ethno-racial segregation in Chapter 3 by addressing current policies concerning urban planning and housing at the municipal level, which invoke the 'reduction of socio-spatial segregation' as one of the main goals and challenges of Cali (Concejo de Santiago de Cali, 2014, p. Art. 14).

2.2 Informality

Although the terms *informal sector* and *informality* were coined to explain an economic phenomenon, these notions rapidly transcended the labour market and focused on other aspects such as dwelling and mobility. During the second half of the 1970s, therefore, *informal housing* became a recurring subject in scholarship and, as mentioned in the introduction to this study, John Turner became one of the most

influential authors in the field. Turner proposed new mechanisms for ensuring urban housing for the poor ranging from self-help housing and progressive development to settlement upgrading initiatives.[54] This approach -backed technically and financially by international agencies such as UN-Habitat and the World Bank- materialised through the implementation of projects in several cities of Latin America, which produced diverse and controversial results. In Colombia, for instance, authors such as Gilma Mosquera (1984) and Hernando Carvajalino (2007) suggest that self-construction was a big mistake because it left the beneficiaries alone to build their own houses without necessarily the technical knowledge to produce high quality dwellings.

In the 1980s, Hernando De Soto, grounded in a neoliberal approach, proposed the massive implementation of programmes to 'formalise the informal' that also had a great impact on Latin American housing policies. While denying external factors as the main cause of informality, De Soto asserted that excessive government interference inhibited the development of the free market. Instead, this author celebrated the creative ways in which the urban poor were able to find new ways of living outside bureaucratic and static governmental rules. Opposing this perspective, neo-Marxist authors such as Pradilla (2014) hinted that informality was 'the expression of the incapacity of the capitalist system to offer employment and stable income, as well as to provide essential housing and social services to the entire population'.

Despite the fact that many academics demonstrated the drawbacks of Turner's and De Soto's proposals as the solution to counteract the affordable housing shortage in Latin America, housing policies in subsequent years were mainly grounded in the guidelines of both authors. Hence, at the end of the 20th century, the pre-eminence of these proposals in the region became proof of the persistence of the rhetoric of modernity based on the idea that any situation 'can be "corrected" with "development", "democracy" [and] a "strong economy"' (Mignolo, 2005, p. 11). The involvement of international agencies in the provision of housing, along with poverty alleviation programmes, supports the argument that countries from the global North continue to perceive marginality and informality as 'failures of development', and therefore,

[54] Some authors, such as Burgess (1978, p. 1126), challenged this approach, arguing that Turner's proposal represented 'nothing less than the now traditional attempts of capitalist interests to palliate the housing shortage in ways that do not interfere with the effective operation of these interests'.

approach cities presenting these phenomena as places 'in urgent need of intervention' (Sheppard, Leitner & Maringanti, 2013, p. 894).

Other authors such as Roy & AlSayyad (2004) have developed a different approach. For them, informality may be the result of policies and strategies that fail to comprehend the complexity of social systems in which urban planning operates. As Roy (2005, p. 156) suggests, '[t]o deal with informality [...] partly means confronting how the apparatus of planning produces the unplanned and unplannable'. Therefore, approaching informality requires addressing this phenomenon *as a logic that goes beyond the duality developed/formal - underdeveloped/informal*, which is itself derived from the rhetoric of modernity. Thus, addressing this implies admitting that a large number of activities classified as informal have become an intrinsic part of the daily life of citizens.

In the following analysis, I demonstrate that informal practices in city-making are not only the result of *spontaneous organising logics* but the outcome of a *top-down institutional planning* approach focused on promoting spatial order and providing housing as the main strategies to tackle marginality. To do so, I address informality through the lens of both informal and government-led housing, including a general examination of local businesses and transport dynamics in the two case studies.

2.2.1 Housing

Under the premise that informality is an organising logic that occurs not only in informal but also in formal neighbourhoods, I came across two different ways in which this phenomenon reveals itself in the case of *Llano Verde*. The first is the emergence of an *informal housing market* stimulated by the fact that the '100% subsidised housing' programme prohibits the beneficiaries for making any commercial transaction involving the dwelling for at least ten years (MVCT, 2013a, p. Art. 4). This means that if people sell, lease or leave their homes, the Ministry of Housing has the right to revoke the administrative act that granted the property and assign it to another family (MVCT, 2013a, p. Art. 7). As a result, housing transactions in this neighbourhood are all informal, because people cannot leave evidence or official records of any negotiation.

When asked about this matter, several interviewees said that they knew people who leased or sold their homes, but apparently nobody is willing to report them for fear of retaliation. However, this informal market is fairly obvious: a five-minute search on a popular website for purchasing and selling in Colombia was enough to find four homes for sale in *Llano Verde* (Figure 9).

Figure 9 Screenshots of housing ads for sale in Llano Verde

Source: OLX, Vendo casa en Llano Verde. Accessed: 16/01/2018.

Conditions imposed by the Ministry of Housing ignore the real needs of poor households but also prevent them from overcoming their marginal situation. Firstly, people cannot move to other municipalities to make a living. Secondly, because they are not allowed to make any transaction in the housing market, the home cannot be used as an asset for earning money; for instance, by leasing or selling the house in order to buy in more suitable locations.

Even more problematic is the fact that, in cases such as the free housing programme in Cali where 98 percent of the beneficiaries are victims of the armed conflict, these types of restrictions are opposed to other government programmes. I refer to the 'Land restitution' programme[55] aimed at facilitating the return of displaced families to their places of origin, which ran in parallel with the free housing initiative. When displaced peasants became beneficiaries of the '100% subsidised housing' initiative, they became permanent urban settlers for at least ten years. This situation means that if they decide to come back to their regions seeking to rebuild their lives, they would become informal sellers or lessors. Thus, the government itself had put them between a rock and a hard place.

[55] For more information on this programme see https://www.restituciondetierras.gov.co/inicio Accessed: 8/10/2018.

It was not only the rules on housing transactions that produced the 'unplanned and unplannable' situation that Roy (2005, p. 156) highlights. From the very moment the houses were delivered, renovations to adapt the structure to households' needs (for instance households with disabled members) and/or extensions to increase the area became common practice in *Llano Verde*. According to the regulations of the national government, informal building activities are another reason to revoke property rights in the free housing complexes (MVCT, 2013a, p. Art. 4). In spite of this rule, none of the cases found in the course of the investigation had building permit notices as required by the municipality.

As observed during fieldwork, both renovations and extensions are carried out in stages, starting with the occupation of the front yard that can be used for a small business or as an annexe of the living room. Afterwards, the backyard is roofed to become a storage area or to extend the kitchen. Later, a concrete slab is built to cover the backyard in order to have additional room on the second floor. Finally, some of the people with greater financial capacity erect a third floor. These modifications, typical of social housing complexes developed from a top-down approach (Jirón, 2012, p. 83), become problematic because these houses were not designed to be extended. For instance, when the backyard is roofed, the air flow and natural light are completely blocked, contravening the regulations on habitation standards.

Original design (right). Construction of a third floor (middle). House with a roofed front yard (left). Photo by the author (2017).

As in many social housing projects in Colombia, in *Llano Verde* both the architectural design of the homes and the neighbourhood master plan were *closed designs* meaning that no modification could be made by the owners. As a result, getting a permit to extend the house is impossible so, as explained by a beneficiary, people complete these works without any authorisation or technical supervision.

> The house is very good, thanks for that, but we Blacks have large families and they [the government] gave us a house with two bedrooms. We are six people, how are we going to sleep? The house is only 3.50m wide by 6.0m deep so we could not fit all six in here. That's why I asked permission from the mayor's office to expand the house

> and they told me that I couldn't do anything because the lot was small and I had to keep the patio for ventilation. I said to myself: "I'm the one who lives here." And that's why I built the extension without disturbing anyone. (Personal communication, September 11, 2017).

The local government does not carry out much control over building activities in this area, which is paradoxical since municipal bodies such as the Secretaries of Housing, Health, Education and even a delegate of the Ministry of Housing frequently visit *Llano Verde* to carry out institutional activities. As a demonstration of the lack of control over compliance with building regulations, data provided by the Ministry of Housing show that between 2013 and March 2018 only one property right has been revoked. This situation is happening for two main reasons. The first is that bureaucracy around these processes makes them so long and complex that sometimes officials prefer not to proceed, while they consider that no serious crime is being committed and that families modify their homes out of necessity. The second is related to fear of retaliation by families under investigation. In any case, all my interviewees said that they feel constantly watched and threatened by the possibility that at any time the government might revoke their right to the home.

In addition, people consider that the numerous restrictions prevent them from being owners, because they have no right to decide about their homes. In the words of a beneficiary,

> We are not owners because there is a document stating: 'You can't do this... you can't do that'. We are caretakers, so how is the municipality going to charge us taxes for ten years if we don't own a single brick of this house? We are living under a *commodatum* agreement! (Personal communication, August 28, 2017).

The feeling that they are not the rightful and absolute owners but merely caretakers of their homes, together with the sensation of being under permanent government surveillance, is recurrent among the inhabitants of *Llano Verde*. Given the proven inadequacy of the project, *the ban* has become the government's tool to prevent any alteration to a social housing model established as the solution for 'poor households in need'. What this case reveal is that the government's fixation with maintaining the spatial order in a planned neighbourhood has produced the opposite result: the rapid emergence of precarious living conditions. Findings related to the appearance of an informal housing market, extra-legal expansions and renovations,

demonstrate that a formal, fully-planned neighbourhood can be gradually 'informalised' through organising logics that adapt to people's needs what policymakers, architects or planners considered 'the right thing to do'.

This reality of many formal social housing neighbourhoods in Cali contrasts with the housing dynamics in the informal settlements of District 18 which have appeared outside the plan and have been consolidated through the joint effort of the community, grass-root organisations and some NGOs. In Cali, individual acts of seizure of vacant land are frequently combined with other forms of occupation promoted by 'pirate developers' who sell lots, shacks or houses once they are established. For this reason, it is common to hear from city officials that informal occupation of land is not a survival activity but a business for a few. Although evictions still happen during the early stages of this process, it seems to be the combination of the persistence of settlers and the low reaction capacity of the government that determines people's fate.

Homes in Pampas del Mirador. Photos by the author (2017).

In the case of District 18, after the hills were occupied the local government tried to evict settlers several times but families returned again and again until they were allowed to stay. As one of the leaders of *Pampas del Mirador* explained,

> We all paid rent and we knew that these lands were own by the municipality. Actually, we knew that these fields were left by the Viceroy II for people who arrived at the city

> without a place to live.[56] But when we realised that the big landowners had taken these lands over, we decided to settle here. The place was empty; there was no cattle or anything. We arrived here and built our shacks. They evicted us several times and we always came back until they gave up and we achieved our goal. (Personal communication, March 8, 2017).

In 2001, one year after the occupation of *Pampas del Mirador*, informal settlers were allowed to stay by the elected mayor who promised not to evict them during the political campaign. However, this verbal promise did not imply any property benefit. Instead, the inhabitants of this area continue to live in a legal limbo despite the fact that most of them pay for public utilities provided by municipal companies. Furthermore, buses of the Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) run on roads that settlers built themselves and some people even pay property taxes. Paradoxically, when the community asks for funds to improve their living conditions -for instance, road paving, construction of schools or parks- the municipality argues that it is forbidden to invest public resources in informal settlements. Indeed, city officials argue that they cannot legalise these areas because, among other reasons, the municipality has no detailed information about property titles to determine whether settlements are occupying *ejidos*, public or private lands.

To exacerbate the contradiction, private developers have obtained construction permits in recent years to build multi-storey housing complexes. In the words of a leader,

> If *Santa Elena* and *La Luisa*[57] are in the same location, why are they legal? And why being right next door, are we illegal? *Polvorines* has been there for over 40 years, others for 30 and us for 20 years [...] Why in *Santa Elena* and *La Luisa* the government can register the property titles and in our lands they cannot? (Personal communication, March 8, 2017).

The ownership of available lands in which the new projects are being built is clear and this is the reason why developers have been granted building permits. However, according to city officials, determining the boundaries of most of the properties irregularly occupied has been a difficult task. Nevertheless, during the last decades,

[56] This leader is referring to the *ejidos* mentioned in Chapter 1.

[57] *Santa Elena* and *La Luisa* are two social housing complexes built in District 18 with the support of the Secretariat of Social Housing.

when the Secretariat of Housing has been able to establish that the municipality owns some of the plots, it has granted property titles to settlers. In line with De Soto's theories, municipal development plans have used titling quotas as the strategy to cope with long-term informal settlements. This situation is precisely what Gilbert (2002, p. 16) highlighted at the turn of the 21st century when he referred to the popularity of this approach among both Latin American governments and multilateral agencies. This author concluded that the risk was 'that [De Soto's] views will persuade policy makers that all they have to do is offer title deeds, and that they can leave the market to do everything else'.

Although in Cali there are other mechanisms to support people in improving the quality of their homes and surrounding areas established in the *Public Policy of Habitat Upgrading*, the municipality is not carrying out any major intervention in the western hills. Meanwhile, informal settlements continue to grow upwards (no land is now available) and a high degree of consolidation is observed in sectors such as *Palmas I* and the main road of *Pampas del Mirador*. In less than two decades, buildings have been transformed by their owners from plastic and wood shacks to brick and concrete houses that range from one to four storeys (Map 9).

Map 9 Urban fabric and height of buildings



Source: Map by the author based on data collected through fieldwork (2017).

Currently, the territory has been occupied with a relatively regular urban fabric despite the sloping topography of the place, designed by both 'pirate developers' as in the case of *La Arboleda* and communities in the case of the other four settlements. Higher densities were identified along main roads (peripheral access in the west limit and *Calle 2C-O* in *Pampas del Mirador*) as well as on the north side of *Palmas I* where the road carrying public transport converges with the road leading to the rural area. Housing dynamics shown in Map 9 demonstrate that people in this area are no longer afraid of getting evicted and feel free to build their homes according to both financial capacity and spatial needs. As in other contexts analysed by authors such as Fernandes (2011), Payne (1989) and Sanyal (1996), informal settlers have been more willing to invest insofar as the municipality has built some infrastructures.[58] This 'freedom', which the inhabitants of the planned neighbourhoods lack, has allowed them to have a better quality of life in spatial terms and, as will be presented above, even using the house as a means to generate income.

However, considering that people living in this area have solved their housing problems through insurgent practices, this community faces a major problem: most of the homes do not comply with standards for earthquake resistance. Building *safe homes*, in fact, has also been recurring in the government's discourse that promotes slum clearance and massive social housing construction. However, as we have seen in the case of Llano Verde, due to unsupervised structural alterations, the current level of vulnerability of homes built by the government, extensively modified by dissatisfied owners, could be similar to that of homes built by informal settlers.

Whether structural vulnerability can reach similar levels in both formal and informal settlements in the medium and long term, one of the main differences that arises from the analysis is that despite the fact that informal settlers occupy vacant land by resorting to extra-legal practices, the inhabitants of the free housing programme also feel under permanent surveillance and at permanent risk of losing their homes. In the free housing programme, the idea of maintaining an established order has made the state not a facilitator to help families overcome marginality, but a permanent watchdog determined to prevent the emergence of dynamics that, as we shall see in the next sections, are typical of poor urban areas. In this regard, the case studies reveal the

[58] During the last decade, almost all the area has been connected to public utility networks (water, sewerage and energy), the road where the BRT feeder bus runs has been paved, and some numbers indicating addresses have been placed in outdoor panels in both streets and homes.

great distance that exists between policies and the everyday practices of communities that, without much support from the state to overcome problems of a more structural nature, constantly challenge a system that has failed to offer alternatives to the prevailing approach of 'development' and 'planning'.

2.2.2 Local economies and transport

Given the high rates of unemployment and under-employment that characterise poor urban communities, informal businesses have become an alternative way to make a living. In the case of Cali, this type of businesses usually take place inside the home or in public spaces and can be found not only in informal settlements but also in formally built environments located in low-income areas.

In *Llano Verde*, in addition to the fact that urban design did not include areas for commerce and services, the fragile financial situation of many households has led them to use the dwelling or adjacent spaces for income generation. As a result, small businesses have mushroomed in both homes and sidewalks, particularly along the main roads. The situation is similar in the informal settlements of District 18 where businesses are also subsistence units which operate on the first or second floor of homes and also offer goods and services on a small scale. As in the free housing complex, they serve a predominantly local demand due both to the type of products and their remote location. During fieldwork I found that the most common economic activities are grocery stores, bakeries, liquor stores, small restaurants, clothing stores, while services are mainly dressmaking, hairdressing, cell phone and Internet rooms (Map 10).

Informal businesses in Llano Verde (Google Street View, 2016) and in the settlements (photo by the author, 2017).

In both cases, small businesses create an endogenous economy since people from adjacent areas are not potential customers. In the case of *Llano Verde*, stigmatisation of the neighbourhood as a poor and dangerous place, together with fear of retaliation for previous protests by the neighbours of *Córdoba* and *Morichal* against the free

housing project, make outsiders afraid to visit the place. In the settlements, people from neighbouring areas just do not need to go to other places since they also have small business which provide commerce and services at a local level.

Map 10 Informal businesses in the case studies



*Llano Verde: sampling on main roads.

Source: Maps by the author based on information gathered from Google Street View (2016) followed by a random verification in Llano Verde and data collected through fieldwork in District 18 (2017).

It is striking that although the emergence of informal businesses in the settlements is something common, in *Llano Verde* local-scale economic units have been the result of household needs and not the outcome of a planning strategy to ensure income generation. The design of this neighbourhood for nearly 20,000 people with a single land-use proves the poor level of understanding by policy makers, planners and builders of urban dynamics in low-income contexts. Ignoring the needs of social housing beneficiaries has not only prevented them from accessing good-quality commerce and services. It has also denied the possibility of using the home to make a living, which reinforces my argument that providing what the government considers proper housing is not enough to break the cycle of marginality. Indeed, the proliferation of small stores in almost every block, in both cases, confirms that the typical features of new forms of marginality such as deterioration of wage labour, the

retrenchment of the welfare state and long-term unemployment *operates interchangeably* in both formal and informal poor environments.

But, informality is not restricted to housing and businesses, since the proliferation of informal means of transport are also a common denominator in poor areas of Cali. What I have found is that in both case studies public transportation is poor and people are compelled to resort, on a daily basis, to alternatives outside the city transport system. These forms of transport operate under three modalities: 1) *gualas*, the name given to old utility vehicles adapted for transporting around 15 people, 2) 'pirate' cars which are private vehicles in very poor condition that provide collective passenger transport services, and 3) *moto-ratones* or mouse-motorbikes transporting passengers. All of them ran on a small scale a decade ago, but have flourished after the implementation of the BRT system when bus routes providing services in the urban peripheries disappeared.

In the case of *Llano Verde*, informal transport[59] moved in to take over the unserved routes, since the BRT feeder bus runs every 40 minutes and, according to community representatives, it does not connect the neighbourhood with strategic areas of the city. In the informal settlements, where paradoxically BRT feeder buses are more frequent (every 10 to 15 minutes), long journey times compel people to resort to informal means, which cover almost the same areas as the BRT. Even with current limitations in the settlements, the greatest difference between the two cases is that, today, a person living in the upper part of District 18 takes between 50 and 61 minutes to reach work nodes in public transport whereas people from *Llano Verde* take between 82 and 90 minutes to get to the same places. This fact makes clear that inconvenient locations coupled with limited access to public transport are major disadvantages that the inhabitants of social housing complexes in remote areas face as a result of poorly planned projects.

So far in this section we have seen how when the critical indicator (housing deficit) is considered to be resolved by the government, other key aspects such as habitability and comfort in the house, income generation or connectivity are left aside.

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[59] Including utility vehicles used in the slopes (where conventional buses cannot go), which appeared in this flat area with paved and wide roads, demonstrating the failure of the municipality to anticipate transport requirements.

As shown in the case of *Llano Verde*, people have been left to their fate with a closed architectural design, no commercial areas and a limited public transport service. As happen in informal settlements, in state-led neighbourhoods alternative organising logics also emerge to meet pressing needs, proving the capacity of people to cope with daily issues related to key aspects such as housing, transport or livelihoods. However, as will be discussed in Section 2.5, the dialogue between technicians and communities about how these alternatives can become seeds for achieving more appropriated solutions is still missing. As I argue in this study, people's experiences, voices and actions must be broadly considered in the city-building in order to reach social justice, and informality is one in a constellation of ways in which citizens communicate how their opinion is ignored not only in the settlements but also in fully-planned government-led housing complexes.

2.3 Hyperunemployment

The third characteristic inherent to urban marginality identified in this study is *hyperunemployment*, a concept introduced by Javier Auyero (1999, p. 49) to refer to specific social segments that experience long spells of unemployment with minimal chance of being hired in a formal job. As mentioned in the introductory chapter, since the late 1960s, theories on marginality grounded in a historical-structuralist approach underlined the role of Latin American industrial capitalism in the consolidation of a permanently 'excluded labour force' (Quijano, 1974, p. 421). According to Quijano (1974, p. 418) this available manpower '*loses in a permanent and not a transitory way the possibility of being absorbed into those hegemonic levels of production*' [italics in original]. According to Nun (1971), what he called the *marginal mass* resulted from the 'contradiction between the prevailing relations of production and the level of development achieved by the productive forces' (Nun, 1971, p. 29). As Auyero argues, at the present time the 'structural character of the mass of the unemployed' alluded to by Quijano and Nun, produced effects beyond their predictions: '(1) depressing incomes; (2) the deterioration of working conditions; and (3) the worsening of contractual guarantees for labour force' (Auyero, 1999, pp. 48–49).

In the neoliberal era the factors contributing to the intensification of unemployment in Latin America, as well as in advanced economies, are the deproletarianisation resulting from deindustrialisation and privatisation of public

enterprises (Auyero, 2003, p. 50), coupled with the precariousness of wage-labour (Sassen, 2002; Wacquant, 1996, p. 124). To this must be added the dismantling of public welfare systems, which condemns large segments of the population to impoverishment and social deterioration (Harvey, 2007, p. 76; Wacquant, 1999, p. 1643). In Colombia, for instance, aid policies have been gradually replaced by CCT programmes such as '*Red Unidos*'[60] and the financial assistance received by a small proportion of vulnerable households does not cover even their basic needs.

Despite the generalisation of the unemployment crisis, the most problematic question is that this phenomenon affects some groups more deeply than others. In this vein, some authors such as Sabatini et al. (2001, pp. 32–33) and Vivas (2013) highlight that there is a close correlation between residential segregation and long-term unemployment. These scholars have found that when spatial segregation entails longer journey times, or when the information circulating in sectors with a homogeneously poor population is narrow, access to job opportunities tends to be limited.

Within this framework, this section focuses on determining how hyperunemployment manifests itself in formal and informal environments in order to gain a better understanding of the underlying factors that produce and perpetuate this phenomenon. The first part elaborates on the geography of unemployment and the relation between levels of education and employment dynamics. The second part includes the variable race within the analysis, expanding previous findings of the operation or racial discrimination in Cali presented in Section 2.1, demonstrating that Afro-descendants and Indigenous people are hit harder by unemployment, underemployment and informality than White/Mestizo groups. Addressing the case studies, the final part displays some figures on average monthly incomes in both cases in order to unveil the existing relationship between stigmatisation and hyperunemployment. This section thus delves into the role of social and cultural stigmas in long-term joblessness, exploring how the community of *Llano Verde* has been directly affected by a programme intended to help the victims of the armed conflict to overcome poverty and marginality.

[60] This government programme is aimed at assisting 1,5M of households (primarily forcibly displaced people and families with SISBEN scores below 47.99) to help them overcome extreme poverty through health assistance, nutrition, primary education and opportunities for income generation.

2.3.1 Education, race and employment opportunities

To begin with the analysis, I first checked the role of education and employment in social mobility by district and, as expected, figures were not encouraging. In terms of education, the average years of schooling of people older than 15 years in District 15 are 8.6, one year below numbers found in District 18 (9.6 years), and 1.2 years under the city average (Ministerio de Trabajo & Alcaldía de Cali, 2013).[61] Results on unemployment were similar. Districts in the eastern fringe (7, 11, 15 and 21) as well as District 20 in the western hills have rates that fluctuate between 17 and 20 per cent, above the average for the city which is 15.1 per cent (Figure 10).

Figure 10 Average years of schooling and unemployment rate



Source: Graph and calculations by the author based on data from the Employment and Quality of Life Survey (Ministerio de Trabajo & Alcaldía de Cali, 2013).

[61] According to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP, 2017) the number of years of schooling in Colombia should be 13.6

This evidence confirms that education and employment are unequally distributed privileges in Cali and disadvantaged communities are trapped in a downward spiral generated by the perpetuation of low-quality education provided, paradoxically, by the state.

Bearing in mind that the *unemployment rate* corresponds to the percentage of the labour force[62] who are jobless, it is worth mentioning that in Colombia a person who performed some paid activity for more than one hour during the week prior to the survey is considered to be *employed*. Hence, there is a bias in employment/ unemployment statistics that conceals other central aspects, such as underemployment, informality or the quality of jobs. Such clarification is important in view of the fact that nearly half of the occupied population (45.6 per cent) is working in the informal labour market (DANE, 2017a, p. 4), which offers neither economic stability nor access to the contributory social security system.

Even considering this bias in the statistics, when the variable *race* is added to the analysis, deeper and less visible problems emerge. In Cali it was found that unemployment is not caused by low education levels alone but is largely attributable to the persistence of racist attitudes amongst the population, and Afro-descendants suffer from labour exclusion even when qualified (Viáfara et al., 2016, p. 87). As the maps above reveal, districts with the highest concentration of Afro-descendants in the east side of the city have reached unemployment rates close to 20 per cent, more than twice the national average estimated to be 9.4 per cent (DANE, 2017b, p. 1). The most critical joblessness situation was found in District 15 where 19.4 per cent of the population face this condition, almost half of them Afro-descendants (Graph 4).

[62] The sum of employed and unemployed.

Graph 4 Unemployment rate per district



Source: Graph and calculations by the author based on data from the Employment and Quality of Life Survey (EECV) (Ministerio de Trabajo & Alcaldía de Cali, 2013).

Recent studies carried out in Cali reveal that, in addition to high rates of unemployment, Afro-descendant and Indigenous communities experience the highest rates of underemployment and informality in comparison with other ethnic groups (Graph 5).

Graph 5 Un/underemployment and informality by ethno-racial condition



Source: Graph by the author based on data from Viáfara et al. (2016, pp. 70–75).[63]

As Viáfara et al. (2016, pp. 70–71) argue, in the case of Cali two main factors prevent Afro-descendant people from finding quality jobs. On the one hand, ethnic minorities frequently have poor education as a result of their sociodemographic

[63] *Subjective underemployment* refers to people who want to improve their working conditions while *objective underemployment* refers to people who, in addition to this desire, have made efforts to improve their jobs.

vulnerability, which limits their ability to compete on equal terms in the labour market. On the other, even when Afro-descendants strive to educate themselves, employers tend to give priority to White or Mestizo people. These recent findings have not prompted any change in local policies for enhancing inclusion of ethnic minorities in both quality schools and quality jobs.[64] The failure to achieve racially inclusive education and employment, coupled with the insistence of ruling elites that racism in Cali is not an issue, is contributing to the perpetuation of the marginal conditions of minority groups. As Figure 11 illustrates, people experiencing long-term unemployment (more than six months) are concentrated in the districts that make up *Aguablanca* (13, 14, 15 and 21), while in western districts numbers are less worrisome.

Figure 11 Percentage of people looking for a job for more than six months



Source: Map and graph by the author based on data from SISBEN (2017).

[64] In fact, although the survey included one question about ethnic self-identification, interviews with professors from *Universidad del Valle* in charge of the EECV suggest that the government was against measuring this variable, under the argument that race has little to do with the interest of a survey focused on employability and quality of life at the district level

The fact that 42 per cent of Cali's long-term unemployed population lives in 4 of the 22 districts shows the degree of relegation of these communities. As mentioned above, differences between racial groups in Cali do not occur simply as a result of socio-economic stratification or attained levels of education, because Afro-descendant people with comparable education systematically obtain worse results in the labour market than their White or Mestizos counterparts. Viáfara et al. (2016, p. 87) have found that Afro-descendants experience an income gap of 8.04 per cent below compared with White people doing the same activity. Indeed, my estimates of family income in male-headed households in *Llano Verde* show that, even if this neighbourhood is homogeneously poor, Afro-descendant families have monthly incomes 5 per cent below the rest of its population.

Such discrimination by race in the labour market also manifests itself in the type of activities carried out by people from ethnic minorities. Statistics on non- or low-skill occupations set out in Table 2 indicate that a high percentage of Afro-descendant and Indigenous people in Cali are linked to precarious activities such as manufacturing, construction, mining and domestic services.

Table 2 Three non- or low-skill occupations by ethnic group (percentages)

Low- or non-skill Occupations*	Indigenous			Afro-descendant			Mulatto			White			Mestizo		
	M	F	T	M	F	T	M	F	T	M	F	T	M	F	T
Manufacturing, construction and mining industry	**30.1**	3.5	18.9	**27.4**	3.0	16.3	21.4	2.5	13.1	13.4	1.8	8.5	17.9	3.0	11.4
Non-skilled workers	9.9	0.1	5.7	10.5	0.7	6.0	12.2	0.7	7.2	10.4	0.9	6.4	10.9	0.5	6.4
Domestic servants	1.3	**22.2**	10.1	1.4	**22.9**	11.2	1.5	13.3	6.6	0.4	4.8	2.3	1.1	8.3	4.3

*Occupations chosen from a list of eleven options included in the original table, considering that these are the least demanding in terms of skills. M: Male; F: Female; T: Total.
Source: Table based on data from Viáfara et al. (2016, p. 81). Icons: https://www.flaticon.com

These figures concur with the assertion of a leader of *Llano Verde* when asked about her perception of the labour conditions of Afro-descendants in Cali. According to her,

> In the labour market the Afro are in informal jobs. Women, for instance, carry a large bowl on their heads and sell products or work as maids. Men work mainly on construction. When there are no vacancies in construction, many women have to assume the role of men and work to support the home. (Personal communication, September 5, 2017).

In addition to highlighting the precariousness of jobs in which a significant part of the Afro-descendant population is working, the leader's statement above also draws attention to the distribution of activities by gender. According to figures in Table 2, a high percentage of Indigenous and Afro-descendant males (30.1 and 27.4 per cent respectively) currently perform activities related to manufacturing, mining and construction. Regarding females, 22.2 per cent of Indigenous and 22.9 of Afro-descendants work in domestic services. Given that DANE (2018c, p. 4) has estimated that in Cali people working in the informal labour market reached 46.8 per cent (August 2018), it is highly probable that a high percentage of non- or low-skill workers lack formal contracts and social security benefits.

2.3.2 Hyperunemployment in the case studies

A closer look at the case studies shows that the critical economic situation of poor households is strikingly apparent in the average family incomes, which are scarcely equivalent to the monthly minimum wage established in Colombia at US$277. In District 15, vulnerable households' monthly earnings range between US$57 and US$133 in the informal settlement and US$103 and US$181 in formal neighbourhoods. In District 18 monthly earnings become lower as the neighbourhoods approach the western edge of the city. In the informal settlements, monthly income per family ranges between US$160 and US$96 while in the flat area it reaches US$239 (Map 11).

Map 11 Average monthly income in Districts 15 and 18

US$57 US$181

US$95 US$239

Informal settlements District 15: (1) Las Gorditas: n.d.; (2) El Retiro: US$106; (3) Retiro/Laureano Gómez: US$123; (4) Laureano Gómez: US$133; (5) Colonia Nariñense: US$90; (6) Brisas del Caracol: US$57; (7) La Antena: US$66, (8) MD: US$116; (9) Brisas de las Palmas: US$101; (10) El Encanto: n.d.; (11) Haiti: US$84; (12) Brisas de Comuneros: US$79; (13) Africa: n.d.; (14) El Valladito: US$95; (15) La Lomita: n.d.

Informal settlements District 18: (1) Pampas del Mirador: US$140; (2) Palmas I: US$104; (3) Brisas de las Palmas: US$130; (4) La Arboleda: US$143; (5) Alto Polvorines: US$153; (6) Alto Meléndez: US$160; (7) Alto Jordán: US$152; (8) Palmas II: US$121; (9) El Árbol: US$104; (10) La Piscina: n.d.; (11) Choclona: US$139; (12) Camino del Minero: US$119; (13) Tanque III: US$95; (14) Alto Nápoles: US$150; (15) Bosques: n.d.; (16) Tamayo: US$151; (17) Alto de los Chorros: US$143; (18) La Cruz: US$140; (19) La Esperanza: US$136.

Source: Maps and estimates by the author based on data from SISBEN (2017).

This comparison between the two cases reveals that families of the free housing complex, where the average monthly income is US$103, have economic conditions analogous to those of people living in the slopes of District 18. This similarity in monthly income between state-led housing and the informal settlements demonstrates the failure of the programme in reducing poverty. Average daily incomes of US$3.4 per household, three years after *Llano Verde* was delivered to the beneficiaries, is the best indicator of this statement. Furthermore, the additional burden of owning a home, when earnings are insufficient to pay obligations such as taxes and utility bills, poses major concerns to people who have already been struggling with other issues after their relocation.

In addition to their inconvenient location, racial issues and low education levels, beneficiaries of *Llano Verde* tend to encounter more barriers when it comes to finding a job. The inhabitants of this neighbourhood have been socially marked, and thus

discriminated against in the labour market, due to their condition as 'displaced' people related to the armed conflict. In Colombia, indeed, the victims of the armed conflict are afflicted by symbolic forms of violence[65] since the first moment they were pigeonholed into one special category: 'the displaced'.

The paradox lies in the fact that stigmatisation of forced migrants persists in Colombia even though it is widely known that people affected by the internal conflict, especially ethnic minorities, have moved to cities seeking refuge. In fact, figures in Cali show that the main reason for Afro-descendants and Indigenous people to migrate was threats against their lives, while Whites and Mestizos moved to this city mainly for family reasons or to look for job opportunities (Graph 6). This fact substantiates my argument that colonial patterns of domination continue to be reproduced and have shaped a new regime of marginality in Colombian cities. It is not accidental that the poorest social segments and ethnic minorities have been steadily exiled from their territories and pushed to urban peripheries.

Graph 6 Reasons for migrants to move to Cali by ethnic group



Source: Graph by the author based on Viáfara, Urrea, Vivas, Correa & Rodríguez (2016, p. 39).

For forced migrants, reaching the city was not a guarantee for a better quality of life or better working conditions. The lack of contingency plans between 1990 and 2010, when forced displacement was accelerated in Colombia, condemned this

[65] As an instrument for domination and social control exerted through communication, symbolic violence serves to maintain hierarchical relationships among groups who have normalised the existence of labels.

population to start from scratch as they lived with relatives, seized vacant land on the city outskirts or paid rent in the cheapest locations. Following a national pattern, the precariousness in which displaced people live in Cali is evident. In both case studies, the highest concentration of this population occurs in the informal settlements and, in the case of District 15, in *Llano Verde* (Map 12).

Map 12 Victims of the armed conflict living in Districts 15 and 18



Source: Maps by the author based on data provided by the Secretariat of Public Health of Cali (2017).

Most interviewees said that being stigmatised when they first arrived in Cali was painful but being rejected by their neighbours or by potential employers when they moved to *Llano Verde* was much worse. As two beneficiaries assert,

> The first time that we came to receive our homes there were people with posters saying: 'We don't want you here. Paramilitaries! Guerrillas!' They were people from *Córdoba* and *Morichal*. They stood around the entrance and received us that way. (Personal communication, September 5, 2017).

> When we say that we are from *Llano Verde* some companies don't hire us because we are seen as suspects. If you're a person who has been relocated, then you're a paramilitary or guerrilla. (Personal communication, June 7, 2017).

From this situation it is striking that victims living in other poor areas are not discriminated against by their neighbours or by the labour market. As shown in the

map above, in the informal settlements of District 18 there is a high concentration of victims with similar trajectories, but none of the interviewees mentioned stigmatisation or rejection as a result of their past related to the conflict. For external actors, people living in the poorest areas of the slopes tend to be seen as 'suspicious' and their territory as 'dangerous' as a result of a stigmatisation by place of residence. However, unlike the inhabitants of *Llano Verde*, this condition has not prevented people from the hills from having more opportunities in the labour market as employment/unemployment figures show.

According to these results, 'marginality by contagion' as a causal factor of hyperunemployment can be detached from the territorial connotation given by Mehretu et al. (2000, p. 93) under the argument that stigmatisation of 'displaced people' has affected, to a greater extent, a group that have been encapsulated by the state within a social category, independently of the physical place they occupy within the city. In this regard, it is my contention that *hyperunemployment is not only the result of limited skills or low education levels since other factors such as race or labels imposed through government policies play a central role in long-term joblessness*. In a context in which labour markets are ruled by neoliberalism and globalisation, operating to the detriment of labour conditions, we must add that in Cali the matrix of domination derived from classist and racist social relations characteristic of coloniality of power (Quijano, 2000b, p. 218) is contributing to long-term unemployment in specific areas of the city.

Although the definition of *hyperunemployment* introduced by Auyero (1999, p. 49) does not include causal factors such as stigmatisation, ethnicity or race, my findings reveal that both Afro-descendants and victims of the conflict who have been grouped by the government in the free housing complex obtain lower quality jobs, lower salaries or experience longer spells of joblessness than other groups with similar socio-economic conditions. This particular fact leads to two main conclusions. At the urban scale, the *racist character of the social relations* that have ruled Cali since the colonial era still persists and manifests itself not only in the city-making, as shown in Section 2.1, but also in the labour market. This situation demonstrates that the principles of coloniality of power continue to operate, creating barriers for ethnic minorities to overcome their marginal condition within the city. At the local scale, on the other hand, not only does *marginality by contagion* become a fundamental barrier

that prevents people from poor areas finding a proper job, but so does the *systemic marginality* that operates when national poorly-conceived programmes are carried out by municipal governments without major objection.

Hence, whereas hyperunemployment is a global phenomenon, largely related to macroeconomic trends, in the case of Cali it cannot be delinked from structural and socio-cultural factors. As presented in this section, stigmatised ethnic minorities and communities (partly because of their places of residence or for their past links with the armed conflict) have little chances of succeeding in the formal labour market. Nevertheless, the role of markers of disadvantage in reducing the possibilities for disadvantaged groups to overcome hyperunemployment is almost undetectable in current official statistics, and clear signs of progress in employability policies for vulnerable populations are not yet visible.

In addition to the little attention paid in the public sphere to the existence of a correlation between socio-cultural factors and hyperunemployment, results ultimately reveal that current urban planning and housing policies have been insufficient to achieve social justice. As shown above, the factors that have influenced long-term joblessness during the last decades have been reproduced and highly aggravated in the case of *Llano Verde*. In this context, the weakness of experiences such as the '100% subsidised housing' in addressing strategies for ensuring livelihoods or reducing stigmas confirms that the notion of *social mobility*, closely linked to education and job opportunities, continues to be translated by the government as *provision of housing units*.

As discussed in the next section, ignoring the reality of beneficiaries has produced a series of unwanted results, including the rapid emergence of diverse forms of violence. This specific characteristic of *Llano Verde*, becomes one of the main differences between this case study and other social housing complexes in other contexts where spatial degradation and violent dynamics come on gradually. In this neighbourhood, the line that separates destitution and hyperunemployment from the opportunities to generate income in illegal activities is thin and blurred, and this condition has worked as an accelerator in the reproduction of the violent dynamics that have afflicted the *Aguablanca* District for decades.

2.4 Urban violence

In both advanced and less advanced economies, the urban poor are not only affected by direct or personal aggressions, while less visible forms of violence, of a structural and symbolic nature, afflict deprived communities on a daily basis (Auyero, 1999; Galtung, 1969, 1990; Perlman, 2005; Wacquant, 2008). As suggested in the introductory chapter, the fact that a large part of the urban population lives in precarious conditions in an era marked by globalisation and economic growth constitutes an act of violence *per se*.

Personal violence in Cali has been alarming since the last decades of the 20th century and, despite a significant decline in homicide rates over the last five years, this phenomenon persists.[66] In this city, 32,132 people have been murdered between 2000 and 2017 and, as Graph 7 shows, during most of the 21th century, homicide rates have been consistently higher than those registered in other Colombian cities such as Bogotá and Medellín, where a radical decrease in the number of murders has been achieved in recent years.

Graph 7 Homicides in Cali, Medellín, Bogotá and Colombia (2000-2017)



	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Homicides Cali	2209	2297	2017	2276	2176	1594	1538	1521	1473	1825	1859	1885	1861	1989	1605	1424	1335	1247
Rate Cali	110	104	89	103	92	66	72	70	67	82	83	83	81	86	68	60	56	52
Rate Medellín	160	168	177	107	56	37	36	35	47	94	86	70	52	38	27	20	22	23
Rate Bogotá	36	32	28	25	23	24	19	20	21	23	24	22	17	17	18	17	16	14
Rate Colombia	61	64	65	50	42	41	33	37	34	39	38	36	34	30	26	24	24	23

Source: Graph by the author based on data from INMLCF (2018).

[66] The ranking of the 50 most violent cities published by the *Consejo Ciudadano para la Seguridad Pública y la Justicia Penal* (2018) shows that in 2017 Cali was the most violent city in Colombia, 25th in Latin America and 28th in the world.

In the case of Medellín, some authors suggest that the drastic reduction in homicide rates is linked to institutional actions but also to agreements reached with and within criminal organisations (Doyle, 2018; Escobedo, Ramírez, Lovera & Patiño, 2016; C. A. Velásquez, 2013). Crime structures in Bogotá, instead, have had limited potential for violence and, therefore, homicides are more related to fights, ordinary crime and disputes over territories for drug micro-trafficking (Escobedo et al., 2016).

In the case of Cali, in contrast, the persistence of homicides in specific areas has been mainly explained by the operation of gang- and mafia-led violence rooted in the territories where violence has become a control mechanism within a well organised crime matrix. According to Escobedo (2013, p. 104), when the big drug cartels were dismantled in Cali during the 1990s, smaller structures maintained the so-called *oficinas de cobro* (collection offices) as necessary mechanisms to keep the business in operation. These 'offices' became independent, well-established criminal structures at the service of drug traffickers aimed at coordinating hitmen, business operations, money collection and the neutralisation of potential competitors (Escobedo, 2013, p. 13).

Unlike Medellín, where a few powerful chiefs of organised crime seem to have been able to retain the capacity to control criminality and violence (Doyle, 2018), organised crime structures in Cali became fragmented into small groups that lack the power to dominate violent activity at the urban scale. As shown in Graph 7, while in Medellín the homicide rate fluctuates with spikes revealing periods of agreements or clashes between perpetrators of violence, in Cali the rate has remained high and steady.

Beyond the direct incidence of gangs and organised crime, the persistence of homicidal violence in Cali is interpreted by Álvaro Guzmán (2011, p. 2351) as the result of the 'mafia culture' unleashed by drug-trafficking, which has permeated political, institutional and social networks. According to this scholar,

> Drug-trafficking mafias continue to operate but they have permeated fields of the legal economy. Then, it is not only about drug trafficking, but also about the domination of the market places, shopkeepers or money lending. (Personal communication, November 21, 2017).

Under the current structure that governs homicide statistics in Cali, estimating the influence of this 'mafia culture' in the variety of violence and crime is a difficult task since the classification of homicides by motive[67] does not reach the level of detail required for disaggregated assessments. Nevertheless, figures from the *Observatorio de Seguridad* show that revenge, settling of accounts, drug-trafficking and fights involving *organised crime* and *gangs*[68] have had a major impact on the homicide rate, in view of the fact that 60 per cent of all cases between 2012 and 2015 were attributed to these groups (Table 3). During this four-year period, homicides connected with organised crime fell by one third, whereas the number of gang-related murders almost doubled. Guerrero (2015) explains the significant reduction of homicides related to criminal organisations as a result of the implementation of stronger security policies.

Table 3 Homicides by motive in Cali between 2012 and 2015

Motive		2012	2013	2014	2015
Organised crime	Cases	952	1011	567	345
	%	51.6%	51.6%	36.3%	25.0%
	Rate	41.5	43.6	24.1	14.6
Gangs	Cases	223	349	420	469
	%	12.1%	17.8%	26.9%	34.0%
	Rate	9.7	15.1	17.9	19.8
Ordinary crime	Cases	154	124	86	60
	%	8.4%	6.3%	5.5%	4.4%
	Rate	6.7	5.4	3.7	2.5
Interpersonal conflicts	Cases	241	344	278	300
	%	13.1%	17.6%	17.8%	21.8%
	Rate	10.5	14.8	11.9	12.7
Other motives	Cases	28	13	24	23
	%	1.5%	0.7%	1.5%	1.7%
	Rate	1.2	0.6	1.0	1.0
Non-established	Cases	246	118	187	181
	%	13.3%	6.0%	12.0%	13.1%
Overall rates*		**80.4**	**84.5**	**66.6**	**58.2**

*These rates differ slightly from those in Graph 9 since data was taken from two different sources.
Source: Table by the author based on data from Fandiño, Guerrero, Mena & Gutiérrez (2017, p. 167).

[67] In recent years consensus was reached in Cali among institutions to classify homicides by motive in six categories: 1) Organised crime: Revenge, settling of accounts and drug-trafficking. 2) Gangs: homicides linked to youth groups. 3) Ordinary crime: crimes against persons and properties. 4) Interpersonal conflicts: Street fights, events related to alcohol consumption, social intolerance and domestic violence. 5) Other motives: homicides resulting from police operations, stray bullets. 6) Non-established: when information is not precise (Fandiño, Guerrero, Mena & Gutiérrez, 2017, p. 164).

[68] The Metropolitan Police of Cali (2015, p. 3) defines 'gangs' as groups of young people with a visible leader that meet up to consume drugs and alcohol. They commit minor crimes without previous planning and fight with other groups for revenge or territorial control. Although they do not have sophisticated weapons, some of them are related to criminal structures as third level members. This means that they can receive a payment for collaborating in drug trafficking or selective homicides without establishing a permanent link with these organisations.

Although no official explanation was given for the increase in homicides linked to gangs, this phenomenon might be explained by the fact that the line that separates homicides committed by both organised crime and gangs is thin and blurred. For instance, the Metropolitan Police has found that some gang members receive payments from criminal organisations to complete tasks such as drug micro-trafficking and selective homicide.

As preliminary results of the *Tratamiento Integral de Pandillas* (TIP) programme [69] reveal, vulnerable young people in Cali have low aspirations or expectations for embarking on a life plan, which facilitates the decision to take the easy money path, through a direct or indirect link with organised crime structures as third parties. As found in other contexts by scholars such as Portes & Roberts (2005) and Wacquant (2008, p. 67), in the case of Cali there is a strong correlation between low opportunities (poor-quality education and hyperunemployment) and the emergence of alternatives to destitution linked to the drug economy and criminal networks. The concentration of violence in the most vulnerable sectors and the fact that the victims are mainly Afro-descendant, young males related to gangs or criminal organisations, demonstrates that crime continues to be an alternative despite the economic uncertainty and the permanent risk that participating in illegal activities generate.

2.4.1 Violence, ethnicity and race

The coincidence between lethal violence, pervasive poverty, unemployment and low levels of education in Cali is not accidental but rather the result of structural forms of violence.[70] As official figures show, during the last decade almost 40 per cent of the 16,925 homicides took place in *Aguablanca* where the poorest Afro-descendant families live (Graph 8).

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[69] Due to the high number of gang-related homicides, the Metropolitan Police implemented in 2015 the TIP programme, which became part of the Municipal Development Plan 2016-2019. This programme is currently carried out by the local government, the police and the Institute for Research and Development of Prevention of Violence and the Promotion of Social Coexistence (CISALVA) of the *Universidad del Valle*.

[70] Structural violence, indirect and concealed, can also be understood as *social injustice* (Galtung, 1969, p. 171). While embedded in the social and economic structures, this form of violence becomes evident by means of unequal power relations leading to unequal life opportunities.

Graph 8 Homicide per District between 2008 and 2018



Source: Graph and estimates by the author based on data from *Observatorio Social* (2018).

Despite the drop in the homicide rates mentioned above, during the last six years the deprived areas of the peri-centre, the east side and the poorest settlements in the western hills, have been consistently hit by homicidal violence (Figure 12). The persistence of this phenomenon in the same areas of the city and its rapid emergence in new stated-led housing complexes reinforces my argument that direct violence is closely related to pervasive poverty, unequal distribution of income and basic services, in a context in which customary social and racial exclusion is maintained through structural violence.

Figure 12 Geography of homicide in Cali between 2012 and 2017

2012 Rate: 81

2013 Rate: 86

2014 Rate: 68

2015 Rate: 60

2016 Rate: 56

2017 Rate: 52

Kernel density analysis. Search radii 100 meters.

Source: Maps by the author based on databases from the National Police (2018).

This argument is corroborated by the fact that almost 1,500 homicides committed between 2008 and 2018 were perpetrated in only four neighbourhoods, all of them peripheral and poor: *Siloé, Potrero Grande, Manuela Beltrá*n and *Mojica* (Figure 13).

Figure 13 The four most violent neighbourhoods (2008-2018)

	1st place		2nd place		3rd place	
2008	Manuela Beltrán	42	El Retiro	31	Siloé	30
2009	Manuela Beltrán	44	Siloé	42	El Retiro	41
2010	Potrero Grande	47	Siloé	45	Terrón Colorado	43
2011	Siloé	50	Mojica	45	Mariano Ramos	44
2012	Mojica	39	Antonio Nariño	39	Potrero Grande	38
2013	Mojica	46	Potrero Grande	43	Siloé	41
2014	Siloé	45	Potrero Grande	38	Manuela Beltrán	35
2015	Potrero Grande	37	Siloé	37	Manuela Beltrán	35
2016	Potrero Grande	28	Mojica	26	Manuela Beltrán	25
2017	Siloé	33	Comuneros I	29	Potrero Grande	26
2018	Potrero Grande	32	Siloé	29	El Vergel	29

Source: Map and table by the author based on information from Annual Reports of Homicides *Observatorio Social*, 2008-2018 (2018).

Unlike *Siloé, Mojica* and *Manuela Beltrán*, which emerged as informal settlements, *Potrero Grande* is a social housing complex built by the municipality in 2005 with the aim of relocating people living on the dyke of the Cauca river, mostly Afro-descendant communities. In this neighbourhood, socio-cultural and ethnic differences, low-quality urban and architectural design and lack of opportunities for social mobility were coupled with scant government support. According to Uribe, Holguín & Ayala (2016), the combination of these factors facilitated the establishment of criminal organisations and the emergence of clientelism and patronage, which became main drivers of violence. Despite the failure of *Potrero Grande*, the same social housing scheme was used to develop *Llano Verde*, where, as will be discussed later, similar problems rapidly emerged.

The concentration and persistence of homicides on the east side of the city led Urrea, Bergonzoli, Carabalí & Muñoz (2015) to investigate a possible correlation between homicidal violence and ethnicity in Cali. Because homicide statistics do not include data on ethnicity and race, these researchers analysed information on phenotypic traits in death certificates issued by local authorities in 2010. Through a

comparison of mortality patterns by age group of Afro-descendant and White/Mestizo populations, they demonstrated that the percentage of Afro-descendant (males and females) victims of homicide is higher than figures regarding other groups (Graph 9).

Graph 9 Deaths due to homicide by ethnicity, age group and gender (2010)



Source: Graph by the author based on data from Urrea, Bergonzoli, Carabalí & Muñoz (2015, p. 150).

These findings reveal that, in addition to poverty, spatial segregation, racial discrimination and long-term unemployment, ethnic minorities in Cali are hit harder than White/Mestizo groups by both direct and structural violence. Unfortunately, until the uneven distribution of power, resources and basic services derived from the matrix of domination prevailing in the city is modified, it is unlikely that significant changes in the figures shown in this research will occur. As Galtung (1990, p. 295) asserts, 'violence is needs-deprivation; needs-deprivation is *serious* [and] one reaction is direct violence' [italics in original].

In the case of marginalised urban communities, the upsurge of violence in recent years has often been explained as a consequence of the expansion of organised crime and drug trafficking. However, as discussed in the next sections regarding the case studies, gang-led and drug-related violence are the expression of more deeply rooted factors affecting poor communities at different levels, such as long-term unemployment, income inequality or less visible factors such as racial discrimination, stigmatisation and segregation.

2.4.2 Direct violence in the case studies

Following the pattern of homicidal violence in the city, a high percentage of violent deaths in the two districts under examination during the last five years were related to gangs and criminal organisations. However, figures in Table 4 show a very different picture in homicide motives in the two cases since numbers in District 15 were more than double the figures recorded in District 18 and the proportion between organised crime and gang-related violence is quite dissimilar in both areas. In District 15, percentages are almost the same (34 and 37 per cent respectively) while in District 18 more than half of the cases (54 per cent) were related to criminal organisations and only 8 per cent to gangs.

Table 4 Murders by motive in Districts 15 and 18 between 2013 and 2017

		Organised crime	Gangs	Interpersonal conflicts	Ordinary crime	Other causes	Non-established / without data	Total
District 15	Cases	232	255	85	27	20	64	**683**
	%	34%	37%	13%	4%	3%	9%	100%
District 18	Cases	136	19	52	10	9	24	**250**
	%	54%	8%	21%	4%	4%	9%	100%

■ Highest figure in each district.

Source: Table and estimates by the author based on data provided by CISALVA (2017).

The high number of homicides in the east side can be explained by the high presence of gangs that control the territory through the creation of invisible borders. Crossing the border is a death sentence. However, high rates are also related to the control exercised by criminal organisations that work directly or hire gang members to carry out specific tasks. As Castillo (2015) argues, high levels of violence are related to the connection of some gang members with criminal structures that demand 'services' related mainly to drug micro-trafficking, local extortion[71] or selective murders linked to debts, territorial control or retaliations.

Beyond the statistics, the spatial analysis of murders by motive in District 15 (Figure 14) reveals that violence hits harder the poorest and more segregated communities living in neighbourhoods in the north area, *Llano Verde* and the informal

[71] Local extortion, known in Colombia as *vacuna* (vaccine), consists of periodic payments that local businesses owners must pay to criminal organisations in exchange for 'security'.

settlements outside the city growth boundary. The high number of gangs in the same areas could be an indicator of the level of relegation in which deprived social groups – youngsters more than others- are maintained. Young people in District 15 are not only marginalised, poor, unemployed and Afro-descendant; they are also both victims and perpetrators of diverse forms of violence.

Figure 14 Gangs and homicides by motive, District 15 (2013-2017)



Sources: Top-left: Map by the author based on mapping activities carried out the Police of District 15 (2017) complemented by information from TIP (Policía Metropolitana de Cali, 2016). Homicide maps by the author based on databases provided by CISALVA and *Observatorio Social* (2018).

In the case of *Llano Verde*, homicidal violence has had a major impact. Between 2013 and 2018, 61 people were killed in this neighbourhood. In 2015, two years after its construction, *Llano Verde* ranked 15th of the 20 most violent neighbourhoods in Cali and in 2018 took 20th position (Observatorio de Seguridad, 2019). Although motives for murders have been diverse, official reports reveal that organised crime and gangs have had a high incidence in most of the cases. Currently, three separate gangs of

youths[72] are based in the neighbourhood, occupying and controlling a significant area where invisible borders (47th and 49th streets for instance), threats and violence follow similar patterns to those found in the rest of the district (Map 13).

Map 13 Gangs, invisible borders and murders in Llano Verde (2013-2017)

Source: Map by the author based on fieldwork and mapping activities with social leaders and the police of District 15 (2017) complemented with data provided by CISALVA and *Observatorio de Seguridad* (2018).

The first gang, *Los del Samán*, is a group of youths who are involved in drug abuse but also linked to minor crimes such as theft of money or mobile phones mainly in the south side of the neighbourhood. The second, *Los Meza*, meet in the area where the beneficiaries of *Plan Jarillón* were relocated. They are members of the same extended

[72] Currently, some members of *Los del Samán* participate in the TIP Programme, while *Los Meza* abandoned this initiative after few months avoiding commitments such as stopping drug-trafficking and petty crimes, and participating in social reintegration activities. *Los del Prins* did not even consider being part of the programme.

family and, according to the police, are involved in drug trafficking, crime at the local level and are likely to have firearms. The third gang, *Los del Prins*, occupies a corner and some adjacent blocks of the main park in the neighbourhood, paradoxically not far from the local police station.[73] The fact that this gang -recognised for being the most violent- is located in the corner of *Llano Verde* where ethnic minorities were grouped might not be a coincidence. Although it cannot be said that violence is related to the ethnic condition *per se*, homicidal violence in Cali is highly correlated to extreme poverty, race, gender and age. In this regard, what has been found in Cali is that young males permanently excluded from the formal labour market and discriminated against because they are Afro-descendant, poor and live in stigmatised areas are more willing to accept job offers in illegal activities, in spite of the risks.

According to investigations carried out by the Metropolitan Police, *Los del Prins* is involved in more complex crimes, carries firearms and has business relationships with criminal organisations that control micro-trafficking and extortion in the east side of the city. Official figures show that disputes between gangs (involving mainly *Los Meza* and *Los del Prins*) plus retaliations from these groups against other gangs of the District have resulted in 12 murders in the last five years. Victims have all been males between the age of 16 and 25 with the exception of a 10-year old girl who was a victim of crossfire.

As illustrated in Map 13, all of the cases took place inside or near the areas controlled by these groups between *Carreras* 46 and 48B and *Calles* 56D and 57 which confirms the supposition that gang members leave their 'safe area' only to carry out specific tasks. According to my interviewees, some of these youths have not left the neighbourhood since their arrival when homes were allocated to their families. Gaps in the conception of the free housing programme, such as *ignoring the needs of youngsters at-risk*, have contributed to creating new spaces of social exclusion where internal violence has flourished as a manifestation of the production and persistence of marginality.

Although territorial control, intimidation and crimes committed by members of the three gangs are highly disruptive, another key aspect revealed in the map above is

[73] In Cali, small police stations located in conflict areas assist residents in cases of domestic violence and petty crime since organised crime and gangs are managed by special units trained for these cases.

that direct violence in *Llano Verde* is not related to these groups alone. Retaliations and the settling of accounts within criminal structures -some of them related to long-standing disputes among actors in the wider armed conflict- added significantly to the level of violence. Of the 47 homicides reported between 2013 and 2017, local authorities have identified motives for 44, establishing that organised crime (18 cases) and gangs (12 cases) are linked to almost 70 per cent of murders. Some leaders claim that criminal organisations, closely related to demobilised paramilitary groups which operate in the east side of Cali, have arrived in *Llano Verde* since 2014 to take control of the neighbourhood. A social leader, threatened by members of a criminal group, told me about her experience,

> I was known in District 21 for being a human rights activist and for supporting the victims of the armed conflict. When I came for the first time to my house in *Llano Verde* some men were waiting for me while chatting with my little son. They told me that they knew all my moves in District 21 and that they came to remind me that there were 'spaces' here that I should never enter. (Personal communication, August 30, 2017).

These personal threats became worse when pamphlets like the one shown here,[74] apparently sent by a paramilitary group,[75] appeared in 2017 to intimidate the most visible social leaders, all of them victims of the armed conflict. Although some of those mentioned in the pamphlet have left their homes and are under government protection, others decided to stay for a variety of reasons, as in the case of this leader, who had decided to ignore this kind of threat.



Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia
AGC
Por una Colombia, Madre Patria para todos

Somos las AUC, AGC el mismo clan del golfo que ha venido operando en las diferentes ciudades de Colombia y Cali no sería la excepción y menos el barrio llano verde donde viven personas que se han venido escondiendo ante un bajo perfil pero al fondo le han venido haciendo mucho daño a las comunidades Y que desde el año 2013 se convirtieron en un estorbo ante la sociedad estos personajes llamados líderes comunitarios y que han querido venir a robar, dañar procesos, enredar las comunidades, oponerse a diferentes proyectos presidenciales, municipales y hasta de la misma iglesia los siguientes lideres están declarados objetivos militares deben acceder a nuestras exigencias o de lo contrario pagaran las consecuencias con sangre nuestras exigencias son. Abandonar el territorio.....GUSTAVO NOGUERA, ANDRES VIDAL, MARIO WALTER QUIÑONEZ MARIO GIRALDO, EDILMA GOMEZ, SANDRA MONTENEGRO, ELVA LERMA, NORMA GARCIA, GLORIA RIOS, NILMA GONZALES

SENTENCIA DE MUERTE A TODOS ESOS HIJOS DE PUTAS

Source: Pamphlet provided by social leaders (2017).

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[74] The authors of this pamphlet argue that social leaders of *Llano Verde* 'want to steal, to sabotage processes, to diddle communities and to oppose different projects from the presidency, from the municipality and from the church'.

[75] The AUC (*Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia)* is a far-right paramilitary group partially demobilised between 2003 and 2006 that continues to operate under the umbrella of other criminal structures known as *bandas criminales* or *bacrim*. The AGC (*Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia*), also known as *Clan del Golfo*, is a criminal organisation related to drug-trafficking, extortion, rents for illegal mining and selective homicides (Álvarez, Llorente, Cajiao & Garzón, 2017, pp. 27–29).

> Two days ago, we received a death threat. The piece of paper says that we are military targets so we have to leave the neighbourhood. We have received many threats and I no longer believe in them [...] I have lived in the world of bandits and if you want to kill someone, you first attract that person. (Personal communication, August 1, 2017).

Three other leaders whose names also appeared in the pamphlet reported feeling intimidated but said that they had no other place to go to. In the words of one of them,

> I don't want to stay here. It is clear that we are in danger; some leaders more than others [...] I'm not at ease in *Llano Verde*. One walks around and says: 'At what point will someone shoot me?' (Personal communication, September 19, 2017).

These testimonies, the threats and the figures presented above reveal how families displaced from their territories, and seeking refuge from the armed conflict in Cali, are being re-victimised in a neighbourhood promoted by the state. Structural factors (socio-economic and cultural), combined with both the national politics of the armed conflict and limited governmental social support, have triggered such levels of violence in a neighbourhood that paradoxically was developed as part of a programme for peace-building. The rapid emergence of direct forms of violence in a new area such as *Llano Verde* reinforces the argument of this thesis that the provision of housing and infrastructure cannot be assumed by policy-makers to be a solution to tackle urban marginality. Once again, the case of *Llano Verde* demonstrates that the idea of housing-as-justice addressed merely from a physical-spatial dimension not only contributes to producing marginality but also exacerbates it.

This overall conclusion is reinforced when comparing direct violence in both the free housing neighbourhood and in the informal settlements of District 18. In this district there are eight gangs confined to small spaces in the hills and a few, but powerful, criminal structures formed by extended families which control local-scale extortion, predatory loans and drug trafficking in the upper part of the area. As Figure 15 illustrates, the location of gangs, illegal groups and drug trafficking clusters coincide with the areas where homicides linked to drugs, settling of accounts and retaliations are concentrated. Although figures on the number of gangs and mafia- and gang-related homicides are much smaller that numbers found in District 15, the spatial distribution of homicides by motive in this area shows that territorial control in the upper part, mainly in the north side of the district is highly exercised by criminal organisations.

Figure 15 Gangs, drug trafficking and homicides in District 18 (2013-2017)



Sources: Top-left: Map by the author based on mapping activities carried out with members of the Police Department of District 15 (2017) complemented with information from the Annual Report, TIP Programme (Policía Metropolitana de Cali, 2016). Homicide maps by the author based on databases provided by CISALVA and *Observatorio Social* (2018).

According to the above, a radical difference between the two cases is that whereas in District 15 the geographic location of homicides and areas controlled by rival gangs largely coincide, in District 18 homicides related to organised crime are concentrated in the areas where gangs do not operate. This situation suggests two main features of direct violence in this area. The first is that in District 18 the territory is controlled by

a few more consolidated criminal organisations, which are not merged with gangs to exercise territorial control unlike what happens in District 15. As the figure above shows, gangs occupy small spots, far from the places where mafia networks operate (yellow lines in the top-left map). The second is that the instrumentalization of youth gang members by criminal structures seems to be lower since, as the numbers reveal, gangs in District 18 are less violent and les responsible for lethal violence.

In the five informal settlements under examination, figures show that between 2013 and 2017, 11 people were murdered and these cases were related to organised crime (four) and gangs (four) while three cases where attributed to social intolerance and domestic violence. Homicides were geographically dispersed, but the highest number of cases were located in *Brisas de las Palmas* (Map 14).

Map 14 *Los del Filo* gang and murders in the settlements (2013-2017)



Source: Map by the author based on mapping activities with social leaders, the police of District 18 (2017) and data provided by CISALVA and *Observatorio de Seguridad* (2018).

In this area, the spot where drug micro-trafficking activities are visible is in the public space of *Pampas del Mirador*[76] where *Los del Filo*, the only gang in this zone,

[76] Although during fieldwork I observed illegal drug sales in other sectors such as *Palmas I*, negotiations are not carried out in specific spots, but on the streets or inside the homes. For this reason, apart from *Pampas del Mirador*, the police have not marked any other drug-dealing clusters in their records.

meets every day. This group, with around 60 members (of whom almost half have agreed to participate in the TIP Programme), is made up of active drug users, some of whom are local drug dealers. After several conversations with some of its members at their meeting place, I learned that *Los del Filo* consider themselves not to be a gang, but a group that supports young people from the settlements experiencing personal problems. In fact, one of its members told me that she began to meet the group when she went through a traumatic family situation:

> I joined the group [*Los del Filo*] at the time I lost my brother. He was killed six years ago and as a result of that I started to meet up with the group because I knew he spent a lot of time here.[77] I did not live here; I came to stay with my mother when he died. I started spending more time here and then I decided to move to this neighbourhood. (Personal communication, 11 July, 2017).

According to people linked to the TIP programme, this gang has a reputation for being less violent than others in the city. This circumstance has been key to achieving a gradual reduction of episodes of violence related to internal conflicts in their area of influence and in reducing drug consumption. However, although the gang accepts the individual decision of some of their members to attend the reintegration programme, some members of the group who have shown an interest in being part of TIP just do not fit into the initiative. As one of *Los del Filo* members explains,

> The programme has been useful because there are fourteen of us working [with the municipality] at the moment. However, many of the young people of *Los del Filo* have been excluded because they do not know how to write, how to speak, or because they never went to school. (Personal communication, 23 August, 2017).

Despite this situation, which reveals that a total transformation of the gang is unfeasible and the fact that in previous years *Los del Filo* had territorial disputes with drug-traffickers from *Palmas I*, the main concern of residents is not violence but drug abuse and the drug trade near their children. The people interviewed said they felt safe in the area and, unlike in *Llano Verde*, in these settlements nobody talks about invisible borders. What I found there is that relationships between neighbours have been lasting, people recognise each other and, as a community, they are trying to support the youngsters of the gang in order to re-integrate them into the life of the

[77] According to my interviewee, her brother was an active member of the gang when he was killed and his death was related to his activities within the gang.

neighbourhood. Similarly, the efforts of the leaders to keep this sector relatively secure from crime has paid off; as the president of a community board asserts,

> At the beginning there were groups of boys from another place and they wanted to promote territorial violence but we did not let them do anything and nothing happened. (Personal communication, March 23, 2017).

Although young people in the settlements also experience poverty and unemployment, unlike gang members of *Llano Verde*, they are supported by an empowered community committed to helping them to overcome their problems. The devotion of community leaders to support *Los del Filo* has led them to think about integration projects such as football matches, and improving the park where they meet, with the help of the neighbours. In this regard, apart from specific particularities at the district level related to who exercises power and territorial control and how the relationships between gangs and criminal structures operate, the role of the community at the local level configures one of the most important differences between the two cases.

In addition to the fact that youth at-risk have been widely ignored in urban planning and housing policies, the location of the free housing programme in the most violent district of the city is the demonstration of the government's lack of interest in solving fundamental problems when it comes to the poor. As shown in this dissertation, poverty, racial segregation, hyperunemployment and social destitution are more entrenched in *Llano Verde* than in the informal settlements, and *pervasive violence becomes the most visible expression of the aggravated marginality* to which the beneficiaries of the free housing programme have been exposed.

2.5 Limited participation in city making

Although citizen participation is as old as democracy itself, its leading role in the formulation of urban policies dates back to recent decades. Participatory processes in urban planning and local budgeting have become a focus for discussions of governance, inclusive citizenship and community empowerment. As Fung (2015, pp. 512–513) argues, participation in public administration is a powerful tool for fulfilling democratic values such as 'effectiveness, legitimacy, and social justice'. However, according to this author,

> [P]ublic participation most often takes the form of conventional public hearings and meetings [...] Most of the speaking is done by officials or invited guests; a few participants say their pieces [...] but most listen as spectators (Fung, 2015, p. 515).

In a similar vein, Miraftab (2009, p. 33) argues that the discussion around participation in the neoliberal era is focused on how 'hegemonic power is pursued through citizens' consent and perceptions of inclusion'. Indeed, some authors such as Cox (1983) and Miraftab (2009) suggest that since the 1980s, when international development agencies started to promote good governance through community participation and partnerships between grassroots organisations and governments, all that hegemonic systems have achieved is to maintain the *status quo*. Strikingly, when it comes to the participation of disadvantaged communities in urban affairs, the picture is even bleaker. As Abdoumaliq Simone (2011, p. 33) asserts, 'contemporary urban governance demonstrates an often effective ability to debilitate capacities for both grassroots and city-wide initiative and organization'. This means that, when public administrations have the intention of preserving the *status quo*, they resort to their authority to inhibit community empowerment or, even worse, seek to 'empower' them through acculturation processes, which reaffirms the existence of disparities within an obscure matrix of domination.

In this context, my claim is that limitations imposed on democratic decision-making mechanisms may be even more radical when underprivileged communities are involved. The history of their exclusion from participatory scenarios can be seen in two illustrative examples regarding how uneven relations of power have operated for centuries to maintain certain groups in disadvantageous positions. Georg Simmel (1965), for instance, shone a light on the relationship between poverty, assistentialism and limited participation within scenarios of class and socio-economic differentiation. According to this author,

> [The] exclusion of the poor [...] is also manifested in the fact that within the modern relatively democratic state public assistance is perhaps the *only* branch of the administration in which the interested parties have no participation whatsoever (Simmel, 1965, p. 123). [Italics in original].

As Simmel suggests, it is highly likely that the poor assisted by the state will remain in an unfavourable condition since they tacitly lose their right to participate as recipients of the minimum support required to cover their basic needs. To this

situation we must add the role of markers of disadvantage such as class, ethnicity and race in retaining certain groups in a subordinated position. As decolonial thinkers have explained, these markers, imposed by the modernity/coloniality condition have remained largely unchanged, maintaining White populations in a position of authority after the Independence. According to Quijano (2000b, p. 226), the mechanisms of differentiation enjoyed by the elites in power effectively denied Afro-descendant, Indigenous and Mestizo groups any possibility of participating in decision-making regarding the social and political organisation of newly-independent states. For this scholar,

> [N]ation building, and specially nation-state building, has been intended and worked against the majority of the population: 'Indians', 'Blacks' and 'Mestizos'. The coloniality of power still is, in most of Latin America, dominant against democracy, citizenship, nation and nation-state (Quijano, 2000b, p. 228).

This well-established social arrangement has historically prevented the participation of disadvantaged communities from contributing to the preservation of the *status quo* in a society whose interest does not seem to be the suppression of social differences.

In contemporary urban planning, Caldeira & Holston (2015, p. 2012) found that when participation is non-binding, it 'risks becoming irrelevant because an administration [...] can both follow the participatory requirements and ignore the results'. This outcome is typical of top-down approaches used in planning, while reaching democratic agreements and consensus is by nature a jumbled process. As Sen (1999, p. 79) implies, a common strategy among technocrats to try to put into action what they consider to be the right thing to do rather than being fully engaged in a participatory process with 'ordinary people'.

It is the combination of limited participation with the potential of self-management which has favoured the emergence of citizen movements that destabilise the current order of hegemonic systems. This social arrangement, called by Holston (2008) *insurgent citizenship*, is fuelled by actors who, having been systematically excluded from decision-making, find the mechanisms to challenge dominant regimes. Furthermore, in the planning arena, Sandercock (1999) has drawn on this approach to elucidate other forms of city-making that succeed in bypassing official channels. These

practices, named *insurgent planning,* challenge the existing power relations and are 'instigated by mobilised communities acting as planners themselves' (Sandercock, 1999, p. 42). Thus, when formal participation in city-making is not an effective way to solve urgent matters, insurgent practices demonstrate the growing power of direct actions that become alternatives to official urban planning.

As I shall argue in this section, the effect of limiting citizen involvement in public affairs can lead to three main results. The first is a general apathy towards taking part in public discussions due to lack of credibility in participatory processes (Fung, 2015). The second is the irrelevance of the processes when citizen participation is not legally binding, since it is easy for institutions to meet the requirements and ignore the results (T. Caldeira & Holston, 2015). Finally, when the urban poor are excluded from participatory processes for local planning and budgeting, insurgent forms of city-making emerge as the solution for ensuring housing and infrastructure by their own means (Holston, 2008; Lombard, 2012; Sandercock, 1999).

The following analysis of limited participation in Cali, and in the case studies, is divided into two parts. The first section focuses on the strategies used by local agencies at the municipal and district level to encourage citizen participation in urban affairs. The second section reveals how official participatory mechanisms for local planning exclude poor communities, how this exclusion affects the consolidation of solidarity networks in social housing complexes, and how, challenging ineffective public participation, informal settlers reach internal agreements and work together in order to implement bottom-up initiatives.

2.5.1 Participatory planning and budgeting in Cali

In Cali, the *Departamento Administrativo de Planeación Municipal* (DAPM) is the office in charge of designing, promoting and ensuring the implementation of citizen participation in urban planning. The most recent process carried out at the city level was the updating of the Comprehensive Territorial Plan (POT for its name in Spanish) undertaken between 2012 and 2014. This process, underpinned by *a population-based*

approach[78] (DAPM, 2014, p. 12), followed a methodology that involved urban and rural committees, local universities, municipal control bodies, guilds and other institutions related to territorial development. In spite of its apparent openness, this methodology followed the typical top-down approach and citizen participation was restricted to accepting technical proposals presented by municipal officials. This participation scheme was questioned at a number of different stages with meetings seen to be more directed to inform than to promote discussions with the community. As an expert in urban and regional planning commented,

> The famous methods of participation to formulate the POT were all fictitious. A number of maps came out overnight as if they had been prefabricated. I think there was no serious exercise and I don't think that much will happen in the next years. (Personal communication, March 28, 2017).

Participatory planning has commonly been limited to what city officials called 'socialisation' which means looking for citizens' approval by showing to the general public proposals developed by technicians. This situation matches Amartya Sen's analysis of the technocracy/democracy relationship and the complexity inherent to a 'democratic search for agreement' (Sen, 1999, p. 79). While a single formula does not exist, participatory processes in Cali have failed in the fulfilment of their central objective: the reaching of joint agreements to build a more equitable city. What I found is that citizen participation for updating the POT was neither extensive nor progressive, and the proposals of the community did not have a radical impact on the results of the plan finally approved by the City Council for guiding the city's development to 2026.

This attitude towards citizen participation as an instrument *to validate* but not to *co-create* with the communities remains a characteristic feature of the marginal role of people in urban planning processes in Cali. As a consequence of the perpetuation of power asymmetries, the involvement of citizens in comprehensive planning has been minimal until the present. The drift of the government towards participation in the early 1990s has not ensured more inclusion or social justice. As demonstrated in this dissertation, urban planning in Cali continues to be used for privileging a few to the

[78] According to the guide for updating the POTs developed by the Ministry of Housing, the population approach in territorial planning 'consists of identifying and understanding the demographic dynamics and the environmental, social and economic aspects of the municipalities' in order to respond appropriately to local issues (Lara, 2007, p. 28).

detriment of the majority relegated to the city outskirts, who have not the slightest influence on city-making.

While the futility of participation at the urban level is crystal clear, official channels of communication and participatory planning at the local level have become an obscure bargaining instrument which combines conventional participation with other practices that involve manipulation, power conflicts, clientelism and patronage.

For instance, as part of the implementation of participatory planning and budgeting, the municipality created in the 1990s Local Planning Committees (CPL for its name in Spanish) in each district as units in charge of managing planning affairs at the local level. Attending the CPLs on a regular basis during a year in the two case studies, I learned that decisions made by committee members are not necessarily the outcome of social consensus but the product of discussions with a limited number of elected leaders who do not fully represent people's interests.

However, it is noteworthy that levels of community representation and coordination among members vary between the two cases. Once we recognise that the effectiveness of the CPL largely depends on the existence of mutual trust among the members, the contrasting urban development history of both study areas, explained in Section 1.4, give us some clues about the connotation that participation has in both cases. The informal origin of the settlements of District 18, gradually built by the settlers without any support from the state, has led to the creation of an internal organisation capacity that, over time, has generated bonds of solidarity and trust outside official participatory channels. In contrast, the formation of District 15 derived from a first wave of organised invasions and a second wave of government-led social housing development, did not leave room for participatory planning and the result was poor-quality urban spaces and weak ties of trust among leaders who attended participation processes.

The levels of citizen involvement in formal and informal environments and the role of the government in limiting open participation in low-income planned areas are mirrored at the local scale in the case studies. As explained below, in the '100% subsidised housing' programme any chance to comment on urban or architectural design was denied to beneficiaries. Ignoring the fact that involving people in the co-

creation of their own habitat could yield positive results, the free housing initiative became a lost opportunity to promote peaceful coexistence, appropriation of the territory and joint work of the residents to achieve common goals. These aspects, still problematic and unclear in *Llano Verde*, are instead common in daily life in the informal settlements of District 18 where spontaneous forms of participation delinked to state programmes have gradually emerged, strengthening community bonds. My attempt in the following pages is to ratify that, as authors such as Fung (2015) have found in other contexts, the challenge of making participation a meaningful and useful mechanism for achieving social justice in Cali is political, not technical.

2.5.2 Community participation in the case studies

- **'100% subsidised housing' programme**

It would be logical that during a process of resettlement of more than 3,500 families in a new neighbourhood, a series of participatory scenarios were promoted. However, citizen participation in the case of *Llano Verde* was never on the public agenda. As a former official involved in the implementation of this neighbourhood asserted,

> It was a project built by a wealthy construction firm. What the government did was buy the finished homes. [In the design of *Llano Verde*] there was no community participation. It was not even anticipated that a small percentage of disabled people would be going to live in two-storey homes. (Personal communication, April 21, 2017).

While customising each house and adjusting it to the needs and desires of users in a housing complex of this magnitude is unfeasible, involving the beneficiaries in some stages of the process would have been crucial for anticipating small arrangements in the homes assigned to families with special needs, building community bonds or even avoiding the coexistence problems revealed in this thesis. Nevertheless, beneficiaries did not have any role in the project. This situation occurred because a programme such as '100% subsidised housing' with a tight schedule, limited budget and serving a population with pressing needs does not leave room for discussions in the decision-making stage. As aforementioned, in order to meet the goal of delivering 200,000 homes around the country in six years (2012-2018) the government decided to hire large building companies with technical and financial capacity or, as was the case of *Llano Verde*, to buy entire projects under construction.

Although, as discussed above, in Cali different kinds of participatory mechanisms for planning and budgeting are considered within the legislation, in government-led social housing complexes it is common that community participation is avoided. Beyond evident factors such as the complexity of the processes, extra costs and time, the fact that beneficiaries are people in urgent need, 'assisted' by the state facilitates their exclusion from participatory decision-making (Simmel, 1965, p. 123). However, whereas limiting citizen participation in a project of this nature can be useful for meeting short-term goals, it is counterproductive in the medium and long term. For instance, since new residents did not experience the challenge of working jointly to solve common problems, community networks have been much more difficult to consolidate. Even if different groups were formed in the neighbourhood, sharing similar targets, they do not work together mainly due to power disputes. As hinted by the coordinator of a social programme developed by the Carvajal Foundation in *Llano Verde*,

> Among them [the leaders] there is a rivalry linked to who achieves more. They have not been able to work together despite the fact that the Secretariat of Social Welfare, the Archdiocese and we ourselves have tried to help them come together. It has not been possible for them all to agree on a common goal. (Personal communication, February 13, 2017).

This testimony reveals that leaders have not been able to reach an agreement to solve common issues, in spite of governmental and non-governmental initiatives promoted to form working groups. Indeed, the act of bringing together a number of leaders who had been working independently for the rights of the victims, without working with them in advance, unleashed power disputes and internal divisions. Apparently, forming their own small group of followers guarantees them the necessary political capital to continue raising funds on their own with governmental and non-governmental institutions that have supported them before their arrival in *Llano Verde*.

> Why we are divided here? It's because everyone wants to defend and represent their own community; each one fights here for their own space [...] The group of leaders have internal problems because some leaders have progressed more than their own community. (Personal communication, August 30, 2017).

As a consequence, current participation meetings to discuss neighbourhood matters are affected by internal divisions that add to the scepticism and apathy felt by

the rest of the community about participating in official events. To this we must add that city officials merely tend to 'socialise' problems and solutions, instead of opening democratic spaces to encourage genuine participation. In fact, from the moment that beneficiaries received their homes, there has not been extensive citizen participation or willingness of the municipality to listen to opinions or suggestions that residents have for improving their living conditions. In this context, in addition to the conflicts derived from ethno-racial segregation, informality, unemployment, and coexistence presented in Chapter 2, it is my contention that the exclusion of the beneficiaries during the inception of the project and in subsequent years has profoundly affected the consolidation of initiatives that are supposed to be managed by the leaders representing the community in official participation processes.

However, as happens at the urban and district levels, in the case of *Llano Verde* the failure of government-led participation coupled with internal conflicts between community representatives has not prevented the emergence of mutual support among neighbours. For instance, during fieldwork I found small-scale initiatives such as a group of women supporting each other in order to learn how to save money and projects intended to train children in environmental culture, reading, arts and sports. These 'unplanned' initiatives are good examples of how communities operate through common sense and common interests, using mutual support as the mechanism to build bonds of solidarity and trust when political will to promote citizen encounter and participation is missing.

These dynamics, that are more apparent in the free housing complex as time goes by and the inhabitants of the neighbourhood get to know each other, have been part of the everyday life of informal settlers of District 18 since its emergence. As discussed below, the main difference between the case studies is that unlike what happened in *Llano Verde*, in the slopes of District 18 people have actively participated in the construction of the settlement and, together, they have had to overcome a myriad of difficulties related to the informal nature of their dwelling.

- **Informal settlements of District 18**

Although communities living in informal settlements are unofficially allowed to attend meetings related to both planning and budgeting at the city and district levels, a rule establishes that municipal resources can be invested only to build or upgrade

infrastructure in public properties located in *formal neighbourhoods*. This means that improving infrastructure in informal settlement through formal requests to the municipality are unfeasible since projects in these areas of the city are automatically excluded from local investment plans. For communities living in the settlements, therefore, the whole participatory planning process has become a frustrating experience. As a social leader explains, her permanent participation in the CPL has not produced the expected results.

> We always wanted to have a park and it was one of the projects that we were focused on from the moment we started a series of meetings with the Planning Office. However, we were informed that while the settlement was not legally recognised, it was unfeasible to get a space [for the park]. (Personal communication, April 20, 2017).

Although restrictions in municipal investments represent a major problem for people living in the slopes of District 18, what is more worrying is the fact that several years of participating in local planning committees have not produced a substantial change in their marginal status of 'informal settlers' within the planning apparatus. Currently, they are not playing any role in official meetings because their territories are not fully recognised as parts of the city and, for this reason, they are not considered valid interlocutors in participatory planning processes. In the words of a social leader who has been attending the CPL of District 18 for more than five years,

> The first barrier we have is the government. One attends a planning committee each week with hope and enthusiasm and finds that people who live below [in the flat area] want to have more... But they don't realise that on the slopes we don't even have a cement court for four neighbourhoods. (Personal communication, March 23, 2017).

Yet these barriers, imposed by the uneven development patterns that have ruled Cali, have not stopped people in the settlements from challenging the developmentalist approach that still governs urban planning and housing policies in Colombia. After a process of physical-spatial consolidation that has lasted more than thirty years, communities have learned how to work together in order to carry out specific projects without the support of the state. Indeed, having partially solved their more urgent infrastructure problems, they are now applying their methods of participation and joint work to the development of initiatives aimed at improving the environmental, social and economic conditions of the area.

For instance, community-based projects found in the case study are mainly focused on environmental protection (barter-trade to increase awareness of solid waste and raise funds for small infrastructure projects,[79] tree planting and solid waste collection on the banks of the Meléndez River), children (soccer and rugby activities to promote coexistence and good use of free time, community canteens and reading clubs), young people at risk (sports tournaments to promote community integration) and local infrastructure improvements (construction of community aqueduct and sewerage systems, food festivals to raise funds for paving streets and sidewalks). All these activities become 'alternatives to development', a notion borrowed from Escobar (2012), which demonstrates the ability of a community to both self-manage their territory and to reach internal agreements outside urban planning mandates.

Unfortunately, these solutions fail to cover the serious shortcomings that uneven power relations have produced and maintained in disadvantaged areas of the city. The paradox, then, lies in the fact that the government has ensured the existence of open spaces for discussion, a regulatory framework (policies and plans) and the flow of public resources to all districts, but the ineffectiveness of participatory planning and budgeting have made these mechanisms insufficient to curb territorial inequalities. In this sense, as argued in this section, limited participation, translated in mid-way solutions such as citizen participation without binding effects and policies that are not challenging the *status quo*, becomes a barrier that retains underprivileged social groups in a permanent state of marginality and deprivation.

In this context of limited participation in decision-making, how do institutional decisions on planning and housing policies made without a broad consensus contribute to the production of marginality in both formal and informal environments? The next chapter, dedicated to this question, critically explores the paradoxes of institutional frameworks of policies and actions at both the national and municipal levels, in the light of the five inherent characteristics of urban marginality proposed as the analytical framework.

In District 15, where violence and race-related poverty are the most pressing issues, initiatives found are aimed at promoting peace and coexistence, supporting music, film and dance activities for children and helping young Afro-descendants to

[79] I will come back to this specific initiative in Section 3.5.

set up their own businesses in order to foster employment and income-generation. In District 18, where natural elements such as the Meléndez River and its banks are important in people's daily life but widely neglected by the government, initiatives are geared toward protecting the natural environment from polluting practices as well as promoting healthy recreation and sports (Premio Cívico por una Ciudad Mejor, 2019).

The fact that communities in both cases have a clear idea of their most pressing issues and are actively searching for solutions to tackle them demonstrates not only their knowledge of the territory but also their self-management capacity. This situation contrasts with the inability of the government to understand the value of people's participation in identifying both solutions and appropriated ways of applying them. In this regard, from my point of view, the reluctance of city officials to carry out an overt participatory process continues to be the main obstacle to encouraging citizen's involvement in decision-making. In any case, keeping people discouraged from participating in urban affairs ensures that government agencies preserve the necessary power to decide on their own, maintaining the *status quo*.

3. URBAN PLANNING AND HOUSING POLICIES IN THE PRODUCTION OF MARGINALITY

As mentioned in Section 1.2, urban planning and housing policies in Colombia emerged a century ago but their approach has been transformed over time as a consequence of a constellation of factors. Although core changes have been related to political ideologies, socio-economic circumstances or the influence of foreign models disseminated by international agencies, the current approach of policies has been shaped by two fundamental milestones. The first is the transition from a conservative and centralised state in which the Catholic Church had a major role in public affairs (Political Constitution of 1886) to a secular and pluralist state under the rules of law in which participative democracy, decentralisation, respect for fundamental rights and pluralism became guiding principles (Political Constitution of 1991). The second is the introduction of a neoliberal approach in the early 1990s in which the role of social housing as a main driver of the country's economy was reaffirmed, and the responsibility for building and selling affordable homes was transferred from the public to the private sector.

Within this framework, and grounded in the historical account presented in Chapter 1, I have selected a range of urban planning and housing policies at both national and municipal levels[80] with the aim of analysing current regulations in the light of the five inherent characteristics of urban marginality. In line with the purpose of this study, this selection is based on three main criteria: 1) Policies that have changed the course of urban and regional planning by following the constitutional principles of

[80] Detailed information about these policies can be found in Appendix A.

administrative decentralisation, citizen participation and peace-building. 2) Policies aimed at increasing access to a supply of social housing through subsidies invested in projects developed by private firms. 3) Policies geared towards the implementation of the '100% subsidised housing' programme.

The analysis presented in this chapter is underpinned by a *normative approach*, which allows the combination of quantitative methods such as performance indicators measurement with qualitative methods in order to identify factors influencing policies' implementation. This approach enables an evaluation of the outcomes of policies and the factors that contribute to their effectiveness in order to reach conclusions and make recommendations (Barreto, Cerón & Fernández, 2010, p. 348). From this perspective, this chapter seeks to link urban theory, public policies and government actions as an attempt to unveil the paradoxes concealed in policies, elaborating on how these paradoxes contribute to the production and reproduction of marginality in poor formal and informal environments.

3.1 Cali will remain a segregated city

As argued in Chapter 2, *ethno-racial segregation* implies an intention of hegemonic institutions to relegate specific social groups on the basis of markers of disadvantage. In the case of Cali, for instance, segregation by socio-economic status, ethnicity and race has operated throughout the urbanisation process, long after the end of the colonial era. As the historian Edgar Vásquez suggests,

> [After the 1950s] the socio-spatial distribution of the city was redefined and consolidated until 'two cities' emerged: the space of the 'excluded' as a ring that surrounds Cali along the hills and the banks of the Cauca River, and the city of the 'included' that occupies the inner part (Vásquez, 2001, p. 4).[81]

This statement concurs with the argument made in previous chapters that the ruling elites of Cali have managed to prevent social mixing by using legitimate instruments such as public policies to maintain the *status quo*. In fact, the POT established as its main objective 'to promote access to urbanised land and decent housing, reducing the socio-spatial segregation [...] and optimising the land-use of the

[81] Author's translation from original in Spanish.

territory according to its limitations and potentialities.' (Concejo de Santiago de Cali, 2014, p. Art. 14). Nevertheless, during the course of this research I could corroborate that beyond referring to socio-spatial segregation in one of its 540 articles, the POT does not contribute to a lessening of historic segregation patterns but rather it perpetuates them. As a former Secretary of Social Housing asserts, urban planning policies in Cali have had a central role in the relegation of the urban poor to the least desirable areas of the city,

> It's like they [city planners] are trying to hide them, trying to take them to the ugliest sectors; that doesn't make sense. City planning creates an impressive barrier. Why do we have poverty belts? Because of planning! (Personal communication, February 6, 2017).

Delving deeper into current planning and housing policies, I found two central and interconnected factors that have become powerful drivers of residential segregation in Cali: the *lack of control over land prices* and the *zoning for social housing developments*.

As mentioned earlier, the best quality lands for urbanisation are located on the north-south axis where people in high- and middle-income brackets live, while the poor inhabit the western and eastern peripheries, which are prone to natural hazards. As a logical consequence, land prices in the best areas are the highest while lower values are recorded on the western and eastern fringes (Map 15). Even though Colombian legislation, particularly Law 388 of 1997, has established mechanisms for local governments to regulate the value of serviced land, urban planning policies in Cali have not been assertive enough to intervene in the structure of prices. Although the cost of developable land is a key factor in achieving social equity, in Cali land value continues to be regulated by the market, which coincides with the neoliberal approach that governs urban development in Colombia at the present.

Map 15 Land prices structure in the urban area

US$1-70 US$71-140 US$141-210
US$211-280 More than US$281

*Value per square metre

Source: Map by the author based on land prices from the Society of Appraisers of Cali (2012).

Furthermore, the unequal development patterns revealed in different dimensions of urban planning addressed in this dissertation become more apparent when analysing social housing projections in Cali and neighbouring municipalities from two perspectives: 1) *the POT* which defined the areas for the future supply and 2) *the market* which determines the current supply.

In 2014 the POT defined specific areas for social housing (Map 16) and established the *Social Interest and Priority Interest Housing Programme* (VIS and VIP)[82] in order to tackle the quantitative deficit estimated at 90,179 homes (Alcaldía de Cali, 2015, p. 46).

[82] According to the Ministry of Housing (2017), VIS is a house 'that counts with conditions that ensure its habitability, quality standards in urban design, architecture and construction, whose maximum value is 135 monthly minimum wages'. VIP is the kind of VIS 'whose maximum value is 70 monthly minimum wages'

Map 16 Areas defined by the POT to develop VIS and VIP

Social housing within the city and in the expansion area

Source: Map by the author based on data from the POT (2014).

Except for the land reserved for affordable housing in the redevelopment zone in the city centre (number 7 in the map), the zoning for social housing in the POT corresponds chiefly to peripheral areas on the western slopes, in *Aguablanca* and in areas for urban expansion on the south-eastern fringe.[83] This reveals that policies addressing housing for the poor are not geared towards breaking the historic pattern of residential segregation even though city splitting has been identified in the POT as a problem to be solved. In the words of a former official of the DAPM,

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[Author's translation from original in Spanish]. In 2018 the monthly minimum wage in Colombia was COP$781,242 corresponding to US$277. This means that the VIS maximum cost is US$37,365 and the VIP maximum cost is US$19,374.

[83] Although the municipality has planned to develop the area of *Navarro* (number 17 in Map 16), there are still concerns regarding the feasibility of this initiative since studies of the *Universidad del Valle* have concluded that *Navarro* is not suitable for building housing due to its low environmental quality resulting from the existence of a closed landfill site near this area.

> Since its foundation, Cali was segregated in its spatial distribution and today the symptoms of this marginalisation have been accentuated not only by maintaining a static model that has not been modified through urban plans, but also to the extent that the city has reached its urban limits [...] Given the scientific explanation that Cali has been segregated since its origin is sad, because this would somehow lead us to the conclusion that the historical planning system has failed. (Personal communication, September 7, 2017).

This statement suggests that, in addition to the scant attention paid to the segregationist pattern that has prevailed in Cali, urban planning policies are not focused on solving this problem, nor are they conceived to resolve the scarcity of low-cost land. In fact, my own estimates of the maximum number of housing units that could be built in the plots of land reserved for social housing demonstrate that the areas designed by the POT are insufficient to meet the quantitative deficit. The social housing supply for 2017-2018 in Cali has been calculated as 11,315 units, during the term of the POT (2014-2026) and in the areas defined by this plan it would be possible to build 25,556 additional homes, which represent a total supply of 36,871 housing units (see details in Complementary Material B). These figures reveal that from the present time up until 2026, the quantitative deficit would not be covered. Therefore, without taking future demand into account, the shortage of social housing will be around 54,000 homes. To this situation we must add that some of the areas (for instance, number 16 in the map) have been recently occupied by poor settlers defrauded by a scammer who illegally sold the property of a third party.[84]

The lack of intervention in land prices has pushed new social housing to the outskirts and fuelled the construction of new affordable housing complexes in neighbouring municipalities. Given the apparent lack of land for low-income homes in Cali, the surrounding towns have modified their urban regulations in order to grant building permits for the construction of large-scale social housing complexes to meet the shortfall of housing provision in Cali. This new scenario presents an ideal opportunity for developers, who are taking advantage of low land prices and the backing of the authorities in small municipalities to build low-cost housing while reserving sites in Cali to build housing for middle- and high-income families.

[84] Additional information about this settlement, known as *Villa Mercado*, can be found in https://youtu.be/suuyT9G2eBg Accessed: 11/12/2018.

According to data gathered from real estate market advertising, the current VIS and VIP supply in the four neighbouring municipalities (*Jamundí, Candelaria, Palmira* and *Yumbo*) has been calculated as 13,390 homes. Added to the aforementioned supply in Cali (11,315 homes), the total supply offered in the market (2017-2108) is 24,705 homes (see general figures in Table 5 and detailed information in Complementary Material C).

Table 5 Social housing supply in Cali and neighbouring municipalities

Municipality	Population in 2015	Number of projects	New housing units	Projected population in the new projects*
Cali	2,369,821	14	11,315	34,736
Jamundí	119,566	11	5,162	16,518
Candelaria	81,700	10	4,295	13,744
Palmira	157,493	8	2,481	7,939
Yumbo	117,156	4	1,452	4,646
TOTAL	**2,845,736**	**47**	**24,705**	**77,583**

*According to DANE (2016) in the Valle del Cauca department the average number of people per household is 3.2. Source: Data on housing supply: Table and estimates by the author based on information gathered from real estate magazines *Fincaraíz, Vivendo* and *Metrocuadrado* (2017) and data on municipal social housing initiatives: Secretariat of Housing (2017).

This boom of social housing complexes in peripheral areas and surrounding municipalities is evident in Map 17 which shows, by size and number of homes, the projects offered on the real estate market between 2017 and 2018.[85] The growth of the population in neighbouring towns that gravitate around the centre of a metropolitan area is a common trend and should not have negative connotations. However, in this case, the attraction of new populations to neighbouring municipalities is not the direct result of the prosperity of local economies, but the consequence of the high costs of new housing in Cali. In this sense, the speculative real estate pressure that Cali is exercising on the surrounding municipalities can be more harmful than beneficial: people with lower purchasing power are compelled to live in surrounding municipalities, accelerating the consolidation of a model of *town-dormitories*, which increases the number of pendular displacements and travel costs.

[85] The query of the current offer of social housing was made between June and December 2017 in the three most important real estate market magazines of the region: *Fincaraíz, Vivendo* and *Metrocuadrado.*

Map 17 Social housing offered by private developers (2017-2018)

Project clusters

Source: Map by the author based on real estate market data (2017).

These findings prove that urban planning and housing policies in Cali are placing economic profits above the welfare of the population as a whole. Land prices are not being controlled by the municipality and the areas for social housing, reserved by the POT, are peripheral but also insufficient to meet the deficit. Under these circumstances, *urban segregation will persist in Cali as an inevitable outcome of a city-making model that privileges the interests of the capital* while maintaining a historical trend characterised by discriminatory divisions.

As a result, these policies in Cali are accelerators of residential segregation trends deeply affecting ethnic minorities who, as aforementioned, are the most vulnerable social group. On the one hand, when establishing peripheral locations for social

housing, the POT is increasing the social divide perpetuating a city split according to socio-economic conditions, ethnicity and race. On the other hand, the lack of serviced land for affordable housing within the city fosters the displacement of the urban poor to other municipalities where housing is cheaper or, in the worst-case scenario, to informal settlements, as we shall see in the next section.

3.2 Promoting (in)formal logics

Roy (2005, p. 157) argues that 'deal[ing] with informality [...] partly means confronting how the apparatus of planning produces the unplanned and unplannable'. From this perspective, analysing informality requires not only the study of local dynamics but also a critical examination of urban planning policies and their outcomes. In the case of Cali, current actions addressing informal housing follow the national parameters, which means that conventional -and ineffective- strategies such as replacing informal dwelling for social housing units continue to prevail. Despite the fact that the POT in 2000 and again 2014 defined parameters and deadlines for a local housing policy, the city has no other regulatory framework than the two axes of intervention proposed by the Ministry of Housing, mentioned earlier. On the one hand, significant amounts of public money have been put in place to support the construction of *new social housing developments*, promoted by the government as the main strategy to cope with the quantitative deficit. On the other, *settlement upgrading initiatives,* less prominent, with less interest and, of course, less resources, are directed to tackle the qualitative deficit. As will be discussed in the following sections, in the absence of inclusive and people-centred housing policies in Cali, during the last two decades these two approaches have underpinned the construction of large-scale peripheral social housing and the abandonment of informal settlements.

3.2.1 Policies stimulating new housing

In Cali, the last five governments have established ambitious goals in order to reduce the quantitative deficit by building new housing complexes with the financial support of the Ministry of Housing. Although almost 40,000 new homes were built between 2000 and 2017, figures in Table 6 reveal that targets have not been met in any of the five governments and only 44 per cent of the estimated shortage has been covered. As discussed in the previous section, this systematic breach of goals targeting

the quantitative deficit is highly, but not only, correlated to the failure of urban planning policies in ensuring a supply of serviced and affordable land for VIS and VIP.

Table 6 Performance indicators - VIS and VIP (2000-2017)

Government period	Indicator	Baseline	Target	Performance	Compliance percentage
2000-2003	Decrease of housing deficit by 30%	No data available	13,222	2,950	22.3%
2004-2007	VIS under construction or delivered	2,950	11,202	9,872	88.1%
2008-2011	Construction of new housing units of VIS and VIP	9,872	12,752	6,616	51.9%
2012-2015	VIS and VIP units built in new serviced land, urban renewal zones and/or areas for densification	6,616	38,616	13,878	35.9%
2016-2019	VIS and VIP housing units built	13,878	20,477	(Until December 2017): 6,436	18.7%
Total number of VIS and VIP units built (2000-2017):				39,752	

Sources: 2000-2003: (Alcaldía de Cali, 2004, p. 22). 2004-2007: Evaluation report PDM (Alcaldía de Cali, 2008a, p. 22). 2008-2011: PDM (Alcaldía de Cali, 2008b, p. 41) and Evaluation report PDM (Alcaldía de Cali, 2012a, p. 118). 2012-2015: PDM 2012-2015 (Alcaldía de Cali, 2012b, p. 187) and Evaluation report PDM 2012-2015 (Alcaldía de Cali, 2016a, p. 123). 2016-2019: PDM (Alcaldía de Cali, 2016d, p. 68) and Evaluation report PDM 2016-2019 (Alcaldía de Cali, 2017b, p. 122).

As mentioned in Chapter 1, the construction of social housing was delegated to private developers while the role of the government has been reduced to establish guidelines, selecting beneficiaries and allocating subsidies. On that basis, during the last two presidential governments (2010-2014 and 2014-2018) the main policies determining the development of VIS and VIP in Colombia have been on-demand subsidies and the '100% subsidised housing' programme.

On-demand subsidies correspond to government grants delivered directly to private developers offering VIS or VIP when beneficiaries select a house in their projects. As the total amount of the subsidy covers between 20 and 30 per cent of the final price of a home, this aid can be granted only to households with savings and/or borrowing capacity. For instance, the cost of a VIS apartment in District 18 is UD$40,367[86] with the buyer required to pay an initial fee of 30 per cent (US$12,110).

[86] VIS complex *Altos del Madrigal* in Meléndez neighbourhood. Mortgage calculations gathered from http://www.vivendo.co/proyectos/cali/altos-del-madrigal Accessed: 13/01/2018.

While the subsidy from the government is up to US$8,324, the remainder of the initial fee (US$3,786) has to be covered by personal savings. This leaves the family with a 20-year mortgage worth US$28,257 and having to make monthly payments of around US$300. Considering that monthly expenditure on housing in Colombia has been estimated at around 30 per cent of family income to ensure coverage of other basic needs (DANE, 2018b), a household must have earnings above 3.5 minimum wages (US$970) in order to buy an apartment in a social housing complex.

My estimates, based on data from SISBEN, reveal that families living in the informal settlements of Districts 15 have monthly incomes that range between US$57 and US$120 while in District 18 earnings vary between US$57 and US$160. These figures demonstrate that while national policies have been historically focused on promoting home ownership, the *on-demand subsidies* scheme excludes poor families from the possibility of buying a home.

The disadvantaged condition of the urban poor led the municipality to create an additional subsidy for households in strata 1 and 2 with SISBEN scores below 54.86 points, and income below four minimum wages (Municipal Agreement 404 of 2016). Unlike the subsidies provided by the Ministry of Housing, this aid has not been restricted solely to purchasing new homes and extends to other alternatives such as second-hand homes, construction on individual owned land, leasing, housing upgrading or property titling. However, the maximum amount of the municipal subsidy corresponds to 20 monthly minimum wages (US$5,535), which is still insufficient for buying or building a home.

As mentioned in Section 1.2, the successive failure of policies to provide decent housing for poor families led the national government to launch the '100% subsidised housing' programme, which targeted families who had no chance of buying a home under market conditions. Although this programme provided the poorest segments with free formally-built homes, it was grounded in a reductionist approach: *free housing as the solution for poor households to overcome marginality*. The results presented in Chapter 2 demonstrate that a solution focused on the development of homes and infrastructure alone is insufficient to solve the issues that commonly afflict poor communities. In the words of a resident of the neighbourhood,

> Here, they [the national government] built only houses, and a neighbourhood to be called 'neighbourhood' has to be a set of other things. The cultural identity and religion of each person must be considered; there must be a health centre and a school. Arriving in a neighbourhood where there is not even a grocery store is hard. (Personal communication, September 9, 2017).

As this person explained, a housing programme seeking to tackle complex issues such as urban marginality, forced displacement and extreme poverty, cannot be reduced to the mere construction of homes. The fact that in this planned area beneficiaries have had to resort to diverse forms of informality to meet their needs is just one more indicator of the shortcomings of the programme. The large number of homes that have been sold, leased or modified suggests that the project was not successful in offering solutions in accordance with the requirements of targeted households. Paradoxically, while a detailed characterisation of the beneficiaries was made, all the homes delivered were identical, ignoring differential factors such as size of families, households with disabled members or cultural backgrounds. To this issue we must add that complementary support in matters such as coexistence, livelihoods and public transportation were not planned holistically.

Furthermore, the fact that subsidised homes, outside the free housing programme, are not reaching poor households is even more problematic. As shown in figures presented in the case of District 18, subsidised homes are unaffordable by families currently living in informal settlements. Within this context, my claim is that policies promoting home ownership in new housing complexes are not appropriate for the targeted population and are not the solution for tackling informality and even less for reducing marginality. Indeed, what is happening in the case of *Llano Verde* is that beneficiaries have progressively 'informalised the formal' to adapt new homes to their needs. This demonstrates that a policy conceived to reduce marginality has produced contrasting results. Despite ensuring the possession of a home, the solution to the problems of the urban poor cannot be limited to the provision of housing and infrastructure, since complementary basic services, social support and opportunities for income generation are key aspects that must be considered.

3.2.2 Policies advocating for urban upgrading

With the aim of improving the quality of life of people living in deprived areas, in 2000 the POT set out the necessity of developing an upgrading programme seeking 'to integrate the settlements with incomplete development [...] to the formal urban fabric' (Alcaldía de Cali, 2000, p. 102 Art. 219). Nonetheless, this initiative to advance holistic interventions was not adopted and the actions of the municipality were reduced to titling properties (with very low performance) and granting individual subsidies aimed at reducing the qualitative deficit estimated at 24,607 homes[87] (Alcaldía de Cali, 2015, p. 46).

Table 7 Performance indicators, housing qualitative deficit (2000-2017)

Period of government	Indicator	Baseline	Target	Performance	Compliance percentage
2000-2003	Titles granted to households living in informal housing	No data available	38,000	4,712	12,4%
2004-2007	Improved homes*	No data available	2,267	4,432	195.5%
2008-2011	Homes with qualitative deficit improved	4,432	6,000	3,167	52,8%
2012-2015	Improved homes	3,167	13,167	738	7,4%
2016-2019	Improved homes	3,905	4,000	(Until December 2017): 940	49.6%
Total number of improved homes (2000-2017):				**13,989**	

* This indicator measures improvements of structure or internal finishes in substandard dwellings.

Sources: 2004-2007: Evaluation report PDM (Alcaldía de Cali, 2008a, p. 22). 2008-2011: Municipal Development Plan (Alcaldía de Cali, 2008b, p. 49) and Evaluation report PDM (Alcaldía de Cali, 2012a, p. 121). 2012-2015: Municipal Development Plan 2012-2015 (Alcaldía de Cali, 2012b, p. 186) and Evaluation report PDM 2012-2015 (Alcaldía de Cali, 2016a, p. 123). 2016-2019: Municipal Development Plan (Alcaldía de Cali, 2016d, p. 68).

As shown in Table 7, since 2004 efforts to improve housing through individual subsidies have benefited 13,989 households but, at the same time, have diverted attention away from the municipality, which has not managed to implement any comprehensive project of settlement upgrading to date. Moreover, following the national trend, urban upgrading actions in Cali have had a marginal role in the public agenda, which is evident in the prioritisation of financial resources. Figures from the

[87] Although this number is the official figure, the *Technical Document of the Policy of Habitat Upgrading* (Alcaldía de Cali, 2017a, p. 6) has established that around 290,000 families currently live in substandard conditions in Cali, of which 38,400 dwell in informal settlements.

last three administrations show that while the city has invested around US$107M in boosting new social housing, resources allocated to improving dwellings in informal settlements corresponds to US$41M.[88] Nevertheless, the last two administrations (2012-2015 and 2016-2019) assigned funds for complying with the requirement of the POT to formulate the habitat upgrading policy. The interest of the municipality in moving this project forward resulted in the City Council's approval of the *Public Policy of Habitat Upgrading for Precarious Human Settlements* (Agreement 411 of 2017) targeting the areas categorised as precarious neighbourhoods and informal settlements (Map 18).

Map 18 Informal settlements and precarious neighbourhoods in Cali



Source: Map by the author based on data from Municipal Agreement 411 of 2017.

[88] Author's estimates based on information gathered from Municipal Development Plans.

Given that until the present no financial resources have been earmarked by the municipality for the implementation of the policy, in numerous places such as District 18 grass-root organisations continue to be the basis for developing mechanisms to solve day-to-day issues, as shown in previous chapters. As municipal support has been minimal, the community does not expect any public investment in the short term. For them, it is clear that current regulations establish that the first step to obtaining financial and technical support to carry out an upgrading programme is the legalisation of the settlements, for which the municipality has not taken any concrete action.

As a result, policies for reducing informal housing in Cali have proved ineffective. Over the last decade the number of homes or dwellings of this kind has increased and projects promoted by the government are not reaching the poorest households. Quijano (1966, p. 62) first drew attention to the adverse effects of policies merely considering the ecological dimension of marginality in the mid-1960s, yet in Cali institutional actions continue to be underpinned by the ineffective housing deficit approach (Gilbert, 2001, pp. 22–23). This focus, together with inadequate housing alternatives for the poor, has fuelled a substantial increase in the number of households living in informal settlements (Alcaldía de Cali, 2017a, p. 8), perpetuating marginality.

Hence, when the operational capacity of municipal governments is not effective enough to meet their own targets, it is also unlikely that the limited actions implemented are innovative and life-changing. As will be seen in the next section, policies that reproduce failed urban and housing typologies in peripheral locations, privileging the number of homes over the detriment of spatial quality, have become significant drivers of marginality, producing low-quality habitational solutions, hyperunemployment and violence in poor urban areas.

3.3 Housing for the poor: quantitative deficit and minimum standards

In Colombia, many social housing complexes developed during the first stages of the ICT were notable for their urban and architectural value. Nevertheless, factors such as the lack of control over land prices, the privatisation of the production of social housing and the relegation of people from decision-making, gradually led to a decline

in the quality of projects. In a few decades, the idea of providing good-quality housing to the poor was replaced by quantitative concerns such as housing deficit and annual housing production capacity. Additionally, mechanisms to financially support on-demand subsidies were neither the regulation of land prices, nor the increase in the saving capabilities of the poorest households, but the reduction of minimum social housing standards (Buraglia, 2004, p. 25).

Driven by the reductionist and exclusionary approach that characterises assistentialist programmes, social housing in Colombia has become the visible expression of the perpetuation of both coloniality of power and wealth accumulation, highlighted in this thesis as main causal factors of marginality. On the one hand, the prevailing model of on-demand subsidies to be used in the real estate market prevents any involvement of beneficiaries in the development of the projects, leaving to the government, the developers and their planners the power to decide over people's everyday lives. On the other hand, the transfer of housing production from the state to private construction firms has turned social housing into a business and, to make it attractive, regulations have become increasingly favourable to ensure developers' profits.

In this context, both the neighbourhoods and the homes are at present the result of mass production, privileging a typology based on a grid of long and narrow rectangular blocks, which enables the maximum utilisation of serviced land. Following the government's requirements (thousands of low-cost homes built in record time) and developers' interest (good profit margin), the master plan of *Llano Verde* was designed with this typology (Figure 16). Although in spatial terms the urban design meets all the regulations and requirements (roads, distance between blocks, public services, public spaces and areas reserved for facilities), one cannot say that this fully-planned neighbourhood is a high-quality urban space. Without any spatial hierarchy or formal exploration, parallel blocks are distributed in the territory producing monotonous, narrow and repetitive spaces.

Figure 16 Llano Verde 's urban fabric

Source: Figure by the author based on data from Google Earth (2019).

This 'urban typology for the poor' contrasts sharply with the urban form of the affluent neighbourhoods of Cali located in District 22. Mimicking the garden city, these areas are made up of organic blocks for individual homes surrounded by gardens. These homes are completely gated and most vehicular roads do not even have sidewalks; people there just do not want strangers walking around. The extreme differences of urban quality between planned poor and rich areas are summarised in the figure below, which shows that the space for a three- or four-people household in *Ciudad Jardín* neighbourhood is the same space that 22 homes (88 people) occupy in *Llano Verde*.

Figure 17 Llano Verde versus Ciudad Jardín



Source: Figure by the author based on data from Google Earth (2019).

Even so, criticisms of social housing models are minimal and initiatives such as the free housing programmes are well received by the general public and government officials seem to be satisfied that they have met their goals. In fact, *Llano Verde* is the typical result of the successive changes made to social housing regulations which, as mentioned in Chapter 1, have led to the decline of urban quality in many respects. For instance, in addition to gradually reducing the size of the lots, in the mid-1970s the Ministry of Housing allowed the separation of the blocks by pedestrian streets, reducing the distance between facades and, therefore, the quality of public spaces. Vehicular roads (red dotted line in Figure 16) became peripheral rings confining sets of blocks and forming what was defined in Colombian housing regulations as super-blocks. Although the dynamics of people flows on the vehicular roads are different, what can be evidenced in the master plan of a typical case such as *Llano Verde* is that this fact is ignored and the homes are exactly the same as those located on pedestrian paths. This fact confirms that neither the spatial quality nor the functionality of the neighbourhoods for the poor have a central role in urban design decisions.

Moreover, although several spaces were reserved for parks and public facilities, the poor-quality of these spaces is evident. The construction firm simply set aside areas for 'green spaces' as required by urban regulations, but these areas are not true parks, denying residents of the neighbourhood the opportunity to have high-quality recreational areas. Indeed, as previously mentioned, some of these areas are currently occupied by informal businesses or controlled by gangs, which prevents the community from using them freely.

To low-quality public spaces we must add the fact that the construction of facilities for basic services was not included in the free housing programme budget. Although the municipality by itself secured the money to build a school and two nurseries in the last four years, the health centre remains unfinished and the neighbourhood lacks a community centre (Figure 18).

Figure 18 Public spaces and facilities in Llano Verde

Source: Map and photos by the author (2017). Photos *Parques del Samán* y *del Amor*: Ruby Becoche (2018).

This omission of public facilities in the national programme occurred because the government privileged the construction of houses, neglecting complementary infrastructure and transferring this responsibility to municipalities that lacked the financial means to complete the projects. As noted by an official of the Ministry of Housing,

> We have witnessed how they [the office in charge of the 100% subsidised housing programme] have done all the implementation of the free housing programme and after finishing it, they thought about the facilities because 'we forgot that part'. What are we going to do with this social time bomb? (Personal communication, August 9, 2017).

This comment corroborates that whereas the government fulfilled the goal of building free housing complexes around the country in record time, *social housing complexes in Colombia have become the final product of quantitative requirements* without any sensitivity as to how urban space can be transformative for vulnerable groups. These complexes have then become the vivid representation of the denial of

the ‘right to the city’ to the poor in the sense given by Lefebvre (2009). The housing problem is solved, but everything else that makes the city a place of encounter, synergy and opportunities has been left aside.

Indeed, the interior design of the homes is no more encouraging. Although architectural and structural designs meet habitability and earthquake-resistance standards, the architectural design of the homes of *Llano Verde* also follows the rule of the minimum quality standards. A recurring complaint of beneficiaries is related to the lack of space and the fact that the homes, built in lots of 35m², cannot be expanded (Figure 19).

Figure 19 Floor plans and interior photos of homes in Llano Verde

Ground floor First floor

Size of homes: 46.3m². Individual plots: 35m² (3.5m x 10m) including front and back yards.
Source: Presentation *Plan de Gestión Social* (Secretaría de Vivienda Social, 2013, p. 6).
Photos: Ruby Becoche (2018).

As a beneficiary explained, even if she was grateful for being granted a free house, limited interior space has been a main problem,

> In my neighbour’s home live eleven people and all the houses have two small bedrooms. In each bedroom there is only room for a small bed and there is only one bathroom. Here I sleep with my little girl to leave the other bedroom to my oldest daughter. We couldn’t put two beds in one room; they just didn’t fit. (Personal communication, August 12, 2017).

In addition to the small spaces and due to budget restrictions, homes in *Llano Verde* were handed over without being completely finished which, as highlighted by a city official, reduced the opportunity for poor households to live in a proper house.

> The urban structure of *Llano Verde* is beautiful but it lacks trees so it's a very hot neighbourhood. The walls [of the homes] are thin and the houses were delivered without doors. Privacy was ignored because there was no room for the couple or for the children. Everything was as small as possible. (Personal communication, September 4, 2017).

As mentioned in the section on informality, this lack of space prompted a series of modifications carried out by the beneficiaries themselves. However, neither the original design nor the modifications made by people have ensured good quality spaces.

Paradoxically, that vibrant and empowered community that planners have been unable to foster in social housing complexes such as *Llano Verde* is the main characteristic of 'unplanned' settlements. As mentioned earlier, the informal settlers of District 18 have been working together for years to improve their environment and to preserve the sense of community that has emerged since the appearance of the settlements. When the occupation of land started, the first residents of this area agreed to reserve some spaces for communal activities, facilities and parks, which have been gradually built over time (Figure 20). The commitment of the community to take these projects forward has made it possible for them to find support from some institutions, NGOs and local universities, which have been engaged in their construction and functioning.

For instance, during the last decade the primary school of *Pampas del Mirador* became part of the municipal education system, the health centre of *Alto Polvorines* was refurbished by the Secretariat of Public Health, the community centre of *La Arboleda* was built with the support of the Reckitt Benckiser Foundation, the multipurpose court of *La Arboleda* was built by the Secretariat of Sports and Recreation and the *Universidad Javeriana* has been helping the community of *Palmas I* to design their community centre. Additionally, a small park in this settlement was the final project of two students from the School of Architecture of the *Universidad del Valle* who designed it and built it together with the community.

Figure 20 Public spaces and facilities in the informal settlements

Source: Map and photos by the author (2017). Photos of urban facilities and *Parque Brisas de las Palmas*: Iván Galindo (2018). Photo *Parque Palmas I*: Darío Conde (2017).

In terms of housing quality, in the settlements the lots are bigger (60m² on average) and the houses are better tailored to households' needs. Despite this comparative advantage over state-led social housing, people in these areas face the typical limitations of informality: 1) lack of legal security of tenure over housing and land, 2) structural vulnerability or risk to natural hazards and 3) deficiencies in local infrastructure.

While people interviewed said they were satisfied living in the settlements, the truth is that the quality of homes varies greatly depending on the financial and technical capability of households to improve their living conditions. What I found is a heterogeneous quality of homes since some families live in precarious conditions while others have managed to upgrade their homes to the point that they look like the constructions of a low-income formal neighbourhood.

Homes at different stages in *Brisas de las Palmas*. Photo: Iván Galindo (2017).

Although it cannot be said that the settlements of District 18 are high-quality urban spaces, the residents of this area feel proud of the results of joint initiatives and feel attached to their communal facilities. In contrast, these collaborative dynamics are not apparent in *Llano Verde* where the role of the community in the construction of the missing infrastructure or in more intangible needs such as income-generation has been focused on demanding direct support and resources from the government but not on self-management models as refined as those found in the settlements. With this statement I am not suggesting that communities have to assume the functions and tasks of the state, but reiterating that participatory schemes have a greater impact on urban transformation.

Learning from bottom-up experiences that contribute to empowering a community is thus one of the challenges that the government must assume in order to obtain better results in new housing projects. However, the first step is to re-evaluate the formula of minimum standards underpinned by policies that ignore people's needs and deepen inequalities.

3.4 Urban planning policies and hyperunemployment

In order to determine whether urban planning policies contribute or not to the building of barriers preventing poor communities from finding suitable jobs, this section is grounded in the premise previously set out in this thesis that hyperunemployment in Cali is not randomly distributed in the territory and, although it affects all vulnerable communities, it impacts ethnic minorities more severely than

other groups. In this sense, conceding that the markers of disadvantage discussed above play a central role in the persistence of hyperunemployment in Cali, this section complements socio-spatial findings with the analysis of three key factors related to planning policies, which contribute to widening the unemployment gap: 1) land-use regulations, 2) location of dwellings in relation to employment areas and 3) unequal accessibility to transport means.

Regarding land-use regulations, an important source of income in underprivileged areas where rates of unemployment are higher is the possibility of setting up a small business on the ground floor of the homes. However, ignoring this reality, the '100% subsidised housing' programme banned the use of houses for running any kind of economic activity. By Decree 847 of 2013, the Ministry of Housing established as a duty of beneficiaries 'to use the property received *solely and exclusively* for housing' [my emphasis] (Article 4). This rule, indeed, was one of the most criticised -and broken- of the free housing programme and one year later the government was compelled to issue an amended decree. In Colombia, under the principle of administrative decentralisation, municipal planning is the responsibility of local governments; thus, it was determined that the Ministry of Housing could not modify land-use regulations in any city. Within this framework, the new Decree, 2481 of 2014, established that homes should be used *mainly for housing* but also for compatible uses in accordance with the POT of each municipality.

In the case of Cali, recognising that in disadvantaged areas the logic of necessity leads families to use their homes to make a living, the POT included a land-use called 'predominantly residential', which allows a mix of housing and commercial activities in the less affluent places of the city (orange areas in Map 19). From my perspective, this type of land-use assumes that the most important commerce and service activities will remain highly centralised in both the CBD and the north-south axis, while economic activities and jobs on offer in poor areas will continue to be the link to subsistence activities and small-scale businesses. This approach to land-use planning demonstrates that the long-term vision of the POT is not challenging the *status quo* since no specific measures are proposed in order to balance the unequal distribution of job-generating activities.

Map 19 Activity Areas established by the POT

Net residential
Mixed uses
Industry
Predominantly residential
Urban facilities
Public space

Source: Map by the author based on the POT (2014).

Under this logic, and following the rules established for the rest of the *Aguablanca* District (Map 19), in 2014 the POT also determined that *Llano Verde* would have a 'predominantly residential' land-use. Nevertheless, when a number of people and city officials were asked about the modification of the national Decree and the permission given by the POT to combine housing and economic activities in the neighbourhood, none of them knew that having a business was allowed. Indeed, three years after the POT was approved a community leader thought that the restriction of the national government was still in force, banning the establishment of any kind of business in the homes. Talking about the disadvantages of living in *Llano Verde* she mentioned,

> One problem that exists here is that people are trained and supported to have a productive project but you cannot have a business inside the house. That's a contradiction. The police inspector has said to us that it's forbidden to have a business but then how will people survive? (Personal communication, August 1, 2017).

This testimony demonstrates the lack of knowledge of urban regulations by both beneficiaries and middle-rank officials in Cali, coupled with the solid idea that the free housing neighbourhood is a project that must follow national government rules. This perception stems from the fact that local officials prefer to wait for explicit confirmations from the Ministry of Housing before allowing any change in *Llano Verde,* even if local dynamics and the municipal plan indicate otherwise.[89] This particular situation reveals that, although Colombia is an administratively decentralised country, the national government preserves the power to impose its rules on municipalities, eroding local autonomy and self-management capacity (Alfonso, 2019). In this regard, mayors accept government-led projects as their own and middle-rank municipal officials prefer to avoid clashes with national agencies than applying local regulations or even using their common sense in favour of citizens.

To this situation linked to land-use regulations, it should be added that the obligation of living in the house for ten years, discussed in Section 2.2, has limited the chances of some beneficiaries to find employment in other municipalities. As one of the inhabitants of the neighbourhood explained,

> Some people had to leave a person taking care of their houses because they found job opportunities in another municipality. And what was happening? City officials came to torture them by saying: 'They [the Ministry of Housing] will take your house because you are not living there'. (Personal communication, June 7, 2017).

People then have to deal with the constant dilemma of staying and not having a livelihood or moving to another city where they have a job offer and thus losing their homes. In this context, government regulations that, in this case, seek to protect property rights become a direct barrier to generate income, producing adverse effects such as the exacerbation of unemployment and poverty. Besides, restrictions on leaving the neighbourhood are compounded with the fact that the peripheral location of this complex affected people's livelihood and prevented new job opportunities.

[89] This conclusion is based on informal conversations held with municipal officials working in *Llano Verde*, the police inspector of District 15, Carvajal Foundation staff members and community leaders.

According to a beneficiary who before receiving a home in Llano Verde worked as a recycler,

> When we were resettled here the economic burden was awful. The very first days I wept and I wanted to come back to the dyke [of the Cauca river] because we weren't accustomed to paying for public utilities and the bills started to arrive [...] To make a living by recycling waste material I had to haul my wooden cart for three hours from here to District 6 where I used to work. It was very difficult so I had to stop working. (Personal communication, June 7, 2017).

In addition to people like this recycler who had to leave their economic activities when they were relocated, the residents of *Llano Verde* suffer the effects of an inadequate location in the city. As mentioned in previous chapters, the fact of having been resettled in a corner of the *Aguablanca* District has limited people's employment opportunities. In current conditions, reaching the areas of the city where most of the job offer is concentrated implies for people living in *Llano Verde* long commuting times and high travelling expenses.[90]

As Rodríguez, Vivas, Pinzón & Jaramillo (2018) have demonstrated, a person living on the outskirts of Cali can take up to three times longer to reach employment areas than a person living near the north-south axis. As Map 20 illustrates, people from the *Aguablanca* District are the most affected by long distances and public transport deficiencies, since a trip to reach work nodes can take them between 60 and 90 minutes. The fact that the poorest areas in the east side are the least covered by the BRT, a newly implemented public transport system, corroborates my hypothesis that urban planning is not serving its purpose of reducing urban inequalities, which ratifies my argument that uneven development in Cali is a customary phenomenon.

The areas with the best coverage (green colour on the map) are those located in the north-south axis, and some of the areas occupied by informal settlements. As mentioned in Section 1.4, people in the settlements have a privileged location, near the most affluent areas of the city (districts along *Calle Quinta* Avenue).

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[90] Due to the fact that the current system does not cover the entire city, some people have to pay for a ticket in the informal transport to get to the BRT stop and, once there, they have to pay for another ticket to reach their final destination.

Map 20 Average time to employment areas and BRT trunk routes



Source: Map by the author based on data from *El Observador Regional* (D. Rodríguez et al., 2018, p. 3) plus shape of trunk routes, MetroCali (2017).

Although people living in the highest parts of the hills are forced to use informal means of transport due to deficiencies in the public system, the map above shows that most of the settlements have good coverage. Paradoxically, a strategic location enabled by the freedom of deciding where to live is a privilege denied to beneficiaries of social housing, who have to live where city planners determine. This combination of factors proves that underprivileged communities, who have been beneficiaries of social housing, will continue to be far from work nodes, which implies not only fewer chances to access quality jobs, but also higher monthly transportation expenses. Since the cost of transportation for poor families corresponds to a large portion of their income, poverty ends up conditioning mobility (Avellaneda, 2008) and low mobility capacity will keep the poor trapped in informal jobs or subsistence businesses found in their own neighbourhoods.

In conclusion, although hyperunemployment is the consequence of a constellation of factors, in the case of Cali I found that two central aspects contribute strongly to the persistence of this phenomenon. On the one hand, the existence of a matrix of domination which, shaped by the principles of coloniality of power, has kept poor communities relegated. As argued throughout this thesis, the discrimination of ethnic minorities and the stigmatisation of poor communities in Cali limit the access of these groups to the formal labour market and restrict their opportunities to low-quality, temporary or informal jobs. On the other hand, urban planning and housing policies are not contributing effectively to closing the social gap but widening it, which proves that governments themselves can (unintentionally or not) create barriers that impede access to adequate education, job training or housing located near job areas.

As shown above, institutional decisions recently taken such as land-use regulations (POT, 2014) and the design of the public transport system (BRT, 2006) suggest no intention to challenge the patterns of segregation and exclusion. Under the current circumstances, two implicit messages derived from the POT are that the poor will continue to rely on peripheral subsistence economic activities and informal jobs, and that the city plan is not designed to reverse this trend.

3.5 Urban planning and housing policies for peace-building

Even if Latin American cities differ greatly in many aspects, the relationship between inadequate urban planning, socio-spatial divisions and urban violence in this region, found by scholars such as Davis (2014), coincides to a large extent with what has been happening in Cali during recent decades. As argued in this thesis, the intensification of organised crime, gang-led and drug-related violence in this city since the 1980s has become a clear indicator of the emergence of new forms of marginality. To counteract these issues, the local government has resorted to a raft of measures which includes prevention[91], strengthening of the police, improvement of judicial systems and specific operations aimed at dismantling criminal organisations and drug-trafficking networks (Guerrero, 2015). However, as revealed in Section 2.4, results

[91] For instance, earlier closure of public establishments where alcohol is consumed or banning the carrying of weapons at certain periods.

remain limited and the city continues to be characterised by high rates of homicide and crime.

While seeking to build long-term peaceful urban environments, the national government, the municipality, some NGOs and grass-roots organisations have developed specific strategies related to urban planning and housing policies, three of which are addressed in this section. The first refers to the housing initiatives targeting victims of the armed conflict and its outcomes in the case of Cali. The second corresponds to the municipal programme *Territories for Inclusion and Opportunities* (TIO) launched in Cali in 2012 with the support of the Ford Foundation within the *Just Cities* platform. The third, with a local impact, consist of three initiatives carried out by community leaders and supported by governmental and non-governmental organisations in the case studies. Although these strategies are not the only ones that seek to generate an adequate response to the repercussions of the armed political conflict and the long-term effects of drug-trafficking in Cali, they are considered here as three examples of the different ways in which institutions and citizens try to counteract the emergence and persistence of violence at different levels.

- **Housing policies for victims of the armed conflict**

At the national level, housing policies aimed at serving the population affected by the armed conflict have been derived from the Law 387 passed by the Colombian Congress in 1997. The legislative act that regulated this Law in terms of housing, Decree 951 of 2001, was centred on granting individual subsidies to victims to be invested in new housing projects offered by private developers. Unfortunately, this decree and the subsequent policies set up to help victims of the internal conflict arriving in cities were unsuccessful, mainly because displaced families were unable to save money or access bank loans, two necessary conditions for purchasing a home on the real estate market (Torres & Vargas, 2009). Five years after the Law 387 was passed, an evaluation conducted by the Constitutional Court concluded that,

> Public policies serving displaced populations have not managed to counteract the serious deterioration in their conditions of vulnerability [...] 92% of displaced people have unsatisfied basic needs and 80% are in extreme poverty. Likewise, 63.5% of them live in inadequate housing (Corte Constitucional, 2004).

According to the Court (2004), between 1998 and 2002 housing programmes targeting displaced populations met just 11.4 per cent of their goals and covered only 3.7 per cent of potential demand. Under these circumstances, as indicated in Chapter 1, the national government proposed to build 200,000 free housing units (Law 1537 of 2012) to respond more effectively to the needs of displaced people living in capital cities. When the first phase of the '100% subsidised housing' programme was concluded in 2014, there was a new assessment by the Constitutional Court (2016, pp. 98–102). This assessment established that the first 100,000 homes delivered only covered 25,129 households whereas 83,878 families with approved subsidies were still waiting for a home, and around 400,000 households had not participated in public calls for subsidies but still needed housing.

In the case of Cali, the limited coverage of the free housing programme was also evident since, as mentioned earlier, only 7 per cent of the total number of victims living in the city were granted a free home in *Llano Verde*. Besides, given that the programme was focused exclusively on solving people's needs through physical-spatial interventions, that is, building homes, this initiative was far from being the ideal solution for displaced populations. As argued in this dissertation, direct, structural and symbolic forms of violence quickly emerged in *Llano Verde*, indicating that the goal of promoting peace and community building by delivering free homes was not achieved. Conversely, frustration and feelings of uprooting were recurrent when I asked residents of this neighbourhood about having received a home there.

> We, the victims living in *Llano Verde* say that we want a better place for our kids. With our work, we can overcome this situation and give them a better life. But, while we are here we have to resist all that's happening. (Personal communication, August 30, 2017).

> As much as we want *Llano Verde* to be a model at the national level, we're not going to achieve this because the institutions and the government don't enable us to have the neighbourhood that we dreamed of. They [the government] believe that we're animals and believed the same when they built *Potrero Grande*. 'This is a pasture, go there and kill yourself!' There was no social fabric. *Potrero… Llano*;[92] what is the difference between the two? Even the name is similar. (Personal communication, September 18, 2017).

[92] The literal translation of *Potrero Grande* is large paddock and *Llano Verde* means green plain. The interviewee made a pun with the names of both neighbourhoods implying that they were sent to remote places used to raise cattle.

These statements lead us back to the discussion of structural violence since poor-quality social housing homes like those built in complexes such as *Potrero Grande* and *Llano Verde* deepen social exclusion and reduce social mobility opportunities. Although social housing based on minimum standards solves the problem of home ownership and facilitates access to public services, what the present analysis proves is that projects are not becoming drivers for stimulating peace or better living conditions for poor communities. The rapid emergence of violence and the persistence of extreme poverty in new social housing complexes in Cali prove that the physical-spatial emphasis of these projects combined with the concentration of extremely poor people in an equally poor context are fundamental flaws that impede the creation of peaceful environments. In the opinion of a former official involved in the national operation of the '100% subsidised housing', trying to cope with issues such as extreme poverty or displaced population by building homes is a wrong approach.

> One of the first complexities of the programme was the construction of housing in remote areas. Imagine the challenge of building a community in these places [...] And if you put together a large number of people with financial difficulties to survive from day to day, things go wrong. (Personal communication, August 10, 2017).

Going further, a former official of the Planning Department of Cali made the following comment about this initiative,

> Maybe the solution should not have been urban housing but rather to think about how people could return to their villages or to their agricultural areas. I mean giving a solution to a multiplicity of problems that cannot be summarised in the provision of housing (Personal communication, September 7, 2017).

Since the inception of *Llano Verde*, municipal officials have detected many failures that were not corrected in time by the national government. For instance, as mentioned in Section 2.1, the government designed a ballot system to randomise the assignment of homes. In addition to the resulting segregation of ethnic minorities, another unexpected consequence of this system was that victims and perpetrators received a house in the same or in the front block, generating the resurgence of risk situations or personal conflicts. As a victim explains,

> President Santos came and 'threw out' the victims together with demobilised former members of illegal armed groups because the peace agreement was going to be signed.

> We, the victims, have had to live in these blocks with people like them. (Personal communication, June 16, 2017).

This mistake, which could have been prevented, exposed a lack of institutional coordination and a lack of knowledge about the community that was going to arrive in the neighbourhood, despite the fact that the Ministry of Housing built a detailed database of the beneficiaries of the programme. In the words of a municipal official, in spite of the positives, the free housing programme became a 'harming action' promoted and produced by the government itself.

> What did we lack? Delaying the programme for a year to get to know families better and to decide how to organise the project with them [...] Today, the fact that they have their own homes is a privilege, but some people were affected because we made decisions that also caused harm. For example, in some cases houses in the same blocks were awarded to victims and perpetrators [of the crimes that displaced them]. (Personal communication, September 4, 2017).

In this context, although the free housing programme became a feasible alternative for victims to receive a home, the contribution of this initiative to the construction of peace was not as expected. As suggested in the quotation above, limited time due to the need for the national government to show quick results played a key role in the rapid emergence of complex problems that, still today, have not been solved.

Furthermore, the government's failure to consider other options that could lead to different results, such as informal settlement upgrading, was detected by the Constitutional Court as one of the biggest weaknesses of housing policies for victims of the conflict. According to the Court,

> Many displaced families have managed to recreate in the informal neighbourhoods not only the ties and community life that the forced displacement destroyed, but the reconstruction of their life project. These families, therefore, are not willing to move again from such settlements but, on the contrary, they are seeking their legalisation and regularisation [...] It is important to reiterate that the legalisation and regularisation of these neighbourhoods can be one of the most appropriate ways to face difficulties seen in the Free Housing Programme (Corte Constitucional, 2016, pp. 107–108).

From my perspective, the fact of ignoring other alternatives has been counterproductive since the findings presented above demonstrate that programmes

based solely on the construction of infrastructure do not constitute a substantive solution for vulnerable communities in social, spatial or economic terms. Nor can the free housing programme be considered to be a successful initiative in the construction of peace, especially when various forms of violence have quickly emerged and are affecting communities on a daily basis.

- **Territories for Inclusion and Opportunities (TIO)**

During his administration, the former mayor of Cali Rodrigo Guerrero, concluded that the exacerbation of social disparities, coupled with interpersonal conflicts and organised crime, became the main causal factors of lethal violence in the city during recent years (Guerrero, 2015, p. 50). That is why, in addition to strengthening security policies and the judicial system, Guerrero included in his Municipal Development Plan (2012-2015) a strategic line called 'Equity for all' seeking to reduce the social gap and, thus, urban violence. This strategic line was materialised through the initiative *Territorios de Inclusión y Oportunidades* known as the TIO, aimed at intervening in neighbourhoods with critical indicators of poverty, violence and security (Alcaldía de Cali, 2012b, p. 16).

Figure 21 TIO: Components, programmes and areas prioritised

1 Social intervention

Programmes:
1. Promotion, prevention, inclusion and opportunities for children and youth.
2. Strengthening of family ties.
3. Fight against poverty and hunger.
4. Job skills.

2 Environments for life

Programme:
1. High-quality habitat.

3 Justice & community coexistence

Programmes:
1. Committed to safety.
2. Peaceful settlement of conflicts.
3. Monitoring and evaluation of TIO.

Neighbourhoods intervened by TIO in 18 Districts (2016-2019)

Source: Figure of components and programmes based on information from the PDM 2012-2015 (Alcaldía de Cali, 2012b, p. 31). Map of areas prioritised in the PDM 2016-2019 (Alcaldía de Cali, 2016d, p. 11).

After the first four years of implementation, an assessment of the performance indicators proposed as measures of the impact of TIO in each of the programmes shown in Figure 21 reveals positive results. For instance, there was a reduction in the numbers of families living below the poverty line from 21.1 to 16.5 per cent and all the districts benefitting from intervention achieved a decrease in infant mortality rates. Also, in almost all the districts (except in District 21) there was a drop in teenage pregnancy (for further details on performance indicators see Appendix E). Other indicators such as environmental quality and reduction of violence and crime show improvements achieved during the implementation of this initiative, that was maintained by mayor Maurice Armitage as a cross-cutting strategy in his Municipal Development Plan (2016-2019). While conceding that measurement of the direct impact of this strategy in reducing social inequalities is not feasible,[93] what is certain is that Cali has reduced by 0,05 points the Gini coefficient since the implementation of the TIO strategy.

Graph 10 Gini coefficient. Cali, Bogotá, Medellín and Colombia (2012-2017)

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Cali	0,515	0,505	0,487	0,478	0,476	0,460
Bogota	0,497	0,504	0,502	0,498	0,499	0,498
Medellin	0,500	0,506	0,526	0,489	0,478	0,464
Colombia	0,539	0,539	0,538	0,522	0,517	0,508

Source: Graph by the author based on data from DANE (2018d).

As illustrated in Graph 10, between 2012 and 2017 the Gini coefficient in Cali dropped from 0.515 to 0.460, a figure below the national average and lower than the figures recorded for Bogotá and Medellín during the same period. Nevertheless, as

[93] There are many other factors that contribute to the variation of socio-economic indicators such as those used for measuring the impact of TIO.

shown in previous sections, the mechanisms implemented to reduce income gaps, segregation and substandard living conditions have proved insufficient or inadequate in breaking the cycle of structural violence that still afflicts underprivileged communities in Cali.

Besides, this strategy currently contributes to the prioritisation of public resource investment but does not necessarily help to meet long-term goals at the urban level. Although TIO has certainly played a part in the reduction of violence and the improvement of living conditions for communities covered by the programme, it has not challenged the development patterns that have shaped the city since the colonial era. The fact that structural issues such as the relegation of the poor to the peripheries and racial segregation are not addressed by any government programmes means that these communities will remain in the disadvantaged position that impedes them from overcoming marginality. According to the analysis, programmes serving a poor population such as TIO could have a greater impact if: 1) They are articulated with urban planning and housing policies to avoid results such as those found in *Llano Verde*. 2) They support grass-root initiatives proven effective in empowering communities and to involve them in the co-creation of solutions for their own needs. 3) They address issues that are not necessarily shown in conventional statistics such as discrimination, segregation and stigmatisation of poor communities and ethnic minorities that have been widely ignored in the design of social support programmes.

- **Grass-roots initiatives**

In addition to the official programmes mentioned above, during fieldwork I found that in the case studies some social leaders are promoting local projects that contribute to the construction of community bonds from multiple perspectives. Three of these initiatives, which will be summarised in this section, are specially related to peace-building. The first two have been implemented in *Llano Verde* and the third in the informal settlements of District 18. All of them, with little financial support, manage to unite the efforts of community members and institutions towards a common goal: promoting a peaceful life in these territories.

· **Carnival for peace, life and reconciliation**:

Every year, grass-roots organisations in *Llano Verde* organise a parade around the neighbourhood, a beauty contest and a costume party for adults and children. This activity, supported by the local government, Carvajal Foundation and other institutions, has been conceived by its organisers as an event to bring together the inhabitants of the neighbourhood through a message of peace and solidarity. Likewise, it has become an opportunity for community-based organisations to present their range of services and achievements to people. As mentioned before, the building of community bonds in this neighbourhood has been made fraught by multiple factors and promoters of the carnival hope to transform *Llano Verde* into a 'territory of peace', a phrase that has gradually become a slogan for the neighbourhood.

Photos by the author (2017).

· **Biblio-Casa**:

With the aim of supporting children from vulnerable households through play activities, a community leader, beneficiary of the free housing programme, promotes reading in *Llano Verde*. As part of the *Biblio-Casa* initiative, this leader runs a group of about 50 children who meet every Friday afternoon. For her, the opportunity to support children in reading and provide a space to encourage them to study represents the first step in keeping children away from domestic conflicts or the influence of gangs and also to building peace in the neighbourhood in the long term.

Photos by the author (2017).

· **Barter-trade in the informal settlements of District 18**:

Photos by Iván Galindo (2018).

A decade ago, the Carvajal Foundation promoted in District 18 a barter-trade activity based on the Indigenous tradition called *trueque*. Since then, two groups of leaders have taken charge of this activity in which, in exchange for recycling material, participants receive *Mingo cards* that can be traded for second-hand clothes, accessories or household items that the organisers have obtained with the help of external collaborators. After the bartering activity, the recycling material collected is sold and the money used to develop a project previously agreed with the whole community. Usually this project involves the paving of streets, stairs and sidewalks in which the community collaborates with the workforce. However, as one of its promoters asserts, the deeper purpose of the activity is to help members of the community to get to know each other by working on a shared project, thus strengthening solidarity and unity among the settlement dwellers.

As mentioned in Section 2.5.2, all these kinds of initiatives, which bypass traditional ways of peace-building and city making, become 'alternatives to development' (Escobar, 2012) that make it possible for people to find their own means of dealing with everyday issues. Outside the developmentalist framework, the accumulation model or the power structures, grass-roots projects demonstrate the value of community empowerment in peace-building. In addition, these three examples corroborate the argument that improving living conditions in disadvantaged areas is not simply a matter of investing in infrastructure but also a question of constructing community bonds to achieve mutual support and trust.

Although community empowerment is fundamental for carrying out successful projects for peace-building, government institutions in charge of urban and social development projects do not necessarily follow this path in designing their programmes. As shown above, the free housing programme was conceived by the government as 'the right thing to do' without giving beneficiaries the opportunity to

participate or opening a discussion about other alternatives to assist the victims as the Constitutional Court has consistently recommended. On the other hand, although strategies such as TIO promote a closer collaboration with communities, one cannot say that this initiative was fully based on a bottom-up approach, failing to address issues outside official statistics well known by communities. Finally, experiences with local impact explore endeavours outside institutional frameworks. Even if some of these initiatives have government support, they are carried out directly by community leaders with limited financial resources but with a clear message: peace-building begins with the construction of community bonds and trust.

In conclusion, although policies aimed at promoting peace-building, socio-economic mixing, compact growth or settlement upgrading have mushroomed in Cali, public actions are failing to fulfil these goals. As the results reveal, inequality, socio-economic and ethno-racial segregation and decisions taken under a top-down approach continue to rule the city-making. Instead of breaking the vicious cycle of marginality, projects and programmes implemented by both the national and local governments constitute palliatives that improve some socio-economic indicators while structural factors contributing to the production and the persistence of marginality are not fully addressed.

In this context, the lack of consistency between what theories reveal, policies advocate and final actions deliver reaffirms the central argument of this dissertation: the adverse living conditions that afflict the urban poor will persist despite government efforts to eradicate marginality, while these efforts are restricted to addressing the physical-spatial dimension of the problem. This situation confirms the urgency of pushing forward theories, public policies and government actions to address marginality from a more holistic perspective. In this sense, the final chapter presented below, serves as an input for laying the groundwork for the formulation of more appropriate urban planning and housing policies.

4. MARGINALITY THROUGH THE LENS OF URBAN PLANNING. FINAL REMARKS

Although the relevance of the concept of marginality has been called into question in both past and present scholarship, authors revisiting this notion in Latin America and other regions with more advanced economies are drawing attention to the emergence of new forms of marginality. The growing theoretical debate worldwide, together with the results presented in this thesis, point to this phenomenon being an unresolved issue that merits further discussion and analysis. In this regard, by proposing a multidimensional approach to urban marginality, which encompasses five inherent characteristics (ethno-racial segregation, informality, hyper-unemployment, violence and limited participation), this dissertation introduces a new conceptual framework aimed at integrating theories, public policies and government actions.

Overall, the cross-case analysis reveals that marginality has multiple nuances that go beyond the origin of the neighbourhoods (planned complexes or spontaneous settlements) or the condition of the tenure of the home (formal or informal). In this regard, the conclusion that emerges from the findings presented in this dissertation is that people who have been beneficiaries of the free housing programme in Cali experience marginality in a more intensive way than people living in the informal settlements of District 18. This means that housing solutions such as *Llano Verde*, focused on promoting a spatial order, and far from addressing features of marginality such as social divisions, income inequality, long-term joblessness, urban violence and extreme poverty, reproduce and, in some cases, aggravate the causal factors of these phenomena.

According to my findings, the government's approach to tackling marginality through 'development and modernisation', translated into the construction of large-scale complexes in the city outskirts, has failed to address the two main drivers of

marginality: the enormous inequalities of a heterogeneous society underpinned by a *capitalistic accumulation system*, and the historical causes of such disparities grounded in the principles of *coloniality of power*. Despite having obtained poor results for decades, there has been no clear intention by the state to modify either the economic model of financing and building social housing or the power structures that give shape to urban planning and housing policies. Variations in strategies, indeed, have been limited to technical issues aimed at optimising the housing production, such as the gradual reduction of minimum standards, the contraction of government subsidies or the design of new operational tools to improve building efficiency.

Hence, challenging government policies and actions that have traditionally put 'development' as the right solution for coping with poverty and marginality, this dissertation has focused on demonstrating that new forms urban marginality emerging in poor areas are not the consequence of the way in which a given territory is inhabited but the result of a constellation of factors linked to forms of domination concealed behind well-positioned discourses. With this in mind, this final chapter summarises the factors that contribute to the production and perpetuation of marginality through the lens of theories and policies analysed in the course of this research. The thesis ends with some conclusions and final remarks that may offer opportunities for future research on urban studies addressing marginality but also for the formulation of more holistic planning and housing policies.

4.1 The production of marginality

At this point I expect to have fully demonstrated –through statistical data, people's statements, and spatial analysis– that government urban planning produces marginality. The principles of development and modernisation, repeated as a mantra for more than seven decades in most Latin American countries, have fixed the idea that urban planning and social housing are the right paths to achieve social justice. This idea, as explained in Chapter 1, has been applied in Cali to the letter. In this city, successive plans developed since the 1930s, as well as fiscal efforts, have focused on the production of new (large-scale) social housing complexes. However, the historic asymmetric distribution of wealth and power have produced and maintained a planning model that has consistently excluded the urban poor -especially ethnic minorities and more recently victims of the armed conflict- from real opportunities to

overcome their marginal conditions. The tandem between *coloniality of power* expressed in socio-spatial segregation by race, cultural or socio-economic status and the *accumulation process* represented in the conception of social housing as an engine for economic growth, has produced places where the features of aggravated marginality have rapidly emerged.

In fact, people who became homeowners in social housing complexes such as *Llano Verde* or *Potrero Grande* are experiencing long-term unemployment, racial and social discrimination and diverse forms of violence, which unveil the failure of both urban planning and housing policies in curbing marginality. Such failure is compounded by the fact that urban phenomena such as socio-spatial divisions, racial segregation and social inequalities have been accepted and gradually normalised by society, producing a general apathy by citizens towards questioning the effectiveness of government interventions targeting deprived communities.

The lack of interest in urban affairs shown by the general population has facilitated the spread of a message of the success of social housing programmes, widely disseminated by government agencies and city developers with the complicity of the mass media. Besides, the isolation of poor neighbourhoods itself has prevented the general public from having their own perspective about the quality and results of state-led social housing. This is why, despite the severity of the problems arising on a daily basis in neighbourhoods such as *Llano Verde* in Cali, the discourse of housing-as-justice continues to be deeply rooted in the collective imagination as the magic formula for achieving social equity. The '100% subsidised housing' programme was in fact chosen in a national survey as the best initiative of the Santos' administration, over the peace process with the FARC or the increasing of the budget for education over the budget for national defence.[94]

Despite the positive perception of public housing programmes, this thesis has revealed that successive discrepancies between government investments, planned goals and people's concerns have produced major adverse outcomes. This demonstrates that, similarly to what Sen (1999) found in other contexts, planning priorities for technocrats in Colombia do not necessarily coincide with people's needs

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94 www.elespectador.com/noticias/politica/entrega-de-casas-gratis-el-principal-acierto-del-gobierno-de-santos-segun-polimetrica-articulo-706404 Accessed: 25/09/2018.

and even less so when it comes to the poorest segments of society. As discussed in Chapter 2, ignoring people's requests or not having the sensitivity -or the interest- to better understand the needs of the underprivileged, leads to inadequate solutions that fail to modify social injustice. Thus, although in this research I have recognised the structural character of marginality, I have also elaborated on the idea that there are avoidable and modifiable factors whose understanding and analysis constitutes an opportunity to incorporate new perspectives in public projects and policies.

4.1.1 Factors influencing the production and persistence of marginality

Grounded in both the theoretical framework that underpins the definition of urban marginality (see pages 65-66) and the analytical framework based on the five inherent characteristics of this phenomenon, this thesis brings to light the key underlying factors that contribute to the production and reproduction of marginality in two contrasting areas of Cali. As my findings suggest, the causal factors of marginality are the product of ill-conceived policies that contribute to the preservation of uneven power relations within a context that facilitates wealth accumulation. Despite the fact that these two aspects were identified in the late 1960s in Latin America as the main drivers of marginality, solutions to counteract the effects of this phenomenon remain framed by physical-spatial interventions underpinned by the developmentalist discourse.

Past theories raised by authors such as Kowarick (1974) and Singer (1973), have demonstrated that the economic model based on industrial capitalism stimulated the economy -as planned- but at the same time widened the income gap. Present theories, elaborated by authors such as Sassen (2002), Wacquant (1999, 2008) and Auyero (1999), suggest that in an era marked by economic growth and global trade, neoliberal practices such as the gradual deterioration of wage labour conditions, the retrenchment of the welfare state and hyperunemployment have exacerbated the marginal conditions of the urban poor. Consequently, although economic growth has been achieved over several decades, the concentration of wealth continues to play a central role in the production of marginality. From the urban planning approach, the accumulation model becomes a key factor in explaining why in cities, historically marked by economic prosperity, the urban poor continue to be marginalised. As shown

in the case of Cali, for instance, policies that preserve the speculative/accumulative model have facilitated the concentration of both land and capital in few hands, producing and exacerbating urban phenomena such as socio-spatial segregation and the occupation of areas at risk by the poorest social groups.

The perpetuation of uneven development patterns has systematically prevented the access to well-located affordable-housing to low-income families who are condemned to live in the city outskirts where prices are attainable. In this regard, one of the paradoxes that emerged from the cross-case analysis is that peripheral areas occupied by informal settlements in the western hills offer better location benefits than social housing in the eastern periphery, shaped by private capital forces -in successive city plans- as the area for developing large-scale complexes. Planning in Cali, therefore, has not been the engine for urban transformation that it is supposed to be, but a tool for preserving land speculation at the expense of the quality of life of the underprivileged.

This particular finding is closely linked to the uneven power relations highlighted in this thesis as another factor influencing the production and persistence of marginality. As shown in this dissertation, a well-established matrix of domination has succeeded in preserving -through urban planning- the spatial separation between White, privileged elites and poor Afro-descendant, Indigenous and Mestizo populations, ensuring the endurance of colonial patterns in city making. This means that the hierarchical system based on racial designation (Hernández, 2017, p. xxi) has been maintained through official mechanisms, which have systematically inhibited both social and racial mixing. As shown in Section 2.1, the more peripheral a sector is, the greater the density of poor Afro-descendant, Indigenous and Mestizo populations, who, in turn, experience the highest rates of poverty, unemployment and violence.

This pattern of racial segregation, that has perpetuated marginal living conditions in the city outskirts, has been reproduced in *Llano Verde*, where ethnic minorities have been confined to a corner of the neighbourhood. Unlike what I found in the case of the settlements of District 18 where racial mixing has been the result of spontaneous dynamics, in the free housing neighbourhood ethno-racial segregation has been the product of ill-conceived government guidelines coupled with the lack of attention by local technocrats to relevant factors such as the racist attitudes that have maintained

minorities marginalised in Cali. In this regard, *Llano Verde* becomes the most recent example of the systemic character that marginality has in Cali, which has permeated both urban planning and government responses to support deprived communities.

However, the maintenance of socio-spatial divisions is not alone in the production of marginality since official mechanisms that preserve a top-down decision-making regime also play an important role. In the case of Cali, the inability of the government to achieve the central objective of participatory planning -giving people a voice- has produced contradictory effects in both formal and informal environments. In the free housing complex, people have assumed a position of passive recipience of initiatives developed by technocrats and many residents seem to have left the fate of the neighbourhood to third parties. The scarce presence of public institutions coupled with the low attachment of beneficiaries to the neighbourhood have favoured the flourishing of gangs and criminal organisations which have taken control over large areas, as shown in Map 13.

In contrast, beyond government frameworks and challenging official participatory channels, communities in the informal settlements have developed tailored participatory tools to achieve common goals. These tools include co-creation and joint work to solve daily issues, which in turn have contributed to increasing community empowerment, territorial attachment and higher levels of coexistence, compared to the formal neighbourhoods built in the *Aguablanca* District. Yet, in spite of the positive results of bottom-up initiatives implemented in informal areas, this approach to city-making has been widely ignored by the government as a valuable practice that can be useful in social housing complexes, where building community bonds *ex-post* has been a difficult task.

In any case, what is crystal clear is that in Cali the objective of making citizen participation in urban planning more inclusive has failed: in state-led planned neighbourhoods because technocrats do not want ‘ordinary people’ to comment on what they consider technical issues, and in unplanned areas because the settlements are not included in the city plan. It is also clear that, regardless of its constitutional status, as long as participation has no binding effects, it will remain a futile mechanism for promoting social justice. From my perspective, under the current conditions of limited participation the government will continue to rely on populist assistance

models such as free housing, informal settlements dynamics will remain isolated initiatives and social policies based on palliative solutions will continue to be the main answer of the government to deescalate emerging conflicts.

Yet, this low profile given to citizen participation in Cali cannot be assumed to be solely as a consequence of the matrix of domination in decision-making at the local level. A final conclusion arising from the analysis is that despite the fact that Article 1 of the Constitution recognises Colombia as a social state of law, promoting decentralisation and local autonomy, the centralised control of financial resources (or subsidies in the case of social housing) has enabled the government to impose state-led programmes such as the '100% subsidised housing' on municipalities. So, preserving the machinery of the elites in power that have succeeded in maintaining the formula *social housing/social justice/economic growth* as the right solution for tackling urban marginality, the state has supported the construction of large amounts of housing units at any social cost.

In this regard, it is worth mentioning that in Colombia, as in many other countries, a close relationship exists between national elites and large construction firms, which is one of the reasons why social housing remains central in politics. Although this aspect was explored in this dissertation in relation to '100% subsidised housing' programme, it deserves further analysis. In this sense, my findings in *Llano Verde* are just an example of the complexity of the issues arising in free housing neighbourhoods, and become the evidence of the failure of projects focused on boosting the economy and supporting political campaigns, which in addition are conceived by national agencies and construction firms both disconnected and oblivious of local realities.

As discussed in the next two sections, urban planning and housing, when well understood and properly used, have a transformative power. The fact that some factors that contribute to the production and perpetuation of marginality are structural does not mean that there are no other possibilities to achieve inclusive cities and more engaged communities in urban affairs. Some examples of these possibilities are presented above.

4.2 Policies versus outcomes

As mentioned in Chapter 1, the Colombian government has formulated a raft of urban planning and housing policies, mainly focused on allocating subsidies to be invested in the real estate market. Between 2012 and 2018 a new, one-time, initiative by the government of President Santos carried out the '100% subsidised housing' programme aimed at breaking the poverty cycle in which extremely poor households and victims of the armed conflict were trapped.

Based on the premise that the free housing programme -widely disseminated as a successful initiative- has produced and even intensified marginality as a counter-intuitive effect, I have resorted to a cross-case analysis in order to compare the living conditions of poor communities in two extreme cases: a '100% subsidised housing' complex and a set of informal settlements in District 18. As my findings suggest, at present marginality is hitting harder families who received a free home in the eastern periphery than families living in the informal settlements of the western hills in District 18.

I found that *Llano Verde* has a fragmented social fabric, determined not only by poverty (a condition shared by all) and race (which affects some residents more than others), but also by the emergence of multiple forms of violence that reproduce the same patterns of gang-led and drug-related conflicts found in neighbouring areas of the *Aguablanca* District. Since the very inception of the project, the government ignored the foreseeable socio-cultural arrangements of ethno-racial segregation, socio-spatial relegation and stigmatisation present in Cali. As a result, these urban phenomena not only emerged but also became amplified in this neighbourhood when victims and perpetrators, ethnic minorities, and an extremely poor population were grouped in this large-scale low-quality housing complex. In contrast, the harsh living conditions of informal settlers, compounded by the exclusion of these areas from the planning apparatus, have been attenuated by strong community bonds and networks of solidarity that have emerged spontaneously, fostering territorial attachment and joint work dynamics that contribute to lessen daily life issues.

The contrasting realities found in the case studies thus unveil the inability of the state and its planners to produce housing solutions for underprivileged urban communities that, beyond a spatial order, are able to foster a social order, encouraging

coexistence, cooperation and productive integration with economic dynamics. In this regard, putting the construction of housing and infrastructure as the main strategy for addressing urban marginality not only fails to counteract adverse living conditions but contributes to producing them. Based on this premise, the next section seeks to sum up the conclusions derived from the analysis of the case studies in the light of urban planning and housing policies.

4.2.1 Urban planning as instrument of social transformation

In Colombia, comprehensive planning has been conceived as an instrument to improve the quality of life of people while ensuring an equitable distribution of opportunities for all (Congreso de Colombia, 1997, p. Article 3). National planning guidelines established in Law 388 of 1997 are implemented in each municipality through the Comprehensive Territorial Plan (POT), which determines the objectives, programmes and projects to be carried out at the city level. In the case of Cali, I found profound contradictions in the POT that led me to question the credibility of the city plan as an instrument for social transformation.

As my findings reveal, the following aspects are not being addressed in a comprehensive manner: 1) social inclusion; 2) the reduction of socio-spatial and ethno-racial segregation; 3) compact urban development; and, 4) environmental sustainability. Though essential for the improvement of living conditions in a city like Cali, these four aspects are not included as specific projects now that the POT is being implemented. While conceding that the materialisation of the plan is a complex endeavour, my contention is that beyond the construction of some housing projects on the city outskirts, other alternatives to counteract the marginal conditions of the urban poor are being overlooked by the municipality; in fact, they are deliberately ignored in some cases. To make matters worse, the POT facilitates urban sprawl, against the desire to implement a compact city model. In order to justify this contradictory move, the municipality argues that there is little serviced land available for housing complexes within the city boundary. As mentioned in Chapter 3, this urban development pattern has produced large residential areas located further and further away from employment nodes, deepening social division, increasing both pendular trips and travel costs.

These contradictory outcomes of the city plan, which generate negative social, environmental and economic impacts, demonstrate that although policies examined in this research advocate for social equity and socio-spatial justice, government actions go against the interest of marginalised communities while favouring economic interests. As we have seen in this study, the resettlement of poor communities in complexes such as *Llano Verde* and *Potrero Grande,* has reinforced the concentration of poor and Afro-descendant communities in the eastern edge of the city, revealing the lack of political will to curb segregation trends. Likewise, we have seen how the planning apparatus has marginalised informal settlers from official mechanisms created to promote local development and citizen participation in urban affairs.

Some conclusions about urban planning policies and actions analysed in this dissertation are the following. Firstly, the spatial dimension of urban equity to promote social equity must transcend the idea of housing-as-justice that has dominated the government discourse. In this direction, I have highlighted in this thesis three key aspects linked to planning that could contribute to promoting social justice at the physical-spatial level: social mixing, a balanced access to basic quality services (public transport included) and accessibility to potential income-generating activities.

Although it seems naive that, in a context characterised by a well-established matrix of domination, social mixing and access to quality services and jobs might be achieved, we must consider that -used properly- urban planning is a powerful tool for curbing socio-spatial disparities. For instance, the regulation of land prices and the use of mechanisms to encourage the development of vacant areas or zones with potential for re-densification, are options that commonly exist in planning laws, which have proven effective in Latin American contexts. Under this kind of scheme, incentives directed to negotiate changes in urban regulations (plot ratio, floor area ratio and land-uses) become effective tools for repopulating areas that have experienced population decline as an opportunity to promote mixed typologies of housing.

Secondly, while it is irrefutable that the successive enlargement of the city growth boundary ensures the availability of land for the construction of new housing, this practice has more negatives than positives. Urban expansion in Cali has produced new forms of marginality since it has been used to maintain social and racial segregation, within a social context based on a social hierarchy. In addition to social and economic

costs, this development pattern has an environmental price that, although widely discussed at the present, has not been sufficiently understood by decision makers to reverse the current trend of land consumption. To environmental effects resulting from pendular trips, we must add the impacts derived from the expansion of the city to agricultural land as well as the occupation of at-risk areas and ecologically fragile zones by the poor when there is not an equitable distribution of land.

The third conclusion is that despite the importance attached to citizen participation in city-making, participatory planning and budgeting processes with no binding effects risk being irrelevant. The limited added value given by the government to participation is paradoxical in cities such as Cali where social leaders and grass-root organisations have developed powerful mechanisms for engaging people in joint projects. Although the elites in power still have an economic and political advantage, citizen mobilisation demanding more inclusive plans and projects is growing fast, and it is no longer limited to low-income social segments demanding basic services coverage. The interest of young people and people in middle-income brackets in influencing decisions about broader topics such as social justice, peace-building, tax revenue investment or the environment is increasing rapidly. In the case of Colombia, with the laws already in favour of citizens, the binding effects of participation and the decentralisation of the urban debate from technical agencies seems to be only a matter of time.

4.2.2 Social housing policies, more than new homes

While neglecting social, cultural and economic aspects, policies designed for the provision of low-income housing have forced communities to resort to their own logic of organisation in order to alleviate pressing needs. Leaving aside formal and spatial explorations that characterised the first decades of the ICT, social housing complexes today are recognised by their poor architectural quality coupled with the prevalence of minimum standards set by the government.

Although the construction of large-scale housing projects ensures economies of scale, this study confirms –along with many studies since the 1960s– that one of the factors that produces and perpetuates marginality is the relegation of disadvantaged communities to remote, poorly-serviced areas. In fact, as a result of inconvenient

locations, land-use regulations, property taxes and low-quality homes, people who may qualify for social housing subsidies have opted to live in informal settlements where plot areas are often more generous and fixed costs are lower. While public actions intended to serve the poor have been focused primarily on building new homes, it is clear that the emphasis of interventions has not been solving fundamental problems. Borrowing the words of Abdumalique Simone, people in substandard homes (government-led housing included) continue to be 'largely maintained in a constant state of suspension, with few bearings or prospects' (Simone, 2011, p. 33). This situation in Cali means living in informal settlements without any governmental support for carrying out upgrading initiatives or receiving free homes in complexes that offer few opportunities for reinforcing bonds of solidarity among neighbours and generating income.

In Colombia, the fact that *housing* is conceived in singular terms, as a right or a need, and in economic terms as a space determined according to the ratio income/cost, implies that housing schemes are homogenised: multiple houses which are all the same, in neighbourhoods with the same urban conditions throughout. However, the city is not (and does not have to be) a place that groups homogeneous populations in homogeneous buildings and land-uses. We have seen how formal and informal transport transform physical-spatial and social dynamics in planned and unplanned areas. These dynamics, produced by spontaneous actions of dwellers who react to poorly-conceived housing policies, are constantly disregarded by technicians and bureaucrats as possible clues for producing more holistic solutions. As a result, state-led projects such as the free housing programme, resulting from an operative/financial logic of efficiency and low-cost, ends by producing marginal urban environments.

Within this framework, a first conclusion about housing policies based on the study of the two cases is that when the benefits of strategic location can be easily translated in economic terms, speculative real estate markets start to operate. In highly unequal societies land speculation becomes a major determinant in the city plan for defining the spots for developing social housing. What we have seen is that places selected for the construction of social housing are predominantly peripheral and even prone to natural hazards, regardless of the consequences of inconvenient locations for vulnerable populations. Sometimes the location of social housing becomes so

disadvantageous that, as my findings suggest, some informal settlements occupy more strategic places in the city than state-led housing complexes.

Hence, a good location makes a big difference in terms of proximity and connectivity, which results in greater access to public transport, goods, services and job opportunities. As the analysis of employment/unemployment in Cali shows, although people living in informal areas are often victims of stigmatisation by place of residence, this barrier is not insurmountable when accessibility and mobility are ensured. Conversely, when an urban area is already stigmatised or labelled as 'poor', 'dangerous' or 'violent' and people there also struggle with low levels of connectivity and poor transport service, it is more likely that access to jobs and good-quality services is more restricted.

Secondly, although it seems clear that Colombian society approves state-led housing programmes, what is less evident is the constellation of unwanted effects that ill-conceived projects produce. The recurrence of the government to housing typologies that have failed to break the cycle of poverty and marginality denotes that the state, its planners, policy makers and developers are not working to ensure a better city for all, but in less altruistic aspects such as efficiency, economic growth and profit in through the housing production.

In the same vein, a final point that emerges from this dissertation is the persistence of barriers that prevent the materialisation of alternative social housing schemes. In addition to upgrading processes mentioned in previous chapters, other options such as the implementation of subsidies for buying second-hand homes, long-term commodatum, leasing agreements or collective land have been barely explored. Some of these options imply moving away from the idea that housing ownership is the only possibility.

4.3 Final remarks

The disadvantaged position in which specific social groups are placed as a result of uneven relations of power and racist attitudes supports my argument that urban development in Colombia has not necessarily been the product of urban planning strategies for achieving social justice, but rather the consequence of a well-established

matrix of domination. At national level, the fact that the housing deficit has been reduced while the Gini coefficient has increased (see Graph 2) poses more questions than answers. Likewise, the lack of long-term strategies targeted at helping families to overcome extreme poverty, coupled with the poor-quality social housing that has been developed over the last decades, demonstrates the weaknesses of policies in ensuring a better quality of life for all.

In a country like Colombia, which for more than half a century has been the scene of violent confrontations linked to social injustice, political confrontations and drug trafficking, it is noteworthy that decent housing is not being seen by the government as a fundamental component of the agenda for peace-building. In addition to the lack of guidelines regarding urban housing in the Peace Accords signed with the FARC guerrillas in 2016, there are significant contradictions in public policies on housing involving ethnic minorities and victims of the armed conflict. As an example, in the last decade the government proposed both the *Programa de Restitución de Tierras* (Land restitution programme), which assists the return of displaced people to their territories and, at the same time, it introduced the '*100% subsidised housing'*. The latter programme compels victims to live for at least ten years in the cities to which they moved after being forcibly expelled from their territories. These facts further reinforce the idea that the common denominator of urban planning and housing policies in Colombia continues to be half measures implemented without success, which have contributed to producing and perpetuating the marginal conditions of vulnerable communities.

At the municipal level, this research reveals that seven decades after the first urban plan was designed for Cali, and almost two decades after the most recent planning tool, the POT, was passed by the City Council, major issues are not being fully addressed. Apart from the laudable intentions and partial achievements of the last two mayors, the political and economic forces devoted to preserving the *status quo* continue to hold the power needed to privilege individual interests over collective ones. As a result, socio-spatial divisions based on markers of disadvantage such as class, ethnicity and race have been deepened, land prices continue to be led by the market, the illegal occupation of environmentally protected areas has increased, and the quality of life of the urban poor is not showing radical improvement. This situation is

compounded by diverse forms of violence arising in the city which hit disadvantaged communities the hardest, in particular Afro-descendant people.

The wrong approach of policies and programmes implemented has been such that, as revealed in this dissertation, living conditions in social housing and particularly in the case of free housing, become more complex and difficult than in the informal settlements. From this overall result arises the conclusion that the two questions that have governed urban policies in Colombia for decades, housing-as-justice and achieving spatial order through urban planning, have become major drivers of urban marginality. In order to foster a real transformation, essential for the construction of peace, there must be a paradigm shift. This change implies that the government and its planners gain a comprehensive understanding of the causes of problems and include communities in the search for solutions.

Although relevant changes could take years of effort, political will and social struggle, the academic endeavour of this research represents an attempt to provoke further discussion about urban marginality in the hope that it might impact the way in which public policies and government actions taken to counteract this phenomenon are conceived and implemented.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A. RESEARCH METHODS

Urban marginality has been defined in this research as a multidimensional phenomenon resulting from the combination of several factors, of which five have been highlighted and defined conceptually in Chapter 2. Given the complexity of measuring these kinds of factors, I drawn upon a *mixed research method* which combines secondary information gathered from official statistics, government reports and local academic investigations with primary data obtained through in-depth semi-structured interviews, direct observations, a survey and mapping activities carried out in Cali during a twelve-month period. Each of the methods and relevant information used in this research are described below.

- **Analysis of secondary data**

This study includes secondary data from 19 sources (see Table A1). Firstly, to support the quantitative analysis of the new forms in which urban marginality manifests itself in the case studies, I have drawn on government statistics and surveys, official documents published by the Municipality of Cali and confidential databases provided by municipal agencies. In addition, I have had access to data from research projects developed by professors from local universities.

Table A1 Synthesis of secondary sources

NATIONAL LEVEL
National Census - DANE, 2005.
Saber 11 test results - Ministry of Education, 2016.
Beneficiaries of the '100% subsidised housing' programme in Cali. Ministry of Housing, 2013.
National Institute of Forensic Medicine and Forensic Sciences (INMLCF, historical series).
Crime statistics – National Police (historical series).

MUNICIPAL LEVEL
SISBEN Survey, 2017.
Employment and Quality of Life Survey (EECV), 2013.
Database *Psychosocial Care and Integral Health Programme for Victims of the Armed Conflict*, 2017.
Crime statistics – Metropolitan Police and *Observatorio Social, Alcaldía de Cali* (historical series).
Local statistics (*Cali en Cifras*, historical reports).
Tree density, air and water pollution (DAGMA, 2015 to 2017).
BRT routes (MetroCali, 2017).
Beneficiaries of the '*Plan Jarillón*'.

LOCAL UNIVERSITIES, NGOs, GUILDS AND REAL ESTATE MARKET
Published and unpublished studies on residential segregation, race and ethnicity in Cali - CIDSE, Universidad del Valle.
Published and unpublished studies on violence in Cali - CISALVA Institute, *Universidad del Valle.*
Carvajal Foundation. Census, 2010.
Registered enterprises database - Chamber of Commerce of Cali.
Land prices in Cali. Society of Appraisers of Cali, 2012.
Social housing supply in the real estate market (real estate magazines and websites).

Source: Synthesis developed by the author.

Secondly, as explained in Chapter 3, I have selected an array of national and municipal policies on planning and housing for an analysis of the case studies in the light of the four inherent characteristics of urban marginality (see Table A2).

Table A2 Synthesis of policies selected for in-depth analysis

NATIONAL LEVEL	
Law 387 of 1997	Adopted measures to prevent forced displacement as well to protect and support internally displaced populations to recover economic stability.
Law 388 of 1997	Determined the obligation for all municipalities to formulate and implement a Comprehensive Territorial Plan (POT). It expanded previous alternatives for ensuring land for social housing and regulated financial mechanisms to achieve an equitable distribution of burdens and benefits in urban development.
Decree 879 of 1998	Established the deadline and procedures for municipalities to approve their comprehensive plans.
Decree 951 of 2001	Regulated Law 387 of 1997 in relation to housing subsidies for displaced people.
Decree 3450 of 2009	Regulated the Family Housing Subsidy linked to Macro-projects of National Social Interest, giving priority to people displaced by the armed conflict.

Decree 2060 of 2004	Defined minimum standards for social housing in urban areas. This regulation established that lots for single-family housing should have a minimum area of 35m^2, for two-family housing 70m^2 and for apartment blocks 120m^2.
Law 1537 of 2012	Promulgated the regulations to promote access to affordable housing. In its Article 12° it established the possibility of providing in-kind subsidies to households in extreme poverty. Thus, this law is the legal framework for the '100% subsidised housing' programme.
Decree 1921 of 2012	Regulated the methodology for the selection of potential beneficiaries of the '100% subsidised housing' programme.
Decree 075 of 2013	Established the percentages of land that must be left by developers to build social housing in new projects as well as in areas for urban renewal programmes.
Decree 847 of 2013	Established the responsibilities of the beneficiaries of the '100% Subsidised Housing' programme.
Decree 2481 of 2014	Modified Article 4° of Decree 847 of 2013 referring to the obligations of the beneficiaries of the '100% subsidised housing' programme by clarifying that regulations regarding land use depend on the norms defined by the Comprehensive Plans of each municipality.
Decree 428 of 2015	Established the social housing programme 'My home now' aiming to benefit 30,000 families between 2015 and 2018.
Decree 1077 of 2015	Included all the regulations concerning subsidies, territorial and housing plans, building norms, risk management and land use guidelines. Also, standards for public space and regulations for legalisation of informal settlements.
Law 1757 of 2015	Established the guidelines for the promotion and protection of the right to democratic participation.
Decree 528 of 2016	Created the National System of Social Support and Social Infrastructure for the '100% subsidised housing' programme. The main objectives of this initiative were to reduce the risks generated by residential relocation and to promote coexistence among beneficiaries.
Law 1848 of 2017	Established the regulations for formalisation, titling and recognition of buildings in urban settlements.

Source: Synthesis developed by the author.

MUNICIPALITY OF CALI

Agreement 01 of 1996	Established rules regarding the structure of the municipal administration.
Decree 1548 of 1995	Established the rules for administrative decentralisation at municipal level, defined responsibilities and created the process for allocation of fiscal resources.
Decree 203 of 2001	Defined the structure of municipal administration and included specific regulations on citizen participation as well as on the offices of the municipality to be in charge of participation processes. Also, it established procedures for participatory budgeting at district level.
Decree 22 of 2007	Established the regulatory framework for the Local Planning Committees.

Agreement 326 of 2012	Adopted the Municipal Development Plan for the government of Mayor Rodrigo Guerrero between 2012-2015.
Agreement 373 of 2014	Adopted the Comprehensive Territorial Plan (POT).
Agreement 396 of 2016	Adopted the Municipal Development Plan for the government of Mayor Maurice Armitage between 2016-2019.
Agreement 404 of 2016	Created the municipal subsidy for social housing.
Agreement 411 of 2017	Adopted the Public Policy of Habitat Upgrading called 'MI-Habitat' in order to promote the implementation of upgrading and legalisation programmes established in the POT.

Source: Synthesis developed by the author.

- **In-depth, semi-structured interviews**

During fieldwork I conducted 70 in-depth semi-structured interviews with different actors. This research method, defined by Barlow (2009) as 'conversations with purpose and direction', requires previous knowledge of the issues to be addressed. For this reason, I started this phase after engaging in informal conversations and tours around the study areas during the first two months. As a first step, I contacted the Carvajal Foundation because that organisation has been working in social development in the informal settlements of District 18 for a decade and for the past two years in *Llano Verde*. The Foundation provided preliminary information and introduced me to the most well-known community leaders who became an entry point into both territories. Once the first exploratory interviews had been conducted, it was possible to identify four stakeholder groups to be interviewed: community members, national and municipal officials and former officials, academics of local universities and Carvajal Foundation staff.

During the remaining ten months of this phase, I conducted interviews with 36 community members from both study areas, 23 officials and former officials of the national and municipal governments, seven academics from local universities, the three coordinators of the Social Development Team of the Carvajal Foundation in charge of programmes in Districts 15 and 18, and the former director of social housing of the Foundation. For ethical purposes all the interviewees were informed of the objectives of the research and all participants agreed to the audio recording of conversations. The duration of interviews ranged between 20 minutes and 2.5

hours and all of them were transcribed and analysed in the light of the four inherent characteristics of urban marginality.

• **Community members:** Given the diversity of issues to be addressed, this group was divided into two parts. The first was made up of presidents and key members of the Community Action Boards and social leaders who attend official meetings about participatory planning on a regular basis. People from this first group were asked about their experiences with regard to their own neighbourhood in terms of living conditions, participation in decision-making, projects carried out through community initiatives. The second group was composed of representatives of ethnic minorities or vulnerable groups who were asked about social dynamics involving discrimination and violence as well as government programmes tackling these issues.

The initial plan was to ask the same series of questions in both study areas, starting with a general question about the arrival of the person in the neighbourhood. In the informal settlements, this opening question elicited positive stories, with interviewees describing the almost heroic achievement of building a neighbourhood without government assistance. However, in the first interview conducted in *Llano Verde*, the participant became visibly distressed and tearful when asked the same question. As *Llano Verde* was built with the main purpose of hosting victims of the armed conflict, memories of the circumstances under which residents arrived are painful. Thus, it was necessary to change the order of the questionnaire and to introduce a number of variations to reflect the sensitivity of the topic.

It is worth mentioning that, while the pace of work was fluid in the informal settlements of District 18, fieldwork in *Llano Verde* were only possible after four months of introductory approaches to leaders and residents who gradually opened up to allow further study.

• **National and Municipal officials:** Interviews with officials and former officials of the national government and the municipality of Cali were aimed at eliciting their personal opinions concerning the implementation of housing and planning policies. At the national level, this group included officials from the

Ministry of Housing and of the Social Prosperity Department of the Presidency. At the local level, the group included the former mayor of Cali, the Municipal Comptroller and a group of local officials of the DAPM, the Secretariat of Social Housing, DAGMA, the Secretariat of Public Health and a former official of Plan Jarillón. Finally, at the district level, I interviewed the two directors of the Integrated Local Administration Centres (CALI) of Districts 15 and 18 as well as the mentors and police officers working on the municipal programme for the social reintegration of gang members.

• **Carvajal Foundation staff:** The Foundation has played a key role in the implementation of social programmes in the two study areas. Therefore, I contacted the managers of the social development team to ask them about their experiences with communities as well as their perception of public policies versus local practices in two specific scenarios. The first, *Llano Verde*, where they were commissioned in 2016 by the Ministry of Housing to implement a two-year social development programme. The second, the informal settlements of District 18 where, for a decade, they have carried out projects through crowdfunding with almost no financial assistance from the municipality. In addition, I interviewed the former director of Carvajal's social housing programme, an expert in affordable housing and social development.

• **Academics:** A grasp of the opinions of academics in the fields of architecture, urbanism, sociology, urban violence, economics and environment, was fundamental in understanding phenomena associated with urban marginality from a broader perspective. Using a previous review of papers and reports produced in local universities, I selected a group of professors and researchers who have carried out research on housing and planning policies, environmental issues and risk, ethno-racial and residential segregation as well as criminal violence and coexistence.

- **Participant and non-participant observation**

The scrutiny of secondary sources, coupled with interviews and regular visits to the study areas, enabled the identification of formal and informal spaces that revealed particular dynamics between policies, official mechanisms for their

implementation and day-to-day practices. To capture relevant information, I used participant and non-participant observation as a third research method, with a view to gaining a more nuanced understanding of internal social and economic dynamics in both cases.

· **Participant observation:** By using this research approach, the researcher sought to study human interactions and behaviours through direct contact in the field (Domenico & Phillips, 2009). In the present study, this method has proved useful for understanding how activities promoted by local leaders contribute to strengthening or weakening community bonds. After asking about communal activities carried out in both sectors, I was invited to participate in the *Carnaval por la paz* and in the *Biblio-Casa*. Engaging in these activities made it possible to enter sectors of the neighbourhoods that would otherwise have been closed and to have a series of informal conversations with organisers and participants.

· **Overt non-participant observation:** This method enabled the researcher 'to enter a social system to observe events, activities, and interactions' thus getting a picture of particular dynamics in their natural context (Liu & Maitlis, 2009). In this study, non-participant observation focused on understanding four community spaces created by the municipality for citizen participation in territorial planning. Attending these meetings, with the consent of leaders and city officials, made it possible to learn about the interaction between the municipality and community representatives but, more than that, to examine the impact of participation in decision making.

- Local Planning Committees (CPL): Following the presentation of this study to the directors of the Local Administration Centres of Districts 15 and 18, I was introduced to the members of the CPL who allowed me to attend their meetings as a permanent guest during 2017. In District 15 the committee holds meetings every two weeks and in District 18 the committee meets weekly.
- Mayor's strategy *'Los territorios progresan contigo'*: Using this strategy, Mayor Maurice Armitage attempts to learn first-hand about citizens' concerns by holding three annual meetings with the community of each district between 5.30 and 8.30am. Despite the early hour, these meetings are extremely well

attended by people for whom this is the sole opportunity to speak directly to the municipal authorities.

· Annual Audit Meeting, Municipal Comptroller of Cali: During annual meetings the Municipal Comptroller's Office presents, in each district, the results of their audit regarding local planning. This audit seeks to verify the fulfilment of goals set out in each Local Development Plan and the expenditure of financial resources allocated through participatory budgeting.

· Interinstitutional Committee of *Llano Verde*: This committee, composed of twelve government agencies, the Metropolitan Police and community leaders, aims to put into practice the social development initiatives that are carried out in *Llano Verde*. It was created in 2014 as a strategy for supporting new residents in building community bonds after the emergence of problems of coexistence in the neighbourhood.

· **Covert non-participant observation:** I also employed covert non-participant observation as a means of collecting primary data on informality, related to housing, income-generation and transport. Carrying out covert non-participant observation was necessary given that in Colombia there is a thin line between legality and illegality when referring to informality and people involved in such activities feel threatened by external observers.

It should be mentioned that in *Llano Verde,* the identification and recorded of extensions of the houses and the presence of informal businesses was possible by using Google Street View (updated in Cali up until 2016) followed by a random verification of data in the neighbourhood. Conversely, in the informal settlements, the identification of informal activities was possible by walking freely through the area. Although targeted groups were not aware of my observations, social leaders and Community Action Boards had been made aware of the research method and had agreed to covert non-participant observation as the best option for collecting this kind of data. When use of a camera was not considered to be safe, members from the community provided good quality images of informal activities in each sector.

- **Survey**

The survey research method was considered the most appropriate instrument to know the views of community leaders appointed to the Local Planning Committees on the effectiveness of participation channels at the district level. Based on my observations at these meetings four central aspects of local planning decision-making were defined, to be explored with the CPL members in further depth.

· Rules governing the CPL: ten questions were included to check the general knowledge of and compliance to the mission, goals and procedures of the CPL established by Decrees 203 of 2001 and 022 of 2005.

· Planned projects versus implemented projects: five questions were incorporated to scrutinise what was planned by the committee, versus what was implemented by the municipality.

· Contracting process and monitoring implementation: participation of members in the procurement processes to implement the projects, and monitoring of activities, was explored through four questions. This part of the survey included a query about the factors that set barriers preventing some CPL members from monitoring projects in progress.

· Institutional response: Since participatory planning was encouraged by the municipality, six questions in the survey inquire about communication channels and institutional responses to the requirements and recommendations made by members of the CPL.

Once the questionnaire was completed, I conducted the survey during the last session of the two committees, which was held in the first week of December 2017, making it clear that the survey was anonymous. All members who attended the committees in both Districts agreed to participate. In District 15 a total of 21 people (81 per cent of the total members) answered the survey and in District 18 this number was 25 people (80 per cent of the total members).

- **Mapping**

Since this study uses a mixed research method, mapping represents an indispensable tool for data collection and comparative analysis. It makes it possible to contrast policies with the reality found in the study areas as well as visualising

the spatial distribution of raw data obtained through secondary sources that have never been georeferenced in relation to the map of Cali. In this research, even though using a Geographic Information System (GIS) facilitated the georeferencing of official data, I tried to push the limits further by using this tool as an instrument to create new cartography that interprets -and explains- the territory from multiple perspectives. This was possible because the mixed research approach enabled me to gather and geo-position information obtained through qualitative methods.

Developing the cartographic bases for the two areas of study posed a number of challenges. In the case of *Llano Verde*, the detailed cadastre was not incorporated into the maps of the city because the neighbourhood was recently built. Therefore, I requested digital maps from the private developer -*Constructora Bolívar*- and incorporated the information in the geodatabase of Cali (Figure A1). Finally, I compared the map with the aerial photograph from Google Earth in order to update the information on public spaces and facilities that were built in recent years.

Figure A1 Cadastral mapping process in *Llano Verde*

1

2

3

4

Plan Jarillón

'100% subsidised housing' Programme

Source: (1) Geodatabase of Cali. (2) Google-Earth, 2016. (3-4) Developed by the author through photogrammetric restitution and field reconnaissance.

In District 18, detailed information about the study area was not available, while information about informal settlements is not incorporated into the official cartography at the cadastral level. These aspects are registered in the maps as large grey polygons without land divisions. Hence, I resorted to photogrammetric restitution and field reconnaissance in order to create the geodatabase of the case study. It is worth mentioning that while my cartography has enough information for the purposes of this research, it was not developed with survey-grade precision (Figure A2).

Figure A2 Cadastral mapping process in informal settlements

Source: (1) Geodatabase of Cali. (2) Google-Earth, 2016. (3-4) Developed by the author through photogrammetric restitution and field reconnaissance.

APPENDIX B. INTERVIEW GUIDES BY STAKEHOLDER GROUP

1) COMMUNITY MEMBERS

Leaders and presidents of Community Action Boards in Llano Verde (District 15)

I. Initiatives and joint work
· How did you become a leader of this community?
· What kind of initiatives are you or the Community Action Board promoting to improve the quality of life in Llano Verde?
· Which institutions or people support these projects?
· Relationship with the municipal government.
· Relationship with other leaders of Llano Verde.
· Obstacles to taking those projects forward.
· Results of the projects carried out.

II. Living in Llano Verde:
· Tell me the story of your arrival at Llano Verde.
· How long have you lived here?
· Do you like living in Llano Verde?
· How would you describe everyday life here?
· If there were to be another free housing programme in Colombia, what do you think the government could improve with respect to what was done in Llano Verde?

III. Participation in decision-making:
· What spaces for citizen participation do you attend?
· Has the municipality considered the opinions and proposals expressed by the community in these spaces opened for participation?
· General opinion on citizen participation and the institutions that lead these kinds of activities in Cali.

IV. Stigmatisation:
· What do outsiders think about this neighbourhood?
· How did the neighbours in other sectors (Córdoba and Morichal) receive you when you arrived here?
· Have you had specific experiences in which you were discriminated against or stigmatised for living in Llano Verde?
* Only for Afro-descendant leaders: Have you experienced episodes of discrimination or stigmatisation for being Afro-descendant?

V. Expectations for the future:

· Have you ever thought about leaving the neighbourhood after the period of ten years established by the government as a requirement for receiving a free home?

Leaders and presidents of Community Action Boards in informal settlements (District 18)

I. Introduction:

· Tell me the story of your arrival at (name of the neighbourhood).
· How long have you lived here?
· Do you like living in this District and this neighbourhood?
· How would you describe everyday life in District 18?

II. Initiatives and joint work:

· How did you become a leader of this community?
· What projects have you or the Community Action Board promoted to improve the quality of life here?
· Which institutions or people support these projects?
· Relationship with the municipal government.
· Relationship with other leaders of Llano Verde.
· Obstacles to taking those projects forward.
· Results of the projects carried out.

III. Participation in decision-making:

· What spaces for citizen participation do you attend?
· Has the municipality considered the opinions and proposals expressed by the community in relation to the spaces opened for participation?
· General opinion on citizen participation and the institutions that lead these kinds of activities in Cali.

IV. Stigmatisation:

· What do outsiders think about this sector?
· Have you had specific experiences in which you were stigmatised for living in an informal settlement?

V. Expectations for the future:

· Have you ever thought about leaving the neighbourhood?
· If there was a relocation programme, would you move to one of the projects offered by the municipality?

Representatives of minorities or vulnerable groups

I. Characteristics of the group (context):

· What group do you represent?
· How many people approximately belong to this group?

II. Leadership, institutional support and role in the Local Planning Committee:
· How did you become the leader of this group?
· What kind of initiatives are you working on to improve the quality of life of the people that make up (name of the group)?
· From which institutions do you receive support?
· Have you ever received resources to carry out a project submitted to the Local Planning Committee?
· What have been the achievements of that or those projects?
· What kind of barriers have you encountered that have prevented you from taking forward the initiatives proposed by the group?

People working with youth at risk

I. Introduction:
· For how long have you been working with young people of this neighbourhood?
· Why you are interested in working with at-risk youth, particularly drug addicts and gang members?

II. 'Integral Support for Vulnerable Youth of Cali' (gang members) programme:
· How did you become the community liaison between the programme and the members of the gang in your neighbourhood?
· How many young people have been included in the programme?
· Activities that you carry out with them.
· Strengths and weaknesses of the programme.
· Results (reduction of drug consumption and internal violence).
· With regard to the methodology of this programme, what do you think the municipality should improve?

Gang members

I. Becoming a member of the gang:
· At what stage of your life did you decide to join the group?
· Reasons that led you to become a member of the group.
· Was it easy to be admitted?
· Activities carried out by the group.
· What have been the positive and the negative aspects of belonging to the group?

II. 'Integral Support for Vulnerable Youth of Cali' programme:
· Why did you decide to be part of the programme?
· What do the members of the group who did not want to enter the programme think about the decision you made to be part of it?
· Activities performed as a member of the programme.
· Do you enjoy these activities?
· What are the main things you have learned from this experience?

· What is your opinion about the programme and what would you propose to improve it?
· If the municipality prolongs the programme until next year, are you willing to continue?

2) NATIONAL AND MUNICIPAL OFFICIALS

Ministry of Housing – Neighbourhood Upgrading programme

I. Introduction:
· Goals of the programme, and mechanisms deployed by the Ministry to support municipalities willing to legalise and upgrade informal neighbourhoods.
· Investment of the current government in upgrading initiatives versus investment in new social housing complexes.
· Processes of legalisation and titling in the municipalities.

II. The case of Cali:
· What was your personal experience in Cali when presenting the upgrading neighbourhood programme within the municipality?
· What have you achieved so far?

III. Citizen participation:
· How is citizen participation encouraged in the processes supported by the Ministry?
· What have you learned from these processes?

IV. '100% Subsidised Housing "programme:
· What is your opinion about the free housing programme?

Ministry of Housing – '100% subsidised housing' programme

I. Introduction:
· Goals of the '100% Subsidised Housing' programme and strategies carried out by the Ministry of Housing to implement this initiative.
· Do you consider that the national government achieved these goals?

II. Methodology:
· Allocation of housing quotas to municipalities.
· Selection of private developers for building the housing complexes.
· Selection of beneficiaries.

III. Requirements for private developers:
· Spaces and infrastructures additional to the houses.
· Financial and technical capacity.
· Relationship with the beneficiaries.

IV. Spaces for the participation of beneficiaries:
· Did you open spaces for the participation of beneficiaries, to allow them to express their opinions on the architectural designs of their homes?

Social Prosperity Department – Presidency of the Republic

I. Introduction:
· Role of the Social Prosperity Department within the '100% subsidised housing' programme.
· Relationship between Social Prosperity and the Ministry of Housing during the execution of the programme.
· Your role as a member of the support team and the time you have worked with the programme.

II. The '100% subsidised housing' programme:
· Do you think that the programme has been successful in fulfilling the goal of improving the quality of life of victims of the armed conflict and families in extreme poverty?

III. Selection of beneficiaries:
· What do you think about the way in which the government managed the selection of beneficiaries?
· Do you think there was corruption or politicization within the beneficiary selection process?
· What do you think about the fact that the location of the beneficiaries in the neighbourhoods was made through a ballot system?

IV. The neighbourhoods:
· What is your opinion about the architectural typologies of the housing complexes?
· What do you think about the location?
· What have been the main social issues that have emerged in the neighbourhoods?
· In your personal experience, what do you think are the causes of these problems?
· What were the strategies implemented by the government to deal with problematic issues and how were they integrated with the work of municipalities?
· What would you recommend to improve the free housing programme?

V. Political impact:
· Do you think that this initiative was a political platform for the current presidential candidate Germán Vargas Lleras, former Minister of Housing and former Vice-President?

Former mayor of Cali

I. <u>National programmes:</u>
· In relation to the housing programmes launched by the national government, what kind of issues has your administration had to deal with in order to implement them?
· With regard to the case of *Llano Verde*, what were the main challenges that your administration had to assume before and after receiving this housing complex from the national government?

II. <u>Municipal policies:</u>
· Do you consider that housing and urban planning policies could exacerbate urban marginality?
· Do you consider that this is currently happening in the case of Cali?
· What should be modified in housing and planning policies to achieve better results?

Current and former officials of the government of Cali

I. <u>Opinion about housing and planning policies put into operation in Cali:</u>
· Comprehensive Territorial Plan and Strategic Housing Plan.
· Recent housing policies and programmes designed to improve the quality of life of disadvantaged families.
· Do you think that urban development in Cali has produced a segregated city? If the answer is yes, do you think that current policies contribute to perpetuating this segregationist pattern?

II. <u>Implementation:</u>
· Achievements and shortcomings of the implementation of social housing projects.
· Institutional articulation.
· What do you think about the expansion of the supply of social housing from Cali to neighbouring municipalities?
· Do you consider that there are housing and urban planning policies that have the unintended effect of creating barriers which prevent people from overcoming marginality? If the answer is yes, what kind of barriers?
· Possible alternatives to reduce urban marginality in Cali.

III. <u>'100% subsidised housing' programme:</u>
· Programme's successes and failures.
· Challenges that the government of Cali had to assume before and after the national government delivered the houses of *Llano Verde* to beneficiaries.
· How could this programme be improved?

IV. <u>Scenarios for citizen participation</u>:
· Regarding the formulation of housing and planning policies, do you consider that the scenarios created for citizen participation are effective?
· Do you think that in the case of Cali citizen participation has been influenced by

politicians?
· Have the initiatives proposed by the communities in the participation processes promoted by (name of the office he or she represents) been included in the plans and programmes of the municipality?

Directors of Integrated Local Administration Centres (CALI)

I. Introduction:
· What is an Integrated Local Administration Centre (CALI) and how is it linked to the administrative structure of Cali?
· What is the role of the CALI in terms of local planning and allocation of participatory budgets?

II. The Local Planning Committee (CPL):
· Members of the committee.
· Annual programme of work.
· Is the CPL only open to representatives of formal neighbourhoods, or are members of the informal settlements allowed to attend?
* (If representatives of the informal settlements attend) Have they a voice and a vote at the CPL?
· What is the methodology used to define the projects that will be presented to the Municipal Administration for the allocation of financial resources?
· When the annual budgeting is defined by DAPM, are the initiatives presented by the communities taken into account?
· Do you consider that politicians have influenced decisions taken at the CPL?
· Do you think that the CPL is an effective tool to implement initiatives that improve the quality of life of the inhabitants of this district?
· What would you suggest to improve the Committee's work?

III. Projects carried out through participatory budgeting:
· What kinds of projects have been proposed by communities throughout the CPL in this district?
· Do these projects have a visible impact on the territory?
· Does the Committee monitor the execution of the projects?

* Only for District 15:
· Has the construction of the free housing complex, *Llano Verde*, had some impact on District 15?
· Are the issues of this sector addressed in the Committee's discussions?

Mentors and police officers working at the 'Integral Support for Vulnerable Youth of Cali' programme

I. General information about the programme:
· For how long have you been officially involved in this programme?
· Do you have previous work experience with at-risk youth?
· With how many gangs are you currently working, and how many people decided to enter the programme in each of them?

II. Methodology:
· What is the methodology implemented to carry out the programme?
· What do you think about this methodology and what would you suggest to improve it?
· Main challenges, achievements and difficulties in the implementation of this initiative.

III. The youngsters involved:
· What strategies did you use to convince gangs members to participate in this initiative?
· What is the profile of the youngsters with whom you are working?
· What kind of activities do you carry out with them?
· During the meetings in their territory, what is the attitude of gang members who did not agree to enter the programme?
· What is next for beneficiaries when the programme ends?

3) CARVAJAL FOUNDATION STAFF

Team managers of social development programmes in District 15 and District 18

I. The Carvajal Foundation initiatives:
· What kind of projects are the Carvajal Foundation currently carrying out in (District 15 or District 18)?
· Do you receive support from any governmental agency?
· Have you managed to integrate your work with other initiatives currently undertaken by local government in this sector?
· What have been your main achievements and failures while working in this sector?

II. Citizen participation:
· How difficult has it been working in this sector compared to your previous experiences of the Carvajal Foundation in other areas of Cali?
· Do you think the leaders of this sector represent the interests of the community?
· Do they work as a team to achieve common goals?

· What do you think about the work of the Community Action Board (or Boards) in this sector?
· Do you consider that the mechanisms for participation, particularly Local Planning Committees, are well conceived and operate efficiently?

III. Clientelism and patronage:
· Do you consider that people in this sector are used by politicians through client/patron practices to promote their political careers?
· How do the dynamics of leaders and communities operate during campaigns for general elections?

* Only for the team manager of the project in *Llano Verde*:
· Why did the Ministry of Housing decide to finance a social development programme in *Llano Verde* and why did they commission the Carvajal Foundation to carry it out?
· Considering that the Ministry of Housing is financing this project only for beneficiaries of the '100% subsidised housing' programme, how have you dealt with the fact that in *Llano Verde* there are almost 800 families relocated from the *Plan Jarillón* who also face social issues?

* Only for the team manager of the project in the informal settlements of District 18:
· Do you think there is a particular interest of DAPM and the Housing Secretary in working to improve the quality of life of people living in the informal settlements of District 18?

4) ACADEMICS FROM LOCAL UNIVERSITIES

Housing and planning policies / ethnic studies

I. Opinion about housing and planning policies put into operation in Cali:
· Comprehensive Territorial Plan and Strategic Housing Plan.
· Recent housing policies and programmes designed to improve the quality of life of disadvantaged families.
·Do you think that urban development in Cali has produced a segregated city?
* If the answer is yes, do you think that current policies contribute to perpetuating this segregationist pattern?

II. Implementation:
· What do you think about the expansion of the supply of social housing for Cali to neighbouring municipalities?
· Do you consider that there are housing and urban planning policies that have the unintended effect of creating barriers which prevent people from overcoming marginality?
* If the answer is yes, what kind of barriers?
· Possible alternatives to reduce urban marginality in Cali.

III. ‘100% subsidised housing’ programme:

· Programme's successes and failures.

· Challenges that the government of Cali had to assume before and after the national government delivered the houses of *Llano Verde* to beneficiaries.

· How could this programme be improved?

IV. Scenarios for citizen participation:

· Regarding the formulation of housing and planning policies, do you consider that the scenarios created for citizen participation are effective?

· Do you think that in the case of Cali citizen participation has been influenced by politicians?

Environmental quality:

I. Environmental quality in Cali

· What are the biggest environmental issues in Cali and what are the agents that are causing them?

II. Opinion about housing and planning policies put into operation in Cali:

· Comprehensive Territorial Plan and Strategic Housing Plan.

· Recent housing policies and programmes designed to improve the quality of life for disadvantaged families.

III. Environmental policies and institutional articulation:

· Do you think that the public policies that operate in Cali to protect and improve the environment are well conceived?

· What are the obstacles to implementing these policies faced by the municipality?

Coexistence, violence and crime:

I. Criminal violence in Cali

· In your opinion, why has Cali been repeatedly presented in the media as the most violent city in the country?

· Why, despite the interest of the municipal administration in reducing criminal violence, has a significant reduction in homicide and crime rates not been achieved, as it has in cities like Bogota and Medellin?

· What kinds of initiatives to reduce violence and crime have generated positive results in Cali?

II. Violence and ethnicity:

· In your research, have you explored the reasons why *Aguablanca* District is one of the areas with the highest rates of homicides and aggravated assault?

· Do you think there is a correlation between race and rates of violence?

III. ‘Integral Support for Vulnerable Youth of Cali’ programme

· Do you know this programme?

· What is your overall opinion of this initiative?

APPENDIX C. SURVEY – LOCAL PLANNING COMMITTEES

*Author's translation from original in Spanish

1. How long have you attended the Local Planning Committee? Years [ ] Months [ ]

2. Are you:
   a) President of the Community Action Board ___
   b) Delegate of the Local Administrative Board ___
   c) Representative of social or community association ___ Which one? _____
   d) Other ___ Which one? ___________________

3. The planning authority at the district level is:
   a) The Local Administrative Board (JAL) ___
   b) The Community Action Boards (JAC) ___
   c) The Local Planning Committee ___
   d) The head of the Integrated Local Administration Centre (CALI) ___

4. The Committee can meet without reaching half plus one of its members:
   a) Always ___
   b) Only in the case of a second meeting, convened due to the lack of quorum ___
   c) Never ___

5. Answer "true" (T) or "false" (F) for each statement:

	T	F
The mission of the Committee includes the possibility of raising funds with private institutions		
The members of the JAL have a voice and vote in the Local Planning Committee		

6. Which of the following statements about the Committee are true? (Multiple options can be listed):
   a) It promotes the participation of the whole community during the formulation of plans, programmes and projects __
   b) This is a space where problems of the District are deeply analysed __
   c) The prioritisation of problems afflicting the community is agreed __
   d) The head of the CALI is supported in planning the territory __
   e) The Committee is the context in which the development and annual investment plans are formulated in order to achieve a comprehensive development __
   f) An active participation of the community is achieved, optimizing efforts and resources __
   g) Agreed projects and actions are monitored __
   h) Actions supported contribute to achieving equality and equity __
   i) Territorial planning responds to the needs of the different population groups __
   j) Common good prevails over individual interests __

7. According to the following statements related to procedures carried out to formulate the Annual Investment Plan, please rate how much you agree or disagree.

1 means agree
2 means neither agree nor disagree
3 means disagree

	1	2	3
In allows any citizen to make contributions			
It contributes to satisfying the most pressing needs of the communities			
The allocation of resources is equitable			
It is a transparent process			
It promotes respectful treatment among the members of the Committee			

8. During the term January-December 2016, did you submit any proposal to be executed with resources from the tax revenues? Yes___ No___

9. Was your proposal approved? Yes___ No___

If the previous answer was YES, please answer question 10. If your answer was NO, please go to question 13.

10. In 2016 the project was implemented:
    a) As formulated ___
    b) With partial modifications ___
    c) It was completely modified ___
    d) It was not implemented ___

Please answer questions 11 and 12 ONLY if you chose options b or c in the previous question.

11. The project was modified:
    a) Totally ___
    b) Partially ___
    c) The modification was minimal ___

12. With the modification, the original problem
    a) Was completely solved ___
    b) Was partially solved ___
    c) It was not solved ___

13. As a Committee member, have you monitored the implementation of a project?
    Yes __ No__

If your answer was YES, please answer 14 and 15. If your answer was NO, please go to question 16.

14. What project or projects did you monitor? ________________________

15. If you made recommendations to the Municipality, were those recommendations considered to have resulted in a concrete action?

a) Totally ___
b) Partially ___
c) The recommendations were not addressed ___

16. Which of the following factors have made it difficult for you to monitor the implementation of projects? (Multiple options can be listed)

a) Lack of time ___
b) There is no project in which I feel able to express my opinion ___
c) It is not easy to communicate with the municipal agencies in charge of the implementation of the projects ___
d) I do not believe that the monitoring activities carried out by the members of the Committee are reflected in the activities of the municipality ___

17. In processes related to the implementation of the Annual Investment Plan, have you made any request or recommendation to any agency of the municipal government? Yes__ No__

If you answer was YES, please go to questions 18 and 19. If your answer was NO, please go to question 20.

18. What channels of communication have you used? (Multiple options can be listed)

a) Website of the municipality ___
b) E-mail ___
c) Went to the office ___
d) Land line call ___
e) Cell phone call to the official in charge___
f) WhatsApp message to the official in charge ___

19. Was your request or recommendation considered?

a) Totally ___
b) Partially ___
c) The request or recommendation was not addressed ___

20. During meetings with the mayor through the strategy *"Cali progresa contigo"*, have you made any kind of request or recommendation? Yes___ No___

If your answer was YES,

21. Was your request or recommendation considered?

a) Totally ___
b) Partially ___
c) The request or recommendation was not addressed ___

22. If your request was addressed (totally or partially), what was the response time? ___

APPENDIX D. STATISTICS PER DISTRICT

VULNERABLE HOUSEHOLDS																							
VARIABLE	Districts																						CALI
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	
SISBEN III average scores	42.62	38.11	37.03	47.16	58.28	52.03	47.11	49.37	36.09	42.41	49.13	46.70	45.28	45.29	45.10	45.11	46.07	42.4	42.07	38.41	48.44	48.92	45.6
Households in SISBEN III	12988	2830	6733	11036	10799	34305	17249	17969	7624	8097	18101	14648	40723	42482	30517	22640	662	23455	2168	18618	30525	181	374350
Households in SISBEN III* (%)	3,5%	0,8%	1,8%	2,9%	2,9%	9,2%	4,6%	4,8%	2,0%	2,2%	4,8%	3,9%	10,9%	11,3%	8,2%	6,0%	0,2%	6,3%	0,6%	5,0%	8,2%	0,0%	·
Households in extreme poverty	1959	653	2095	1207	371	2249	1825	1741	2221	1221	1551	1437	4901	4545	3790	2428	75	3894	331	3990	2663	18	45165
Households in extreme poverty** (%)	4,3%	1,4%	4,6%	2,7%	0,8%	5,0%	4,0%	3,9%	4,9%	2,7%	3,4%	3,2%	10,9%	10,1%	8,4%	5,4%	0,2%	8,6%	0,7%	8,8%	5,9%	0,0%	·

*Percentages calculated on the basis of the total number of households in SISBEN III. **Percentages calculated on the basis of the total number of households with scores below 23.4.

EDUCATION																							
VARIABLE	Districts																						CALI
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	
Net primary schooling rate	88,2%	86,0%	68,4%	78,1%	72,2%	83,2%	81,4%	83,5%	82,4%	96,6%	75,7%	87,3%	84,4%	75,3%	77,8%	78,7%	80,5%	77,2%	83,1%	81,8%	85,0%	81,8%	81,1%
Net secondary schooling rate	64,0%	76,0%	71,8%	79,0%	72,7%	75,6%	76,6%	84,1%	66,7%	75,7%	75,6%	75,8%	69,2%	70,3%	67,3%	66,7%	76,6%	83,3%	84,5%	60,7%	69,6%	84,8%	73,5%
Net higher education schooling rate	9,4%	24,7%	19,3%	16,7%	16,7%	13,6%	10,7%	20,7%	13,8%	22,8%	16,0%	14,1%	8,2%	7,9%	6,6%	8,3%	45,6%	16,0%	40,2%	3,5%	2,8%	50,0%	15,7%
High school + higher education	34,3%	65,9%	40,4%	48,4%	57,3%	44,3%	42,0%	48,9%	46,3%	48,4%	43,2%	35,5%	33,9%	29,7%	35,8%	39,3%	68,9%	46,9%	69,8%	31,4%	36,6%	72,7%	45,5%

UNEMPLOYMENT																							
VARIABLE	Districts																						CALI
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	
Unemployment rate	17,4%	9,0%	12,8%	16,5%	15,3%	16,0%	19,0%	15,5%	12,9%	15,1%	18,0%	11,8%	16,9%	17,0%	19,4%	15,6%	8,9%	16,6%	8,8%	19,0%	18,0%	1,8%	**15,1%**

APPENDIX E. PERFORMANCE INDICATORS TIO STRATEGY

Component	Indicator	Unit	Baseline	Target	Performance	Compliance percentage
Social intervention	Multidimensional poverty	%	32	15.7	12	81.%
	Proportion of people below the poverty line	%	25.1	21.5	16.5	239%
	Homicide of young people in areas where TIO operate	Number	630	483	516	78%
	Families that benefit from the programmes for overcoming extreme poverty	Number	53,000	58,000	56,616	72%
	Infant mortality in Districts 1, 3, 13, 14, 15, 20 and 21	Rate per 1,000 live births	D1: 16.4	14.1	9.5	300%
			D3: 14.8	12.4	8.7	254%
			D13: 12.5	11.4	10.7	163%
			D14: 12.6	11.4	11.4	100%
			D15: 12.7	11.4	9.2	269%
			D20: 13.3	11.6	7.1	364%
			D21: 16.0	14.1	9.3	352%
	Births to women aged under 20 in Districts 13, 14, 15, 20 and 21	%	D13: 25.1	22.6	20.5	184%
			D14: 26.6	24.4	21.6	227%
			D15: 26.4	24.4	21.3	255%
			D20: 29.8	27.7	20.7	433%
			D21: 25.8	24.0	25.1	39%
	Organisations of at-risk youth linked to reintegration programmes (gangs)	Number	20	75	52	58%
Environments for life	TIO with deteriorated environments recovered with community participation	Number	0	10	9	90%
	TIO that comply with sanitary, environmental and safety quality	Index	3.5	10	9	85%
	Aedic index in the TIO (ratio of homes in which Aedes Aegypti mosquito was found)	Index	3.1	<4	0.9	100%
Justice and community coexistence	Homicide cases	Number	1,151	927	951	89%
	Conflicts resolved by a commissar	%	58	70	89	127%
	Thefts registered	Number	5,661	4,529	4,285	122%

Performance: Excellent (100% or more) Good (between 75% and 99%) Regular (below 75%)

Source: Table by the author based on data from the evaluation report PDM 2012-2015 (Alcaldía de Cali, 2016a, p. 124).